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Examples of permissions working within native applications to develop use cases for permissions on the web

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Use Cases & Requirements for Permissions for Geolocation on the Web

Examples of permissions working within native applications to develop use cases for permissions on the web.

Introduction

There is a growing mountain of evidence that some government and commercial institutions have exploited software, hardware, and laws to undermine individuals’ fundamental human right to privacy. In the worst cases, misuse of personal information has led to serious privacy violations: individuals unjustly find themselves deprived of access to goods, services, or even employment because an institution has violated their privacy – without any avenue for recourse. Where privacy has been erroneously violated, as in the case with mistaken identity or human error, it can take months or even years for an individual to have the damage undone. In more severe cases, individuals have found themselves incarcerated for exercising their human right of freedom of expression. This as a direct result of commercial entities providing personally identifiable information to law enforcement agencies of countries that have little or no respect for human rights. In some states, such as the United States, individuals have virtually no legal right to control, modify, or access data about themselves; nor can they see who can access that data, or who that data is being sold to (and for what purpose). Bottom line is: because of the Internet our privacy and reputation is more at threat than at any other time in human history.

The roll-out of “advanced Web APIs”, which is really an euphemism for APIs that access device capabilities and other personally identifiable data, will add more data that needs to be carefully protected by all those involved: the public, businesses, browser makers, standards setting bodies, operating system vendors, hardware manufacturers, and law makers. A balance needs to be struct between adhering with local and international laws, protecting the rights of individuals, and being able to conduct business across the globe.

Use Cases

Common issues occuring within use cases and use cases are given below.

Common Issues

When conducting this use case analysis it was found that a number of privacy and UX related issues continued to be occur:

  • Time duration: the permission alert / process gave no idication of how long the permission will remain in an not active or active state.
  • How data is being used: the permissions alert / process gave no indication of how the user's data would be used, and whether this would be sent to a third party, or who these third parties are.
  • Geolocation Provider: the permissions alert / process gave no indication of who the provider of the geolocation data is, or how to change this.
  • Prompt is Modal: the user cannot fully view or interact with the underlying application to make an assessment of what the application might do with the positioning data, without first rejecting geolocation access to the website.
  • No Revoke: If a user changes their mind about allowing location services, there is usually no way for them to revoke geolocation access without either quitting the application, uninstalling the application, or finding some other convoluted way to revoke access to geolocation services (e.g., having to globally disable location services on the device through the “Settings” menu).
  • Clear Origin: it is not clear which origin is requesting the geolocation data.

Use Cases derived from Native Applications

Here is a collection of geolocation permissions flows from a number of high profile native applications featured in iOS and Android application stores.

In the book, The Future of Reputation: Gossip, Rumor, and Privacy on the Internet, Solove [2] argues that privacy can be evaluated in terms of confidentiality, accessibility, and control. I define these terms with the following questions:

  • Accessibility: Are options and information pertaining to privacy accessible to the end-user?
  • Control: Given the accessibility to privacy options, how much control does the system afford the end-user over privacy settings?
  • Confidentiality: Does the system afford to the end-user anonymity or alternative means of protecting their privacy?

iOS

Android

Use Cases derived from Mobile Browsers

Chrome

Safari

Internet Explorer

Firefox

Opera

Classification of Methods

The examples above show a range of differenct permissions model methods. These can be classified as follows:

  • Information Bar: (describe info bar now if it still exists, and whether it is modal or non, displays t&c or not etc.)
  • Activity Indicators and Controls: (describe any indicators, in address bar or otherwise, and whether icon or indicator is clickable)

Other Issues

Click Through: modal confirmation dialog lead to ‘click fatigue’: whereby users simply become accustomed to clicking “OK” to every prompt without grasping the consequences of their actions

Privacy policies buried: “Settings” menu of the iPhone, under the “Legal” option, which contains about 50 pages of legalese and no searchable index!

Requirements

  1. Browsers must avoid confirmation dialogs that don’t allow users to make informed decisions
  2. Digital signatures must be only used to verify data integrity and verify continuity of authorship, and should not exclusively be used as a means of enabling APIs.
  3. Where device capabilities are required by applications, those capabilities must be declared by the author up-front. Where capabilities are declared and potentially affect a user’s privacy, the system must provide a user interface to view which capabilities will be used by an application.
  4. Where necessary, standards bodies must mandate that conforming user agents provide user interfaces that give end-users access and control over their privacy.
  5. Where it makes sense, it must be possible to change providers – particularly third-party providers. And where the provider is a third party, the provider’s privacy policy must be accessible and intrinsically linked in the user interface.
  6. Communication between the provider and the client must be encrypted, particularly in the case of third-party providers.
  7. Browser vendors must work together to reach de facto or de jure standardization of iconic activity indicators (as has effectively been achieved with the padlock indicator for secure communication).
  8. Policy and law makers should work with the public to come up with more accessible privacy policies (i.e., like the creative commons icons, but for privacy policies).
  9. When it comes to storing privacy choices that an end-user has made, such as which provider to use, those choices should be treated as sensitive data and appropriately secured via, for example, cryptographic means. End user’s should be informed of any attempt by a third party to temper with their choices.

User Privacy Controls

List requirements

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Examples of permissions working within native applications to develop use cases for permissions on the web

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