Bump step-security/harden-runner from 2.9.1 to 2.13.2

[dependabot]

Bumps step-security/harden-runner from 2.9.1 to 2.13.2.

Release notes

Sourced from step-security/harden-runner's releases.

v2.13.2

What's Changed

• Fixed an issue where there was a limit of 512 allowed endpoints when using block egress policy. This restriction has been removed, allowing for an unlimited number of endpoints to be configured.
• Harden Runner now automatically detects if the agent is already pre-installed on a custom VM image used by a GitHub-hosted runner. When detected, the action will skip reinstallation and use the existing agent.

Full Changelog: step-security/harden-runner@v2.13.1...v2.13.2

v2.13.1

What's Changed

• Graceful handling of HTTP errors: Improved error handling when fetching Harden Runner policies from the StepSecurity Policy Store API, ensuring more reliable execution even in case of temporary network/API issues.

• Security updates for npm dependencies: Updated vulnerable npm package dependencies to the latest secure versions.

• Faster enterprise agent downloads: The enterprise agent is now downloaded from GitHub Releases instead of packages.stepsecurity.io, improving download speed and reliability.

Full Changelog: step-security/harden-runner@v2.13.0...v2.13.1

v2.13.0

What's Changed

• Improved job markdown summary
• Https monitoring for all domains (included with the enterprise tier)

Full Changelog: step-security/harden-runner@v2...v2.13.0

v2.12.2

What's Changed

Added HTTPS Monitoring for additional destinations - *.githubusercontent.com Bug fixes:

• Implicitly allow local multicast, local unicast and broadcast IP addresses in block mode
• Increased policy map size for block mode

Full Changelog: step-security/harden-runner@v2...v2.12.2

v2.12.1

What's Changed

• Detection capabilities have been upgraded to better recognize attempts at runner tampering. These improvements are informed by real-world incident learnings, including analysis of anomalous behaviors observed in the tj-actions and reviewdog supply chain attack.
• Resolved an issue where the block policy was not enforced correctly when the GitHub Actions job was running inside a container on a self-hosted VM runner.

Full Changelog: step-security/harden-runner@v2...v2.12.1

v2.12.0

What's Changed

1. A new option, disable-sudo-and-containers, is now available to replace the disable-sudo policy, addressing Docker-based privilege escalation (CVE-2025-32955). More details can be found in this blog post.

2. New detections have been added based on insights from the tj-actions and reviewdog actions incidents.

... (truncated)

Commits

• 95d9a5d Merge pull request #606 from step-security/rc-28
• 87e429d Update limitations.md
• ef891c3 feat: add support for custom vm image
• 1fa8c8a update agent
• 92c522a Merge pull request #593 from step-security/ak-readme-updates
• 4719ad5 README updates
• 4fde639 Merge pull request #591 from eromosele-stepsecurity/Upd
• f682f2f Update README.md
• f4a75cf Merge pull request #588 from step-security/rc-26
• 95503d0 ci: remove code-review workflow
• Additional commits viewable in compare view

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[github-actions]

Dependency Review

✅ No vulnerabilities or license issues or OpenSSF Scorecard issues found.

OpenSSF Scorecard

Package	Version	Score	Details
actions/step-security/harden-runner	95d9a5deda9de15063e7595e9719c11c38c90ae2	🟢 8.7	Details Check Score Reason Binary-Artifacts 🟢 10 no binaries found in the repo Branch-Protection 🟢 8 branch protection is not maximal on development and all release branches CI-Tests 🟢 10 7 out of 7 merged PRs checked by a CI test -- score normalized to 10 CII-Best-Practices ⚠️ 0 no effort to earn an OpenSSF best practices badge detected Code-Review 🟢 10 all changesets reviewed Contributors 🟢 6 project has 2 contributing companies or organizations -- score normalized to 6 Dangerous-Workflow 🟢 10 no dangerous workflow patterns detected Dependency-Update-Tool 🟢 10 update tool detected Fuzzing ⚠️ 0 project is not fuzzed License 🟢 10 license file detected Maintained 🟢 10 20 commit(s) and 1 issue activity found in the last 90 days -- score normalized to 10 Packaging ⚠️ -1 packaging workflow not detected Pinned-Dependencies 🟢 6 dependency not pinned by hash detected -- score normalized to 6 SAST 🟢 10 SAST tool is run on all commits Security-Policy 🟢 10 security policy file detected Signed-Releases ⚠️ -1 no releases found Token-Permissions 🟢 10 GitHub workflow tokens follow principle of least privilege Vulnerabilities 🟢 10 0 existing vulnerabilities detected
actions/step-security/harden-runner	95d9a5deda9de15063e7595e9719c11c38c90ae2	🟢 8.7	Details Check Score Reason Binary-Artifacts 🟢 10 no binaries found in the repo Branch-Protection 🟢 8 branch protection is not maximal on development and all release branches CI-Tests 🟢 10 7 out of 7 merged PRs checked by a CI test -- score normalized to 10 CII-Best-Practices ⚠️ 0 no effort to earn an OpenSSF best practices badge detected Code-Review 🟢 10 all changesets reviewed Contributors 🟢 6 project has 2 contributing companies or organizations -- score normalized to 6 Dangerous-Workflow 🟢 10 no dangerous workflow patterns detected Dependency-Update-Tool 🟢 10 update tool detected Fuzzing ⚠️ 0 project is not fuzzed License 🟢 10 license file detected Maintained 🟢 10 20 commit(s) and 1 issue activity found in the last 90 days -- score normalized to 10 Packaging ⚠️ -1 packaging workflow not detected Pinned-Dependencies 🟢 6 dependency not pinned by hash detected -- score normalized to 6 SAST 🟢 10 SAST tool is run on all commits Security-Policy 🟢 10 security policy file detected Signed-Releases ⚠️ -1 no releases found Token-Permissions 🟢 10 GitHub workflow tokens follow principle of least privilege Vulnerabilities 🟢 10 0 existing vulnerabilities detected

Scanned Manifest Files

.github/workflows/dependency.yml

• step-security/harden-runner@95d9a5d
• step-security/harden-runner@5c7944e

.github/workflows/lint.yml

• step-security/harden-runner@95d9a5d
• step-security/harden-runner@5c7944e