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Support PKCS#1 v2.0; support OAEP/PSS #68
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I will give it a try, starting with OAEP :) |
@adamantike what's your progress so far? I'd love to be able to release 4.0 in the coming month or so. Do you think that's feasible? |
@sybrenstuvel I haven't made any progress since the last PR. I can start working on OAEP, and hopefully there'll be some progress before next weekend. Is there any other goal for 4.0 that is not included in the milestone? |
That would be awesome :)
Nope. If more comes up, we'll just release 4.1 :) |
Does python-rsa currently support OAEP padding? I saw #89 but I wasn't sure exactly the implications of it. |
Is the encryption part of this issue fixed by #126? |
Hi everyone, I saw this thread about PKCS#1 v2.0 support for python rsa. I have currently rsa version 4.8 .. I have another library (Crypto++) whose RSA encryption I am trying to decrypt. The library supports both OAEP and PKCS. Crypto++ is using v.2.0 Can Python RSA decrypt both PKCS #1 v.1.15 and v.2.0 ? If I want the decryptor to use a specific version of PKCS #1 or OAEP, is there a way to specify this ? In the rsa.encrypt(..) and rsa.decrypt(..) function I did not see any way to specify the version or the padding format ? def encrypt_rsa(message, key): def decrypt_rsa(cipherbytes, key): |
Python RSA does not currently support PKCS #1 v2.0+.
No. OAEP is not supported. |
See http://stackoverflow.com/a/36633937/875379 and http://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/12688/can-you-explain-bleichenbachers-cca-attack-on-pkcs1-v1-5 for more info.
RSA 4.0 should support OAEP for encryption and PSS for signing, as described in PKCS#1 v2.0. This makes it much less (if it even still is) vulnerable to a Bleichenbacher attack.
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