🚨 [security] [ruby] Update rails-html-sanitizer 1.6.0 → 1.6.1 (patch)

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🚨 Your current dependencies have known security vulnerabilities 🚨

This dependency update fixes known security vulnerabilities. Please see the details below and assess their impact carefully. We recommend to merge and deploy this as soon as possible!

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Here is everything you need to know about this update. Please take a good look at what changed and the test results before merging this pull request.

What changed?

↗️ rails-html-sanitizer (indirect, 1.6.0 → 1.6.1) · Repo · Changelog

Security Advisories 🚨

🚨 rails-html-sanitize has XSS vulnerability with certain configurations

Summary

There is a possible XSS vulnerability with certain configurations of Rails::HTML::Sanitizer 1.6.0 when used with Rails >= 7.1.0 and Nokogiri < 1.15.7, or 1.16.x < 1.16.8.

• Versions affected: 1.6.0
• Not affected: < 1.6.0
• Fixed versions: 1.6.1

Please note that the fix in v1.6.1 is to update the dependency on Nokogiri to 1.15.7 or >= 1.16.8.

Impact

A possible XSS vulnerability with certain configurations of Rails::HTML::Sanitizer may allow an attacker to inject content if HTML5 sanitization is enabled and the application developer has overridden the sanitizer's allowed tags in either of the following ways:

• allow both "math" and "style" elements
• or allow both "svg" and "style" elements

Code is only impacted if Rails is configured to use HTML5 sanitization, please see documentation for config.action_view.sanitizer_vendor and config.action_text.sanitizer_vendor for more information on these configuration options.

Code is only impacted if allowed tags are being overridden. Applications may be doing this in a few different ways:

1. using application configuration to configure Action View sanitizers' allowed tags:

# In config/application.rb
config.action_view.sanitized_allowed_tags = ["math", "style"]
# or
config.action_view.sanitized_allowed_tags = ["svg", "style"]

see https://guides.rubyonrails.org/configuring.html#configuring-action-view

2. using a :tags option to the Action View helper sanitize:

<%= sanitize @comment.body, tags: ["math", "style"] %>
<%# or %>
<%= sanitize @comment.body, tags: ["svg", "style"] %>

see https://api.rubyonrails.org/classes/ActionView/Helpers/SanitizeHelper.html#method-i-sanitize

3. setting Rails::HTML5::SafeListSanitizer class attribute allowed_tags:

# class-level option
Rails::HTML5::SafeListSanitizer.allowed_tags = ["math", "style"]
# or
Rails::HTML5::SafeListSanitizer.allowed_tags = ["svg", "style"]

(note that this class may also be referenced as Rails::Html::SafeListSanitizer)

4. using a :tags options to the Rails::HTML5::SafeListSanitizer instance method sanitize:

# instance-level option
Rails::HTML5::SafeListSanitizer.new.sanitize(@article.body, tags: ["math", "style"])
# or
Rails::HTML5::SafeListSanitizer.new.sanitize(@article.body, tags: ["svg", "style"])

(note that this class may also be referenced as Rails::Html::SafeListSanitizer)

5. setting ActionText::ContentHelper module attribute allowed_tags:

ActionText::ContentHelper.allowed_tags = ["math", "style"]
# or
ActionText::ContentHelper.allowed_tags = ["svg", "style"]

All users overriding the allowed tags by any of the above mechanisms to include (("math" or "svg") and "style") should either upgrade or use one of the workarounds.

Workarounds

Any one of the following actions will work around this issue:

• Remove "style" from the overridden allowed tags,
• Or, remove "math" and "svg" from the overridden allowed tags,
• Or, downgrade sanitization to HTML4 (see documentation for config.action_view.sanitizer_vendor and config.action_text.sanitizer_vendor for more information)
• Or, independently upgrade Nokogiri to v1.15.7 or >= 1.16.8.

References

• CWE - CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting') (4.9)
• Original report: https://hackerone.com/reports/2503220

Credit

This vulnerability was responsibly reported by HackerOne user @taise.

🚨 rails-html-sanitizer has XSS vulnerability with certain configurations

Summary

There is a possible XSS vulnerability with certain configurations of Rails::HTML::Sanitizer 1.6.0 when used with Rails >= 7.1.0.

• Versions affected: 1.6.0
• Not affected: < 1.6.0
• Fixed versions: 1.6.1

Impact

A possible XSS vulnerability with certain configurations of Rails::HTML::Sanitizer may allow an attacker to inject content if HTML5 sanitization is enabled and the application developer has overridden the sanitizer's allowed tags in the following way:

• the "math" and "style" elements are both explicitly allowed

Code is only impacted if Rails is configured to use HTML5 sanitization, please see documentation for config.action_view.sanitizer_vendor and config.action_text.sanitizer_vendor for more information on these configuration options.

The default configuration is to disallow these elements. Code is only impacted if allowed tags are being overridden. Applications may be doing this in a few different ways:

1. using application configuration to configure Action View sanitizers' allowed tags:

# In config/application.rb
config.action_view.sanitized_allowed_tags = ["math", "style"]

see https://guides.rubyonrails.org/configuring.html#configuring-action-view

2. using a :tags option to the Action View helper sanitize:

<%= sanitize @comment.body, tags: ["math", "style"] %>

see https://api.rubyonrails.org/classes/ActionView/Helpers/SanitizeHelper.html#method-i-sanitize

3. setting Rails::HTML5::SafeListSanitizer class attribute allowed_tags:

# class-level option
Rails::HTML5::SafeListSanitizer.allowed_tags = ["math", "style"]

(note that this class may also be referenced as Rails::Html::SafeListSanitizer)

4. using a :tags options to the Rails::HTML5::SafeListSanitizer instance method sanitize:

# instance-level option
Rails::HTML5::SafeListSanitizer.new.sanitize(@article.body, tags: ["math", "style"])

(note that this class may also be referenced as Rails::Html::SafeListSanitizer)

5. setting ActionText::ContentHelper module attribute allowed_tags:

ActionText::ContentHelper.allowed_tags = ["math", "style"]

All users overriding the allowed tags by any of the above mechanisms to include both "math" and "style" should either upgrade or use one of the workarounds.

Workarounds

Any one of the following actions will work around this issue:

• Remove "math" or "style" from the overridden allowed tags,
• Or, downgrade sanitization to HTML4 (see documentation for config.action_view.sanitizer_vendor and config.action_text.sanitizer_vendor for more information).

References

• CWE - CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting') (4.9)
• Original report: https://hackerone.com/reports/2519941

Credit

This vulnerability was responsibly reported by So Sakaguchi (mokusou).

🚨 rails-html-sanitizer has XSS vulnerability with certain configurations

Summary

There is a possible XSS vulnerability with certain configurations of Rails::HTML::Sanitizer 1.6.0 when used with Rails >= 7.1.0.

• Versions affected: 1.6.0
• Not affected: < 1.6.0
• Fixed versions: 1.6.1

Impact

A possible XSS vulnerability with certain configurations of Rails::HTML::Sanitizer may allow an attacker to inject content if HTML5 sanitization is enabled and the application developer has overridden the sanitizer's allowed tags in the following way:

• the "math", "mtext", "table", and "style" elements are allowed
• and either "mglyph" or "malignmark" are allowed

Code is only impacted if Rails is configured to use HTML5 sanitization, please see documentation for config.action_view.sanitizer_vendor and config.action_text.sanitizer_vendor for more information on these configuration options.

The default configuration is to disallow all of these elements except for "table". Code is only impacted if allowed tags are being overridden. Applications may be doing this in a few different ways:

1. using application configuration to configure Action View sanitizers' allowed tags:

# In config/application.rb
config.action_view.sanitized_allowed_tags = ["math", "mtext", "table", "style", "mglyph"]
# or
config.action_view.sanitized_allowed_tags = ["math", "mtext", "table", "style", "malignmark"]

see https://guides.rubyonrails.org/configuring.html#configuring-action-view

2. using a :tags option to the Action View helper sanitize:

<%= sanitize @comment.body, tags: ["math", "mtext", "table", "style", "mglyph"] %>
<%# or %>
<%= sanitize @comment.body, tags: ["math", "mtext", "table", "style", "malignmark"] %>

see https://api.rubyonrails.org/classes/ActionView/Helpers/SanitizeHelper.html#method-i-sanitize

3. setting Rails::HTML5::SafeListSanitizer class attribute allowed_tags:

# class-level option
Rails::HTML5::SafeListSanitizer.allowed_tags = ["math", "mtext", "table", "style", "mglyph"]
# or
Rails::HTML5::SafeListSanitizer.allowed_tags = ["math", "mtext", "table", "style", "malignmark"]

(note that this class may also be referenced as Rails::Html::SafeListSanitizer)

4. using a :tags options to the Rails::HTML5::SafeListSanitizer instance method sanitize:

# instance-level option
Rails::HTML5::SafeListSanitizer.new.sanitize(@article.body, tags: ["math", "mtext", "table", "style", "mglyph"])
# or
Rails::HTML5::SafeListSanitizer.new.sanitize(@article.body, tags: ["math", "mtext", "table", "style", "malignmark"])

(note that this class may also be referenced as Rails::Html::SafeListSanitizer)

5. setting ActionText::ContentHelper module attribute allowed_tags:

ActionText::ContentHelper.allowed_tags = ["math", "mtext", "table", "style", "mglyph"]
# or
ActionText::ContentHelper.allowed_tags = ["math", "mtext", "table", "style", "malignmark"]

All users overriding the allowed tags by any of the above mechanisms to include ("math" and "mtext" and "table" and "style" and ("mglyph" or "malignmark")) should either upgrade or use one of the workarounds.

Workarounds

Any one of the following actions will work around this issue:

• Remove "mglyph" and "malignmark" from the overridden allowed tags,
• Or, downgrade sanitization to HTML4 (see documentation for config.action_view.sanitizer_vendor and config.action_text.sanitizer_vendor for more information).

References

• CWE - CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting') (4.9)
• Original report: https://hackerone.com/reports/2519936

Credit

This vulnerability was responsibly reported by So Sakaguchi (mokusou).

🚨 rails-html-sanitizer has XSS vulnerability with certain configurations

Summary

There is a possible XSS vulnerability with certain configurations of Rails::HTML::Sanitizer 1.6.0 when used with Rails >= 7.1.0.

• Versions affected: 1.6.0
• Not affected: < 1.6.0
• Fixed versions: 1.6.1

Impact

A possible XSS vulnerability with certain configurations of Rails::HTML::Sanitizer may allow an attacker to inject content if HTML5 sanitization is enabled and the application developer has overridden the sanitizer's allowed tags in the following way:

• the "style" element is explicitly allowed
• the "svg" or "math" element is not allowed

Code is only impacted if Rails is configured to use HTML5 sanitization, please see documentation for config.action_view.sanitizer_vendor and config.action_text.sanitizer_vendor for more information on these configuration options.

The default configuration is to disallow all of these elements. Code is only impacted if allowed tags are being overridden. Applications may be doing this in a few different ways:

1. using application configuration to configure Action View sanitizers' allowed tags:

# In config/application.rb
config.action_view.sanitized_allowed_tags = ["style"]

see https://guides.rubyonrails.org/configuring.html#configuring-action-view

2. using a :tags option to the Action View helper sanitize:

<%= sanitize @comment.body, tags: ["style"] %>

see https://api.rubyonrails.org/classes/ActionView/Helpers/SanitizeHelper.html#method-i-sanitize

3. setting Rails::HTML5::SafeListSanitizer class attribute allowed_tags:

# class-level option
Rails::HTML5::SafeListSanitizer.allowed_tags = ["style"]

(note that this class may also be referenced as Rails::Html::SafeListSanitizer)

4. using a :tags options to the Rails::HTML5::SafeListSanitizer instance method sanitize:

# instance-level option
Rails::HTML5::SafeListSanitizer.new.sanitize(@article.body, tags: ["style"])

(note that this class may also be referenced as Rails::Html::SafeListSanitizer)

5. setting ActionText::ContentHelper module attribute allowed_tags:

ActionText::ContentHelper.allowed_tags = ["style"]

All users overriding the allowed tags by any of the above mechanisms to include "style" and omit "svg" or "math" should either upgrade or use one of the workarounds.

Workarounds

Any one of the following actions will work around this issue:

• Remove "style" from the overridden allowed tags,
• Or, downgrade sanitization to HTML4 (see documentation for config.action_view.sanitizer_vendor and config.action_text.sanitizer_vendor for more information).

References

• CWE - CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting') (4.9)
• Original report: https://hackerone.com/reports/2519936

Credit

This vulnerability was responsibly reported by So Sakaguchi (mokusou).

🚨 rails-html-sanitizer has XSS vulnerability with certain configurations

Summary

There is a possible XSS vulnerability with certain configurations of Rails::HTML::Sanitizer 1.6.0 when used with Rails >= 7.1.0.

• Versions affected: 1.6.0
• Not affected: < 1.6.0
• Fixed versions: 1.6.1

Impact

A possible XSS vulnerability with certain configurations of Rails::HTML::Sanitizer may allow an attacker to inject content if HTML5 sanitization is enabled and the application developer has overridden the sanitizer's allowed tags in the following way:

• the "noscript" element is explicitly allowed

Code is only impacted if Rails is configured to use HTML5 sanitization, please see documentation for config.action_view.sanitizer_vendor and config.action_text.sanitizer_vendor for more information on these configuration options.

The default configuration is to disallow all of these elements. Code is only impacted if allowed tags are being overridden. Applications may be doing this in a few different ways:

1. using application configuration to configure Action View sanitizers' allowed tags:

# In config/application.rb
config.action_view.sanitized_allowed_tags = ["noscript"]

see https://guides.rubyonrails.org/configuring.html#configuring-action-view

2. using a :tags option to the Action View helper sanitize:

<%= sanitize @comment.body, tags: ["noscript"] %>

see https://api.rubyonrails.org/classes/ActionView/Helpers/SanitizeHelper.html#method-i-sanitize

3. setting Rails::HTML5::SafeListSanitizer class attribute allowed_tags:

# class-level option
Rails::HTML5::SafeListSanitizer.allowed_tags = ["noscript"]

(note that this class may also be referenced as Rails::Html::SafeListSanitizer)

4. using a :tags options to the Rails::HTML5::SafeListSanitizer instance method sanitize:

# instance-level option
Rails::HTML5::SafeListSanitizer.new.sanitize(@article.body, tags: ["noscript"])

(note that this class may also be referenced as Rails::Html::SafeListSanitizer)

5. setting ActionText::ContentHelper module attribute allowed_tags:

ActionText::ContentHelper.allowed_tags = ["noscript"]

All users overriding the allowed tags by any of the above mechanisms to include "noscript" should either upgrade or use one of the workarounds.

Workarounds

Any one of the following actions will work around this issue:

• Remove "noscript" from the overridden allowed tags,
• Or, downgrade sanitization to HTML4 (see documentation for config.action_view.sanitizer_vendor and config.action_text.sanitizer_vendor for more information).

References

• CWE - CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting') (4.9)
• Original report: https://hackerone.com/reports/2509647

Credit

This vulnerability was responsibly reported by HackerOne user @taise.

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by 51 commits:

• version bump to v1.6.1
• doc: update CHANGELOG with assigned CVEs
• Combine the noscript/mglyph prevention blocks
• Merge branch 'h1-2509647-noscript' into flavorjones-2024-security-fixes
• Merge branch 'h1-2519936-mglyph-foster-parenting' into flavorjones-2024-security-fixes
• Merge branch 'h1-2519936-foreign-ns-confusion' into flavorjones-2024-security-fixes
• Merge branch 'h1-2503220-nokogiri-serialization' into flavorjones-2024-security-fixes
• doc: update CHANGELOG
• fix: disallow 'noscript' from safe lists
• fix: disallow 'mglyph' and 'malignmark' from safe lists
• dep: bump Nokogiri dependency to address the foreign style issue
• Merge pull request #194 from rails/flavorjones-bundle-update-20241130
• dev: bundle update
• doc: update CHANGELOG for #188
• fix: Namespace confusion when disallowing 'svg' or 'math'
• test: Nokogiri's HTML5 "foreign style serialization" issue
• Merge pull request #193 from rails/dependabot/bundler/rexml-3.3.9
• build(deps-dev): bump rexml from 3.3.6 to 3.3.9
• Merge pull request #191 from seanpdoyle/patch-1
• Update README.md
• Merge pull request #189 from rails/dependabot/bundler/rexml-3.3.6
• build(deps-dev): bump rexml from 3.3.5 to 3.3.6
• Merge pull request #188 from rails/flavorjones-minimize-operations
• Do not scrub removed attributes
• Do not scrub attributes on a removed node
• Merge pull request #187 from rails/flavorjones-20240813-bundle-update
• dep(dev): bundle update
• Merge pull request #185 from rails/flavorjones-dep-update-nokogiri
• dep: update nokogiri in Gemfile.lock
• Merge pull request #184 from rails/dependabot/bundler/rexml-3.2.8
• build(deps-dev): bump rexml from 3.2.6 to 3.2.8
• Merge pull request #182 from trevorrjohn/main
• Small simplification
• Merge pull request #180 from dogweather/patch-1
• Update sanitizer.rb: add <mark> to safe list
• Merge pull request #179 from rails/flavorjones-dep-bundle-update-20240409
• dep: bundle update
• Merge pull request #178 from rails/dependabot/bundler/rack-3.0.9.1
• build(deps-dev): bump rack from 3.0.8 to 3.0.9.1
• Merge pull request #177 from jweir/ruby-version-cleanup
• Remove checks for Ruby versions no longer supported
• Merge pull request #176 from m-nakamura145/update-checkout-action
• Update latest checkout action version
• Merge pull request #173 from rails/flavorjones-gemfile-lock
• Merge pull request #174 from rails/flavorjones-202401-rubocop-update
• track Gemfile.lock
• Merge pull request #175 from akhilgkrishnan/bump-versions-in-workflow
• Bump action/checkout and ruby version in workflow
• style: update rubocop config to match latest rails config
• Merge pull request #172 from m-nakamura145/update-ci-matrix
• Add Ruby 3.3 to CI matrix

✳️ nokogiri (1.16.7 → 1.16.8) · Repo · Changelog

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by 4 commits:

• version bump to v1.16.8
• fix: escape foreign style tag content when serializing HTML5 (v1.16.x) (#3349)
• doc: update CHANGELOG
• fix: escape foreign style tag content when serializing HTML5

↗️ loofah (indirect, 2.22.0 → 2.23.1) · Repo · Changelog

Release Notes

2.23.1

2.23.1 / 2024-10-25

Added

• Allow CSS properties min-height and max-height. [#288] @lazyatom

Full Changelog: v2.23.0...v2.23.1

2.23.0

2.23.0 / 2024-10-24

Added

• Allow CSS property min-width. [#287] @lazyatom

New Contributors

• @m-nakamura145 made their first contribution in #280
• @lazyatom made their first contribution in #287

Full Changelog: v2.22.0...v2.23.0

Does any of this look wrong? Please let us know.

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by 15 commits:

• version bump to v2.23.1
• Merge pull request #288 from lazyatom/add-min-height-and-max-height-to-safelist
• Allow CSS properties: min-height, max-height
• version bump to v2.23.0
• Merge pull request #287 from lazyatom/allow-css-min-width
• Allow CSS property: min-width
• Merge pull request #286 from flavorjones/flavorjones-fix-rubocop
• style(rubocop): Gemspec/AddRuntimeDependency
• dep(dev): pin rubocop
• Merge pull request #281 from m-nakamura145/update-checkout-action
• Bump actions/checkout
• Merge pull request #280 from m-nakamura145/update-ci-matrix
• Add Ruby 3.3 to CI matrix
• doc: canonical contributor list in README
• doc: say thank you to @getsentry

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