text oo grover paper

draft-iab-bias-workshop-report.md

@@ -160,7 +160,8 @@ The censorship reports, with a focus on Asia, and specifically India, as well as
 
 {{SAMSUDIN}} reported on confirmed blocking form 10 countries (Cambodia, Hong Kong (China), India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Vietnam) in the period from 1 July 2022 to 30 June 2023. The blocking was either confirmed by OONI measurements for existing blocking fingerprints, heuristics i.e. for new blocking fingerprints as well as news reports of blocking orders or user experiences. Most of these countries block specific contents such as porn, gambling, or certain news pages. Interesting the block in Hong Kong and Myanmar is focused on mililtary and governmental page from forgein countries. Blocking often realized by either DNS tampering or HTTP tampering. For DNS, either a decided IP address, a Bogon IP address (127.0.0.1) or an empty domain (nxdomain) is used. In case DNS tampering using a decided IP address or HTTP tamoering some countries provide block page that exposed the blocking, however, more transparency about blocking applied to requested by civil society organisations and the iMAP project.
 
-{{GROVER}} further fosuced the discussion on online censorship in India, Pakistan and Indonesia.
+{{GROVER}} further fosuced the discussion on online censorship in India, Pakistan and Indonesia. In India, where providers are resonsible to implement the blocking but no method is mandated, the six mayor ISPs (covering 98.82% of all subscribers) were tested on 4379 blocked websites (based on courts orders, user reports, and publicably available or leaked governement orders) on DNS poisoing/injection or HTTP/SNI-based censorship. Used censorship techniques and websites blocked were different between ISPs. Only one ISP used SNI-based blocking. Multiple ISPs used two different technqiues (depending on the website), and all but one provide censorship notices. Providers blocked between 1892 to 3721 (of 4379) pages with only 1115 (27.64%) of pages blocked by all ISPs. In constract, e.g. in Parkistan the government can also order the IPSs to perform blocking, and blocking as even been observed in the past on IXP leven, however, since 2020 there is also a central Web Monitoring System deployed. In Indonesia initially the governement provided guidance to ISP, however, the regulation was updated in 2020 and now allows Indonesian ISPs to block websites on their own discretion. But there was also in 2022 a proposal to centralise DNS. In Indonesia the block is is publicly available but without any indication why something is blocked.
+
 
 
 Further, the possibility and prevalence for using VPNs for circumvention has been discussed including user expectation and an analysis of security short-comings of commercial VPN services. This analysis has shown various problems that lead to data leaks, not upholding user expectations especially when used in authoritarian regimes for censorship circumvention or private communication.