CFE-3293: make callers declare intent when reading a variable - #6304
Open
nickanderson wants to merge 2 commits into
Open
CFE-3293: make callers declare intent when reading a variable#6304nickanderson wants to merge 2 commits into
nickanderson wants to merge 2 commits into
Conversation
victormlg
suggested changes
Aug 19, 2026
| VarRef *ref = VarRefParseFromScope(cp->lval, "control_agent"); | ||
| DataType value_type; | ||
| const void *value = EvalContextVariableGet(ctx, ref, &value_type); | ||
| const void *value = EvalContextVariableGetPlaintext(ctx, ref, &value_type); |
Contributor
There was a problem hiding this comment.
You should remember to replace these inside the enterprise and nova repos as well
Member
Author
There was a problem hiding this comment.
yep enterprise and nova.
Member
Author
There was a problem hiding this comment.
EvalContextVariableGet() always returned the plaintext value, so a caller had no way to ask for a secret-tagged variable to be redacted. Adds a get_secret parameter and *Plaintext wrappers, and moves every existing caller onto the plaintext form. No behaviour change: every call site asks for plaintext, exactly as before. Ticket: CFE-3293 Changelog: None
EvalContextVariableGet() kept the variable's declared type while returning the redacted scalar sentinel, so an indexed read of a secret-tagged container -- mydata[key] -- took the container branch and handed that string to RvalContainerValue(), which aborts with a ProgrammingError. Deriving the type from the value actually being returned fixes it and removes the separate type_out special case. Not reachable yet: no caller passes get_secret=false until the CFE-3294 work. test_secret_container_redacts_indexed_read aborts (SIGABRT) without this and passes with it, and asserts the plaintext reads still work so redaction cannot be faked by breaking container reads. Ticket: CFE-3293 Changelog: None
nickanderson
force-pushed
the
CFE-3293-accessor-split/master
branch
from
August 19, 2026 20:42
0c249f0 to
4d9f900
Compare
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
2 participants
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
EvalContextVariableGet()always returned the plaintext value, so a caller had noway to ask for a secret-tagged variable to be redacted. This adds a
get_secretparameter, plus
EvalContextVariableGetPlaintext()and friends, and moves the 20existing call sites in core onto the plaintext form.
No behaviour change: every call site asks for plaintext, exactly as before. It is
the groundwork for the CFE-3294 leak fixes, which switch selected sites over.
The second commit fixes an indexed read of a secret-tagged container
(
mydata[key]) aborting inRvalContainerValue(): the declared type was reportedwhile the returned value was the redacted scalar sentinel. Not reachable until a
caller passes
get_secret=false, which the CFE-3294 work does.Needs paired changes in the enterprise and nova repos, which call these accessors
and will not compile against the new signature —
enterprise/libcfserverd/server.cand four sites in
nova/cf-hub/cf-hub.c.