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Scroll Security Council Tools

The repository offers tools for the Security Council to run and validate certain operations against Scroll's ZkVM release

Setup

  • Clone the scroll-sc-tools repository:
$ git clone git@github.com:scroll-tech/scroll-sc-tools.git && cd scroll-sc-tools
rustup toolchain install nightly-2025-08-18

Generate Verifier

Scroll's ZkVM architecture proves Scroll's L2 blocks in layers (chunking -> batching -> bundling) where only the final layer (aka bundle) is an EVM-verifiable SNARK proof.

This proof is verified as part of the Bundle Finalization on-chain transaction.

The proof itself is verified by a Verifier contract, that's essentially a PLONK-verifier constructed using OpenVM's SDK. The Verifier contract is deployed on Sepolia and Mainnet.

The generate-verifier command allows one to trustlessly re-generate the verifier contract and prints out its codehash, that can be validated against on-chain available data.

Prerequisite

$ cargo install svm-rs

$ svm install 0.8.19

$ solc --version

In order to generate the verifier contract, we can either download the source from OpenVM or re-compute it.

  • Download the verifier contract:
$ cargo run --release -- generate-verifier
  • Re-compute the verifier contract (using OpenVM SDK):
# download SRS parameters
$ bash scripts/download-params.sh

# generate verifier
$ RUST_MIN_STACK=16777216 cargo run --release -- generate-verifier --recompute

Note: Re-computation requires very large amounts of computation and memory (~200 GB). It took about 4 minutes on AWS c7a.24xlarge.

Compute Digests

The final layer (aka bundle) circuit is identified by two digests, namely digest_1 and digest_2.

  • digest_1: Attestation to the circuit code/logic. Any modification to the circuitry, to any layer including and below the final layer, will trigger a change to this digest value.
  • digest_2: Attestation to the circuit config. The openvm.toml files configure each circuit (chunk/batch/bundle) and finally this digest value will change if any of those was modified.

An important requirement for "proof generation" to "on-chain verification" is that the on-chain verifier must populate these digests (constants) so as to disallow proof submitter to potentially post digests for malicious circuitry. These digests are available on-chain in the deployed contracts on Sepolia and Mainnet.

An independent party can re-compute these digests from the ZkVM released circuitry and validate against on-chain values.

$ cargo run --release -- compute-digest