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## No cloning theorem | ||
* You can't copy a state if you don't know the $\alpha$ and $\beta$ values | ||
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## Measurements | ||
* you create something in the $Z$ basis, then You measure in the $X$ basis, you have 50% of chance of not getting the initial prepared state | ||
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## QKD | ||
1. Alice create a sequence of zeros and ones | ||
2. Alice selects a random basis for each bit to be encoded | ||
3. Alice sends the resulting states for Bob | ||
4. Bob pick random basis to try to decode what Alice has sent | ||
5. Alice publishes (publicly) the basis that she's used | ||
6. they discard the values that bob measured with the wrong basis | ||
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* after the QKD, the final key Will be roughly 50% of the inital one | ||
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* If Eve tries to measure the values in a man-in-the-middle attack, it'll cause disturbance in the Bob's measured values, so the error rate in the system may increase | ||
* If Eve attacks, It may not know the whole key, just about 50% of it | ||
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## BB84 | ||
* the used basis are non orthogonal one to another | ||
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* Hemogenization(random permutation): we distribute equally the disturbance through the whole key, so we know how much disturbance we expect to have in the Bob results. | ||
* If the final disturbance(QBER, quantum bits error rate) is <= the expected, we just apply a error correction code and a privacy amplification algorithm (these are classical) | ||
* However, if the QBER is high, we abort the protocol | ||
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## Six-state protocol | ||
* You add more basis that a qubit can be measure, this decreases the amount percent of the key that Eve can have during a attack | ||
* it also shrinkins the length of the key by $1\over N$ where $N$ is the number of basis | ||
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## Entanglement QKD | ||
* Randomness: it's good because you can create random states just by measuring a quantum satte that are in entanglement | ||
* monogamy: If a state is maximally entangled, it's totally unentangled with other parts, so if Alice and Bob are maximally entangled there's noone attacking the communication | ||
* Whole vs part: You have a qubit in $Z$ basis that came from a entangled state, you can't know from what state it came from | ||
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* to check if Alice and bob are maximally entangled, we can Use the CHSH inequality, then if the get the expectation value of the system as $< C > = 2 \sqrt{2}$, so Eve isn't there |
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courses/qworld/qclass23-24/qkd/notes-3-error-correction-privacy-amplification-etc.pdf
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