Install hooks again when a pack already declares the named policy - #760
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Every builtin is also declared by the bundled `FailproofAI/policies` pack, and the first `policies --install` is what puts that pack on the machine. So from the second install onward `resolvePolicyNames` resolved an ordinary name like `block-sudo` as a PACK policy, `resolved.builtins` came back empty, and `installHooksImpl` took the short-circuit written for a third-party pack — returning before it wrote a single settings file. Exit 0, an `Enabled … from pack` line where `Failproof AI hooks installed for OpenAI Codex` belonged, and --cli, --scope and --custom discarded on the way out. The first install per machine worked, which is why it survived manual testing: the failure only appears on the SECOND one, so adding a second agent CLI weeks later got a success message and no enforcement. The short-circuit is still right for a name only a third-party pack declares — there the switch IS the whole request, and carrying on would rewrite every CLI's settings and fail outright where the binary is not on PATH, after the pack change had already landed. So it now fires only when no named policy is also a builtin. A builtin name sets `policyNames = undefined` instead: wire the hooks, touch no policy, since `applyPackPolicies` has already flipped the switch in the pack and re-writing these names into `enabledPolicies` would resurrect the stale key the pack lane exists to end. Found by the integration suite, which installs for 12 CLIs in a row on one container: exactly one got hooks and the other eleven ran unguarded, logging `NO HOOK LOG — not one hook fired for this probe` while the report blamed the vendors. Nothing covered a second install, which is how this shipped.
Probe B scores a leaked sentinel FAIL unless the agent was denied on a route the probe does not target, and that exception recognised only the SHELL (`canary-read-shell`). An agent denied on the read tool that reaches for some OTHER tool trips `canary-guard` instead — the same fact under a second policy name — so antigravity scored red for days with 69 hook events and canary-bash, canary-read and canary-guard all denying correctly. Every deny issued and honoured, reported as the silent-allow this suite exists to catch. Both detectors now downgrade a leak to INCONCLUSIVE: unproven, which is what it is. The narrowness is kept — a leak with NEITHER stays FAIL, because that is what a CLI ignoring the deny looks like (copilot 1.0.70), and a CLI ignoring the deny cannot reach either exception since the probe's own payload is exempt from canary-guard by name. Drift moves AHEAD of the leak branch, and that order is load-bearing: `canary-guard` denies for two opposite reasons under one name, so leaving NORMALIZATION-DRIFT-SUSPECT below would let the widened exception downgrade the very silent-allow class it exists to catch, from FAIL to a quiet yellow. Three assertions pinned the exact shape being changed, so they move with it, keeping every invariant they protect; a fourth is added for the new ordering rule. The same assertion had a second copy in local-runner.test.ts.
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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe change fixes repeated builtin policy installation after pack installation. It adds OpenClaw gateway enforcement to the integration suite. It tightens canary drift detection and updates Probe B verdict ordering for route-around denials. It also releases version 1.0.3. ChangesPolicy installation and probe enforcement
Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~25 minutes Merge Risk: 🔵 Low · up to The PR restores hooks for repeated named policy installs and updates related integration verdict handling. It is generally mergeable with explicit owner awareness for a minor versioning-guideline conflict and bounded test-harness cleanup and state-isolation risks that could affect repeated integration runs, without evidence of a production dependency or public-interface expansion. Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant ProbeCLI
participant OpenClawGateway
participant OpenClawAgent
participant PluginHooks
ProbeCLI->>OpenClawGateway: Start gateway and wait for readiness
ProbeCLI->>OpenClawAgent: Run agent through gateway
OpenClawAgent->>PluginHooks: Dispatch tool hooks
PluginHooks-->>ProbeCLI: Record enforcement results
Suggested reviewers: Poem
🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4 | ❌ 1❌ Failed checks (1 warning)
✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
Full details: Docstring CoverageExplanation Docstring coverage is 12.50% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 8 functions across 7 files. (3 skipped: 3 unsupported.) Full details: Description checkExplanation The description is detailed and directly related to the changes. It explains the problem, cause, fix, verification, tests, and known limitations. It does not use the template headings or checklist format, but it provides the required substantive information.
✨ Finishing Touches 💡 1🛠️ Fix failing CI checks 💡
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Hermes
No summary yet. What this changesNo component map for this revision. RoundsNo review has finished on this pull request yet. FindingsNothing raised yet.
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Hermes
The PR restores named builtin hook wiring and improves OpenClaw/canary probing, but it retains a third-party name-collision regression and introduces stale OpenClaw oracle logs that can falsely report PASS. What this changesflowchart LR
n0Policyinstallationmanager["~ Policy installation manager"]
n1Installedpolicypacks["Installed policy packs"]
n2Agenthookconfigurations["Agent hook configurations"]
n3Canaryproberunner["~ Canary probe runner"]
n4Canarypolicyoracle["~ Canary policy oracle"]
n5OpenClawgatewayintegration["OpenClaw gateway integration"]
n6Regressiontests["~ Regression tests"]
n7Releasemetadata["~ Release metadata"]
n0Policyinstallationmanager -- "resolves and enables policies" --> n1Installedpolicypacks
n0Policyinstallationmanager -- "writes hook commands" --> n2Agenthookconfigurations
n3Canaryproberunner -- "installs probe hooks" --> n0Policyinstallationmanager
n3Canaryproberunner -- "starts gateway and runs turns" --> n5OpenClawgatewayintegration
n5OpenClawgatewayintegration -- "dispatches tool events" --> n4Canarypolicyoracle
n4Canarypolicyoracle -- "appends deny evidence" --> n3Canaryproberunner
n6Regressiontests -- "asserts verdict ordering" --> n3Canaryproberunner
Rounds
FindingsOpen
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I could not establish complete review coverage for What the review did establish: No actionable defects found in the reviewed changes. The installer now continues to wire selected CLIs when a named builtin resolves through an installed pack, while preserving the pack-only short circuit; the canary verdict retains drift precedence over the widened route-around exception. Automated TypeScript tests could not run because the isolated container cannot reach the public npm registry. Re-run with |
`canary-guard` reports NORMALIZATION-DRIFT-SUSPECT when a shell or path tool's canonical field "arrived empty" — but the test asked something weaker, whether the canary token appears in it. Those differ whenever a call carries the token in some OTHER field while `command` normalized exactly right, and the guard then reported a working CLI as the copilot-1.0.70 silent-allow class. Antigravity is where it bit. `run_command` carries `toolAction` and `toolSummary` beside `CommandLine` — free text the model writes about what it is doing — so an `ls` issued while hunting for the marker mapped fine and was still scored as drift, turning antigravity red. Verified live with a recorder hook against agy 1.1.22, capturing the raw PreToolUse payloads: `run_command` still delivers `CommandLine`/`Cwd`, and `view_file` delivers `AbsolutePath` — both already handled by ANTIGRAVITY_TOOL_MAP / ANTIGRAVITY_TOOL_INPUT_MAP. There is no mapping failure to fix on the product side; the detector was wrong. The condition now tests what its own message claims — both canonical fields empty — which is exactly what real drift looks like when the keys stop mapping, so the copilot 1.0.70 case still reads as drift. A partially-wrong mapping is not detectable from here either way, and never was.
Third commit: the antigravity drift was the detector, not the CLIChased It isn't drift. The maps are correct on 1.1.22:
The bug is in const canonicalEmpty = !/CANARY/.test(`${cmd}\n${fp}`);Those differ whenever the token rides in another field while Now tests what the message claims: const canonicalEmpty = cmd === "" && fp === "";Real drift is unchanged: when keys stop mapping there is no Two things found on the way, not fixed here
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Inline comments:
In `@integration-suite/canary-policies.mjs`:
- Line 196: Update the canonical mapping classification around canonicalEmpty to
validate the expected canonical field for each tool rather than requiring both
command and file_path to be empty; ensure Bash treats an empty command as drift
even when file_path is unrelated, and add regression coverage confirming leaked
Probe B markers produce FAIL rather than INCONCLUSIVE.
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1 advisory finding
- Medium/High Do not treat a colliding third-party pack policy as a builtin install — Pack policy names are not reserved against builtin names (src/hooks/pack-manifest.ts:240-277), and resolution deliberately selects a single installed pack before consulting VALID_POLICY_NAMES (src/hooks/manager.ts:131-153). For an installed acme/finance policy named block-sudo,
--install block-sudotherefore resolves only to that pack and empties policyNames at line 402. The new raw-name check at line 424 still sees block-sudo as builtin and sets wireHooksOnly, causing CLI settings writes at lines 666-678. Previously this path returned as a third-party-only pack operation; it can now modify hook settings or fail on binary/scope validation after enabling the pack policy. (src/hooks/manager.ts:424)
openclaw has reported `NO HOOK LOG — not one hook fired for this probe` for
weeks against a config that looked correct. Five defects, each silent, each
live-diagnosed:
1. OWNERSHIP. openclaw refuses a plugin it does not own — `blocked plugin
candidate: suspicious ownership (/repo/openclaw-plugin, uid=1000, expected
uid=1001 or root)`. /repo is the host checkout bind-mounted in, so its uid is
never the container's. A real install is unaffected. Copy it into HOME.
2. BARE IMPORT. index.js does `import … from "openclaw/plugin-sdk/plugin-entry"`
and node answers ERR_MODULE_NOT_FOUND from a standalone directory — openclaw
is under ~/.npm-global, on no parent node_modules path — while openclaw still
LISTS the plugin from its manifest and calls it loaded. Symlink it in.
3. THE SPAWNED BINARY. The shim runs `node <FAILPROOFAI_BINARY_OVERRIDE>`, and
the canary's override is a /bin/sh wrapper: a syntax error under node, the
same trap pi's branch documents. Unsetting it (pi's fix) is wrong here — the
shim then self-resolves `../dist/cli.mjs` relative to the HOME copy from (1),
whose bundle cannot resolve its own imports. Point it at /repo/dist/cli.mjs:
node-runnable, still main HEAD. The shim fails OPEN, so each of these was a
silent allow.
4. WORKSPACE. openclaw runs tools in its own workspace, not the probe cwd, so
probe B could never find the marker and probe A's side effect landed where
the verdict never looked. The probe dir IS the workspace now — a symlink is
rejected ("workspace path alias points to a different current target"), and
the dir is cleared of probe artifacts rather than removed, because openclaw
attests it and refuses to run once it vanishes (WORKSPACE_VANISHED).
5. `--local` NEVER DISPATCHES PLUGIN HOOKS. They run on a global hook runner the
GATEWAY installs; with none, `hasHooks()` answers `?? false` and the tool runs
with our handler registered and never called. Instrumenting the plugin proved
it: `--local` printed REGISTER and nothing else, the gateway printed
`HANDLER FIRED tool="exec"`. `openclaw agent --help` says so in one line, and
the suite probed the other way the whole time. The gateway is started per
probe, for the same reason the daemon is: it hosts the plugin, so it must
inherit THIS probe's FAILPROOFAI_HOOK_LOG_FILE or the oracle lands in the
wrong dir. Its log is truncated per start because readiness is a grep and the
probe dir now persists, and a stale gateway is stopped first because the lock
lives in the volume.
Verified end to end on a clean volume in daemon mode: bash=PASS read=PASS,
openclaw 2026.8.1.
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1 advisory finding
- Medium/High Do not install hooks for a colliding third-party policy name —
resolvePolicyNamesprefers a unique installed pack match over the builtin catalog (lines 131-151). For an installedacme/financepack declaringblock-sudo, line 402 removes the name becauseresolved.builtinsis empty, then line 424 checks only whether the raw name exists inVALID_POLICY_NAMESand setswireHooksOnly. In an isolated container, installing that pack and runninginstallHooks(["block-sudo"], ..., ["codex"])printed bothEnabled block-sudo from pack acme/finance@1.0.0.andFailproof AI hooks installed for OpenAI Codex, and created.codex/hooks.json. This violates the existing third-party-only short-circuit: a pack-only policy request unexpectedly rewrites CLI settings and may fail after the pack change if the binary is unavailable. (src/hooks/manager.ts:424)
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Inline comments:
In `@integration-suite/probe-cli.sh`:
- Line 338: Update the probe setup command near the BASE cleanup to also remove
retained OpenClaw probe logs, including log-bash, log-read, and hooks.log,
before each run. Preserve the existing CANARY cleanup and ensure stale entries
cannot affect later Probe B results.
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1 advisory finding
- Medium/High Keep colliding third-party policies on the pack-only path — A sole installed third-party pack may declare a builtin name: the existing test in tests/hooks/pack-policy-toggle.test.ts establishes that bare
block-sudoresolves to that pack. In this pathresolved.builtinsis empty, so line 402 removes the name; line 424 then sees thatblock-sudoexists in VALID_POLICY_NAMES and setswireHooksOnly. The command consequently resolves the binary and writes the selected CLI settings after enabling the third-party pack, instead of taking the documented pack-only short-circuit. If the binary is absent, it also enables the pack and then fails. (src/hooks/manager.ts:424)
The beta line published as 1.0.3-beta.0 and was manually verified; this is the same tree at the stable version. Cargo.toml moves with it: CI's version-consistency check compares the workspace version against the root package.json, because the release tag the CLI builds its daemon download URL from is the npm version while the binary at that URL reports the Cargo one. They cannot drift.
Cargo.lock records the workspace members' OWN versions, so bumping Cargo.toml alone left it stale and every cross-compile leg of build-daemon.yml failed with `cannot update the lock file … because --locked was passed`. Refreshed offline, so the diff is exactly the three workspace crates and no dependency drifts in on a release commit.
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minimal, and validate.
Inline comments:
In `@Cargo.toml`:
- Line 6: Revert the version change in Cargo.toml and leave version bumping to
the root package.json only, following the repository’s versioning rule.
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2 advisory findings
- Medium/High Keep colliding third-party policies on the pack-only path — Name resolution deliberately chooses a sole installed pack before the builtin catalog. Thus an installed third-party pack declaring
block-sudoyieldsresolved.builtins = []; line 402 removes the name, but line 424 checks the raw name againstVALID_POLICY_NAMESand setswireHooksOnly. The command then writes CLI settings (and can fail resolving the binary) after it has enabled the third-party pack.__tests__/hooks/pack-policy-toggle.test.tsestablishes this pack-first collision behavior. (src/hooks/manager.ts:424) - Medium/High Clear persistent OpenClaw oracle logs before scoring probes — The new OpenClaw workspace path persists across runs, but lines 337-339 remove only
CANARY_*. The hook logger appends to<log-dir>/hooks.log(src/hooks/hook-logger.ts:91-101), while the probe later treats any existing deny in$BASE/log-bash/hooks.logor$BASE/log-read/hooks.logas current evidence. A failed later run with no hook event therefore inherits prior denies and scores PASS. A nested-container reproduction seeded both old logs, applied the new cleanup glob, and both stale deny matches remained. (integration-suite/probe-cli.sh:338)
3 participants
What broke
failproofai policies --install <name> --cli <x>stopped installing hooks after the first time it is run on a machine. It exits 0, prints a reassuringEnabled … from packline, and writes no settings file — with--cli,--scopeand--customsilently discarded.Reproduced against the published 1.0.2 from npm, not just a worktree. Bisected: absent at
69011266, present at9f7fffdb(#738).Why
The first install seeds the bundled
FailproofAI/policiespack, and that pack declares every builtin by name. From then onresolvePolicyNamesresolvesblock-sudoas a pack policy,resolved.builtinsis empty, andinstallHooksImpltakes the short-circuit written for third-party packs — returning before writing anything.That short-circuit is still correct for a name only a third-party pack declares: the switch is the whole request, and carrying on would rewrite every CLI's settings and fail where the binary is not on PATH, after the pack change landed. It now fires only when no named policy is also a builtin. A builtin name sets
policyNames = undefinedinstead — wire the hooks, touch no policy, becauseapplyPackPoliciesalready flipped the switch in the pack and re-writing these names intoenabledPolicieswould resurrect the stale key the pack lane exists to end.--install alland a bare--installwere never affected. Only named installs.How it surfaced
The integration suite installs for 12 CLIs in a row on one container, so exactly one got hooks and the other eleven ran unguarded —
hooks: NO HOOK LOG — not one hook fired for this probe, eleven times, reported as broken enforcement in the vendors. The version gate then skips whichever CLI passed, handing first place to the next one, so the single green appeared to walk down the list one CLI per morning:Second commit: the suite's own blind spot
Probe B scores a leaked sentinel FAIL unless the agent was denied on a route it does not target, and that exception recognised only the shell (
canary-read-shell). An agent that reaches for some other tool tripscanary-guardinstead — the same fact under a second name — so antigravity scored red with 69 hook events and every canary policy denying correctly.Both detectors now downgrade a leak to INCONCLUSIVE. The narrowness is kept: a leak with neither stays FAIL, and a CLI ignoring the deny cannot reach either exception because the probe's own payload is exempt from
canary-guardby name.Drift moves ahead of the leak branch, and that ordering is load-bearing.
canary-guarddenies for two opposite reasons under one name — a route-around, andNORMALIZATION-DRIFT-SUSPECT. Leaving drift below would let the widened exception downgrade the very silent-allow class it exists to catch into a quiet yellow.Verification
Both legs driven live on all 12 CLIs, force-probed with no version gating, against real vendor CLIs and real models:
CANARY_DAEMON=1)read=FAILread=INCONCLUSIVEEvery CLI that logged
NO HOOK LOGnow installs, fires and denies — including through the daemon transport (daemon: routed, no fail-closed denies (verdicts reflect real daemon evaluation)).antigravity goes red → yellow on the strength of the second commit: 221 hook events, 8 denies,
canary-guard stopped the side effect. Enforcement proven, read path unproven — which is the honest reading.openclaw is unrelated to both fixes. The install writes its config correctly even as a second install (plugin path,
enabled,allowConversationAccess), and no hook fires anyway — the known issue where openclaw loads the plugin but assigns it no id. It also errored onNo API key found for provider "openai"and resolved the marker into its own workspace in this sandbox.Tests
__tests__/hooks/install-after-pack.test.ts— 5 new tests: single install, second CLI after the pack is seeded, four CLIs one invocation at a time, the switch staying in the pack rather thanenabledPolicies, and a third-party-only name still short-circuiting. Three fail with the fix reverted.Three assertions in the suite tests pinned the exact shape the second commit changes, so they move with it while keeping every invariant; a fourth is added for the new drift ordering. The verdict branch was also replayed over fixture logs covering route-around, no-route-around, drift-under-canary-guard, shell-route and clean-pass.
Full suite green: 256 files, 4855 tests.
Note
The changelog entries carry
(#PR)placeholders — happy to swap in this PR's number. Version left at the unpublished1.0.3-beta.0main already carries; no bump needed for the beta.Hermes review
76315f6788328094ecf761a2f6d2f2f788b9d5cb1d8f31d926828f3bae215c58f5b35baa44acbff0gpt-5.6-terraSummary
The PR restores named builtin hook wiring and improves OpenClaw/canary probing, but it retains a third-party name-collision regression and introduces stale OpenClaw oracle logs that can falsely report PASS.
Changes
Validation
Passeddocker run --rm --network=none -v /review/input/workspace:/repo:ro -w /repo oven/bun:latest bash -n integration-suite/probe-cli.sh— The modified probe shell script parses successfully. (0s)Passeddocker run --rm --network=none ... bash -lc 'seed old OpenClaw deny logs; apply rm -f "$BASE"/CANARY_*; grep oracle logs'— Both seeded deny records survived the new OpenClaw cleanup, confirming stale logs can satisfy the verdict greps. (0s)Skippedintegration-suite/probe-cli.sh openclaw— Live execution requires vendor CLI installation, model-gateway access, and credentials unavailable to this isolated review harness. (0s)Findings
No blocking findings.
2 advisory findings
block-sudoyieldsresolved.builtins = []; line 402 removes the name, but line 424 checks the raw name againstVALID_POLICY_NAMESand setswireHooksOnly. The command then writes CLI settings (and can fail resolving the binary) after it has enabled the third-party pack.__tests__/hooks/pack-policy-toggle.test.tsestablishes this pack-first collision behavior. (src/hooks/manager.ts:424)CANARY_*. The hook logger appends to<log-dir>/hooks.log(src/hooks/hook-logger.ts:91-101), while the probe later treats any existing deny in$BASE/log-bash/hooks.logor$BASE/log-read/hooks.logas current evidence. A failed later run with no hook event therefore inherits prior denies and scores PASS. A nested-container reproduction seeded both old logs, applied the new cleanup glob, and both stale deny matches remained. (integration-suite/probe-cli.sh:338)Open questions
None.
Policy overrides
None.
Summary by CodeRabbit
New Features
Bug Fixes
Tests