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Discurso Stalin Prueba.txt
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Discurso Stalin Prueba.txt
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Comrades!
Eight years have passed since the last elections to the Supreme Soviet. This has
been a period replete with events of a decisive nature. The first four years were
years of intense labour on the part of Soviet people in carrying out the Third Five-
Year Plan. The second four years covered the events of the war against the
German and Japanese aggressors -- the events of the Second World War.
Undoubtedly, the war was the main event during the past period.
It would be wrong to think that the Second World War broke out accidentally,
or as a re-
page 22
sult of blunders committed by certain statesmen, although blunders were certainly
committed. As a matter of fact, the war broke out as the inevitable result of the
development of world economic and political forces on the basis of present-day
monopolistic capitalism. Marxists have more than once stated that the capitalist
system of world economy contains the elements of a general crisis and military
conflicts, that, in view of that, the development of world capitalism in our times
does not proceed smoothly and evenly, but through crises and catastrophic wars.
The point is that the uneven development of capitalist countries usually leads, in
the course of time, to a sharp disturbance of the equilibrium within the world
system of capitalism, and that group of capitalist countries regards itself as being
less securely provides with raw materials and markets usually attempts to change
the situation and to redistribute "spheres of influence" in its own favour -- by
employing armed force. As a result of this, the capitalist world is split into two
hostile camps, and war breaks out between them.
Perhaps catastrophic wars could be avoided if it were possible periodically to
redistribute raw materials and markets among the respective countries in
conformity with their economic weight by means of concerted and peaceful
decisions. But this is impossible under the present
page 23
capitalist conditions of world economic development.
Thus, as a result of the first crisis of the capitalist system of world economy,
the First World War broke out; and as a result of the second crisis, the Second
World War broke out.
This does not mean, of course, that the Second World War was a copy of the
first. On the contrary, the Second world differed substantially in character from
the first. It must be borne in mind that before attacking the Allied countries the
major fascist states -- Germany, Japan and Italy -- destroyed the last remnants of
bourgeois-democratic liberties at home and established there a cruel terroristic
regime, trampled upon the principle of the sovereignty and free development of
small countries, proclaimed as their own the policy of seizing foreign territory,
and shouted from the housetops that they were aiming at world domination and
the spreading of the fascist regime all over the world; and by seizing
Czechoslovakia and the central regions of China, the Axis Powers showed that
they were ready to carry out their threat to enslave all the freedom-loving peoples.
In new of this, the Second World War against the Axis Powers, unlike the First
World War, assumed from the very outset the character of an anti-fascist war, a
war of liberation, one of the tasks of which was to restore democratic
page 24
liberties. The entry of the Soviet Union into the war against the Axis Powers
could only augment -- and really did augment -- the anti-fascist and liberating
character of the Second World War.
It was on this basis that the anti-fascist coalition of the Soviet Union, the
United States of America, Great Britain and other freedom-loving countries came
into being and later played the decisive role in defeating the armed forces of the
Axis Powers.
That is how it stands with the question of the origin and character of the Second
World War.
Everybody, perhaps, now admits that the war was not nor could have been an
accident in the lives of the peoples, that it actually became a war of the peoples
for their existence, and that for that very reason could not have been a swift or
lightning war.
As far as our country is concerned, for her this war was the fiercest and most
arduous ever fought in the history of our Motherland.
But the war was not only a curse. It was also a great school which examined
and tested all the forces of the people. The war laid bare all facts and events in the
rear and at the front, it ruthlessly tore down all the veils and coverings that
concealed the actual features of slates, governments and parties, and brought
page 25
them onto the stage without masks and without make-up, with all their defects and
merits. The war was something in the nature of an examination of our Soviet
system, of our State, of our Government and of our Communist Party, and it
summed up their work and said, as it were: Here they are, your people and
organizations, their life and work scrutinize them carefully and treat them
according to their deserts.
This is one of the positive sides of the war.
For us, for the voters, this is of immense importance, for it helps us quickly and
impartially to appraise the activities of the Party and its men, and to draw correct
conclusions. At another time we would have had to study the speeches and reports
of the representatives of the Party, analyze them, compare their words with their
deeds, sum up the results, and so, forth. This is a complicated and laborious job,
and there is no guarantee against mistakes. It is different now, when the war is
over, when the war itself has verified the work of our organizations and leaders
and has summed it up. It is now much easier for us to examine it, and arrive at
correct conclusions.
And so, what is the summation of the war?
There is one principal summation upon which all the others rest. This
summation is, that towards the end of the war the enemies sus-
page 26
tained defeat and we and our Allies proved to be the victors. We terminated the
war with complete victory over our enemies -- this is the principal summation of
the war. But this summation is too general, and we cannot put a full stop here. Of
course, to defeat the enemies in a war such as the Second World War, the like of
which has never been witnessed in the history of mankind before, means
achieving a victory of world historical importance. That is true. But still, it is a
general summation, and we cannot rest content with it. To appreciate the great
historical importance of our victory we must analyze the matter more concretely.
And so, how should our victory over the enemies be interpreted? What can this
victory signify from the point of view of the state and the development of the
internal forces of our country?
Our victory signifies, first of all, that our Soviet social system was victorious,
that the Soviet social system successfully passed the test of fire in the war and
proved that it is fully viable.
As we know, the foreign press on more than one occasion asserted that the
Soviet social system was a "dangerous experiment" that was doomed to failure,
that the Soviet system was a "house of cards" having no foundations
page 27
in life and imposed upon the people by the Cheka, and that a slight shock from
without was sufficient to cause this "house of cards" to collapse.
Now we can say that the war has, refuted all these assertions of the foreign
press and has proved them to have been groundless. The war proved that the
Soviet social system is a genuinely people's system, which grew up from the
ranks of the people and enjoys their powerful| support; that the Soviet social
system is fully viable and stable form of organization of society.
More than that. The issue now is not whether the Soviet social system is viable
or not, because after the object lessons of the war, no skeptic now dares to express
doubt concerning the viability of the Soviet social system. Now the issue is that
the Soviet social system has proved to be more viable and stable than the non-
Soviet social system, that the Soviet social system is a better form of organization
of society than any non-Soviet social system.
Secondly, our victory signifies that our Soviet state system was victorious, that
our multinational Soviet state passed all the tests of the war and proved its
viability.
As we know, prominent foreign journalists have more than once expressed
themselves to the effect that the Soviet multinational state is
page 28
an "artificial and short-lived structure," that in the event of any complications
arising the collapse of the Soviet Union would be inevitable, that the Soviet Union
would share the fate of Austria-Hungary.
Now we can say that the war refuted these statements of the foreign press and
proved them to have been devoid of all foundation. The war proved that the
Soviet multinational state system successfully passed the test, grew stronger than
ever during the war, and turned out to be quite a viable state system. These
gentlemen failed to realize that the analogy of Austria-Hungary was unsound,
because our multinational state grew up not on the bourgeois basis, which
stimulates sentiments of national distrust and national enmity, but on the Soviet
basis, which, on the contrary, cultivates sentiments of friendship and fraternal
cooperation among the peoples of our state.
Incidentally, after the lessons of the war, these gentlemen no longer dare to
come out and deny the viability of the Soviet state system. The issue now is no
longer the viability of the Soviet state system, because there can be no doubt
about its viability. Now the issue is that the Soviet state system has proved to be a
model multinational state, that the Soviet state system is a system of state
organization in which the national problem and the problem, of the
page 29
collaboration of nations have found a better solution than in any other
multinational state.
Thirdly, our victory signifies that the Soviet Armed Forces, our Red Army, was
victorious, that the Red Army heroically withstood all the hardships of the war,
utterly routed the armies of our enemies, and emerged from the war the victor. (A
voice: "Under Comrade Stalin's leadership!" All rise. Loud and prolonged
applause, rising to an ovation.)
Now, everybody, friends and enemies alike, admit that the Red Army proved
equal to its tremendous task. But this was not the case six years ago, in the period
before the war. As we know, prominent foreign journalists, and many recognized
authorities on military affairs abroad, repeatedly stated that the condition of the
Red Army roused grave doubts, that the Red Army was poorly armed and lacked
a proper commanding staff, that its morale was beneath criticism, that while it
might be fit for defence, it was useless for attack, and that, if struck by the
German troops, the Red Army would collapse like "a colossus with feet of clay."
Such statements were made not only in Germany, but also in France, Great
Britain and America.
Now we can say that the war refuted all these statements and proved them to
have been groundless and ridiculous. The war proved that the Red Army is not "a
colossus with feet of
page 30
clay," but a first-class modern army, equipped with the most up-to-date
armaments, led by most experienced commanders and possessing high morale and
fighting qualities. It must not be forgotten that the Red Army is the army which
utterly routed the German army, the army which only yesterday struck terror in
the hearts of the armies of the European states.
It must be noted that the "critics" of the Red Army are becoming fewer and
fewer. More than that. Comments are more and more frequently appearing in the
foreign press noting the high qualities of the Red Army, the skill of its men and
commanders, and the flawlessness of its strategy and tactics. This is
understandable. After the brilliant victories the Red Army achieved at Moscow
and Stalingrad, at Kursk and Belgorod, at Kiev and Kirovograd, at Minsk and
Bobruisk, at Leningrad and Tallinn, at Jassy and Lvov, on the Vistula and the
Niemen, on the Danube and the Oder and at Vienna and Berlin -- after all this, it
is impossible not to admit that the Red Army is a first-class army, from which
much can be learned. (Loud applause.)
This is how we concretely understand the victory our country achieved over her
enemies.
Such, in the main, is the summation of the war.
It would be wrong to think that such a historical victory could have been
achieved without
page 31
preliminary preparation by the whole country for active defence. It would be no
less wrong to assume that such preparation could have been made in a short space
of time, in a matter of three or four years. It would be still more wrong to assert
that our victory was entirely due to the bravery of our troops. Without bravery it
is, of course, impossible to achieve victory. But bravery alone is not enough to
overpower an enemy who possesses a vast army, first-class armaments, well-
trained officers and fairly well-organized supplies. To withstand the blow of such
an enemy, to resist him and then to inflict utter defeat upon him it was necessary
to have, in addition to the unexampled bravery of our troops, fully up-to-date
armaments, and in sufficient quantities, and well-organized supplies, also in
sufficient quantities. But for this it was necessary to have, and in, sufficient
quantities, elementary things such as: metals -- for the production of armaments,
equipment and industrial machinery; fuel -- to ensure the operation of industry
and transport; cotton -- to manufacture army clothing; grain -- to supply the army
with food.
Can it be said that before entering the Second World War our country already
possessed the necessary minimum of the material potentialities needed to satisfy
these main requirements? I think it can. To prepare for this im-
page 32
mense task we had to carry out three five year plans of national-economic
development. It was these three five-year plans that enabled us to create these
material potentialities. At all events, the situation in our country in this respect
was ever so much better before the Second World War, in 1940, than it was
before the First World War, in 1913.
What were the material potentialities at our country's disposal before the
Second World War?
To help you to understand this I will have to make you a brief report on the
activities of the Communist Party in the matter of preparing our country for active
defence.
If we take the data for 1940 the eve of the Second World War -- and compare it
with the data for 1913 -- the eve of the First World War -- we shall get the
following picture.
In 1913 there was produced in our country 4,220,000 tons of pig iron,
4,230,000 tons of steel, 29,000,000 tons of coal, 9,000,000 tons of oil, 21,600,000
tons of market grain and 740,000 tons of raw cotton.
Such were the material potentialities of our country when she entered the First
World War.
This was the economic basis old Russia could utilize for the purpose of
prosecuting the war.
As regards 1940, in that year the following was produced in our country:
15,000,000 tons
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of pig iron, i.e., nearly four times as much as in 1913; 18,300,000 tons of steel,
i.e., four and a half times as much as in 1913; 166,000,000 tons of coal, i.e., five
and a half times as much as in 1913; 31,000,000 tons of oil, i.e., three and a half
times as much as in 1913; 38,300,000 tons of market grain, i.e., 17,000,000 tons
more than in 1913; 2,700,000 tons of raw cotton, i.e., three and a half times as
much as in 1913.
Such were the material potentialities of our country when she entered the
Second World War.
This was the economic basis the Soviet Union could utilize for the purpose of
prosecuting the war.
The difference, as you see, is colossal.
This unprecedented growth of production cannot be regarded as the simple and
ordinary development of a country from backwardness to progress. It was a leap
by which our Motherland became transformed from a backward country into an
advanced country, from an agrarian into an industrial country.
This historic transformation was brought about in the course of three five-year
plans, beginning with 1928 with the first year of the First Five-Year Plan. Up to
that time we had to restore our ruined industries and heal the wounds inflicted
upon us by the First World War and the Civil War. If we take into con-
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sideration the fact that the First Five-Year Plan was carried out in four years, and
that the execution of the Third Five-Year Plan was interrupted by the war in the
fourth year, it works out that the transformation of our country from an agrarian
into an industrial country took only about thirteen years.
It cannot but be admitted that thirteen years is an incredibly short period for the
execution of such a gigantic task.
It is this that explains the storm of debate that was roused in the foreign press at
one time by the publication of these figures. Our friends decided that a "miracle"
had happened; those who were ill-disposed towards us proclaimed that the five-
year plans were "Bolshevik propaganda" and "tricks of the Cheka." But as
miracles do not happen and the Cheka is not so powerful as to be able to annul the
laws of social development, "public opinion" abroad was obliged to resign itself
to the facts.
By what policy was the Communist Party able to create these material
potentialities in so short a time?
First of all by the Soviet policy of industrializing the country.
The Soviet method of industrializing the country differs radically from the
capitalist method of industrialization. In capitalist countries, industrialization
usually starts with light indus-
page 35
try. In view of the fact that light industry requires less investments, that capital
turnover is faster, and profits are made more easily than in heavy industry, light
industry becomes the first object of industrialization, in those countries. 0nly after
the passage of a long period of time, during which light industry accumulates
profits and concentrates them in the banks, only after this, does the turn of heavy
industry come and accumulation begin gradually to be transferred to heavy
industry for the purpose of creating conditions for its expansion. But this is a long
process, which takes a long time, running into several decades, during which you
have to wait while the light industry develops and do without heavy industry.
Naturally, the Communist Party, could not take this path. The Party knew that war
was approaching, that it would be impossible to defend our country without heavy
industry, that it was necessary to set to work to develop heavy industry as quickly
as possible, and that to be belated in this matter meant courting defeat. The Party
remembered what Lenin said about it being impossible to protect the
independence of our country without heavy industry, and about the likelihood of
the Soviet system perishing without heavy industry. The Communist Party of our
country therefore rejected the "ordinary" path of industrialization and commenced
the industrialization of the country by
page 36
developing heavy industry. This was a very difficult task, but one that could be
accomplished. It was greatly facilitated by the nationalization of industry and the
banks, which made it possible quickly to collect funds and transfer them to heavy
industry.
There can be no doubt that without this it would have been impossible to
transform our country into an industrial country in so short a time.
Secondly, by the policy of collectivizing agriculture.
To put an end to our backwardness in agriculture and to provide the country
with the largest possible amount of market grain, cotton, and so forth, it was
necessary to pass from small peasant farming to large-scale farming, for only
large-scale farming can employ modern machinery, utilize all the achievements of
agricultural science and provide the largest possible quantity of market produce.
But there are two kinds of large-scale farming -- capitalist and collective. The
Communist Party could not take the capitalist path of developing agriculture not
only on grounds of principle, but also because that path presupposes an
exceedingly long process of development and requires the preliminary ruination
of the peasants and their transformation into agricultural labourers. The
Communist Party therefore took the path of collectivizing
page
agriculture, the path of organizing large farms by uniting the peasant farms into
collective farm's. The collective method proved to be an exceedingly progressive