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* initial draft of policy review document

* Apply suggestions from code review

Co-authored-by: LeoTM <[email protected]>

* update formatting

- markdownlint: specify json in fenced code block
- prettier: format doc, except powerful APIs table

* chore: Apply suggestions from code review

Co-authored-by: Christopher Hiller <[email protected]>

* chore: Apply suggestions from code review

Co-authored-by: Christopher Hiller <[email protected]>

* chore: more fixes to eventually squash

* chore: fix formatting

---------

Co-authored-by: LeoTM <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Christopher Hiller <[email protected]>
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85 changes: 85 additions & 0 deletions src/content/docs/guides/policy-diff.md
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---
title: Reviewing Policy
description: How to review LavaMoat Policy and its diffs
---

<!-- markdownlint-disable no-inline-html -->

This guide will show you how to review changes to your LavaMoat Policy File.

## Why review Policy?

The Policy File generated by LavaMoat is based on a scan of your codebase, identifying all the powers it uses. The initial policy, resulting from the first time you run policy generation, doesn't provide security on its own.
**Instead, it's your review of the initial policy and the subsequent updates (with new or updated dependencies) that makes your application secure.**

Reviewing diffs as dependencies change lets you spot suspicious packages or limit the powers you wish to allow newly added packages to use.

The purpose of the initial review is twofold:

1. It helps you build confidence that the current state of your app is not compromised
2. You may deny powers to dependencies if you determine they are excessive - not needed for the subset of functionality your app uses.

Reviewing your initial policy may seem like a lot of effort - but think of it as an _investment_ in your application's security posture.

## How to review your policy?

The LavaMoat Policy lists all powers that a package can use; these are the `globals` and `builtin` fields.
It also lists which other packages are allowed for the current package to import. You can follow those relations to see whether a package with access to very [powerful APIs](#powerful-apis) is used by any suspicious packages as a dependency. See [Principle of Least Authority][PoLA]

### What to look for when reviewing a Policy diff?

The goal of reviewing the diff is to spot a malicious package being added.

#### TL;DR

- Check `globals` and `builtins` for new powers and investigate if you're surprised the package would need them
- Check if new relationships in `packages` are pointing to packages with very [powerful APIs](#powerful-apis) (e.g. spawning child processes in Node.js)
- Be aware that the identifier may change to `pkgC>actual-name` from `pkgB>pkgA>actual-name` BUT! If the package now also has totally different powers, it's likely a different package of the same name. Investigate! `npm ls actual-name` should help
- When a new package is added, consider limiting its powers to what you actually use

#### Best Practices for Finding Suspicious Changes

First of all - you need to check if any of the packages get access to new [powerful APIs](#powerful-apis) unexpectedly.

If a package that was supposed to only be doing basic string operations is suddenly also using `fetch` and `process.env` in your build system, you should give it a closer look or add

```json
"fetch": false,
"process": false
```

to the `globals` field for that package in `policy-override.json`.

When a new dependency shows up in `packages` field of _packageA_: look up what it's pointing to and if the dependency has access to very [powerful APIs](#powerful-apis); doublecheck whether it makes sense to you that _packageA_ would need to use it.

When dependency tree changes, it's possible that the dependency nesting might change - so the shortest identifier for one of the resources may now be `pkgC>actual-name`, _not_ `pkgB>pkgA>actual-name`.
But there are other more nefarious reasons why that could happen.
If the package now also has totally different powers or dependencies listed it's likely a different package of the same name. There can be more than one `actual-name` named package in this case. It could have been introduced as a different version or a totally different package installed from git or as a bundled dependency.

Whn a new package is added, consider limiting its powers to what you actually use.

### What to look for in initial review?

The goal of reviewing the initial policy is to spot where packages are given powers that allow them escaping LavaMoat protections or abusing the application.

The minimal viable review is to look at the `globals` and `builtins` fields of the policy file to see if any of the packages have access to unexpected [powerful APIs](#powerful-apis).

A more advanced review would be to apply [Principle of Least Authority][PoLA] and add entries to policy-override.json to limit the powers of packages to what they actually need to serve your usecase.

## Powerful APIs

Examples of powerful APIs - not an exhaustive list:

| global | builtin | description |
| ----------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| | `child_process` and any form of `exec` or `spawn` | Allows running arbitrary commands on the host machine and is not covered |
| | `fs` | Allows reading and writing files on the host machine |
| `fetch`, `XMLHttpRequest`, `WebSocket`, `EventSource` | `http`, `https`, `net` | Allows making network requests |
| `document` | | contains a lot of powerful APIs that can be used to manipulate the DOM, including creating iframes with unprotected globals |
| `open` | | `window.open` allows opening new windows/tabs and accessing clean globals there |
| `navigator` | | contains a lot of powerful APIs that can be used to fingerprint the user or control the browser |
| `chrome` or `browser` | | extension APIs - should only be accessed by a package that is a helper library for cross-browser extensions |
| `process` | | Allows reading and writing environment variables and other process-related operations |
| | `vm` | Allows running arbitrary code in a new context |

[PoLA]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_least_privilege
4 changes: 4 additions & 0 deletions src/content/docs/reference/glossary.md
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Expand Up @@ -67,6 +67,10 @@ The `lockdown()` function introduced by [SES][], when called creates a [hardened

:::

## Powers

There's a concept in [Hardened JavaScript][] called _powers_. Powers are the capabilities that a compartment has access to. The compartment can only access the powers that it has been granted. For the specific use-case that LavaMoat Policy provides, Powers are effectively the globals and built-in (in case of Node.js programs) modules that are available to the compartment.

## Object Capability Programming

> a.k.a. _OCAP_ or _object-capability model_
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