From c1b5258f810dcb71f471677f9e0d7e0fb997a602 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: femi oyesanya Date: Tue, 10 Nov 2026 20:05:47 -0600 Subject: [PATCH 1/5] feat(containment): generic out-of-band security webhook and signals contract (#879) Signed-off-by: femi oyesanya --- api/agentmesh.pb.go | 1944 ++++++++++++++--- api/agentmesh.proto | 230 ++ api/policy.go | 25 +- cmd/agentmesh-node/main.go | 62 + .../generic-containment-webhook/README.md | 408 ++++ .../generic-containment-webhook/main.go | 444 ++++ .../generic-containment-webhook/main_test.go | 483 ++++ internal/containment/client.go | 467 ++++ internal/containment/coalescer.go | 256 +++ internal/containment/config.go | 168 ++ .../containment_concurrency_test.go | 726 ++++++ .../containment_resilience_test.go | 619 ++++++ internal/containment/dispatcher.go | 236 ++ internal/containment/dispatcher_test.go | 713 ++++++ internal/containment/metrics.go | 129 ++ internal/controlplane/config.go | 5 + .../containment_controlplane_test.go | 366 ++++ .../controlplane/containment_edge_test.go | 502 +++++ internal/controlplane/server.go | 150 +- internal/node/auth_gate.go | 19 + internal/node/config.go | 46 + internal/node/containment_classifier_test.go | 361 +++ internal/node/containment_node_test.go | 411 ++++ internal/node/containment_security_test.go | 836 +++++++ internal/node/controlplane_sync.go | 5 + internal/node/egress_inspect.go | 37 + internal/node/middleware.go | 202 +- internal/node/node.go | 254 +++ internal/node/options.go | 5 + sdk/js/src/gen/agentmesh_pb.ts | 780 ++++++- .../src/agent_mesh/_proto/agentmesh_pb2.py | 467 ++-- .../src/agent_mesh/_proto/agentmesh_pb2.pyi | 1813 ++++++++------- site/content/docs/preview/sandboxed-agents.md | 116 +- site/content/docs/reference/agentmesh-node.md | 18 + .../docs/reference/containment-signals.md | 294 +++ site/content/docs/reference/node-config.md | 33 + 36 files changed, 12312 insertions(+), 1318 deletions(-) create mode 100644 development/examples/generic-containment-webhook/README.md create mode 100644 development/examples/generic-containment-webhook/main.go create mode 100644 development/examples/generic-containment-webhook/main_test.go create mode 100644 internal/containment/client.go create mode 100644 internal/containment/coalescer.go create mode 100644 internal/containment/config.go create mode 100644 internal/containment/containment_concurrency_test.go create mode 100644 internal/containment/containment_resilience_test.go create mode 100644 internal/containment/dispatcher.go create mode 100644 internal/containment/dispatcher_test.go create mode 100644 internal/containment/metrics.go create mode 100644 internal/controlplane/containment_controlplane_test.go create mode 100644 internal/controlplane/containment_edge_test.go create mode 100644 internal/node/containment_classifier_test.go create mode 100644 internal/node/containment_node_test.go create mode 100644 internal/node/containment_security_test.go create mode 100644 site/content/docs/reference/containment-signals.md diff --git a/api/agentmesh.pb.go b/api/agentmesh.pb.go index ecd9221a..a8494cd1 100644 --- a/api/agentmesh.pb.go +++ b/api/agentmesh.pb.go @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ // Code generated by protoc-gen-go. DO NOT EDIT. // versions: // protoc-gen-go v1.36.12 -// protoc v3.21.12 +// protoc v5.28.3 // source: api/agentmesh.proto package api @@ -293,6 +293,330 @@ func (ResponseInspection) EnumDescriptor() ([]byte, []int) { return file_api_agentmesh_proto_rawDescGZIP(), []int{4} } +// Direction of the caller when a security event or policy evaluation occurs. +type SignalCallerDirection int32 + +const ( + SignalCallerDirection_SIGNAL_CALLER_DIRECTION_UNSPECIFIED SignalCallerDirection = 0 + // A local workload/agent process invoking the agentmesh-node sidecar. + SignalCallerDirection_LOCAL_WORKLOAD SignalCallerDirection = 1 + // An external or remote peer sending traffic across the mesh network. + SignalCallerDirection_REMOTE_PEER SignalCallerDirection = 2 +) + +// Enum value maps for SignalCallerDirection. +var ( + SignalCallerDirection_name = map[int32]string{ + 0: "SIGNAL_CALLER_DIRECTION_UNSPECIFIED", + 1: "LOCAL_WORKLOAD", + 2: "REMOTE_PEER", + } + SignalCallerDirection_value = map[string]int32{ + "SIGNAL_CALLER_DIRECTION_UNSPECIFIED": 0, + "LOCAL_WORKLOAD": 1, + "REMOTE_PEER": 2, + } +) + +func (x SignalCallerDirection) Enum() *SignalCallerDirection { + p := new(SignalCallerDirection) + *p = x + return p +} + +func (x SignalCallerDirection) String() string { + return protoimpl.X.EnumStringOf(x.Descriptor(), protoreflect.EnumNumber(x)) +} + +func (SignalCallerDirection) Descriptor() protoreflect.EnumDescriptor { + return file_api_agentmesh_proto_enumTypes[5].Descriptor() +} + +func (SignalCallerDirection) Type() protoreflect.EnumType { + return &file_api_agentmesh_proto_enumTypes[5] +} + +func (x SignalCallerDirection) Number() protoreflect.EnumNumber { + return protoreflect.EnumNumber(x) +} + +// Deprecated: Use SignalCallerDirection.Descriptor instead. +func (SignalCallerDirection) EnumDescriptor() ([]byte, []int) { + return file_api_agentmesh_proto_rawDescGZIP(), []int{5} +} + +// Reason codes for policy evaluation denial. +type PolicyDenialReason int32 + +const ( + PolicyDenialReason_POLICY_DENIAL_REASON_UNSPECIFIED PolicyDenialReason = 0 + // Denied by Biscuit Datalog authorization policy evaluation. + PolicyDenialReason_DATALOG_EVALUATION_DENIED PolicyDenialReason = 1 + // Denied by TaskAuthorizationRule (tar_block) narrowing or operation constraints. + PolicyDenialReason_TASK_AUTHORIZATION_RULE_VIOLATION PolicyDenialReason = 2 + // Blocked by an inspection filter (ModelArmor or ExtProc). + PolicyDenialReason_INSPECTION_FILTER_BLOCKED PolicyDenialReason = 3 + // Caller does not possess the required PolicyRole. + PolicyDenialReason_ROLE_MISMATCH PolicyDenialReason = 4 + // Caller credential or Biscuit has expired. + PolicyDenialReason_EXPIRED_CREDENTIAL PolicyDenialReason = 5 + // Requested service name is not allowed by policy. + PolicyDenialReason_UNAUTHORIZED_SERVICE PolicyDenialReason = 6 + // Requested HTTP method or path pattern is not permitted by HTTPGrant. + PolicyDenialReason_UNAUTHORIZED_PATH_OR_METHOD PolicyDenialReason = 7 +) + +// Enum value maps for PolicyDenialReason. +var ( + PolicyDenialReason_name = map[int32]string{ + 0: "POLICY_DENIAL_REASON_UNSPECIFIED", + 1: "DATALOG_EVALUATION_DENIED", + 2: "TASK_AUTHORIZATION_RULE_VIOLATION", + 3: "INSPECTION_FILTER_BLOCKED", + 4: "ROLE_MISMATCH", + 5: "EXPIRED_CREDENTIAL", + 6: "UNAUTHORIZED_SERVICE", + 7: "UNAUTHORIZED_PATH_OR_METHOD", + } + PolicyDenialReason_value = map[string]int32{ + "POLICY_DENIAL_REASON_UNSPECIFIED": 0, + "DATALOG_EVALUATION_DENIED": 1, + "TASK_AUTHORIZATION_RULE_VIOLATION": 2, + "INSPECTION_FILTER_BLOCKED": 3, + "ROLE_MISMATCH": 4, + "EXPIRED_CREDENTIAL": 5, + "UNAUTHORIZED_SERVICE": 6, + "UNAUTHORIZED_PATH_OR_METHOD": 7, + } +) + +func (x PolicyDenialReason) Enum() *PolicyDenialReason { + p := new(PolicyDenialReason) + *p = x + return p +} + +func (x PolicyDenialReason) String() string { + return protoimpl.X.EnumStringOf(x.Descriptor(), protoreflect.EnumNumber(x)) +} + +func (PolicyDenialReason) Descriptor() protoreflect.EnumDescriptor { + return file_api_agentmesh_proto_enumTypes[6].Descriptor() +} + +func (PolicyDenialReason) Type() protoreflect.EnumType { + return &file_api_agentmesh_proto_enumTypes[6] +} + +func (x PolicyDenialReason) Number() protoreflect.EnumNumber { + return protoreflect.EnumNumber(x) +} + +// Deprecated: Use PolicyDenialReason.Descriptor instead. +func (PolicyDenialReason) EnumDescriptor() ([]byte, []int) { + return file_api_agentmesh_proto_rawDescGZIP(), []int{6} +} + +// Reason codes for libp2p connection or stream gate refusals. +type TransportRefusalReason int32 + +const ( + TransportRefusalReason_TRANSPORT_REFUSAL_REASON_UNSPECIFIED TransportRefusalReason = 0 + // Remote peer did not complete authentication within deadline. + TransportRefusalReason_PEER_UNAUTHENTICATED TransportRefusalReason = 1 + // Remote peer attempted to access a router-only protocol without mesh:role:router. + TransportRefusalReason_NOT_ROUTER_ROLE TransportRefusalReason = 2 + // Auth handshake wait timed out. + TransportRefusalReason_AUTH_DEADLINE_EXCEEDED TransportRefusalReason = 3 + // Remote peer is in the banned/revocation set. + TransportRefusalReason_PEER_BANNED TransportRefusalReason = 4 + // Protocol requested is not permitted for the peer's role. + TransportRefusalReason_PROTOCOL_UNAUTHORIZED TransportRefusalReason = 5 +) + +// Enum value maps for TransportRefusalReason. +var ( + TransportRefusalReason_name = map[int32]string{ + 0: "TRANSPORT_REFUSAL_REASON_UNSPECIFIED", + 1: "PEER_UNAUTHENTICATED", + 2: "NOT_ROUTER_ROLE", + 3: "AUTH_DEADLINE_EXCEEDED", + 4: "PEER_BANNED", + 5: "PROTOCOL_UNAUTHORIZED", + } + TransportRefusalReason_value = map[string]int32{ + "TRANSPORT_REFUSAL_REASON_UNSPECIFIED": 0, + "PEER_UNAUTHENTICATED": 1, + "NOT_ROUTER_ROLE": 2, + "AUTH_DEADLINE_EXCEEDED": 3, + "PEER_BANNED": 4, + "PROTOCOL_UNAUTHORIZED": 5, + } +) + +func (x TransportRefusalReason) Enum() *TransportRefusalReason { + p := new(TransportRefusalReason) + *p = x + return p +} + +func (x TransportRefusalReason) String() string { + return protoimpl.X.EnumStringOf(x.Descriptor(), protoreflect.EnumNumber(x)) +} + +func (TransportRefusalReason) Descriptor() protoreflect.EnumDescriptor { + return file_api_agentmesh_proto_enumTypes[7].Descriptor() +} + +func (TransportRefusalReason) Type() protoreflect.EnumType { + return &file_api_agentmesh_proto_enumTypes[7] +} + +func (x TransportRefusalReason) Number() protoreflect.EnumNumber { + return protoreflect.EnumNumber(x) +} + +// Deprecated: Use TransportRefusalReason.Descriptor instead. +func (TransportRefusalReason) EnumDescriptor() ([]byte, []int) { + return file_api_agentmesh_proto_rawDescGZIP(), []int{7} +} + +// Provenance/source of an identity revocation. +type RevocationSource int32 + +const ( + RevocationSource_REVOCATION_SOURCE_UNSPECIFIED RevocationSource = 0 + // Administrative action on agentmesh-control-plane. + RevocationSource_CONTROL_PLANE_ADMIN RevocationSource = 1 + // MeshEvent.BANNED received via gossip / SSE broadcast. + RevocationSource_MESH_EVENT_BANNED_GOSSIP RevocationSource = 2 + // Reconciled during control-plane synchronization. + RevocationSource_LOCAL_CONTROL_PLANE_SYNC RevocationSource = 3 + // Token refresh endpoint refused due to active ban. + RevocationSource_TOKEN_REFRESH_REJECTION RevocationSource = 4 +) + +// Enum value maps for RevocationSource. +var ( + RevocationSource_name = map[int32]string{ + 0: "REVOCATION_SOURCE_UNSPECIFIED", + 1: "CONTROL_PLANE_ADMIN", + 2: "MESH_EVENT_BANNED_GOSSIP", + 3: "LOCAL_CONTROL_PLANE_SYNC", + 4: "TOKEN_REFRESH_REJECTION", + } + RevocationSource_value = map[string]int32{ + "REVOCATION_SOURCE_UNSPECIFIED": 0, + "CONTROL_PLANE_ADMIN": 1, + "MESH_EVENT_BANNED_GOSSIP": 2, + "LOCAL_CONTROL_PLANE_SYNC": 3, + "TOKEN_REFRESH_REJECTION": 4, + } +) + +func (x RevocationSource) Enum() *RevocationSource { + p := new(RevocationSource) + *p = x + return p +} + +func (x RevocationSource) String() string { + return protoimpl.X.EnumStringOf(x.Descriptor(), protoreflect.EnumNumber(x)) +} + +func (RevocationSource) Descriptor() protoreflect.EnumDescriptor { + return file_api_agentmesh_proto_enumTypes[8].Descriptor() +} + +func (RevocationSource) Type() protoreflect.EnumType { + return &file_api_agentmesh_proto_enumTypes[8] +} + +func (x RevocationSource) Number() protoreflect.EnumNumber { + return protoreflect.EnumNumber(x) +} + +// Deprecated: Use RevocationSource.Descriptor instead. +func (RevocationSource) EnumDescriptor() ([]byte, []int) { + return file_api_agentmesh_proto_rawDescGZIP(), []int{8} +} + +// Reason codes for enrollment rejection. +type EnrollmentRejectionReason int32 + +const ( + EnrollmentRejectionReason_ENROLLMENT_REJECTION_REASON_UNSPECIFIED EnrollmentRejectionReason = 0 + // Platform JWT token validation failed (signature, audience, issuer). + EnrollmentRejectionReason_INVALID_JWT EnrollmentRejectionReason = 1 + // Bootstrap token has expired. + EnrollmentRejectionReason_EXPIRED_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN EnrollmentRejectionReason = 2 + // Bootstrap token max usage limit reached. + EnrollmentRejectionReason_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_USAGE_EXCEEDED EnrollmentRejectionReason = 3 + // Requested labels failed policy attestation. + EnrollmentRejectionReason_UNATTESTED_LABELS_REJECTED EnrollmentRejectionReason = 4 + // Proof of possession challenge signature is invalid. + EnrollmentRejectionReason_INVALID_CHALLENGE_SIGNATURE EnrollmentRejectionReason = 5 + // Requested role is not permitted for the caller identity. + EnrollmentRejectionReason_REQUESTED_ROLE_UNAUTHORIZED EnrollmentRejectionReason = 6 + // Peer is in the banned peer list. + EnrollmentRejectionReason_PEER_PREVIOUSLY_BANNED EnrollmentRejectionReason = 7 + // Autonomous token recovery is disabled for the token or node. + EnrollmentRejectionReason_AUTONOMOUS_RECOVERY_DISABLED EnrollmentRejectionReason = 8 +) + +// Enum value maps for EnrollmentRejectionReason. +var ( + EnrollmentRejectionReason_name = map[int32]string{ + 0: "ENROLLMENT_REJECTION_REASON_UNSPECIFIED", + 1: "INVALID_JWT", + 2: "EXPIRED_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN", + 3: "BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_USAGE_EXCEEDED", + 4: "UNATTESTED_LABELS_REJECTED", + 5: "INVALID_CHALLENGE_SIGNATURE", + 6: "REQUESTED_ROLE_UNAUTHORIZED", + 7: "PEER_PREVIOUSLY_BANNED", + 8: "AUTONOMOUS_RECOVERY_DISABLED", + } + EnrollmentRejectionReason_value = map[string]int32{ + "ENROLLMENT_REJECTION_REASON_UNSPECIFIED": 0, + "INVALID_JWT": 1, + "EXPIRED_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN": 2, + "BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_USAGE_EXCEEDED": 3, + "UNATTESTED_LABELS_REJECTED": 4, + "INVALID_CHALLENGE_SIGNATURE": 5, + "REQUESTED_ROLE_UNAUTHORIZED": 6, + "PEER_PREVIOUSLY_BANNED": 7, + "AUTONOMOUS_RECOVERY_DISABLED": 8, + } +) + +func (x EnrollmentRejectionReason) Enum() *EnrollmentRejectionReason { + p := new(EnrollmentRejectionReason) + *p = x + return p +} + +func (x EnrollmentRejectionReason) String() string { + return protoimpl.X.EnumStringOf(x.Descriptor(), protoreflect.EnumNumber(x)) +} + +func (EnrollmentRejectionReason) Descriptor() protoreflect.EnumDescriptor { + return file_api_agentmesh_proto_enumTypes[9].Descriptor() +} + +func (EnrollmentRejectionReason) Type() protoreflect.EnumType { + return &file_api_agentmesh_proto_enumTypes[9] +} + +func (x EnrollmentRejectionReason) Number() protoreflect.EnumNumber { + return protoreflect.EnumNumber(x) +} + +// Deprecated: Use EnrollmentRejectionReason.Descriptor instead. +func (EnrollmentRejectionReason) EnumDescriptor() ([]byte, []int) { + return file_api_agentmesh_proto_rawDescGZIP(), []int{9} +} + type RouterGoAway_Reason int32 const ( @@ -326,11 +650,11 @@ func (x RouterGoAway_Reason) String() string { } func (RouterGoAway_Reason) Descriptor() protoreflect.EnumDescriptor { - return file_api_agentmesh_proto_enumTypes[5].Descriptor() + return file_api_agentmesh_proto_enumTypes[10].Descriptor() } func (RouterGoAway_Reason) Type() protoreflect.EnumType { - return &file_api_agentmesh_proto_enumTypes[5] + return &file_api_agentmesh_proto_enumTypes[10] } func (x RouterGoAway_Reason) Number() protoreflect.EnumNumber { @@ -375,11 +699,11 @@ func (x MeshEvent_Type) String() string { } func (MeshEvent_Type) Descriptor() protoreflect.EnumDescriptor { - return file_api_agentmesh_proto_enumTypes[6].Descriptor() + return file_api_agentmesh_proto_enumTypes[11].Descriptor() } func (MeshEvent_Type) Type() protoreflect.EnumType { - return &file_api_agentmesh_proto_enumTypes[6] + return &file_api_agentmesh_proto_enumTypes[11] } func (x MeshEvent_Type) Number() protoreflect.EnumNumber { @@ -424,11 +748,11 @@ func (x ExtProcProcessingMode_HeaderMode) String() string { } func (ExtProcProcessingMode_HeaderMode) Descriptor() protoreflect.EnumDescriptor { - return file_api_agentmesh_proto_enumTypes[7].Descriptor() + return file_api_agentmesh_proto_enumTypes[12].Descriptor() } func (ExtProcProcessingMode_HeaderMode) Type() protoreflect.EnumType { - return &file_api_agentmesh_proto_enumTypes[7] + return &file_api_agentmesh_proto_enumTypes[12] } func (x ExtProcProcessingMode_HeaderMode) Number() protoreflect.EnumNumber { @@ -479,11 +803,11 @@ func (x ExtProcProcessingMode_BodyMode) String() string { } func (ExtProcProcessingMode_BodyMode) Descriptor() protoreflect.EnumDescriptor { - return file_api_agentmesh_proto_enumTypes[8].Descriptor() + return file_api_agentmesh_proto_enumTypes[13].Descriptor() } func (ExtProcProcessingMode_BodyMode) Type() protoreflect.EnumType { - return &file_api_agentmesh_proto_enumTypes[8] + return &file_api_agentmesh_proto_enumTypes[13] } func (x ExtProcProcessingMode_BodyMode) Number() protoreflect.EnumNumber { @@ -6309,117 +6633,939 @@ func (x *RevocationsResponse) GetBannedPeerIds() []string { return nil } -var File_api_agentmesh_proto protoreflect.FileDescriptor +// Emitted as CloudEvents type "agentmesh.policy.denied" when an authorization check, +// TAR rule narrowing, or inspection filter rejects a request. +type PolicyDeniedSignal struct { + state protoimpl.MessageState `protogen:"open.v1"` + // Direction of the caller: LOCAL_WORKLOAD vs REMOTE_PEER. + Direction SignalCallerDirection `protobuf:"varint,1,opt,name=direction,proto3,enum=agentmesh.v1.SignalCallerDirection" json:"direction,omitempty"` + // Structured policy denial reason code. + Reason PolicyDenialReason `protobuf:"varint,2,opt,name=reason,proto3,enum=agentmesh.v1.PolicyDenialReason" json:"reason,omitempty"` + // Human-readable detail or rejection explanation. + Detail string `protobuf:"bytes,3,opt,name=detail,proto3" json:"detail,omitempty"` + // Target service requested (e.g. "bigquery", "calculator-mcp"). + TargetService string `protobuf:"bytes,4,opt,name=target_service,json=targetService,proto3" json:"target_service,omitempty"` + // Requested operation (e.g. HTTP method "POST" or MCP tool "execute"). + RequestedOperation string `protobuf:"bytes,5,opt,name=requested_operation,json=requestedOperation,proto3" json:"requested_operation,omitempty"` + // Requested path or resource pattern (e.g. "/v1/projects/*"). + RequestedResource string `protobuf:"bytes,6,opt,name=requested_resource,json=requestedResource,proto3" json:"requested_resource,omitempty"` + // Caller peer ID (if REMOTE_PEER or known). + CallerPeerId string `protobuf:"bytes,7,opt,name=caller_peer_id,json=callerPeerId,proto3" json:"caller_peer_id,omitempty"` + // Caller principal/subject from Biscuit or JWT. + CallerSubject string `protobuf:"bytes,8,opt,name=caller_subject,json=callerSubject,proto3" json:"caller_subject,omitempty"` + // Caller roles extracted from Biscuit authority/delegation blocks. + CallerRoles []string `protobuf:"bytes,9,rep,name=caller_roles,json=callerRoles,proto3" json:"caller_roles,omitempty"` + // Attested caller labels from Biscuit. + CallerLabels map[string]string `protobuf:"bytes,10,rep,name=caller_labels,json=callerLabels,proto3" json:"caller_labels,omitempty" protobuf_key:"bytes,1,opt,name=key" protobuf_val:"bytes,2,opt,name=value"` + // Instant when policy denial occurred. Per AGENTS.md, MUST be named *_time. + EventTime *timestamppb.Timestamp `protobuf:"bytes,11,opt,name=event_time,json=eventTime,proto3" json:"event_time,omitempty"` + unknownFields protoimpl.UnknownFields + sizeCache protoimpl.SizeCache +} -const file_api_agentmesh_proto_rawDesc = "" + - "\n" + - "\x13api/agentmesh.proto\x12\fagentmesh.v1\x1a\x1egoogle/protobuf/duration.proto\x1a\x1fgoogle/protobuf/timestamp.proto\"L\n" + - "\tAuthFrame\x12\x18\n" + - "\abiscuit\x18\x01 \x01(\fR\abiscuit\x12%\n" + - "\x0etarget_service\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\rtargetService\"X\n" + - "\fAuthResponse\x12\x18\n" + - "\asuccess\x18\x01 \x01(\bR\asuccess\x12\x14\n" + - "\x05error\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\x05error\x12\x18\n" + - "\abiscuit\x18\x03 \x01(\fR\abiscuit\"\xc5\x01\n" + - "\fRouterGoAway\x129\n" + - "\x06reason\x18\x01 \x01(\x0e2!.agentmesh.v1.RouterGoAway.ReasonR\x06reason\x12:\n" + - "\vretry_after\x18\x02 \x01(\v2\x19.google.protobuf.DurationR\n" + - "retryAfter\">\n" + - "\x06Reason\x12\x16\n" + - "\x12REASON_UNSPECIFIED\x10\x00\x12\f\n" + - "\bDRAINING\x10\x01\x12\x0e\n" + - "\n" + - "OVERLOADED\x10\x02\"\x8e\x02\n" + - "\tMeshEvent\x120\n" + - "\x04type\x18\x01 \x01(\x0e2\x1c.agentmesh.v1.MeshEvent.TypeR\x04type\x12\x17\n" + - "\apeer_id\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\x06peerId\x129\n" + - "\n" + - "event_time\x18\x03 \x01(\v2\x1a.google.protobuf.TimestampR\teventTime\x12$\n" + - "\x0enew_public_key\x18\x04 \x01(\fR\fnewPublicKey\x12\x1c\n" + - "\tsignature\x18\x05 \x01(\fR\tsignature\"7\n" + - "\x04Type\x12\n" + - "\n" + - "\x06BANNED\x10\x00\x12\x10\n" + - "\fKEY_ROTATION\x10\x01\x12\x11\n" + - "\rPOLICY_UPDATE\x10\x02\"\xd9\x02\n" + - "\rEnrollRequest\x12\x10\n" + - "\x03jwt\x18\x01 \x01(\tR\x03jwt\x12\x17\n" + - "\apeer_id\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\x06peerId\x12\x1d\n" + - "\n" + - "public_key\x18\x03 \x01(\fR\tpublicKey\x12%\n" + - "\x0erequested_role\x18\x04 \x01(\tR\rrequestedRole\x12?\n" + - "\x06labels\x18\x05 \x03(\v2'.agentmesh.v1.EnrollRequest.LabelsEntryR\x06labels\x12*\n" + - "\x11challenge_unix_ms\x18\x06 \x01(\x03R\x0fchallengeUnixMs\x12/\n" + - "\x13challenge_signature\x18\a \x01(\fR\x12challengeSignature\x1a9\n" + - "\vLabelsEntry\x12\x10\n" + - "\x03key\x18\x01 \x01(\tR\x03key\x12\x14\n" + - "\x05value\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\x05value:\x028\x01\"\xfb\x01\n" + - "\x0eEnrollResponse\x12#\n" + - "\rbiscuit_token\x18\x01 \x01(\fR\fbiscuitToken\x12#\n" + - "\rerror_message\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\ferrorMessage\x127\n" + - "\x18control_plane_public_key\x18\x03 \x01(\fR\x15controlPlanePublicKey\x12)\n" + - "\x10router_addresses\x18\x04 \x03(\tR\x0frouterAddresses\x12;\n" + - "\vexpire_time\x18\x05 \x01(\v2\x1a.google.protobuf.TimestampR\n" + - "expireTime\"\x82\x03\n" + - "\x16BootstrapEnrollRequest\x12'\n" + - "\x0fbootstrap_token\x18\x01 \x01(\tR\x0ebootstrapToken\x12\x17\n" + - "\apeer_id\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\x06peerId\x12\x1d\n" + - "\n" + - "public_key\x18\x03 \x01(\fR\tpublicKey\x12%\n" + - "\x0erequested_role\x18\x04 \x01(\tR\rrequestedRole\x12H\n" + - "\x06labels\x18\x05 \x03(\v20.agentmesh.v1.BootstrapEnrollRequest.LabelsEntryR\x06labels\x12*\n" + - "\x11challenge_unix_ms\x18\x06 \x01(\x03R\x0fchallengeUnixMs\x12/\n" + - "\x13challenge_signature\x18\a \x01(\fR\x12challengeSignature\x1a9\n" + - "\vLabelsEntry\x12\x10\n" + - "\x03key\x18\x01 \x01(\tR\x03key\x12\x14\n" + - "\x05value\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\x05value:\x028\x01\"\xf0\x02\n" + - "\x17BootstrapEnrollResponse\x126\n" + - "\x06status\x18\x01 \x01(\x0e2\x1e.agentmesh.v1.EnrollmentStatusR\x06status\x12#\n" + - "\rbiscuit_token\x18\x02 \x01(\fR\fbiscuitToken\x122\n" + - "\x15poll_interval_seconds\x18\x03 \x01(\x05R\x13pollIntervalSeconds\x12#\n" + - "\rerror_message\x18\x04 \x01(\tR\ferrorMessage\x127\n" + - "\x18control_plane_public_key\x18\x05 \x01(\fR\x15controlPlanePublicKey\x12)\n" + - "\x10router_addresses\x18\x06 \x03(\tR\x0frouterAddresses\x12;\n" + - "\vexpire_time\x18\a \x01(\v2\x1a.google.protobuf.TimestampR\n" + - "expireTime\"b\n" + - "\x0eServiceIngress\x12:\n" + - "\tauth_mode\x18\x01 \x01(\x0e2\x1d.agentmesh.v1.IngressAuthModeR\bauthMode\x12\x14\n" + - "\x05allow\x18\x02 \x03(\tR\x05allow\"\xaa\x01\n" + - "\vServiceInfo\x12-\n" + - "\x04type\x18\x01 \x01(\x0e2\x19.agentmesh.v1.ServiceTypeR\x04type\x12\x12\n" + - "\x04name\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\x04name\x12 \n" + - "\vdescription\x18\x03 \x01(\tR\vdescription\x126\n" + - "\aingress\x18\x04 \x01(\v2\x1c.agentmesh.v1.ServiceIngressR\aingress\"\x9b\x01\n" + - "\x0eCommandBackend\x12\x18\n" + - "\acommand\x18\x01 \x03(\tR\acommand\x127\n" + - "\x03env\x18\x02 \x03(\v2%.agentmesh.v1.CommandBackend.EnvEntryR\x03env\x1a6\n" + - "\bEnvEntry\x12\x10\n" + - "\x03key\x18\x01 \x01(\tR\x03key\x12\x14\n" + - "\x05value\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\x05value:\x028\x01\"\xb3\x01\n" + - "\x16RegisterServiceRequest\x123\n" + - "\aservice\x18\x01 \x01(\v2\x19.agentmesh.v1.ServiceInfoR\aservice\x12\x1f\n" + - "\n" + - "target_url\x18\x02 \x01(\tH\x00R\ttargetUrl\x128\n" + - "\acommand\x18\x03 \x01(\v2\x1c.agentmesh.v1.CommandBackendH\x00R\acommandB\t\n" + - "\abackend\"\x99\x01\n" + - "\x12DiscoveredProvider\x12\x17\n" + - "\apeer_id\x18\x01 \x01(\tR\x06peerId\x12&\n" + - "\x0flocal_proxy_url\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\rlocalProxyUrl\x12\x19\n" + - "\bsrv_name\x18\x03 \x01(\tR\asrvName\x12'\n" + - "\x0fsrv_description\x18\x04 \x01(\tR\x0esrvDescription\"\xbc\x02\n" + - "\x18ControlPlaneInfoResponse\x12\x1f\n" + - "\voidc_issuer\x18\x01 \x01(\tR\n" + - "oidcIssuer\x12\x1b\n" + - "\tclient_id\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\bclientId\x12\x1a\n" + - "\baudience\x18\x03 \x01(\tR\baudience\x12)\n" + - "\x10router_addresses\x18\x04 \x03(\tR\x0frouterAddresses\x12&\n" + - "\x0fbanned_peer_ids\x18\x05 \x03(\tR\rbannedPeerIds\x122\n" + - "\arouters\x18\x06 \x03(\v2\x18.agentmesh.v1.RouterInfoR\arouters\x12?\n" + - "\tdirectory\x18\a \x01(\v2!.agentmesh.v1.DirectoryParametersR\tdirectory\"\xbb\x01\n" + - "\x13DirectoryParameters\x12 \n" + - "\vreplication\x18\x01 \x01(\x05R\vreplication\x12H\n" + - "\x12reprovide_interval\x18\x02 \x01(\v2\x19.google.protobuf.DurationR\x11reprovideInterval\x128\n" + - "\n" + +func (x *PolicyDeniedSignal) Reset() { + *x = PolicyDeniedSignal{} + mi := &file_api_agentmesh_proto_msgTypes[77] + ms := protoimpl.X.MessageStateOf(protoimpl.Pointer(x)) + ms.StoreMessageInfo(mi) +} + +func (x *PolicyDeniedSignal) String() string { + return protoimpl.X.MessageStringOf(x) +} + +func (*PolicyDeniedSignal) ProtoMessage() {} + +func (x *PolicyDeniedSignal) ProtoReflect() protoreflect.Message { + mi := &file_api_agentmesh_proto_msgTypes[77] + if x != nil { + ms := protoimpl.X.MessageStateOf(protoimpl.Pointer(x)) + if ms.LoadMessageInfo() == nil { + ms.StoreMessageInfo(mi) + } + return ms + } + return mi.MessageOf(x) +} + +// Deprecated: Use PolicyDeniedSignal.ProtoReflect.Descriptor instead. +func (*PolicyDeniedSignal) Descriptor() ([]byte, []int) { + return file_api_agentmesh_proto_rawDescGZIP(), []int{77} +} + +func (x *PolicyDeniedSignal) GetDirection() SignalCallerDirection { + if x != nil { + return x.Direction + } + return SignalCallerDirection_SIGNAL_CALLER_DIRECTION_UNSPECIFIED +} + +func (x *PolicyDeniedSignal) GetReason() PolicyDenialReason { + if x != nil { + return x.Reason + } + return PolicyDenialReason_POLICY_DENIAL_REASON_UNSPECIFIED +} + +func (x *PolicyDeniedSignal) GetDetail() string { + if x != nil { + return x.Detail + } + return "" +} + +func (x *PolicyDeniedSignal) GetTargetService() string { + if x != nil { + return x.TargetService + } + return "" +} + +func (x *PolicyDeniedSignal) GetRequestedOperation() string { + if x != nil { + return x.RequestedOperation + } + return "" +} + +func (x *PolicyDeniedSignal) GetRequestedResource() string { + if x != nil { + return x.RequestedResource + } + return "" +} + +func (x *PolicyDeniedSignal) GetCallerPeerId() string { + if x != nil { + return x.CallerPeerId + } + return "" +} + +func (x *PolicyDeniedSignal) GetCallerSubject() string { + if x != nil { + return x.CallerSubject + } + return "" +} + +func (x *PolicyDeniedSignal) GetCallerRoles() []string { + if x != nil { + return x.CallerRoles + } + return nil +} + +func (x *PolicyDeniedSignal) GetCallerLabels() map[string]string { + if x != nil { + return x.CallerLabels + } + return nil +} + +func (x *PolicyDeniedSignal) GetEventTime() *timestamppb.Timestamp { + if x != nil { + return x.EventTime + } + return nil +} + +// Emitted as CloudEvents type "agentmesh.transport.refused" when the connection +// or stream auth gate (internal/node/auth_gate.go) rejects an incoming stream/peer. +type TransportRefusedSignal struct { + state protoimpl.MessageState `protogen:"open.v1"` + // Structured reason code for transport refusal. + Reason TransportRefusalReason `protobuf:"varint,1,opt,name=reason,proto3,enum=agentmesh.v1.TransportRefusalReason" json:"reason,omitempty"` + // Human-readable detail message. + Detail string `protobuf:"bytes,2,opt,name=detail,proto3" json:"detail,omitempty"` + // Remote libp2p peer ID string. + PeerId string `protobuf:"bytes,3,opt,name=peer_id,json=peerId,proto3" json:"peer_id,omitempty"` + // Remote multiaddr string (e.g. "/ip4/192.168.1.10/tcp/4001"). + RemoteMultiaddr string `protobuf:"bytes,4,opt,name=remote_multiaddr,json=remoteMultiaddr,proto3" json:"remote_multiaddr,omitempty"` + // Protocol ID requested (e.g. "/agentmesh/auth", "/libp2p-http"). + ProtocolId string `protobuf:"bytes,5,opt,name=protocol_id,json=protocolId,proto3" json:"protocol_id,omitempty"` + // Coalesced refusal count within the deduplication window (>= 1). + CoalescedCount uint32 `protobuf:"varint,6,opt,name=coalesced_count,json=coalescedCount,proto3" json:"coalesced_count,omitempty"` + // Timestamp of the first observed rejection in this coalescing window. + FirstSeenTime *timestamppb.Timestamp `protobuf:"bytes,7,opt,name=first_seen_time,json=firstSeenTime,proto3" json:"first_seen_time,omitempty"` + // Timestamp of the most recent rejection. Per AGENTS.md, MUST be named *_time. + EventTime *timestamppb.Timestamp `protobuf:"bytes,8,opt,name=event_time,json=eventTime,proto3" json:"event_time,omitempty"` + unknownFields protoimpl.UnknownFields + sizeCache protoimpl.SizeCache +} + +func (x *TransportRefusedSignal) Reset() { + *x = TransportRefusedSignal{} + mi := &file_api_agentmesh_proto_msgTypes[78] + ms := protoimpl.X.MessageStateOf(protoimpl.Pointer(x)) + ms.StoreMessageInfo(mi) +} + +func (x *TransportRefusedSignal) String() string { + return protoimpl.X.MessageStringOf(x) +} + +func (*TransportRefusedSignal) ProtoMessage() {} + +func (x *TransportRefusedSignal) ProtoReflect() protoreflect.Message { + mi := &file_api_agentmesh_proto_msgTypes[78] + if x != nil { + ms := protoimpl.X.MessageStateOf(protoimpl.Pointer(x)) + if ms.LoadMessageInfo() == nil { + ms.StoreMessageInfo(mi) + } + return ms + } + return mi.MessageOf(x) +} + +// Deprecated: Use TransportRefusedSignal.ProtoReflect.Descriptor instead. +func (*TransportRefusedSignal) Descriptor() ([]byte, []int) { + return file_api_agentmesh_proto_rawDescGZIP(), []int{78} +} + +func (x *TransportRefusedSignal) GetReason() TransportRefusalReason { + if x != nil { + return x.Reason + } + return TransportRefusalReason_TRANSPORT_REFUSAL_REASON_UNSPECIFIED +} + +func (x *TransportRefusedSignal) GetDetail() string { + if x != nil { + return x.Detail + } + return "" +} + +func (x *TransportRefusedSignal) GetPeerId() string { + if x != nil { + return x.PeerId + } + return "" +} + +func (x *TransportRefusedSignal) GetRemoteMultiaddr() string { + if x != nil { + return x.RemoteMultiaddr + } + return "" +} + +func (x *TransportRefusedSignal) GetProtocolId() string { + if x != nil { + return x.ProtocolId + } + return "" +} + +func (x *TransportRefusedSignal) GetCoalescedCount() uint32 { + if x != nil { + return x.CoalescedCount + } + return 0 +} + +func (x *TransportRefusedSignal) GetFirstSeenTime() *timestamppb.Timestamp { + if x != nil { + return x.FirstSeenTime + } + return nil +} + +func (x *TransportRefusedSignal) GetEventTime() *timestamppb.Timestamp { + if x != nil { + return x.EventTime + } + return nil +} + +// Emitted as CloudEvents type "agentmesh.identity.revoked" when a peer identity +// or Biscuit token is revoked or banned. +type IdentityRevokedSignal struct { + state protoimpl.MessageState `protogen:"open.v1"` + // Subject peer ID that has been revoked or banned. + PeerId string `protobuf:"bytes,1,opt,name=peer_id,json=peerId,proto3" json:"peer_id,omitempty"` + // Source or trigger of the revocation. + Source RevocationSource `protobuf:"varint,2,opt,name=source,proto3,enum=agentmesh.v1.RevocationSource" json:"source,omitempty"` + // Revocation reason provided by administrator or policy. + Reason string `protobuf:"bytes,3,opt,name=reason,proto3" json:"reason,omitempty"` + // Hex-encoded Biscuit authority revocation IDs (RevocationIds()[0]). + RevocationIds []string `protobuf:"bytes,4,rep,name=revocation_ids,json=revocationIds,proto3" json:"revocation_ids,omitempty"` + // Peer ID of the node or control plane emitting the revocation. + IssuerPeerId string `protobuf:"bytes,5,opt,name=issuer_peer_id,json=issuerPeerId,proto3" json:"issuer_peer_id,omitempty"` + // Instant when the revocation occurred. Per AGENTS.md, MUST be named *_time. + EventTime *timestamppb.Timestamp `protobuf:"bytes,6,opt,name=event_time,json=eventTime,proto3" json:"event_time,omitempty"` + unknownFields protoimpl.UnknownFields + sizeCache protoimpl.SizeCache +} + +func (x *IdentityRevokedSignal) Reset() { + *x = IdentityRevokedSignal{} + mi := &file_api_agentmesh_proto_msgTypes[79] + ms := protoimpl.X.MessageStateOf(protoimpl.Pointer(x)) + ms.StoreMessageInfo(mi) +} + +func (x *IdentityRevokedSignal) String() string { + return protoimpl.X.MessageStringOf(x) +} + +func (*IdentityRevokedSignal) ProtoMessage() {} + +func (x *IdentityRevokedSignal) ProtoReflect() protoreflect.Message { + mi := &file_api_agentmesh_proto_msgTypes[79] + if x != nil { + ms := protoimpl.X.MessageStateOf(protoimpl.Pointer(x)) + if ms.LoadMessageInfo() == nil { + ms.StoreMessageInfo(mi) + } + return ms + } + return mi.MessageOf(x) +} + +// Deprecated: Use IdentityRevokedSignal.ProtoReflect.Descriptor instead. +func (*IdentityRevokedSignal) Descriptor() ([]byte, []int) { + return file_api_agentmesh_proto_rawDescGZIP(), []int{79} +} + +func (x *IdentityRevokedSignal) GetPeerId() string { + if x != nil { + return x.PeerId + } + return "" +} + +func (x *IdentityRevokedSignal) GetSource() RevocationSource { + if x != nil { + return x.Source + } + return RevocationSource_REVOCATION_SOURCE_UNSPECIFIED +} + +func (x *IdentityRevokedSignal) GetReason() string { + if x != nil { + return x.Reason + } + return "" +} + +func (x *IdentityRevokedSignal) GetRevocationIds() []string { + if x != nil { + return x.RevocationIds + } + return nil +} + +func (x *IdentityRevokedSignal) GetIssuerPeerId() string { + if x != nil { + return x.IssuerPeerId + } + return "" +} + +func (x *IdentityRevokedSignal) GetEventTime() *timestamppb.Timestamp { + if x != nil { + return x.EventTime + } + return nil +} + +// Emitted as CloudEvents type "agentmesh.enrollment.rejected" when enrollment +// or autonomous token recovery is rejected on /enroll or /refresh. +type EnrollmentRejectedSignal struct { + state protoimpl.MessageState `protogen:"open.v1"` + // Peer ID attempting enrollment or recovery. + PeerId string `protobuf:"bytes,1,opt,name=peer_id,json=peerId,proto3" json:"peer_id,omitempty"` + // Role requested in the enrollment attempt. + RequestedRole string `protobuf:"bytes,2,opt,name=requested_role,json=requestedRole,proto3" json:"requested_role,omitempty"` + // Structured reason code for rejection. + Reason EnrollmentRejectionReason `protobuf:"varint,3,opt,name=reason,proto3,enum=agentmesh.v1.EnrollmentRejectionReason" json:"reason,omitempty"` + // Human-readable detail message. + Detail string `protobuf:"bytes,4,opt,name=detail,proto3" json:"detail,omitempty"` + // Bootstrap token ID used (if bootstrap enrollment). + BootstrapTokenId string `protobuf:"bytes,5,opt,name=bootstrap_token_id,json=bootstrapTokenId,proto3" json:"bootstrap_token_id,omitempty"` + // Remote IP address or multiaddr of the enrollment requester. + RemoteAddress string `protobuf:"bytes,6,opt,name=remote_address,json=remoteAddress,proto3" json:"remote_address,omitempty"` + // Labels submitted in the enrollment request. + SubmittedLabels map[string]string `protobuf:"bytes,7,rep,name=submitted_labels,json=submittedLabels,proto3" json:"submitted_labels,omitempty" protobuf_key:"bytes,1,opt,name=key" protobuf_val:"bytes,2,opt,name=value"` + // True if this rejection occurred during an autonomous recovery attempt on /refresh. + IsAutonomousRecovery bool `protobuf:"varint,8,opt,name=is_autonomous_recovery,json=isAutonomousRecovery,proto3" json:"is_autonomous_recovery,omitempty"` + // Instant when rejection occurred. Per AGENTS.md, MUST be named *_time. + EventTime *timestamppb.Timestamp `protobuf:"bytes,9,opt,name=event_time,json=eventTime,proto3" json:"event_time,omitempty"` + unknownFields protoimpl.UnknownFields + sizeCache protoimpl.SizeCache +} + +func (x *EnrollmentRejectedSignal) Reset() { + *x = EnrollmentRejectedSignal{} + mi := &file_api_agentmesh_proto_msgTypes[80] + ms := protoimpl.X.MessageStateOf(protoimpl.Pointer(x)) + ms.StoreMessageInfo(mi) +} + +func (x *EnrollmentRejectedSignal) String() string { + return protoimpl.X.MessageStringOf(x) +} + +func (*EnrollmentRejectedSignal) ProtoMessage() {} + +func (x *EnrollmentRejectedSignal) ProtoReflect() protoreflect.Message { + mi := &file_api_agentmesh_proto_msgTypes[80] + if x != nil { + ms := protoimpl.X.MessageStateOf(protoimpl.Pointer(x)) + if ms.LoadMessageInfo() == nil { + ms.StoreMessageInfo(mi) + } + return ms + } + return mi.MessageOf(x) +} + +// Deprecated: Use EnrollmentRejectedSignal.ProtoReflect.Descriptor instead. +func (*EnrollmentRejectedSignal) Descriptor() ([]byte, []int) { + return file_api_agentmesh_proto_rawDescGZIP(), []int{80} +} + +func (x *EnrollmentRejectedSignal) GetPeerId() string { + if x != nil { + return x.PeerId + } + return "" +} + +func (x *EnrollmentRejectedSignal) GetRequestedRole() string { + if x != nil { + return x.RequestedRole + } + return "" +} + +func (x *EnrollmentRejectedSignal) GetReason() EnrollmentRejectionReason { + if x != nil { + return x.Reason + } + return EnrollmentRejectionReason_ENROLLMENT_REJECTION_REASON_UNSPECIFIED +} + +func (x *EnrollmentRejectedSignal) GetDetail() string { + if x != nil { + return x.Detail + } + return "" +} + +func (x *EnrollmentRejectedSignal) GetBootstrapTokenId() string { + if x != nil { + return x.BootstrapTokenId + } + return "" +} + +func (x *EnrollmentRejectedSignal) GetRemoteAddress() string { + if x != nil { + return x.RemoteAddress + } + return "" +} + +func (x *EnrollmentRejectedSignal) GetSubmittedLabels() map[string]string { + if x != nil { + return x.SubmittedLabels + } + return nil +} + +func (x *EnrollmentRejectedSignal) GetIsAutonomousRecovery() bool { + if x != nil { + return x.IsAutonomousRecovery + } + return false +} + +func (x *EnrollmentRejectedSignal) GetEventTime() *timestamppb.Timestamp { + if x != nil { + return x.EventTime + } + return nil +} + +// SecuritySignalEvent is the CloudEvents 1.0 compliant envelope for dispatching +// security state transitions to external runtimes over HTTP or Unix sockets. +type SecuritySignalEvent struct { + state protoimpl.MessageState `protogen:"open.v1"` + // CloudEvents 'id': Unique event identifier (UUID v4). + Id string `protobuf:"bytes,1,opt,name=id,proto3" json:"id,omitempty"` + // CloudEvents 'source': URI identifying the emitting context (e.g. "urn:agentmesh:node:"). + Source string `protobuf:"bytes,2,opt,name=source,proto3" json:"source,omitempty"` + // CloudEvents 'specversion': The CloudEvents specification version (always "1.0"). + SpecVersion string `protobuf:"bytes,3,opt,name=spec_version,json=specVersion,proto3" json:"spec_version,omitempty"` + // CloudEvents 'type': Event type (e.g. "agentmesh.policy.denied"). + Type string `protobuf:"bytes,4,opt,name=type,proto3" json:"type,omitempty"` + // CloudEvents 'time': Event generation instant. Per AGENTS.md, MUST be named *_time. + EventTime *timestamppb.Timestamp `protobuf:"bytes,5,opt,name=event_time,json=eventTime,proto3" json:"event_time,omitempty"` + // CloudEvents 'datacontenttype': MIME type ("application/json" or "application/x-protobuf"). + DataContentType string `protobuf:"bytes,6,opt,name=data_content_type,json=dataContentType,proto3" json:"data_content_type,omitempty"` + // CloudEvents 'subject': Subject peer ID or identifier. + Subject string `protobuf:"bytes,7,opt,name=subject,proto3" json:"subject,omitempty"` + // Typed signal payload (mutually exclusive). + // + // Types that are valid to be assigned to Data: + // + // *SecuritySignalEvent_PolicyDenied + // *SecuritySignalEvent_TransportRefused + // *SecuritySignalEvent_IdentityRevoked + // *SecuritySignalEvent_EnrollmentRejected + Data isSecuritySignalEvent_Data `protobuf_oneof:"data"` + unknownFields protoimpl.UnknownFields + sizeCache protoimpl.SizeCache +} + +func (x *SecuritySignalEvent) Reset() { + *x = SecuritySignalEvent{} + mi := &file_api_agentmesh_proto_msgTypes[81] + ms := protoimpl.X.MessageStateOf(protoimpl.Pointer(x)) + ms.StoreMessageInfo(mi) +} + +func (x *SecuritySignalEvent) String() string { + return protoimpl.X.MessageStringOf(x) +} + +func (*SecuritySignalEvent) ProtoMessage() {} + +func (x *SecuritySignalEvent) ProtoReflect() protoreflect.Message { + mi := &file_api_agentmesh_proto_msgTypes[81] + if x != nil { + ms := protoimpl.X.MessageStateOf(protoimpl.Pointer(x)) + if ms.LoadMessageInfo() == nil { + ms.StoreMessageInfo(mi) + } + return ms + } + return mi.MessageOf(x) +} + +// Deprecated: Use SecuritySignalEvent.ProtoReflect.Descriptor instead. +func (*SecuritySignalEvent) Descriptor() ([]byte, []int) { + return file_api_agentmesh_proto_rawDescGZIP(), []int{81} +} + +func (x *SecuritySignalEvent) GetId() string { + if x != nil { + return x.Id + } + return "" +} + +func (x *SecuritySignalEvent) GetSource() string { + if x != nil { + return x.Source + } + return "" +} + +func (x *SecuritySignalEvent) GetSpecVersion() string { + if x != nil { + return x.SpecVersion + } + return "" +} + +func (x *SecuritySignalEvent) GetType() string { + if x != nil { + return x.Type + } + return "" +} + +func (x *SecuritySignalEvent) GetEventTime() *timestamppb.Timestamp { + if x != nil { + return x.EventTime + } + return nil +} + +func (x *SecuritySignalEvent) GetDataContentType() string { + if x != nil { + return x.DataContentType + } + return "" +} + +func (x *SecuritySignalEvent) GetSubject() string { + if x != nil { + return x.Subject + } + return "" +} + +func (x *SecuritySignalEvent) GetData() isSecuritySignalEvent_Data { + if x != nil { + return x.Data + } + return nil +} + +func (x *SecuritySignalEvent) GetPolicyDenied() *PolicyDeniedSignal { + if x != nil { + if x, ok := x.Data.(*SecuritySignalEvent_PolicyDenied); ok { + return x.PolicyDenied + } + } + return nil +} + +func (x *SecuritySignalEvent) GetTransportRefused() *TransportRefusedSignal { + if x != nil { + if x, ok := x.Data.(*SecuritySignalEvent_TransportRefused); ok { + return x.TransportRefused + } + } + return nil +} + +func (x *SecuritySignalEvent) GetIdentityRevoked() *IdentityRevokedSignal { + if x != nil { + if x, ok := x.Data.(*SecuritySignalEvent_IdentityRevoked); ok { + return x.IdentityRevoked + } + } + return nil +} + +func (x *SecuritySignalEvent) GetEnrollmentRejected() *EnrollmentRejectedSignal { + if x != nil { + if x, ok := x.Data.(*SecuritySignalEvent_EnrollmentRejected); ok { + return x.EnrollmentRejected + } + } + return nil +} + +type isSecuritySignalEvent_Data interface { + isSecuritySignalEvent_Data() +} + +type SecuritySignalEvent_PolicyDenied struct { + PolicyDenied *PolicyDeniedSignal `protobuf:"bytes,8,opt,name=policy_denied,json=policyDenied,proto3,oneof"` +} + +type SecuritySignalEvent_TransportRefused struct { + TransportRefused *TransportRefusedSignal `protobuf:"bytes,9,opt,name=transport_refused,json=transportRefused,proto3,oneof"` +} + +type SecuritySignalEvent_IdentityRevoked struct { + IdentityRevoked *IdentityRevokedSignal `protobuf:"bytes,10,opt,name=identity_revoked,json=identityRevoked,proto3,oneof"` +} + +type SecuritySignalEvent_EnrollmentRejected struct { + EnrollmentRejected *EnrollmentRejectedSignal `protobuf:"bytes,11,opt,name=enrollment_rejected,json=enrollmentRejected,proto3,oneof"` +} + +func (*SecuritySignalEvent_PolicyDenied) isSecuritySignalEvent_Data() {} + +func (*SecuritySignalEvent_TransportRefused) isSecuritySignalEvent_Data() {} + +func (*SecuritySignalEvent_IdentityRevoked) isSecuritySignalEvent_Data() {} + +func (*SecuritySignalEvent_EnrollmentRejected) isSecuritySignalEvent_Data() {} + +// WebhookEndpointConfig defines a single outbound destination for security signals. +type WebhookEndpointConfig struct { + state protoimpl.MessageState `protogen:"open.v1"` + // Target URL: https://..., http://127.0.0.1:, or unix:/path/to.sock. + Url string `protobuf:"bytes,1,opt,name=url,proto3" json:"url,omitempty"` + // File path to the shared secret for HMAC-SHA256 signing (X-AgentMesh-Signature). + // Per AGENTS.md secret hygiene, MUST be a file path, never an inline secret string. + HmacSecretPath string `protobuf:"bytes,2,opt,name=hmac_secret_path,json=hmacSecretPath,proto3" json:"hmac_secret_path,omitempty"` + // File path to CA certificate bundle for server TLS verification. + CaCertPath string `protobuf:"bytes,3,opt,name=ca_cert_path,json=caCertPath,proto3" json:"ca_cert_path,omitempty"` + // File path to client TLS certificate for mTLS authentication. + ClientCertPath string `protobuf:"bytes,4,opt,name=client_cert_path,json=clientCertPath,proto3" json:"client_cert_path,omitempty"` + // File path to client TLS private key for mTLS authentication. + ClientKeyPath string `protobuf:"bytes,5,opt,name=client_key_path,json=clientKeyPath,proto3" json:"client_key_path,omitempty"` + // Per-dispatch HTTP request / socket write deadline. + Timeout *durationpb.Duration `protobuf:"bytes,6,opt,name=timeout,proto3" json:"timeout,omitempty"` + // Maximum retry attempts for transient delivery failures (default: 3). + MaxRetries uint32 `protobuf:"varint,7,opt,name=max_retries,json=maxRetries,proto3" json:"max_retries,omitempty"` + // Filter list of event types to dispatch. If empty, all signals are sent. + EventTypes []string `protobuf:"bytes,8,rep,name=event_types,json=eventTypes,proto3" json:"event_types,omitempty"` + unknownFields protoimpl.UnknownFields + sizeCache protoimpl.SizeCache +} + +func (x *WebhookEndpointConfig) Reset() { + *x = WebhookEndpointConfig{} + mi := &file_api_agentmesh_proto_msgTypes[82] + ms := protoimpl.X.MessageStateOf(protoimpl.Pointer(x)) + ms.StoreMessageInfo(mi) +} + +func (x *WebhookEndpointConfig) String() string { + return protoimpl.X.MessageStringOf(x) +} + +func (*WebhookEndpointConfig) ProtoMessage() {} + +func (x *WebhookEndpointConfig) ProtoReflect() protoreflect.Message { + mi := &file_api_agentmesh_proto_msgTypes[82] + if x != nil { + ms := protoimpl.X.MessageStateOf(protoimpl.Pointer(x)) + if ms.LoadMessageInfo() == nil { + ms.StoreMessageInfo(mi) + } + return ms + } + return mi.MessageOf(x) +} + +// Deprecated: Use WebhookEndpointConfig.ProtoReflect.Descriptor instead. +func (*WebhookEndpointConfig) Descriptor() ([]byte, []int) { + return file_api_agentmesh_proto_rawDescGZIP(), []int{82} +} + +func (x *WebhookEndpointConfig) GetUrl() string { + if x != nil { + return x.Url + } + return "" +} + +func (x *WebhookEndpointConfig) GetHmacSecretPath() string { + if x != nil { + return x.HmacSecretPath + } + return "" +} + +func (x *WebhookEndpointConfig) GetCaCertPath() string { + if x != nil { + return x.CaCertPath + } + return "" +} + +func (x *WebhookEndpointConfig) GetClientCertPath() string { + if x != nil { + return x.ClientCertPath + } + return "" +} + +func (x *WebhookEndpointConfig) GetClientKeyPath() string { + if x != nil { + return x.ClientKeyPath + } + return "" +} + +func (x *WebhookEndpointConfig) GetTimeout() *durationpb.Duration { + if x != nil { + return x.Timeout + } + return nil +} + +func (x *WebhookEndpointConfig) GetMaxRetries() uint32 { + if x != nil { + return x.MaxRetries + } + return 0 +} + +func (x *WebhookEndpointConfig) GetEventTypes() []string { + if x != nil { + return x.EventTypes + } + return nil +} + +// SecuritySignalsConfig configures out-of-band security signal dispatching. +type SecuritySignalsConfig struct { + state protoimpl.MessageState `protogen:"open.v1"` + // True if security signal dispatching is enabled. + Enabled bool `protobuf:"varint,1,opt,name=enabled,proto3" json:"enabled,omitempty"` + // Destination endpoints. + Endpoints []*WebhookEndpointConfig `protobuf:"bytes,2,rep,name=endpoints,proto3" json:"endpoints,omitempty"` + // Bounded ring-buffer queue capacity (default: 1024). + QueueCapacity uint32 `protobuf:"varint,3,opt,name=queue_capacity,json=queueCapacity,proto3" json:"queue_capacity,omitempty"` + // Window duration for coalescing repetitive events. + CoalescingWindow *durationpb.Duration `protobuf:"bytes,4,opt,name=coalescing_window,json=coalescingWindow,proto3" json:"coalescing_window,omitempty"` + unknownFields protoimpl.UnknownFields + sizeCache protoimpl.SizeCache +} + +func (x *SecuritySignalsConfig) Reset() { + *x = SecuritySignalsConfig{} + mi := &file_api_agentmesh_proto_msgTypes[83] + ms := protoimpl.X.MessageStateOf(protoimpl.Pointer(x)) + ms.StoreMessageInfo(mi) +} + +func (x *SecuritySignalsConfig) String() string { + return protoimpl.X.MessageStringOf(x) +} + +func (*SecuritySignalsConfig) ProtoMessage() {} + +func (x *SecuritySignalsConfig) ProtoReflect() protoreflect.Message { + mi := &file_api_agentmesh_proto_msgTypes[83] + if x != nil { + ms := protoimpl.X.MessageStateOf(protoimpl.Pointer(x)) + if ms.LoadMessageInfo() == nil { + ms.StoreMessageInfo(mi) + } + return ms + } + return mi.MessageOf(x) +} + +// Deprecated: Use SecuritySignalsConfig.ProtoReflect.Descriptor instead. +func (*SecuritySignalsConfig) Descriptor() ([]byte, []int) { + return file_api_agentmesh_proto_rawDescGZIP(), []int{83} +} + +func (x *SecuritySignalsConfig) GetEnabled() bool { + if x != nil { + return x.Enabled + } + return false +} + +func (x *SecuritySignalsConfig) GetEndpoints() []*WebhookEndpointConfig { + if x != nil { + return x.Endpoints + } + return nil +} + +func (x *SecuritySignalsConfig) GetQueueCapacity() uint32 { + if x != nil { + return x.QueueCapacity + } + return 0 +} + +func (x *SecuritySignalsConfig) GetCoalescingWindow() *durationpb.Duration { + if x != nil { + return x.CoalescingWindow + } + return nil +} + +var File_api_agentmesh_proto protoreflect.FileDescriptor + +const file_api_agentmesh_proto_rawDesc = "" + + "\n" + + "\x13api/agentmesh.proto\x12\fagentmesh.v1\x1a\x1egoogle/protobuf/duration.proto\x1a\x1fgoogle/protobuf/timestamp.proto\"L\n" + + "\tAuthFrame\x12\x18\n" + + "\abiscuit\x18\x01 \x01(\fR\abiscuit\x12%\n" + + "\x0etarget_service\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\rtargetService\"X\n" + + "\fAuthResponse\x12\x18\n" + + "\asuccess\x18\x01 \x01(\bR\asuccess\x12\x14\n" + + "\x05error\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\x05error\x12\x18\n" + + "\abiscuit\x18\x03 \x01(\fR\abiscuit\"\xc5\x01\n" + + "\fRouterGoAway\x129\n" + + "\x06reason\x18\x01 \x01(\x0e2!.agentmesh.v1.RouterGoAway.ReasonR\x06reason\x12:\n" + + "\vretry_after\x18\x02 \x01(\v2\x19.google.protobuf.DurationR\n" + + "retryAfter\">\n" + + "\x06Reason\x12\x16\n" + + "\x12REASON_UNSPECIFIED\x10\x00\x12\f\n" + + "\bDRAINING\x10\x01\x12\x0e\n" + + "\n" + + "OVERLOADED\x10\x02\"\x8e\x02\n" + + "\tMeshEvent\x120\n" + + "\x04type\x18\x01 \x01(\x0e2\x1c.agentmesh.v1.MeshEvent.TypeR\x04type\x12\x17\n" + + "\apeer_id\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\x06peerId\x129\n" + + "\n" + + "event_time\x18\x03 \x01(\v2\x1a.google.protobuf.TimestampR\teventTime\x12$\n" + + "\x0enew_public_key\x18\x04 \x01(\fR\fnewPublicKey\x12\x1c\n" + + "\tsignature\x18\x05 \x01(\fR\tsignature\"7\n" + + "\x04Type\x12\n" + + "\n" + + "\x06BANNED\x10\x00\x12\x10\n" + + "\fKEY_ROTATION\x10\x01\x12\x11\n" + + "\rPOLICY_UPDATE\x10\x02\"\xd9\x02\n" + + "\rEnrollRequest\x12\x10\n" + + "\x03jwt\x18\x01 \x01(\tR\x03jwt\x12\x17\n" + + "\apeer_id\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\x06peerId\x12\x1d\n" + + "\n" + + "public_key\x18\x03 \x01(\fR\tpublicKey\x12%\n" + + "\x0erequested_role\x18\x04 \x01(\tR\rrequestedRole\x12?\n" + + "\x06labels\x18\x05 \x03(\v2'.agentmesh.v1.EnrollRequest.LabelsEntryR\x06labels\x12*\n" + + "\x11challenge_unix_ms\x18\x06 \x01(\x03R\x0fchallengeUnixMs\x12/\n" + + "\x13challenge_signature\x18\a \x01(\fR\x12challengeSignature\x1a9\n" + + "\vLabelsEntry\x12\x10\n" + + "\x03key\x18\x01 \x01(\tR\x03key\x12\x14\n" + + "\x05value\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\x05value:\x028\x01\"\xfb\x01\n" + + "\x0eEnrollResponse\x12#\n" + + "\rbiscuit_token\x18\x01 \x01(\fR\fbiscuitToken\x12#\n" + + "\rerror_message\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\ferrorMessage\x127\n" + + "\x18control_plane_public_key\x18\x03 \x01(\fR\x15controlPlanePublicKey\x12)\n" + + "\x10router_addresses\x18\x04 \x03(\tR\x0frouterAddresses\x12;\n" + + "\vexpire_time\x18\x05 \x01(\v2\x1a.google.protobuf.TimestampR\n" + + "expireTime\"\x82\x03\n" + + "\x16BootstrapEnrollRequest\x12'\n" + + "\x0fbootstrap_token\x18\x01 \x01(\tR\x0ebootstrapToken\x12\x17\n" + + "\apeer_id\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\x06peerId\x12\x1d\n" + + "\n" + + "public_key\x18\x03 \x01(\fR\tpublicKey\x12%\n" + + "\x0erequested_role\x18\x04 \x01(\tR\rrequestedRole\x12H\n" + + "\x06labels\x18\x05 \x03(\v20.agentmesh.v1.BootstrapEnrollRequest.LabelsEntryR\x06labels\x12*\n" + + "\x11challenge_unix_ms\x18\x06 \x01(\x03R\x0fchallengeUnixMs\x12/\n" + + "\x13challenge_signature\x18\a \x01(\fR\x12challengeSignature\x1a9\n" + + "\vLabelsEntry\x12\x10\n" + + "\x03key\x18\x01 \x01(\tR\x03key\x12\x14\n" + + "\x05value\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\x05value:\x028\x01\"\xf0\x02\n" + + "\x17BootstrapEnrollResponse\x126\n" + + "\x06status\x18\x01 \x01(\x0e2\x1e.agentmesh.v1.EnrollmentStatusR\x06status\x12#\n" + + "\rbiscuit_token\x18\x02 \x01(\fR\fbiscuitToken\x122\n" + + "\x15poll_interval_seconds\x18\x03 \x01(\x05R\x13pollIntervalSeconds\x12#\n" + + "\rerror_message\x18\x04 \x01(\tR\ferrorMessage\x127\n" + + "\x18control_plane_public_key\x18\x05 \x01(\fR\x15controlPlanePublicKey\x12)\n" + + "\x10router_addresses\x18\x06 \x03(\tR\x0frouterAddresses\x12;\n" + + "\vexpire_time\x18\a \x01(\v2\x1a.google.protobuf.TimestampR\n" + + "expireTime\"b\n" + + "\x0eServiceIngress\x12:\n" + + "\tauth_mode\x18\x01 \x01(\x0e2\x1d.agentmesh.v1.IngressAuthModeR\bauthMode\x12\x14\n" + + "\x05allow\x18\x02 \x03(\tR\x05allow\"\xaa\x01\n" + + "\vServiceInfo\x12-\n" + + "\x04type\x18\x01 \x01(\x0e2\x19.agentmesh.v1.ServiceTypeR\x04type\x12\x12\n" + + "\x04name\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\x04name\x12 \n" + + "\vdescription\x18\x03 \x01(\tR\vdescription\x126\n" + + "\aingress\x18\x04 \x01(\v2\x1c.agentmesh.v1.ServiceIngressR\aingress\"\x9b\x01\n" + + "\x0eCommandBackend\x12\x18\n" + + "\acommand\x18\x01 \x03(\tR\acommand\x127\n" + + "\x03env\x18\x02 \x03(\v2%.agentmesh.v1.CommandBackend.EnvEntryR\x03env\x1a6\n" + + "\bEnvEntry\x12\x10\n" + + "\x03key\x18\x01 \x01(\tR\x03key\x12\x14\n" + + "\x05value\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\x05value:\x028\x01\"\xb3\x01\n" + + "\x16RegisterServiceRequest\x123\n" + + "\aservice\x18\x01 \x01(\v2\x19.agentmesh.v1.ServiceInfoR\aservice\x12\x1f\n" + + "\n" + + "target_url\x18\x02 \x01(\tH\x00R\ttargetUrl\x128\n" + + "\acommand\x18\x03 \x01(\v2\x1c.agentmesh.v1.CommandBackendH\x00R\acommandB\t\n" + + "\abackend\"\x99\x01\n" + + "\x12DiscoveredProvider\x12\x17\n" + + "\apeer_id\x18\x01 \x01(\tR\x06peerId\x12&\n" + + "\x0flocal_proxy_url\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\rlocalProxyUrl\x12\x19\n" + + "\bsrv_name\x18\x03 \x01(\tR\asrvName\x12'\n" + + "\x0fsrv_description\x18\x04 \x01(\tR\x0esrvDescription\"\xbc\x02\n" + + "\x18ControlPlaneInfoResponse\x12\x1f\n" + + "\voidc_issuer\x18\x01 \x01(\tR\n" + + "oidcIssuer\x12\x1b\n" + + "\tclient_id\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\bclientId\x12\x1a\n" + + "\baudience\x18\x03 \x01(\tR\baudience\x12)\n" + + "\x10router_addresses\x18\x04 \x03(\tR\x0frouterAddresses\x12&\n" + + "\x0fbanned_peer_ids\x18\x05 \x03(\tR\rbannedPeerIds\x122\n" + + "\arouters\x18\x06 \x03(\v2\x18.agentmesh.v1.RouterInfoR\arouters\x12?\n" + + "\tdirectory\x18\a \x01(\v2!.agentmesh.v1.DirectoryParametersR\tdirectory\"\xbb\x01\n" + + "\x13DirectoryParameters\x12 \n" + + "\vreplication\x18\x01 \x01(\x05R\vreplication\x12H\n" + + "\x12reprovide_interval\x18\x02 \x01(\v2\x19.google.protobuf.DurationR\x11reprovideInterval\x128\n" + + "\n" + "record_ttl\x18\x03 \x01(\v2\x19.google.protobuf.DurationR\trecordTtl\"\xa7\x02\n" + "\x10DirectoryRequest\x12:\n" + "\aprovide\x18\x01 \x01(\v2\x1e.agentmesh.v1.DirectoryProvideH\x00R\aprovide\x12M\n" + @@ -6808,7 +7954,89 @@ const file_api_agentmesh_proto_rawDesc = "" + "\ttask_name\x18\x05 \x01(\tR\btaskName\"d\n" + "\x13RevocationsResponse\x12%\n" + "\x0erevocation_ids\x18\x01 \x03(\tR\rrevocationIds\x12&\n" + - "\x0fbanned_peer_ids\x18\x02 \x03(\tR\rbannedPeerIds*\x94\x01\n" + + "\x0fbanned_peer_ids\x18\x02 \x03(\tR\rbannedPeerIds\"\xf5\x04\n" + + "\x12PolicyDeniedSignal\x12A\n" + + "\tdirection\x18\x01 \x01(\x0e2#.agentmesh.v1.SignalCallerDirectionR\tdirection\x128\n" + + "\x06reason\x18\x02 \x01(\x0e2 .agentmesh.v1.PolicyDenialReasonR\x06reason\x12\x16\n" + + "\x06detail\x18\x03 \x01(\tR\x06detail\x12%\n" + + "\x0etarget_service\x18\x04 \x01(\tR\rtargetService\x12/\n" + + "\x13requested_operation\x18\x05 \x01(\tR\x12requestedOperation\x12-\n" + + "\x12requested_resource\x18\x06 \x01(\tR\x11requestedResource\x12$\n" + + "\x0ecaller_peer_id\x18\a \x01(\tR\fcallerPeerId\x12%\n" + + "\x0ecaller_subject\x18\b \x01(\tR\rcallerSubject\x12!\n" + + "\fcaller_roles\x18\t \x03(\tR\vcallerRoles\x12W\n" + + "\rcaller_labels\x18\n" + + " \x03(\v22.agentmesh.v1.PolicyDeniedSignal.CallerLabelsEntryR\fcallerLabels\x129\n" + + "\n" + + "event_time\x18\v \x01(\v2\x1a.google.protobuf.TimestampR\teventTime\x1a?\n" + + "\x11CallerLabelsEntry\x12\x10\n" + + "\x03key\x18\x01 \x01(\tR\x03key\x12\x14\n" + + "\x05value\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\x05value:\x028\x01\"\xfb\x02\n" + + "\x16TransportRefusedSignal\x12<\n" + + "\x06reason\x18\x01 \x01(\x0e2$.agentmesh.v1.TransportRefusalReasonR\x06reason\x12\x16\n" + + "\x06detail\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\x06detail\x12\x17\n" + + "\apeer_id\x18\x03 \x01(\tR\x06peerId\x12)\n" + + "\x10remote_multiaddr\x18\x04 \x01(\tR\x0fremoteMultiaddr\x12\x1f\n" + + "\vprotocol_id\x18\x05 \x01(\tR\n" + + "protocolId\x12'\n" + + "\x0fcoalesced_count\x18\x06 \x01(\rR\x0ecoalescedCount\x12B\n" + + "\x0ffirst_seen_time\x18\a \x01(\v2\x1a.google.protobuf.TimestampR\rfirstSeenTime\x129\n" + + "\n" + + "event_time\x18\b \x01(\v2\x1a.google.protobuf.TimestampR\teventTime\"\x88\x02\n" + + "\x15IdentityRevokedSignal\x12\x17\n" + + "\apeer_id\x18\x01 \x01(\tR\x06peerId\x126\n" + + "\x06source\x18\x02 \x01(\x0e2\x1e.agentmesh.v1.RevocationSourceR\x06source\x12\x16\n" + + "\x06reason\x18\x03 \x01(\tR\x06reason\x12%\n" + + "\x0erevocation_ids\x18\x04 \x03(\tR\rrevocationIds\x12$\n" + + "\x0eissuer_peer_id\x18\x05 \x01(\tR\fissuerPeerId\x129\n" + + "\n" + + "event_time\x18\x06 \x01(\v2\x1a.google.protobuf.TimestampR\teventTime\"\xa5\x04\n" + + "\x18EnrollmentRejectedSignal\x12\x17\n" + + "\apeer_id\x18\x01 \x01(\tR\x06peerId\x12%\n" + + "\x0erequested_role\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\rrequestedRole\x12?\n" + + "\x06reason\x18\x03 \x01(\x0e2'.agentmesh.v1.EnrollmentRejectionReasonR\x06reason\x12\x16\n" + + "\x06detail\x18\x04 \x01(\tR\x06detail\x12,\n" + + "\x12bootstrap_token_id\x18\x05 \x01(\tR\x10bootstrapTokenId\x12%\n" + + "\x0eremote_address\x18\x06 \x01(\tR\rremoteAddress\x12f\n" + + "\x10submitted_labels\x18\a \x03(\v2;.agentmesh.v1.EnrollmentRejectedSignal.SubmittedLabelsEntryR\x0fsubmittedLabels\x124\n" + + "\x16is_autonomous_recovery\x18\b \x01(\bR\x14isAutonomousRecovery\x129\n" + + "\n" + + "event_time\x18\t \x01(\v2\x1a.google.protobuf.TimestampR\teventTime\x1aB\n" + + "\x14SubmittedLabelsEntry\x12\x10\n" + + "\x03key\x18\x01 \x01(\tR\x03key\x12\x14\n" + + "\x05value\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\x05value:\x028\x01\"\xc8\x04\n" + + "\x13SecuritySignalEvent\x12\x0e\n" + + "\x02id\x18\x01 \x01(\tR\x02id\x12\x16\n" + + "\x06source\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\x06source\x12!\n" + + "\fspec_version\x18\x03 \x01(\tR\vspecVersion\x12\x12\n" + + "\x04type\x18\x04 \x01(\tR\x04type\x129\n" + + "\n" + + "event_time\x18\x05 \x01(\v2\x1a.google.protobuf.TimestampR\teventTime\x12*\n" + + "\x11data_content_type\x18\x06 \x01(\tR\x0fdataContentType\x12\x18\n" + + "\asubject\x18\a \x01(\tR\asubject\x12G\n" + + "\rpolicy_denied\x18\b \x01(\v2 .agentmesh.v1.PolicyDeniedSignalH\x00R\fpolicyDenied\x12S\n" + + "\x11transport_refused\x18\t \x01(\v2$.agentmesh.v1.TransportRefusedSignalH\x00R\x10transportRefused\x12P\n" + + "\x10identity_revoked\x18\n" + + " \x01(\v2#.agentmesh.v1.IdentityRevokedSignalH\x00R\x0fidentityRevoked\x12Y\n" + + "\x13enrollment_rejected\x18\v \x01(\v2&.agentmesh.v1.EnrollmentRejectedSignalH\x00R\x12enrollmentRejectedB\x06\n" + + "\x04data\"\xbe\x02\n" + + "\x15WebhookEndpointConfig\x12\x10\n" + + "\x03url\x18\x01 \x01(\tR\x03url\x12(\n" + + "\x10hmac_secret_path\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\x0ehmacSecretPath\x12 \n" + + "\fca_cert_path\x18\x03 \x01(\tR\n" + + "caCertPath\x12(\n" + + "\x10client_cert_path\x18\x04 \x01(\tR\x0eclientCertPath\x12&\n" + + "\x0fclient_key_path\x18\x05 \x01(\tR\rclientKeyPath\x123\n" + + "\atimeout\x18\x06 \x01(\v2\x19.google.protobuf.DurationR\atimeout\x12\x1f\n" + + "\vmax_retries\x18\a \x01(\rR\n" + + "maxRetries\x12\x1f\n" + + "\vevent_types\x18\b \x03(\tR\n" + + "eventTypes\"\xe3\x01\n" + + "\x15SecuritySignalsConfig\x12\x18\n" + + "\aenabled\x18\x01 \x01(\bR\aenabled\x12A\n" + + "\tendpoints\x18\x02 \x03(\v2#.agentmesh.v1.WebhookEndpointConfigR\tendpoints\x12%\n" + + "\x0equeue_capacity\x18\x03 \x01(\rR\rqueueCapacity\x12F\n" + + "\x11coalescing_window\x18\x04 \x01(\v2\x19.google.protobuf.DurationR\x10coalescingWindow*\x94\x01\n" + "\x10EnrollmentStatus\x12!\n" + "\x1dENROLLMENT_STATUS_UNSPECIFIED\x10\x00\x12\x1d\n" + "\x19ENROLLMENT_STATUS_PENDING\x10\x01\x12\x1e\n" + @@ -6830,7 +8058,43 @@ const file_api_agentmesh_proto_rawDesc = "" + "\x0fEGRESS_MODE_TCP\x10\x01*\\\n" + "\x12ResponseInspection\x12 \n" + "\x1cRESPONSE_INSPECTION_BUFFERED\x10\x00\x12$\n" + - " RESPONSE_INSPECTION_REQUEST_ONLY\x10\x01B!Z\x1fgithub.com/google/agentmesh/apib\x06proto3" + " RESPONSE_INSPECTION_REQUEST_ONLY\x10\x01*e\n" + + "\x15SignalCallerDirection\x12'\n" + + "#SIGNAL_CALLER_DIRECTION_UNSPECIFIED\x10\x00\x12\x12\n" + + "\x0eLOCAL_WORKLOAD\x10\x01\x12\x0f\n" + + "\vREMOTE_PEER\x10\x02*\x85\x02\n" + + "\x12PolicyDenialReason\x12$\n" + + " POLICY_DENIAL_REASON_UNSPECIFIED\x10\x00\x12\x1d\n" + + "\x19DATALOG_EVALUATION_DENIED\x10\x01\x12%\n" + + "!TASK_AUTHORIZATION_RULE_VIOLATION\x10\x02\x12\x1d\n" + + "\x19INSPECTION_FILTER_BLOCKED\x10\x03\x12\x11\n" + + "\rROLE_MISMATCH\x10\x04\x12\x16\n" + + "\x12EXPIRED_CREDENTIAL\x10\x05\x12\x18\n" + + "\x14UNAUTHORIZED_SERVICE\x10\x06\x12\x1f\n" + + "\x1bUNAUTHORIZED_PATH_OR_METHOD\x10\a*\xb9\x01\n" + + "\x16TransportRefusalReason\x12(\n" + + "$TRANSPORT_REFUSAL_REASON_UNSPECIFIED\x10\x00\x12\x18\n" + + "\x14PEER_UNAUTHENTICATED\x10\x01\x12\x13\n" + + "\x0fNOT_ROUTER_ROLE\x10\x02\x12\x1a\n" + + "\x16AUTH_DEADLINE_EXCEEDED\x10\x03\x12\x0f\n" + + "\vPEER_BANNED\x10\x04\x12\x19\n" + + "\x15PROTOCOL_UNAUTHORIZED\x10\x05*\xa7\x01\n" + + "\x10RevocationSource\x12!\n" + + "\x1dREVOCATION_SOURCE_UNSPECIFIED\x10\x00\x12\x17\n" + + "\x13CONTROL_PLANE_ADMIN\x10\x01\x12\x1c\n" + + "\x18MESH_EVENT_BANNED_GOSSIP\x10\x02\x12\x1c\n" + + "\x18LOCAL_CONTROL_PLANE_SYNC\x10\x03\x12\x1b\n" + + "\x17TOKEN_REFRESH_REJECTION\x10\x04*\xba\x02\n" + + "\x19EnrollmentRejectionReason\x12+\n" + + "'ENROLLMENT_REJECTION_REASON_UNSPECIFIED\x10\x00\x12\x0f\n" + + "\vINVALID_JWT\x10\x01\x12\x1b\n" + + "\x17EXPIRED_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN\x10\x02\x12\"\n" + + "\x1eBOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_USAGE_EXCEEDED\x10\x03\x12\x1e\n" + + "\x1aUNATTESTED_LABELS_REJECTED\x10\x04\x12\x1f\n" + + "\x1bINVALID_CHALLENGE_SIGNATURE\x10\x05\x12\x1f\n" + + "\x1bREQUESTED_ROLE_UNAUTHORIZED\x10\x06\x12\x1a\n" + + "\x16PEER_PREVIOUSLY_BANNED\x10\a\x12 \n" + + "\x1cAUTONOMOUS_RECOVERY_DISABLED\x10\bB!Z\x1fgithub.com/google/agentmesh/apib\x06proto3" var ( file_api_agentmesh_proto_rawDescOnce sync.Once @@ -6844,218 +8108,252 @@ func file_api_agentmesh_proto_rawDescGZIP() []byte { return file_api_agentmesh_proto_rawDescData } -var file_api_agentmesh_proto_enumTypes = make([]protoimpl.EnumInfo, 9) -var file_api_agentmesh_proto_msgTypes = make([]protoimpl.MessageInfo, 85) +var file_api_agentmesh_proto_enumTypes = make([]protoimpl.EnumInfo, 14) +var file_api_agentmesh_proto_msgTypes = make([]protoimpl.MessageInfo, 94) var file_api_agentmesh_proto_goTypes = []any{ (EnrollmentStatus)(0), // 0: agentmesh.v1.EnrollmentStatus (ServiceType)(0), // 1: agentmesh.v1.ServiceType (IngressAuthMode)(0), // 2: agentmesh.v1.IngressAuthMode (EgressMode)(0), // 3: agentmesh.v1.EgressMode (ResponseInspection)(0), // 4: agentmesh.v1.ResponseInspection - (RouterGoAway_Reason)(0), // 5: agentmesh.v1.RouterGoAway.Reason - (MeshEvent_Type)(0), // 6: agentmesh.v1.MeshEvent.Type - (ExtProcProcessingMode_HeaderMode)(0), // 7: agentmesh.v1.ExtProcProcessingMode.HeaderMode - (ExtProcProcessingMode_BodyMode)(0), // 8: agentmesh.v1.ExtProcProcessingMode.BodyMode - (*AuthFrame)(nil), // 9: agentmesh.v1.AuthFrame - (*AuthResponse)(nil), // 10: agentmesh.v1.AuthResponse - (*RouterGoAway)(nil), // 11: agentmesh.v1.RouterGoAway - (*MeshEvent)(nil), // 12: agentmesh.v1.MeshEvent - (*EnrollRequest)(nil), // 13: agentmesh.v1.EnrollRequest - (*EnrollResponse)(nil), // 14: agentmesh.v1.EnrollResponse - (*BootstrapEnrollRequest)(nil), // 15: agentmesh.v1.BootstrapEnrollRequest - (*BootstrapEnrollResponse)(nil), // 16: agentmesh.v1.BootstrapEnrollResponse - (*ServiceIngress)(nil), // 17: agentmesh.v1.ServiceIngress - (*ServiceInfo)(nil), // 18: agentmesh.v1.ServiceInfo - (*CommandBackend)(nil), // 19: agentmesh.v1.CommandBackend - (*RegisterServiceRequest)(nil), // 20: agentmesh.v1.RegisterServiceRequest - (*DiscoveredProvider)(nil), // 21: agentmesh.v1.DiscoveredProvider - (*ControlPlaneInfoResponse)(nil), // 22: agentmesh.v1.ControlPlaneInfoResponse - (*DirectoryParameters)(nil), // 23: agentmesh.v1.DirectoryParameters - (*DirectoryRequest)(nil), // 24: agentmesh.v1.DirectoryRequest - (*DirectoryProvide)(nil), // 25: agentmesh.v1.DirectoryProvide - (*DirectoryWithdraw)(nil), // 26: agentmesh.v1.DirectoryWithdraw - (*DirectoryFindProviders)(nil), // 27: agentmesh.v1.DirectoryFindProviders - (*DirectoryFindPeer)(nil), // 28: agentmesh.v1.DirectoryFindPeer - (*DirectoryResponse)(nil), // 29: agentmesh.v1.DirectoryResponse - (*PeerRecord)(nil), // 30: agentmesh.v1.PeerRecord - (*RouterInfo)(nil), // 31: agentmesh.v1.RouterInfo - (*RouterLeaseRequest)(nil), // 32: agentmesh.v1.RouterLeaseRequest - (*RouterLeaseResponse)(nil), // 33: agentmesh.v1.RouterLeaseResponse - (*PolicyRole)(nil), // 34: agentmesh.v1.PolicyRole - (*IngressGrant)(nil), // 35: agentmesh.v1.IngressGrant - (*HTTPGrant)(nil), // 36: agentmesh.v1.HTTPGrant - (*EgressDestination)(nil), // 37: agentmesh.v1.EgressDestination - (*Inspection)(nil), // 38: agentmesh.v1.Inspection - (*Inspector)(nil), // 39: agentmesh.v1.Inspector - (*ModelArmor)(nil), // 40: agentmesh.v1.ModelArmor - (*ExtProc)(nil), // 41: agentmesh.v1.ExtProc - (*ExtProcProcessingMode)(nil), // 42: agentmesh.v1.ExtProcProcessingMode - (*CredentialBroker)(nil), // 43: agentmesh.v1.CredentialBroker - (*OIDCFederation)(nil), // 44: agentmesh.v1.OIDCFederation - (*AWSAssumeRole)(nil), // 45: agentmesh.v1.AWSAssumeRole - (*PlatformIdentity)(nil), // 46: agentmesh.v1.PlatformIdentity - (*PolicyBinding)(nil), // 47: agentmesh.v1.PolicyBinding - (*PolicyConfig)(nil), // 48: agentmesh.v1.PolicyConfig - (*PolicyConfigGetRequest)(nil), // 49: agentmesh.v1.PolicyConfigGetRequest - (*PolicyConfigGetResponse)(nil), // 50: agentmesh.v1.PolicyConfigGetResponse - (*PolicyConfigUpdateResponse)(nil), // 51: agentmesh.v1.PolicyConfigUpdateResponse - (*EgressAssignmentsRequest)(nil), // 52: agentmesh.v1.EgressAssignmentsRequest - (*EgressAssignmentsResponse)(nil), // 53: agentmesh.v1.EgressAssignmentsResponse - (*KeysResponse)(nil), // 54: agentmesh.v1.KeysResponse - (*TokenRefreshRequest)(nil), // 55: agentmesh.v1.TokenRefreshRequest - (*TokenRefreshResponse)(nil), // 56: agentmesh.v1.TokenRefreshResponse - (*NodeCatalogReport)(nil), // 57: agentmesh.v1.NodeCatalogReport - (*TokenRevokeRequest)(nil), // 58: agentmesh.v1.TokenRevokeRequest - (*TokenRevokeResponse)(nil), // 59: agentmesh.v1.TokenRevokeResponse - (*BootstrapTokenCreateRequest)(nil), // 60: agentmesh.v1.BootstrapTokenCreateRequest - (*BootstrapTokenCreateResponse)(nil), // 61: agentmesh.v1.BootstrapTokenCreateResponse - (*BootstrapToken)(nil), // 62: agentmesh.v1.BootstrapToken - (*BootstrapTokenListResponse)(nil), // 63: agentmesh.v1.BootstrapTokenListResponse - (*EnrollmentRequest)(nil), // 64: agentmesh.v1.EnrollmentRequest - (*EnrollmentRequestListResponse)(nil), // 65: agentmesh.v1.EnrollmentRequestListResponse - (*User)(nil), // 66: agentmesh.v1.User - (*EnrolledNode)(nil), // 67: agentmesh.v1.EnrolledNode - (*RouterLease)(nil), // 68: agentmesh.v1.RouterLease - (*NodeServices)(nil), // 69: agentmesh.v1.NodeServices - (*AdminStatusResponse)(nil), // 70: agentmesh.v1.AdminStatusResponse - (*UserStatusResponse)(nil), // 71: agentmesh.v1.UserStatusResponse - (*NodeListResponse)(nil), // 72: agentmesh.v1.NodeListResponse - (*IdentityEvidenceResponse)(nil), // 73: agentmesh.v1.IdentityEvidenceResponse - (*PeerEvidenceResponse)(nil), // 74: agentmesh.v1.PeerEvidenceResponse - (*MemberCredential)(nil), // 75: agentmesh.v1.MemberCredential - (*TrustedSigningKey)(nil), // 76: agentmesh.v1.TrustedSigningKey - (*OIDCSession)(nil), // 77: agentmesh.v1.OIDCSession - (*TaskAuthorizationRule)(nil), // 78: agentmesh.v1.TaskAuthorizationRule - (*TaskRule)(nil), // 79: agentmesh.v1.TaskRule - (*TaskOperation)(nil), // 80: agentmesh.v1.TaskOperation - (*TokenExchangeRequest)(nil), // 81: agentmesh.v1.TokenExchangeRequest - (*TokenExchangeResponse)(nil), // 82: agentmesh.v1.TokenExchangeResponse - (*STSTokenRequest)(nil), // 83: agentmesh.v1.STSTokenRequest - (*STSTokenResponse)(nil), // 84: agentmesh.v1.STSTokenResponse - (*RevocationsResponse)(nil), // 85: agentmesh.v1.RevocationsResponse - nil, // 86: agentmesh.v1.EnrollRequest.LabelsEntry - nil, // 87: agentmesh.v1.BootstrapEnrollRequest.LabelsEntry - nil, // 88: agentmesh.v1.CommandBackend.EnvEntry - nil, // 89: agentmesh.v1.RouterInfo.LabelsEntry - nil, // 90: agentmesh.v1.EnrollmentRequest.LabelsEntry - nil, // 91: agentmesh.v1.EnrolledNode.LabelsEntry - nil, // 92: agentmesh.v1.AdminStatusResponse.NodeCatalogEntry - nil, // 93: agentmesh.v1.PeerEvidenceResponse.LabelsEntry - (*durationpb.Duration)(nil), // 94: google.protobuf.Duration - (*timestamppb.Timestamp)(nil), // 95: google.protobuf.Timestamp + (SignalCallerDirection)(0), // 5: agentmesh.v1.SignalCallerDirection + (PolicyDenialReason)(0), // 6: agentmesh.v1.PolicyDenialReason + (TransportRefusalReason)(0), // 7: agentmesh.v1.TransportRefusalReason + (RevocationSource)(0), // 8: agentmesh.v1.RevocationSource + (EnrollmentRejectionReason)(0), // 9: agentmesh.v1.EnrollmentRejectionReason + (RouterGoAway_Reason)(0), // 10: agentmesh.v1.RouterGoAway.Reason + (MeshEvent_Type)(0), // 11: agentmesh.v1.MeshEvent.Type + (ExtProcProcessingMode_HeaderMode)(0), // 12: agentmesh.v1.ExtProcProcessingMode.HeaderMode + (ExtProcProcessingMode_BodyMode)(0), // 13: agentmesh.v1.ExtProcProcessingMode.BodyMode + (*AuthFrame)(nil), // 14: agentmesh.v1.AuthFrame + (*AuthResponse)(nil), // 15: agentmesh.v1.AuthResponse + (*RouterGoAway)(nil), // 16: agentmesh.v1.RouterGoAway + (*MeshEvent)(nil), // 17: agentmesh.v1.MeshEvent + (*EnrollRequest)(nil), // 18: agentmesh.v1.EnrollRequest + (*EnrollResponse)(nil), // 19: agentmesh.v1.EnrollResponse + (*BootstrapEnrollRequest)(nil), // 20: agentmesh.v1.BootstrapEnrollRequest + (*BootstrapEnrollResponse)(nil), // 21: agentmesh.v1.BootstrapEnrollResponse + (*ServiceIngress)(nil), // 22: agentmesh.v1.ServiceIngress + (*ServiceInfo)(nil), // 23: agentmesh.v1.ServiceInfo + (*CommandBackend)(nil), // 24: agentmesh.v1.CommandBackend + (*RegisterServiceRequest)(nil), // 25: agentmesh.v1.RegisterServiceRequest + (*DiscoveredProvider)(nil), // 26: agentmesh.v1.DiscoveredProvider + (*ControlPlaneInfoResponse)(nil), // 27: agentmesh.v1.ControlPlaneInfoResponse + (*DirectoryParameters)(nil), // 28: agentmesh.v1.DirectoryParameters + (*DirectoryRequest)(nil), // 29: agentmesh.v1.DirectoryRequest + (*DirectoryProvide)(nil), // 30: agentmesh.v1.DirectoryProvide + (*DirectoryWithdraw)(nil), // 31: agentmesh.v1.DirectoryWithdraw + (*DirectoryFindProviders)(nil), // 32: agentmesh.v1.DirectoryFindProviders + (*DirectoryFindPeer)(nil), // 33: agentmesh.v1.DirectoryFindPeer + (*DirectoryResponse)(nil), // 34: agentmesh.v1.DirectoryResponse + (*PeerRecord)(nil), // 35: agentmesh.v1.PeerRecord + (*RouterInfo)(nil), // 36: agentmesh.v1.RouterInfo + (*RouterLeaseRequest)(nil), // 37: agentmesh.v1.RouterLeaseRequest + (*RouterLeaseResponse)(nil), // 38: agentmesh.v1.RouterLeaseResponse + (*PolicyRole)(nil), // 39: agentmesh.v1.PolicyRole + (*IngressGrant)(nil), // 40: agentmesh.v1.IngressGrant + (*HTTPGrant)(nil), // 41: agentmesh.v1.HTTPGrant + (*EgressDestination)(nil), // 42: agentmesh.v1.EgressDestination + (*Inspection)(nil), // 43: agentmesh.v1.Inspection + (*Inspector)(nil), // 44: agentmesh.v1.Inspector + (*ModelArmor)(nil), // 45: agentmesh.v1.ModelArmor + (*ExtProc)(nil), // 46: agentmesh.v1.ExtProc + (*ExtProcProcessingMode)(nil), // 47: agentmesh.v1.ExtProcProcessingMode + (*CredentialBroker)(nil), // 48: agentmesh.v1.CredentialBroker + (*OIDCFederation)(nil), // 49: agentmesh.v1.OIDCFederation + (*AWSAssumeRole)(nil), // 50: agentmesh.v1.AWSAssumeRole + (*PlatformIdentity)(nil), // 51: agentmesh.v1.PlatformIdentity + (*PolicyBinding)(nil), // 52: agentmesh.v1.PolicyBinding + (*PolicyConfig)(nil), // 53: agentmesh.v1.PolicyConfig + (*PolicyConfigGetRequest)(nil), // 54: agentmesh.v1.PolicyConfigGetRequest + (*PolicyConfigGetResponse)(nil), // 55: agentmesh.v1.PolicyConfigGetResponse + (*PolicyConfigUpdateResponse)(nil), // 56: agentmesh.v1.PolicyConfigUpdateResponse + (*EgressAssignmentsRequest)(nil), // 57: agentmesh.v1.EgressAssignmentsRequest + (*EgressAssignmentsResponse)(nil), // 58: agentmesh.v1.EgressAssignmentsResponse + (*KeysResponse)(nil), // 59: agentmesh.v1.KeysResponse + (*TokenRefreshRequest)(nil), // 60: agentmesh.v1.TokenRefreshRequest + (*TokenRefreshResponse)(nil), // 61: agentmesh.v1.TokenRefreshResponse + (*NodeCatalogReport)(nil), // 62: agentmesh.v1.NodeCatalogReport + (*TokenRevokeRequest)(nil), // 63: agentmesh.v1.TokenRevokeRequest + (*TokenRevokeResponse)(nil), // 64: agentmesh.v1.TokenRevokeResponse + (*BootstrapTokenCreateRequest)(nil), // 65: agentmesh.v1.BootstrapTokenCreateRequest + (*BootstrapTokenCreateResponse)(nil), // 66: agentmesh.v1.BootstrapTokenCreateResponse + (*BootstrapToken)(nil), // 67: agentmesh.v1.BootstrapToken + (*BootstrapTokenListResponse)(nil), // 68: agentmesh.v1.BootstrapTokenListResponse + (*EnrollmentRequest)(nil), // 69: agentmesh.v1.EnrollmentRequest + (*EnrollmentRequestListResponse)(nil), // 70: agentmesh.v1.EnrollmentRequestListResponse + (*User)(nil), // 71: agentmesh.v1.User + (*EnrolledNode)(nil), // 72: agentmesh.v1.EnrolledNode + (*RouterLease)(nil), // 73: agentmesh.v1.RouterLease + (*NodeServices)(nil), // 74: agentmesh.v1.NodeServices + (*AdminStatusResponse)(nil), // 75: agentmesh.v1.AdminStatusResponse + (*UserStatusResponse)(nil), // 76: agentmesh.v1.UserStatusResponse + (*NodeListResponse)(nil), // 77: agentmesh.v1.NodeListResponse + (*IdentityEvidenceResponse)(nil), // 78: agentmesh.v1.IdentityEvidenceResponse + (*PeerEvidenceResponse)(nil), // 79: agentmesh.v1.PeerEvidenceResponse + (*MemberCredential)(nil), // 80: agentmesh.v1.MemberCredential + (*TrustedSigningKey)(nil), // 81: agentmesh.v1.TrustedSigningKey + (*OIDCSession)(nil), // 82: agentmesh.v1.OIDCSession + (*TaskAuthorizationRule)(nil), // 83: agentmesh.v1.TaskAuthorizationRule + (*TaskRule)(nil), // 84: agentmesh.v1.TaskRule + (*TaskOperation)(nil), // 85: agentmesh.v1.TaskOperation + (*TokenExchangeRequest)(nil), // 86: agentmesh.v1.TokenExchangeRequest + (*TokenExchangeResponse)(nil), // 87: agentmesh.v1.TokenExchangeResponse + (*STSTokenRequest)(nil), // 88: agentmesh.v1.STSTokenRequest + (*STSTokenResponse)(nil), // 89: agentmesh.v1.STSTokenResponse + (*RevocationsResponse)(nil), // 90: agentmesh.v1.RevocationsResponse + (*PolicyDeniedSignal)(nil), // 91: agentmesh.v1.PolicyDeniedSignal + (*TransportRefusedSignal)(nil), // 92: agentmesh.v1.TransportRefusedSignal + (*IdentityRevokedSignal)(nil), // 93: agentmesh.v1.IdentityRevokedSignal + (*EnrollmentRejectedSignal)(nil), // 94: agentmesh.v1.EnrollmentRejectedSignal + (*SecuritySignalEvent)(nil), // 95: agentmesh.v1.SecuritySignalEvent + (*WebhookEndpointConfig)(nil), // 96: agentmesh.v1.WebhookEndpointConfig + (*SecuritySignalsConfig)(nil), // 97: agentmesh.v1.SecuritySignalsConfig + nil, // 98: agentmesh.v1.EnrollRequest.LabelsEntry + nil, // 99: agentmesh.v1.BootstrapEnrollRequest.LabelsEntry + nil, // 100: agentmesh.v1.CommandBackend.EnvEntry + nil, // 101: agentmesh.v1.RouterInfo.LabelsEntry + nil, // 102: agentmesh.v1.EnrollmentRequest.LabelsEntry + nil, // 103: agentmesh.v1.EnrolledNode.LabelsEntry + nil, // 104: agentmesh.v1.AdminStatusResponse.NodeCatalogEntry + nil, // 105: agentmesh.v1.PeerEvidenceResponse.LabelsEntry + nil, // 106: agentmesh.v1.PolicyDeniedSignal.CallerLabelsEntry + nil, // 107: agentmesh.v1.EnrollmentRejectedSignal.SubmittedLabelsEntry + (*durationpb.Duration)(nil), // 108: google.protobuf.Duration + (*timestamppb.Timestamp)(nil), // 109: google.protobuf.Timestamp } var file_api_agentmesh_proto_depIdxs = []int32{ - 5, // 0: agentmesh.v1.RouterGoAway.reason:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.RouterGoAway.Reason - 94, // 1: agentmesh.v1.RouterGoAway.retry_after:type_name -> google.protobuf.Duration - 6, // 2: agentmesh.v1.MeshEvent.type:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.MeshEvent.Type - 95, // 3: agentmesh.v1.MeshEvent.event_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp - 86, // 4: agentmesh.v1.EnrollRequest.labels:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.EnrollRequest.LabelsEntry - 95, // 5: agentmesh.v1.EnrollResponse.expire_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp - 87, // 6: agentmesh.v1.BootstrapEnrollRequest.labels:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.BootstrapEnrollRequest.LabelsEntry + 10, // 0: agentmesh.v1.RouterGoAway.reason:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.RouterGoAway.Reason + 108, // 1: agentmesh.v1.RouterGoAway.retry_after:type_name -> google.protobuf.Duration + 11, // 2: agentmesh.v1.MeshEvent.type:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.MeshEvent.Type + 109, // 3: agentmesh.v1.MeshEvent.event_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp + 98, // 4: agentmesh.v1.EnrollRequest.labels:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.EnrollRequest.LabelsEntry + 109, // 5: agentmesh.v1.EnrollResponse.expire_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp + 99, // 6: agentmesh.v1.BootstrapEnrollRequest.labels:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.BootstrapEnrollRequest.LabelsEntry 0, // 7: agentmesh.v1.BootstrapEnrollResponse.status:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.EnrollmentStatus - 95, // 8: agentmesh.v1.BootstrapEnrollResponse.expire_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp + 109, // 8: agentmesh.v1.BootstrapEnrollResponse.expire_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp 2, // 9: agentmesh.v1.ServiceIngress.auth_mode:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.IngressAuthMode 1, // 10: agentmesh.v1.ServiceInfo.type:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.ServiceType - 17, // 11: agentmesh.v1.ServiceInfo.ingress:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.ServiceIngress - 88, // 12: agentmesh.v1.CommandBackend.env:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.CommandBackend.EnvEntry - 18, // 13: agentmesh.v1.RegisterServiceRequest.service:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.ServiceInfo - 19, // 14: agentmesh.v1.RegisterServiceRequest.command:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.CommandBackend - 31, // 15: agentmesh.v1.ControlPlaneInfoResponse.routers:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.RouterInfo - 23, // 16: agentmesh.v1.ControlPlaneInfoResponse.directory:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.DirectoryParameters - 94, // 17: agentmesh.v1.DirectoryParameters.reprovide_interval:type_name -> google.protobuf.Duration - 94, // 18: agentmesh.v1.DirectoryParameters.record_ttl:type_name -> google.protobuf.Duration - 25, // 19: agentmesh.v1.DirectoryRequest.provide:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.DirectoryProvide - 27, // 20: agentmesh.v1.DirectoryRequest.find_providers:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.DirectoryFindProviders - 28, // 21: agentmesh.v1.DirectoryRequest.find_peer:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.DirectoryFindPeer - 26, // 22: agentmesh.v1.DirectoryRequest.withdraw:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.DirectoryWithdraw - 17, // 23: agentmesh.v1.DirectoryProvide.ingress:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.ServiceIngress - 30, // 24: agentmesh.v1.DirectoryResponse.providers:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.PeerRecord - 30, // 25: agentmesh.v1.DirectoryResponse.peer:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.PeerRecord - 17, // 26: agentmesh.v1.PeerRecord.ingress:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.ServiceIngress - 89, // 27: agentmesh.v1.RouterInfo.labels:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.RouterInfo.LabelsEntry - 94, // 28: agentmesh.v1.RouterLeaseRequest.ttl:type_name -> google.protobuf.Duration - 95, // 29: agentmesh.v1.RouterLeaseResponse.expire_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp - 36, // 30: agentmesh.v1.PolicyRole.http:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.HTTPGrant - 35, // 31: agentmesh.v1.PolicyRole.allowed_ingress:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.IngressGrant + 22, // 11: agentmesh.v1.ServiceInfo.ingress:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.ServiceIngress + 100, // 12: agentmesh.v1.CommandBackend.env:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.CommandBackend.EnvEntry + 23, // 13: agentmesh.v1.RegisterServiceRequest.service:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.ServiceInfo + 24, // 14: agentmesh.v1.RegisterServiceRequest.command:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.CommandBackend + 36, // 15: agentmesh.v1.ControlPlaneInfoResponse.routers:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.RouterInfo + 28, // 16: agentmesh.v1.ControlPlaneInfoResponse.directory:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.DirectoryParameters + 108, // 17: agentmesh.v1.DirectoryParameters.reprovide_interval:type_name -> google.protobuf.Duration + 108, // 18: agentmesh.v1.DirectoryParameters.record_ttl:type_name -> google.protobuf.Duration + 30, // 19: agentmesh.v1.DirectoryRequest.provide:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.DirectoryProvide + 32, // 20: agentmesh.v1.DirectoryRequest.find_providers:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.DirectoryFindProviders + 33, // 21: agentmesh.v1.DirectoryRequest.find_peer:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.DirectoryFindPeer + 31, // 22: agentmesh.v1.DirectoryRequest.withdraw:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.DirectoryWithdraw + 22, // 23: agentmesh.v1.DirectoryProvide.ingress:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.ServiceIngress + 35, // 24: agentmesh.v1.DirectoryResponse.providers:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.PeerRecord + 35, // 25: agentmesh.v1.DirectoryResponse.peer:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.PeerRecord + 22, // 26: agentmesh.v1.PeerRecord.ingress:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.ServiceIngress + 101, // 27: agentmesh.v1.RouterInfo.labels:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.RouterInfo.LabelsEntry + 108, // 28: agentmesh.v1.RouterLeaseRequest.ttl:type_name -> google.protobuf.Duration + 109, // 29: agentmesh.v1.RouterLeaseResponse.expire_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp + 41, // 30: agentmesh.v1.PolicyRole.http:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.HTTPGrant + 40, // 31: agentmesh.v1.PolicyRole.allowed_ingress:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.IngressGrant 2, // 32: agentmesh.v1.IngressGrant.allowed_auth_modes:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.IngressAuthMode - 43, // 33: agentmesh.v1.EgressDestination.broker:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.CredentialBroker - 38, // 34: agentmesh.v1.EgressDestination.inspection:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.Inspection + 48, // 33: agentmesh.v1.EgressDestination.broker:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.CredentialBroker + 43, // 34: agentmesh.v1.EgressDestination.inspection:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.Inspection 3, // 35: agentmesh.v1.EgressDestination.mode:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.EgressMode - 39, // 36: agentmesh.v1.Inspection.inspectors:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.Inspector - 40, // 37: agentmesh.v1.Inspector.model_armor:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.ModelArmor - 41, // 38: agentmesh.v1.Inspector.ext_proc:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.ExtProc + 44, // 36: agentmesh.v1.Inspection.inspectors:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.Inspector + 45, // 37: agentmesh.v1.Inspector.model_armor:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.ModelArmor + 46, // 38: agentmesh.v1.Inspector.ext_proc:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.ExtProc 4, // 39: agentmesh.v1.ModelArmor.response:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.ResponseInspection - 94, // 40: agentmesh.v1.ModelArmor.timeout:type_name -> google.protobuf.Duration - 42, // 41: agentmesh.v1.ExtProc.processing_mode:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.ExtProcProcessingMode - 94, // 42: agentmesh.v1.ExtProc.message_timeout:type_name -> google.protobuf.Duration - 7, // 43: agentmesh.v1.ExtProcProcessingMode.request_header_mode:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.ExtProcProcessingMode.HeaderMode - 7, // 44: agentmesh.v1.ExtProcProcessingMode.response_header_mode:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.ExtProcProcessingMode.HeaderMode - 8, // 45: agentmesh.v1.ExtProcProcessingMode.request_body_mode:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.ExtProcProcessingMode.BodyMode - 8, // 46: agentmesh.v1.ExtProcProcessingMode.response_body_mode:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.ExtProcProcessingMode.BodyMode - 7, // 47: agentmesh.v1.ExtProcProcessingMode.request_trailer_mode:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.ExtProcProcessingMode.HeaderMode - 7, // 48: agentmesh.v1.ExtProcProcessingMode.response_trailer_mode:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.ExtProcProcessingMode.HeaderMode - 44, // 49: agentmesh.v1.CredentialBroker.oidc_federation:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.OIDCFederation - 45, // 50: agentmesh.v1.CredentialBroker.aws_assume_role:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.AWSAssumeRole - 46, // 51: agentmesh.v1.CredentialBroker.platform_identity:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.PlatformIdentity - 34, // 52: agentmesh.v1.PolicyConfig.roles:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.PolicyRole - 47, // 53: agentmesh.v1.PolicyConfig.bindings:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.PolicyBinding - 37, // 54: agentmesh.v1.PolicyConfig.egress:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.EgressDestination - 37, // 55: agentmesh.v1.EgressAssignmentsResponse.egress:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.EgressDestination - 95, // 56: agentmesh.v1.KeysResponse.sign_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp - 95, // 57: agentmesh.v1.TokenRefreshResponse.expire_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp - 18, // 58: agentmesh.v1.NodeCatalogReport.services:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.ServiceInfo - 95, // 59: agentmesh.v1.BootstrapTokenCreateResponse.expire_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp - 95, // 60: agentmesh.v1.BootstrapToken.create_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp - 95, // 61: agentmesh.v1.BootstrapToken.expire_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp - 95, // 62: agentmesh.v1.BootstrapToken.revoke_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp - 62, // 63: agentmesh.v1.BootstrapTokenListResponse.tokens:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.BootstrapToken + 108, // 40: agentmesh.v1.ModelArmor.timeout:type_name -> google.protobuf.Duration + 47, // 41: agentmesh.v1.ExtProc.processing_mode:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.ExtProcProcessingMode + 108, // 42: agentmesh.v1.ExtProc.message_timeout:type_name -> google.protobuf.Duration + 12, // 43: agentmesh.v1.ExtProcProcessingMode.request_header_mode:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.ExtProcProcessingMode.HeaderMode + 12, // 44: agentmesh.v1.ExtProcProcessingMode.response_header_mode:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.ExtProcProcessingMode.HeaderMode + 13, // 45: agentmesh.v1.ExtProcProcessingMode.request_body_mode:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.ExtProcProcessingMode.BodyMode + 13, // 46: agentmesh.v1.ExtProcProcessingMode.response_body_mode:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.ExtProcProcessingMode.BodyMode + 12, // 47: agentmesh.v1.ExtProcProcessingMode.request_trailer_mode:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.ExtProcProcessingMode.HeaderMode + 12, // 48: agentmesh.v1.ExtProcProcessingMode.response_trailer_mode:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.ExtProcProcessingMode.HeaderMode + 49, // 49: agentmesh.v1.CredentialBroker.oidc_federation:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.OIDCFederation + 50, // 50: agentmesh.v1.CredentialBroker.aws_assume_role:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.AWSAssumeRole + 51, // 51: agentmesh.v1.CredentialBroker.platform_identity:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.PlatformIdentity + 39, // 52: agentmesh.v1.PolicyConfig.roles:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.PolicyRole + 52, // 53: agentmesh.v1.PolicyConfig.bindings:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.PolicyBinding + 42, // 54: agentmesh.v1.PolicyConfig.egress:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.EgressDestination + 42, // 55: agentmesh.v1.EgressAssignmentsResponse.egress:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.EgressDestination + 109, // 56: agentmesh.v1.KeysResponse.sign_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp + 109, // 57: agentmesh.v1.TokenRefreshResponse.expire_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp + 23, // 58: agentmesh.v1.NodeCatalogReport.services:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.ServiceInfo + 109, // 59: agentmesh.v1.BootstrapTokenCreateResponse.expire_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp + 109, // 60: agentmesh.v1.BootstrapToken.create_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp + 109, // 61: agentmesh.v1.BootstrapToken.expire_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp + 109, // 62: agentmesh.v1.BootstrapToken.revoke_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp + 67, // 63: agentmesh.v1.BootstrapTokenListResponse.tokens:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.BootstrapToken 0, // 64: agentmesh.v1.EnrollmentRequest.status:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.EnrollmentStatus - 90, // 65: agentmesh.v1.EnrollmentRequest.labels:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.EnrollmentRequest.LabelsEntry - 95, // 66: agentmesh.v1.EnrollmentRequest.create_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp - 95, // 67: agentmesh.v1.EnrollmentRequest.resolve_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp - 64, // 68: agentmesh.v1.EnrollmentRequestListResponse.requests:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.EnrollmentRequest - 95, // 69: agentmesh.v1.User.create_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp - 91, // 70: agentmesh.v1.EnrolledNode.labels:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.EnrolledNode.LabelsEntry - 95, // 71: agentmesh.v1.EnrolledNode.enroll_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp - 95, // 72: agentmesh.v1.EnrolledNode.expire_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp - 95, // 73: agentmesh.v1.RouterLease.last_renewal_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp - 95, // 74: agentmesh.v1.RouterLease.expire_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp - 18, // 75: agentmesh.v1.NodeServices.services:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.ServiceInfo - 95, // 76: agentmesh.v1.NodeServices.report_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp - 66, // 77: agentmesh.v1.AdminStatusResponse.users:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.User - 68, // 78: agentmesh.v1.AdminStatusResponse.active_routers:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.RouterLease - 67, // 79: agentmesh.v1.AdminStatusResponse.enrolled_nodes:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.EnrolledNode - 64, // 80: agentmesh.v1.AdminStatusResponse.enrollment_requests:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.EnrollmentRequest - 62, // 81: agentmesh.v1.AdminStatusResponse.bootstrap_tokens:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.BootstrapToken - 48, // 82: agentmesh.v1.AdminStatusResponse.policy:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.PolicyConfig - 92, // 83: agentmesh.v1.AdminStatusResponse.node_catalog:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.AdminStatusResponse.NodeCatalogEntry - 66, // 84: agentmesh.v1.UserStatusResponse.user:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.User - 67, // 85: agentmesh.v1.UserStatusResponse.enrolled_nodes:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.EnrolledNode - 62, // 86: agentmesh.v1.UserStatusResponse.bootstrap_tokens:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.BootstrapToken - 68, // 87: agentmesh.v1.UserStatusResponse.active_routers:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.RouterLease - 48, // 88: agentmesh.v1.UserStatusResponse.policy:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.PolicyConfig - 67, // 89: agentmesh.v1.NodeListResponse.nodes:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.EnrolledNode - 95, // 90: agentmesh.v1.IdentityEvidenceResponse.biscuit_expire_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp - 95, // 91: agentmesh.v1.IdentityEvidenceResponse.check_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp - 93, // 92: agentmesh.v1.PeerEvidenceResponse.labels:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.PeerEvidenceResponse.LabelsEntry - 95, // 93: agentmesh.v1.PeerEvidenceResponse.expire_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp - 95, // 94: agentmesh.v1.PeerEvidenceResponse.check_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp - 95, // 95: agentmesh.v1.MemberCredential.expire_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp - 76, // 96: agentmesh.v1.MemberCredential.trusted_keys:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.TrustedSigningKey - 77, // 97: agentmesh.v1.MemberCredential.oidc_session:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.OIDCSession - 95, // 98: agentmesh.v1.TrustedSigningKey.receive_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp - 79, // 99: agentmesh.v1.TaskAuthorizationRule.rules:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.TaskRule - 95, // 100: agentmesh.v1.TaskAuthorizationRule.expire_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp - 80, // 101: agentmesh.v1.TaskRule.operation:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.TaskOperation - 78, // 102: agentmesh.v1.TokenExchangeRequest.task_rule:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.TaskAuthorizationRule - 95, // 103: agentmesh.v1.TokenExchangeResponse.expire_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp - 95, // 104: agentmesh.v1.STSTokenResponse.expire_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp - 69, // 105: agentmesh.v1.AdminStatusResponse.NodeCatalogEntry.value:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.NodeServices - 106, // [106:106] is the sub-list for method output_type - 106, // [106:106] is the sub-list for method input_type - 106, // [106:106] is the sub-list for extension type_name - 106, // [106:106] is the sub-list for extension extendee - 0, // [0:106] is the sub-list for field type_name + 102, // 65: agentmesh.v1.EnrollmentRequest.labels:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.EnrollmentRequest.LabelsEntry + 109, // 66: agentmesh.v1.EnrollmentRequest.create_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp + 109, // 67: agentmesh.v1.EnrollmentRequest.resolve_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp + 69, // 68: agentmesh.v1.EnrollmentRequestListResponse.requests:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.EnrollmentRequest + 109, // 69: agentmesh.v1.User.create_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp + 103, // 70: agentmesh.v1.EnrolledNode.labels:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.EnrolledNode.LabelsEntry + 109, // 71: agentmesh.v1.EnrolledNode.enroll_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp + 109, // 72: agentmesh.v1.EnrolledNode.expire_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp + 109, // 73: agentmesh.v1.RouterLease.last_renewal_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp + 109, // 74: agentmesh.v1.RouterLease.expire_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp + 23, // 75: agentmesh.v1.NodeServices.services:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.ServiceInfo + 109, // 76: agentmesh.v1.NodeServices.report_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp + 71, // 77: agentmesh.v1.AdminStatusResponse.users:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.User + 73, // 78: agentmesh.v1.AdminStatusResponse.active_routers:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.RouterLease + 72, // 79: agentmesh.v1.AdminStatusResponse.enrolled_nodes:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.EnrolledNode + 69, // 80: agentmesh.v1.AdminStatusResponse.enrollment_requests:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.EnrollmentRequest + 67, // 81: agentmesh.v1.AdminStatusResponse.bootstrap_tokens:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.BootstrapToken + 53, // 82: agentmesh.v1.AdminStatusResponse.policy:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.PolicyConfig + 104, // 83: agentmesh.v1.AdminStatusResponse.node_catalog:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.AdminStatusResponse.NodeCatalogEntry + 71, // 84: agentmesh.v1.UserStatusResponse.user:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.User + 72, // 85: agentmesh.v1.UserStatusResponse.enrolled_nodes:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.EnrolledNode + 67, // 86: agentmesh.v1.UserStatusResponse.bootstrap_tokens:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.BootstrapToken + 73, // 87: agentmesh.v1.UserStatusResponse.active_routers:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.RouterLease + 53, // 88: agentmesh.v1.UserStatusResponse.policy:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.PolicyConfig + 72, // 89: agentmesh.v1.NodeListResponse.nodes:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.EnrolledNode + 109, // 90: agentmesh.v1.IdentityEvidenceResponse.biscuit_expire_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp + 109, // 91: agentmesh.v1.IdentityEvidenceResponse.check_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp + 105, // 92: agentmesh.v1.PeerEvidenceResponse.labels:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.PeerEvidenceResponse.LabelsEntry + 109, // 93: agentmesh.v1.PeerEvidenceResponse.expire_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp + 109, // 94: agentmesh.v1.PeerEvidenceResponse.check_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp + 109, // 95: agentmesh.v1.MemberCredential.expire_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp + 81, // 96: agentmesh.v1.MemberCredential.trusted_keys:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.TrustedSigningKey + 82, // 97: agentmesh.v1.MemberCredential.oidc_session:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.OIDCSession + 109, // 98: agentmesh.v1.TrustedSigningKey.receive_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp + 84, // 99: agentmesh.v1.TaskAuthorizationRule.rules:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.TaskRule + 109, // 100: agentmesh.v1.TaskAuthorizationRule.expire_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp + 85, // 101: agentmesh.v1.TaskRule.operation:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.TaskOperation + 83, // 102: agentmesh.v1.TokenExchangeRequest.task_rule:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.TaskAuthorizationRule + 109, // 103: agentmesh.v1.TokenExchangeResponse.expire_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp + 109, // 104: agentmesh.v1.STSTokenResponse.expire_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp + 5, // 105: agentmesh.v1.PolicyDeniedSignal.direction:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.SignalCallerDirection + 6, // 106: agentmesh.v1.PolicyDeniedSignal.reason:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.PolicyDenialReason + 106, // 107: agentmesh.v1.PolicyDeniedSignal.caller_labels:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.PolicyDeniedSignal.CallerLabelsEntry + 109, // 108: agentmesh.v1.PolicyDeniedSignal.event_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp + 7, // 109: agentmesh.v1.TransportRefusedSignal.reason:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.TransportRefusalReason + 109, // 110: agentmesh.v1.TransportRefusedSignal.first_seen_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp + 109, // 111: agentmesh.v1.TransportRefusedSignal.event_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp + 8, // 112: agentmesh.v1.IdentityRevokedSignal.source:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.RevocationSource + 109, // 113: agentmesh.v1.IdentityRevokedSignal.event_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp + 9, // 114: agentmesh.v1.EnrollmentRejectedSignal.reason:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.EnrollmentRejectionReason + 107, // 115: agentmesh.v1.EnrollmentRejectedSignal.submitted_labels:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.EnrollmentRejectedSignal.SubmittedLabelsEntry + 109, // 116: agentmesh.v1.EnrollmentRejectedSignal.event_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp + 109, // 117: agentmesh.v1.SecuritySignalEvent.event_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp + 91, // 118: agentmesh.v1.SecuritySignalEvent.policy_denied:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.PolicyDeniedSignal + 92, // 119: agentmesh.v1.SecuritySignalEvent.transport_refused:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.TransportRefusedSignal + 93, // 120: agentmesh.v1.SecuritySignalEvent.identity_revoked:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.IdentityRevokedSignal + 94, // 121: agentmesh.v1.SecuritySignalEvent.enrollment_rejected:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.EnrollmentRejectedSignal + 108, // 122: agentmesh.v1.WebhookEndpointConfig.timeout:type_name -> google.protobuf.Duration + 96, // 123: agentmesh.v1.SecuritySignalsConfig.endpoints:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.WebhookEndpointConfig + 108, // 124: agentmesh.v1.SecuritySignalsConfig.coalescing_window:type_name -> google.protobuf.Duration + 74, // 125: agentmesh.v1.AdminStatusResponse.NodeCatalogEntry.value:type_name -> agentmesh.v1.NodeServices + 126, // [126:126] is the sub-list for method output_type + 126, // [126:126] is the sub-list for method input_type + 126, // [126:126] is the sub-list for extension type_name + 126, // [126:126] is the sub-list for extension extendee + 0, // [0:126] is the sub-list for field type_name } func init() { file_api_agentmesh_proto_init() } @@ -7083,13 +8381,19 @@ func file_api_agentmesh_proto_init() { (*CredentialBroker_AwsAssumeRole)(nil), (*CredentialBroker_PlatformIdentity)(nil), } + file_api_agentmesh_proto_msgTypes[81].OneofWrappers = []any{ + (*SecuritySignalEvent_PolicyDenied)(nil), + (*SecuritySignalEvent_TransportRefused)(nil), + (*SecuritySignalEvent_IdentityRevoked)(nil), + (*SecuritySignalEvent_EnrollmentRejected)(nil), + } type x struct{} out := protoimpl.TypeBuilder{ File: protoimpl.DescBuilder{ GoPackagePath: reflect.TypeOf(x{}).PkgPath(), RawDescriptor: unsafe.Slice(unsafe.StringData(file_api_agentmesh_proto_rawDesc), len(file_api_agentmesh_proto_rawDesc)), - NumEnums: 9, - NumMessages: 85, + NumEnums: 14, + NumMessages: 94, NumExtensions: 0, NumServices: 0, }, diff --git a/api/agentmesh.proto b/api/agentmesh.proto index b265be2a..9e153203 100644 --- a/api/agentmesh.proto +++ b/api/agentmesh.proto @@ -1066,3 +1066,233 @@ message RevocationsResponse { repeated string banned_peer_ids = 2; } +// ============================================================================ +// Generic Security Signals & Containment Contract (Issue #879) +// ============================================================================ + +// Direction of the caller when a security event or policy evaluation occurs. +enum SignalCallerDirection { + SIGNAL_CALLER_DIRECTION_UNSPECIFIED = 0; + // A local workload/agent process invoking the agentmesh-node sidecar. + LOCAL_WORKLOAD = 1; + // An external or remote peer sending traffic across the mesh network. + REMOTE_PEER = 2; +} + +// Reason codes for policy evaluation denial. +enum PolicyDenialReason { + POLICY_DENIAL_REASON_UNSPECIFIED = 0; + // Denied by Biscuit Datalog authorization policy evaluation. + DATALOG_EVALUATION_DENIED = 1; + // Denied by TaskAuthorizationRule (tar_block) narrowing or operation constraints. + TASK_AUTHORIZATION_RULE_VIOLATION = 2; + // Blocked by an inspection filter (ModelArmor or ExtProc). + INSPECTION_FILTER_BLOCKED = 3; + // Caller does not possess the required PolicyRole. + ROLE_MISMATCH = 4; + // Caller credential or Biscuit has expired. + EXPIRED_CREDENTIAL = 5; + // Requested service name is not allowed by policy. + UNAUTHORIZED_SERVICE = 6; + // Requested HTTP method or path pattern is not permitted by HTTPGrant. + UNAUTHORIZED_PATH_OR_METHOD = 7; +} + +// Emitted as CloudEvents type "agentmesh.policy.denied" when an authorization check, +// TAR rule narrowing, or inspection filter rejects a request. +message PolicyDeniedSignal { + // Direction of the caller: LOCAL_WORKLOAD vs REMOTE_PEER. + SignalCallerDirection direction = 1; + // Structured policy denial reason code. + PolicyDenialReason reason = 2; + // Human-readable detail or rejection explanation. + string detail = 3; + // Target service requested (e.g. "bigquery", "calculator-mcp"). + string target_service = 4; + // Requested operation (e.g. HTTP method "POST" or MCP tool "execute"). + string requested_operation = 5; + // Requested path or resource pattern (e.g. "/v1/projects/*"). + string requested_resource = 6; + // Caller peer ID (if REMOTE_PEER or known). + string caller_peer_id = 7; + // Caller principal/subject from Biscuit or JWT. + string caller_subject = 8; + // Caller roles extracted from Biscuit authority/delegation blocks. + repeated string caller_roles = 9; + // Attested caller labels from Biscuit. + map caller_labels = 10; + // Instant when policy denial occurred. Per AGENTS.md, MUST be named *_time. + google.protobuf.Timestamp event_time = 11; +} + +// Reason codes for libp2p connection or stream gate refusals. +enum TransportRefusalReason { + TRANSPORT_REFUSAL_REASON_UNSPECIFIED = 0; + // Remote peer did not complete authentication within deadline. + PEER_UNAUTHENTICATED = 1; + // Remote peer attempted to access a router-only protocol without mesh:role:router. + NOT_ROUTER_ROLE = 2; + // Auth handshake wait timed out. + AUTH_DEADLINE_EXCEEDED = 3; + // Remote peer is in the banned/revocation set. + PEER_BANNED = 4; + // Protocol requested is not permitted for the peer's role. + PROTOCOL_UNAUTHORIZED = 5; +} + +// Emitted as CloudEvents type "agentmesh.transport.refused" when the connection +// or stream auth gate (internal/node/auth_gate.go) rejects an incoming stream/peer. +message TransportRefusedSignal { + // Structured reason code for transport refusal. + TransportRefusalReason reason = 1; + // Human-readable detail message. + string detail = 2; + // Remote libp2p peer ID string. + string peer_id = 3; + // Remote multiaddr string (e.g. "/ip4/192.168.1.10/tcp/4001"). + string remote_multiaddr = 4; + // Protocol ID requested (e.g. "/agentmesh/auth", "/libp2p-http"). + string protocol_id = 5; + // Coalesced refusal count within the deduplication window (>= 1). + uint32 coalesced_count = 6; + // Timestamp of the first observed rejection in this coalescing window. + google.protobuf.Timestamp first_seen_time = 7; + // Timestamp of the most recent rejection. Per AGENTS.md, MUST be named *_time. + google.protobuf.Timestamp event_time = 8; +} + +// Provenance/source of an identity revocation. +enum RevocationSource { + REVOCATION_SOURCE_UNSPECIFIED = 0; + // Administrative action on agentmesh-control-plane. + CONTROL_PLANE_ADMIN = 1; + // MeshEvent.BANNED received via gossip / SSE broadcast. + MESH_EVENT_BANNED_GOSSIP = 2; + // Reconciled during control-plane synchronization. + LOCAL_CONTROL_PLANE_SYNC = 3; + // Token refresh endpoint refused due to active ban. + TOKEN_REFRESH_REJECTION = 4; +} + +// Emitted as CloudEvents type "agentmesh.identity.revoked" when a peer identity +// or Biscuit token is revoked or banned. +message IdentityRevokedSignal { + // Subject peer ID that has been revoked or banned. + string peer_id = 1; + // Source or trigger of the revocation. + RevocationSource source = 2; + // Revocation reason provided by administrator or policy. + string reason = 3; + // Hex-encoded Biscuit authority revocation IDs (RevocationIds()[0]). + repeated string revocation_ids = 4; + // Peer ID of the node or control plane emitting the revocation. + string issuer_peer_id = 5; + // Instant when the revocation occurred. Per AGENTS.md, MUST be named *_time. + google.protobuf.Timestamp event_time = 6; +} + +// Reason codes for enrollment rejection. +enum EnrollmentRejectionReason { + ENROLLMENT_REJECTION_REASON_UNSPECIFIED = 0; + // Platform JWT token validation failed (signature, audience, issuer). + INVALID_JWT = 1; + // Bootstrap token has expired. + EXPIRED_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN = 2; + // Bootstrap token max usage limit reached. + BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_USAGE_EXCEEDED = 3; + // Requested labels failed policy attestation. + UNATTESTED_LABELS_REJECTED = 4; + // Proof of possession challenge signature is invalid. + INVALID_CHALLENGE_SIGNATURE = 5; + // Requested role is not permitted for the caller identity. + REQUESTED_ROLE_UNAUTHORIZED = 6; + // Peer is in the banned peer list. + PEER_PREVIOUSLY_BANNED = 7; + // Autonomous token recovery is disabled for the token or node. + AUTONOMOUS_RECOVERY_DISABLED = 8; +} + +// Emitted as CloudEvents type "agentmesh.enrollment.rejected" when enrollment +// or autonomous token recovery is rejected on /enroll or /refresh. +message EnrollmentRejectedSignal { + // Peer ID attempting enrollment or recovery. + string peer_id = 1; + // Role requested in the enrollment attempt. + string requested_role = 2; + // Structured reason code for rejection. + EnrollmentRejectionReason reason = 3; + // Human-readable detail message. + string detail = 4; + // Bootstrap token ID used (if bootstrap enrollment). + string bootstrap_token_id = 5; + // Remote IP address or multiaddr of the enrollment requester. + string remote_address = 6; + // Labels submitted in the enrollment request. + map submitted_labels = 7; + // True if this rejection occurred during an autonomous recovery attempt on /refresh. + bool is_autonomous_recovery = 8; + // Instant when rejection occurred. Per AGENTS.md, MUST be named *_time. + google.protobuf.Timestamp event_time = 9; +} + +// SecuritySignalEvent is the CloudEvents 1.0 compliant envelope for dispatching +// security state transitions to external runtimes over HTTP or Unix sockets. +message SecuritySignalEvent { + // CloudEvents 'id': Unique event identifier (UUID v4). + string id = 1; + // CloudEvents 'source': URI identifying the emitting context (e.g. "urn:agentmesh:node:"). + string source = 2; + // CloudEvents 'specversion': The CloudEvents specification version (always "1.0"). + string spec_version = 3; + // CloudEvents 'type': Event type (e.g. "agentmesh.policy.denied"). + string type = 4; + // CloudEvents 'time': Event generation instant. Per AGENTS.md, MUST be named *_time. + google.protobuf.Timestamp event_time = 5; + // CloudEvents 'datacontenttype': MIME type ("application/json" or "application/x-protobuf"). + string data_content_type = 6; + // CloudEvents 'subject': Subject peer ID or identifier. + string subject = 7; + + // Typed signal payload (mutually exclusive). + oneof data { + PolicyDeniedSignal policy_denied = 8; + TransportRefusedSignal transport_refused = 9; + IdentityRevokedSignal identity_revoked = 10; + EnrollmentRejectedSignal enrollment_rejected = 11; + } +} + +// WebhookEndpointConfig defines a single outbound destination for security signals. +message WebhookEndpointConfig { + // Target URL: https://..., http://127.0.0.1:, or unix:/path/to.sock. + string url = 1; + // File path to the shared secret for HMAC-SHA256 signing (X-AgentMesh-Signature). + // Per AGENTS.md secret hygiene, MUST be a file path, never an inline secret string. + string hmac_secret_path = 2; + // File path to CA certificate bundle for server TLS verification. + string ca_cert_path = 3; + // File path to client TLS certificate for mTLS authentication. + string client_cert_path = 4; + // File path to client TLS private key for mTLS authentication. + string client_key_path = 5; + // Per-dispatch HTTP request / socket write deadline. + google.protobuf.Duration timeout = 6; + // Maximum retry attempts for transient delivery failures (default: 3). + uint32 max_retries = 7; + // Filter list of event types to dispatch. If empty, all signals are sent. + repeated string event_types = 8; +} + +// SecuritySignalsConfig configures out-of-band security signal dispatching. +message SecuritySignalsConfig { + // True if security signal dispatching is enabled. + bool enabled = 1; + // Destination endpoints. + repeated WebhookEndpointConfig endpoints = 2; + // Bounded ring-buffer queue capacity (default: 1024). + uint32 queue_capacity = 3; + // Window duration for coalescing repetitive events. + google.protobuf.Duration coalescing_window = 4; +} + + diff --git a/api/policy.go b/api/policy.go index 6f998674..3e06a8ae 100644 --- a/api/policy.go +++ b/api/policy.go @@ -52,8 +52,29 @@ type NodeConfig struct { // Labels is what this node is, attested at enrollment; Egress is what it // demands of the peers it talks to. Adjacent because they are read // together and mean opposite directions. - Labels map[string]string `yaml:"labels,omitempty"` - Egress Egress `yaml:"egress"` + Labels map[string]string `yaml:"labels,omitempty"` + Egress Egress `yaml:"egress"` + SecuritySignals SecuritySignalsConfigYAML `yaml:"security_signals,omitempty"` +} + +// SecuritySignalsConfigYAML holds YAML configuration for out-of-band security containment webhooks. +type SecuritySignalsConfigYAML struct { + Enabled bool `yaml:"enabled"` + QueueCapacity int `yaml:"queue_capacity,omitempty"` + CoalescingWindow string `yaml:"coalescing_window,omitempty"` + Endpoints []WebhookEndpointConfigYAML `yaml:"endpoints,omitempty"` +} + +// WebhookEndpointConfigYAML holds YAML configuration for an individual webhook endpoint. +type WebhookEndpointConfigYAML struct { + URL string `yaml:"url"` + HMACSecretPath string `yaml:"hmac_secret_path,omitempty"` + CACertPath string `yaml:"ca_cert_path,omitempty"` + ClientCertPath string `yaml:"client_cert_path,omitempty"` + ClientKeyPath string `yaml:"client_key_path,omitempty"` + Timeout string `yaml:"timeout,omitempty"` + MaxRetries uint32 `yaml:"max_retries,omitempty"` + EventTypes []string `yaml:"event_types,omitempty"` } // NodeConfigVersionV1Alpha1 is the only node config schema this build understands. diff --git a/cmd/agentmesh-node/main.go b/cmd/agentmesh-node/main.go index 798f1afb..40b50b0f 100644 --- a/cmd/agentmesh-node/main.go +++ b/cmd/agentmesh-node/main.go @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ import ( "time" "github.com/google/agentmesh/api" + "github.com/google/agentmesh/internal/containment" "github.com/google/agentmesh/internal/logging" "github.com/google/agentmesh/internal/node" "github.com/google/agentmesh/internal/pprofserver" @@ -112,6 +113,17 @@ var ( secretsDirFlag string controlPlaneSyncIntervalFlag time.Duration cloudProviderFlag string + + securityWebhookURLFlag string + securityWebhookHMACPathFlag string + securityWebhookCACertPathFlag string + securityWebhookClientCertFlag string + securityWebhookClientKeyFlag string + securityWebhookTimeoutFlag time.Duration + securityWebhookMaxRetriesFlag uint32 + securityWebhookEventsFlag []string + securityWebhookQueueCapFlag int + securityWebhookCoalesceWinFlag time.Duration ) var logger = golog.Logger("agentmesh-node-cli") @@ -438,6 +450,39 @@ func main() { logger.Fatalf("Invalid --router-prefer: %v", err) } + var containmentCfg containment.Config + if nodeConfig != nil && nodeConfig.SecuritySignals != nil { + containmentCfg = *nodeConfig.SecuritySignals + } + if securityWebhookURLFlag != "" { + containmentCfg.Enabled = true + if securityWebhookQueueCapFlag > 0 { + containmentCfg.QueueCapacity = securityWebhookQueueCapFlag + } + if securityWebhookCoalesceWinFlag > 0 { + containmentCfg.CoalescingWindow = securityWebhookCoalesceWinFlag + } + ep := containment.EndpointConfig{ + URL: securityWebhookURLFlag, + HMACSecretPath: securityWebhookHMACPathFlag, + CACertPath: securityWebhookCACertPathFlag, + ClientCertPath: securityWebhookClientCertFlag, + ClientKeyPath: securityWebhookClientKeyFlag, + Timeout: securityWebhookTimeoutFlag, + MaxRetries: securityWebhookMaxRetriesFlag, + EventTypes: securityWebhookEventsFlag, + } + if ep.HMACSecretPath == "" { + if envPath := os.Getenv("AGENTMESH_CONTAINMENT_HMAC_SECRET_PATH"); envPath != "" { + ep.HMACSecretPath = envPath + } else if envSecret := os.Getenv("AGENTMESH_CONTAINMENT_HMAC_SECRET"); envSecret != "" { + ep.HMACSecret = []byte(envSecret) + _ = os.Unsetenv("AGENTMESH_CONTAINMENT_HMAC_SECRET") + } + } + containmentCfg.Endpoints = append(containmentCfg.Endpoints, ep) + } + buildRuntimeNodeOptions := func(priv crypto.PrivKey, cpPub ed25519.PublicKey, rAddrs []multiaddr.Multiaddr) node.Options { return node.Options{ PrivKey: priv, @@ -468,6 +513,7 @@ func main() { DiscoveryConcurrency: discoveryConcurrencyFlag, BackendProbeTimeout: backendProbeTimeoutFlag, SecretsDir: secretsDirFlag, + Containment: containmentCfg, } } @@ -739,6 +785,11 @@ func main() { } } + var containmentCfg containment.Config + if nodeConfig != nil && nodeConfig.SecuritySignals != nil { + containmentCfg = *nodeConfig.SecuritySignals + } + priv := node.GetOrGenerateKey(store) meshNode, err := node.NewAgentMeshNode(node.Options{ PrivKey: priv, @@ -760,6 +811,7 @@ func main() { RequiredRole: api.RoleNode, ControlPlaneSyncInterval: controlPlaneSyncIntervalFlag, BootstrapTokenPath: bootstrapTokenPathFlag, + Containment: containmentCfg, }) if err != nil { logger.Fatalf("Failed to initialize node for enrollment: %v", err) @@ -892,6 +944,16 @@ func main() { runCmd.Flags().DurationVar(&controlPlaneSyncIntervalFlag, "control-plane-sync-interval", node.DefaultControlPlaneSyncInterval, "How often signing keys, bans, router addresses and mesh policy are pulled from the control plane. Keep it well below the control plane's --key-grace-period; raise it on large meshes.") runCmd.Flags().DurationVar(&backendProbeTimeoutFlag, "backend-probe-timeout", 0, "Timeout for probing a command-spawned service backend before advertising it (0 uses default 2s); raise this for backends with slower cold-start times") runCmd.Flags().StringVar(&secretsDirFlag, "secrets-dir", node.DefaultSecretsDir, "Directory holding the credentials named by the control plane's egress destinations, one file per credential name") + runCmd.Flags().StringVar(&securityWebhookURLFlag, "security-webhook-url", "", "Out-of-band security containment webhook endpoint URL (https://..., http://127.0.0.1:port, or unix:/path/to.sock)") + runCmd.Flags().StringVar(&securityWebhookHMACPathFlag, "security-webhook-hmac-path", "", "Path to file containing shared secret for HMAC-SHA256 signature (or env AGENTMESH_CONTAINMENT_HMAC_SECRET)") + runCmd.Flags().StringVar(&securityWebhookCACertPathFlag, "security-webhook-ca-cert-path", "", "Path to CA certificate bundle for security webhook server verification") + runCmd.Flags().StringVar(&securityWebhookClientCertFlag, "security-webhook-client-cert-path", "", "Path to client TLS certificate for security webhook mTLS") + runCmd.Flags().StringVar(&securityWebhookClientKeyFlag, "security-webhook-client-key-path", "", "Path to client TLS private key for security webhook mTLS") + runCmd.Flags().DurationVar(&securityWebhookTimeoutFlag, "security-webhook-timeout", 500*time.Millisecond, "Per-dispatch HTTP/socket timeout for security webhook") + runCmd.Flags().Uint32Var(&securityWebhookMaxRetriesFlag, "security-webhook-max-retries", 3, "Maximum delivery retry attempts for security webhook") + runCmd.Flags().StringSliceVar(&securityWebhookEventsFlag, "security-webhook-events", nil, "Filter event types for security webhook (e.g. agentmesh.policy.denied); empty sends all") + runCmd.Flags().IntVar(&securityWebhookQueueCapFlag, "security-webhook-queue-capacity", 1024, "Bounded ring-buffer queue capacity for security webhook") + runCmd.Flags().DurationVar(&securityWebhookCoalesceWinFlag, "security-webhook-coalescing-window", time.Second, "Sliding deduplication window for security signals") rootCmd.PersistentFlags().StringVar(&controlPlaneAddr, "control-plane", "", "Control plane URL") rootCmd.PersistentFlags().BoolVar(&insecureControlPlaneFlag, "insecure-control-plane", false, "Accept a plaintext http:// control plane URL to a non-loopback host (whoever answers it becomes this node's trust root; only for networks you already trust)") rootCmd.PersistentFlags().StringVar(&configFile, "config", node.DefaultConfigFile, "Path to agentmesh-node.yaml configuration file") diff --git a/development/examples/generic-containment-webhook/README.md b/development/examples/generic-containment-webhook/README.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4bc6bf06 --- /dev/null +++ b/development/examples/generic-containment-webhook/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,408 @@ +# Generic Containment Webhook Blueprint + +A runnable, pure Go reference implementation of an out-of-band security containment webhook receiver for [Google Agent Mesh](https://github.com/google/agentmesh) ([Issue #879](https://github.com/google/agentmesh/issues/879)). + +This blueprint demonstrates how external supervisors—such as **Kubernetes container controllers**, **OpenShell / gVisor sandbox supervisors**, **host security daemons (e.g., KillSwitch)**, or **enterprise SIEMs**—receive, authenticate, and process real-time security signals emitted by `agentmesh-node` and `agentmesh-control-plane`. + +--- + +## 1. Architecture Overview + +Agent Mesh components enforce Zero Trust and task-scoped authorization. When an uncooperative agent, compromised sandbox, or malicious peer attempts an unauthorized action, `agentmesh-node` and `agentmesh-control-plane` emit asynchronous, non-blocking security signals across an out-of-band containment webhook: + +``` + +---------------------------------------+ + | google/agentmesh Components | + | | + | +---------------------------------+ | + | | agentmesh-node / control-plane | | + | | - Biscuit / TAR Authorizer | | + | | - Inspection (ModelArmor/Proc) | | + | | - libp2p Stream Auth Gate | | + | | - Ban / Revocation Sync | | + | | - /enroll and /refresh Handler | | + | +----------------+----------------+ | + | | (rejections) | + | v | + | +---------------------------------+ | + | | internal/containment Dispatcher | | + | | - Bounded Ring Buffer Queue | | + | | - Per-(Signal,Peer) Coalescer | | + | | - Promauto Metrics & Logger | | + | | - HMAC-SHA256 Signer | | + | | - Unix / Loopback HTTP Client | | + | +----------------+----------------+ | + +-------------------|-------------------+ + | + CloudEvents 1.0 | (unix:/path.sock OR + HMAC Signed | http://127.0.0.1:port) + ProtoJSON | + v + +---------------------------------------+ + | Generic Containment Webhook | + | (development/examples/generic-.../) | + | - Validates CloudEvents 1.0 headers | + | - Validates HMAC-SHA256 signatures | + | - Deserializes protojson event | + | - Pretty-prints structured alert | + +-------------------+-------------------+ + | + v + +---------------------------------------+ + | External Containment Actions | + | * K8s Controller: isolate Pod | + | * OpenShell: freeze sandbox cgroups | + | * Host Daemon: terminate process | + | * SIEM: trigger SOC incident alert | + +---------------------------------------+ +``` + +### Supported Signal Types + +The webhook handles the 4 core Agent Mesh security transitions defined in `api/agentmesh.proto`: + +| Signal Type | Emitting Component | Trigger Condition | +| :--- | :--- | :--- | +| `agentmesh.policy.denied` | `agentmesh-node` | Biscuit Datalog check failed, Task Authorization Rule (`tar_block`) narrowed access, or Inspection filter blocked request. | +| `agentmesh.transport.refused` | `agentmesh-node` | libp2p auth gate refused unauthenticated peer, invalid router role, or banned peer stream. Coalesced over sliding window. | +| `agentmesh.identity.revoked` | `agentmesh-control-plane` & `agentmesh-node` | Peer banned mesh-wide or Biscuit revocation IDs broadcast via gossip / sync. | +| `agentmesh.enrollment.rejected` | `agentmesh-control-plane` | Token validation failed, bootstrap token expired, or autonomous recovery rejected. | + +--- + +## 2. Quickstart + +### Prerequisites + +- Go 1.26 or higher +- Cloned `google/agentmesh` repository + +### Running the Webhook Receiver + +The receiver uses **only the Go standard library** and the existing `api` protobuf bindings in the repository. It introduces **zero new entries** to `go.mod` or `go.sum`. + +#### Option A: Local TCP HTTP Mode (Default: Port 8095) + +```bash +go run ./development/examples/generic-containment-webhook -port 8095 +``` + +Output: +``` +HMAC signature verification disabled (no -hmac-secret-path provided) +Listening for containment signals on HTTP http://127.0.0.1:8095/events +Generic Containment Webhook receiver ready. Press Ctrl+C to exit. +``` + +#### Option B: Unix Domain Socket Mode (High-Performance Local Isolation) + +```bash +go run ./development/examples/generic-containment-webhook \ + -port 0 \ + -socket-path /tmp/agentmesh-containment.sock +``` + +#### Option C: With HMAC-SHA256 Signature Verification + +To enforce cryptographic integrity and anti-tampering between the node and the webhook supervisor, supply a shared secret file: + +```bash +# Generate a random 32-byte secret key +openssl rand -hex 32 > /tmp/containment-hmac.key +chmod 600 /tmp/containment-hmac.key + +# Start the webhook receiver with HMAC verification +go run ./development/examples/generic-containment-webhook \ + -port 8095 \ + -hmac-secret-path /tmp/containment-hmac.key \ + -verbose +``` + +### CLI Options + +| Flag | Default | Description | +| :--- | :--- | :--- | +| `-port` | `8095` | Local TCP port for HTTP webhook receiver (`0` to disable TCP). | +| `-socket-path` | `""` | Unix domain socket path for webhook receiver (e.g. `/tmp/containment.sock`). | +| `-hmac-secret-path` | `""` | File containing shared secret for HMAC-SHA256 signature verification. | +| `-verbose` | `false` | Pretty-prints the complete raw ProtoJSON payload in addition to formatted summary. | +| `-no-color` | `false` | Disables ANSI terminal colors (also respects `NO_COLOR=1` environment variable). | + +--- + +## 3. Configuring `agentmesh-node` + +To direct `agentmesh-node` to forward containment events to the webhook, pass `--security-webhook-*` flags on startup: + +### Connecting via Local HTTP + +```bash +./bin/agentmesh-node run \ + --control-plane https://mesh.example.com \ + --security-webhook-url http://127.0.0.1:8095/events \ + --security-webhook-hmac-path /tmp/containment-hmac.key \ + --security-webhook-events agentmesh.policy.denied,agentmesh.identity.revoked \ + --security-webhook-timeout 500ms \ + --security-webhook-max-retries 3 \ + --security-webhook-queue-capacity 1024 \ + --security-webhook-coalescing-window 1s +``` + +### Connecting via Unix Domain Socket + +For tight, container-local or host-local execution, Unix domain sockets avoid TCP port allocation and bypass network stack overhead: + +```bash +./bin/agentmesh-node run \ + --control-plane https://mesh.example.com \ + --security-webhook-url unix:///tmp/agentmesh-containment.sock \ + --security-webhook-hmac-path /tmp/containment-hmac.key +``` + +--- + +## 4. Testing with `curl` & Sample Events + +You can test the webhook receiver directly using `curl`. Each example conforms strictly to the CloudEvents 1.0 specification and `api.SecuritySignalEvent` protojson schema. + +### 1. Test `agentmesh.policy.denied` (Authorization Failure) + +```bash +curl -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8095/events \ + -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ + -H "ce-specversion: 1.0" \ + -H "ce-id: b9b0d1e2-3f4a-4a5b-8c6d-7e8f9a0b1c2d" \ + -H "ce-type: agentmesh.policy.denied" \ + -H "ce-source: urn:agentmesh:node:12D3KooWNodeDemo12345" \ + -H "ce-time: $(date -u +'%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ')" \ + -H "ce-subject: peer-finance-analyzer" \ + -d '{ + "id": "b9b0d1e2-3f4a-4a5b-8c6d-7e8f9a0b1c2d", + "source": "urn:agentmesh:node:12D3KooWNodeDemo12345", + "spec_version": "1.0", + "type": "agentmesh.policy.denied", + "subject": "peer-finance-analyzer", + "event_time": "'$(date -u +'%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ')'", + "data_content_type": "application/json", + "policy_denied": { + "direction": "LOCAL_WORKLOAD", + "reason": "DATALOG_EVALUATION_DENIED", + "detail": "datalog block 0 denied egress to unauthorized database", + "target_service": "bigquery", + "requested_operation": "POST", + "requested_resource": "//bigquery.googleapis.com/projects/prod-ledger", + "caller_peer_id": "12D3KooWCallerDemo67890", + "caller_subject": "spiffe://example.org/ns/prod/sa/analytics-agent", + "caller_roles": ["agent", "reader"], + "caller_labels": { + "env": "production", + "tier": "restricted" + }, + "event_time": "'$(date -u +'%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ')'" + } + }' +``` + +Receiver Output: +``` +================================================================================ +[SECURITY SIGNAL RECEIVED] Type: agentmesh.policy.denied (via 127.0.0.1:54321) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + ID: b9b0d1e2-3f4a-4a5b-8c6d-7e8f9a0b1c2d + Source: urn:agentmesh:node:12D3KooWNodeDemo12345 + SpecVersion: 1.0 + Subject: peer-finance-analyzer + Event Time: 2026-11-10T23:00:00Z (2ms ago) +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + PolicyDeniedSignal: + Direction: LOCAL_WORKLOAD + Reason: DATALOG_EVALUATION_DENIED + Detail: datalog block 0 denied egress to unauthorized database + Target Service: bigquery + Requested Op: POST + Requested Res: //bigquery.googleapis.com/projects/prod-ledger + Caller Peer ID: 12D3KooWCallerDemo67890 + Caller Subject: spiffe://example.org/ns/prod/sa/analytics-agent + Caller Roles: agent, reader + Caller Labels: env=production, tier=restricted +================================================================================ +``` + +### 2. Test `agentmesh.transport.refused` (Connection Gate Refusal) + +```bash +curl -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8095/events \ + -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ + -H "ce-specversion: 1.0" \ + -H "ce-id: 3c2a1b0f-8e7d-6c5b-4a3b-2c1d0e9f8a7b" \ + -H "ce-type: agentmesh.transport.refused" \ + -H "ce-source: urn:agentmesh:node:12D3KooWNodeDemo12345" \ + -H "ce-time: $(date -u +'%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ')" \ + -d '{ + "id": "3c2a1b0f-8e7d-6c5b-4a3b-2c1d0e9f8a7b", + "source": "urn:agentmesh:node:12D3KooWNodeDemo12345", + "spec_version": "1.0", + "type": "agentmesh.transport.refused", + "event_time": "'$(date -u +'%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ')'", + "data_content_type": "application/json", + "transport_refused": { + "reason": "PEER_UNAUTHENTICATED", + "detail": "peer handshake deadline exceeded before completing TLS auth", + "peer_id": "12D3KooWAttacker99999", + "remote_multiaddr": "/ip4/198.51.100.42/tcp/49152", + "protocol_id": "/agentmesh/auth/1.0.0", + "coalesced_count": 5, + "first_seen_time": "'$(date -u +'%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ')'", + "event_time": "'$(date -u +'%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ')'" + } + }' +``` + +### 3. Test `agentmesh.identity.revoked` (Peer Banishment) + +```bash +curl -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8095/events \ + -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ + -H "ce-specversion: 1.0" \ + -H "ce-id: fa1a2b3c-4d5e-6f7a-8b9c-0d1e2f3a4b5c" \ + -H "ce-type: agentmesh.identity.revoked" \ + -H "ce-source: urn:agentmesh:control-plane:cp-primary-0" \ + -H "ce-time: $(date -u +'%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ')" \ + -d '{ + "id": "fa1a2b3c-4d5e-6f7a-8b9c-0d1e2f3a4b5c", + "source": "urn:agentmesh:control-plane:cp-primary-0", + "spec_version": "1.0", + "type": "agentmesh.identity.revoked", + "event_time": "'$(date -u +'%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ')'", + "data_content_type": "application/json", + "identity_revoked": { + "peer_id": "12D3KooWCompromisedAgent456", + "source": "CONTROL_PLANE_ADMIN", + "reason": "Administrative eviction following host sandbox compromise", + "revocation_ids": ["0a1b2c3d4e5f6a7b8c9d0e1f"], + "issuer_peer_id": "12D3KooWControlPlaneMaster", + "event_time": "'$(date -u +'%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ')'" + } + }' +``` + +### 4. Test HMAC-SHA256 Authenticated Request + +When HMAC verification is enabled on the receiver (`-hmac-secret-path`), every request must supply `X-AgentMesh-Timestamp` (milliseconds since Unix epoch) and `X-AgentMesh-Signature` (`sha256=` over `timestamp + "." + body`): + +```bash +SECRET="my-super-secret-hmac-key-12345" +echo -n "${SECRET}" > /tmp/hmac.key + +# Start server in background +go run ./development/examples/generic-containment-webhook \ + -port 8095 \ + -hmac-secret-path /tmp/hmac.key & + +# Prepare payload +TS=$(python3 -c 'import time; print(int(time.time() * 1000))') +BODY='{"id":"test-1","source":"test","spec_version":"1.0","type":"agentmesh.identity.revoked","identity_revoked":{"peer_id":"12D3KooWBanned","reason":"compromised"}}' + +# Calculate signature: sha256= +SIG=$(python3 -c " +import hmac, hashlib +msg = f'${TS}.${BODY}'.encode('utf-8') +key = b'${SECRET}' +print('sha256=' + hmac.new(key, msg, hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()) +") + +# Send signed request +curl -i -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8095/events \ + -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ + -H "ce-specversion: 1.0" \ + -H "ce-id: test-1" \ + -H "ce-type: agentmesh.identity.revoked" \ + -H "ce-source: test" \ + -H "X-AgentMesh-Timestamp: ${TS}" \ + -H "X-AgentMesh-Signature: ${SIG}" \ + -d "${BODY}" +``` + +--- + +## 5. External Consumer Architecture Notes + +The generic security signals contract is deliberately runtime-agnostic. Below are architectural blueprints for four common external consumer environments: + +### Pattern A: Kubernetes Admission & Container Controllers + +In a Kubernetes deployment, `agentmesh-node` runs either as a DaemonSet or as a sidecar container alongside agent workloads. A dedicated **Containment Controller** (or admission webhook) listens for security signals: + +1. **Deployment**: + - The controller exposes an internal HTTPS Service: `https://containment-controller.agentmesh.svc.cluster.local:8443/events` (secured with mTLS or cluster CA; plaintext HTTP to non-loopback destinations is rejected by anti-SSRF policy). + - Alternatively, it shares a hostPath/emptyDir Unix domain socket (`unix:///run/agentmesh/containment.sock`) or binds to pod-local loopback (`http://127.0.0.1:8095/events`) with the `agentmesh-node` pod. +2. **Action Trigger**: + - On `agentmesh.identity.revoked` or repeated `agentmesh.policy.denied` signals: + - The controller translates `caller_subject` (e.g., `spiffe://cluster.local/ns/agent-apps/sa/rag-bot`) to the offending Pod. + - Adds a label to the Pod: `quarantine: "true"`. + - Applies a dynamic `NetworkPolicy` blocking all egress from pods with `quarantine: "true"`. + - Evicts or deletes the compromised Pod via the Kubernetes API: + ```go + clientset.CoreV1().Pods(ns).Delete(ctx, podName, metav1.DeleteOptions{}) + ``` + +### Pattern B: OpenShell & gVisor Sandbox Supervisors + +In an OpenShell or gVisor sandbox environment (`development/examples/openshell-sandbox/`), agent workloads run inside unprivileged micro-VMs or virtualized user-space kernels: + +1. **Deployment**: + - The sandbox supervisor mounts a Unix domain socket `/run/agentmesh/containment.sock`. + - `agentmesh-node` is configured with `--security-webhook-url unix:///run/agentmesh/containment.sock`. +2. **Action Trigger**: + - On receiving an out-of-band `agentmesh.policy.denied` signal indicating lateral traversal or unauthorized tool access: + - The supervisor freezes container execution immediately using cgroups v2: + ```bash + echo "1" > /sys/fs/cgroup/openshell/sandbox-123/cgroup.freeze + ``` + - Revokes the sandbox's SPIRE Workload API token, preventing it from obtaining any new mesh credentials. + - Shuts down the container boundary cleanly. + +### Pattern C: Host Security Daemons (e.g., KillSwitch, Falco, Wazuh) + +When agents run on enterprise workstations or dedicated servers, a host security daemon monitors both OS system calls and mesh application-layer transitions: + +1. **Deployment**: + - The host daemon creates `/var/run/containment/security.sock` with root/owner permissions. + - `agentmesh-node` connects to the socket with `--security-webhook-url unix:///var/run/containment/security.sock`. +2. **Action Trigger**: + - Correlates application-layer denials (`agentmesh.policy.denied`) with host eBPF / auditd system call events (e.g. unexpected socket connect or subprocess spawning). + - Enforces host-level isolation: + - Inserts dynamic `nftables` / `iptables` drop rules for the agent process UID. + - Sends `SIGSTOP` or `SIGKILL` to uncooperative agent processes. + - Revokes any task Biscuit held by the sandbox via `POST /oauth/revoke` on the local `agentmesh-node` Unix socket. + +### Pattern D: Enterprise SIEM & SOC Observability (Splunk, Elastic, Datadog) + +For centralized monitoring and compliance auditing: + +1. **Deployment**: + - The webhook receiver runs as an ingestion adapter or serverless function. +2. **Action Trigger**: + - Enriches the CloudEvents envelope with infrastructure metadata (cloud account, region, host ID). + - Maps `PolicyDeniedSignal` and `TransportRefusedSignal` fields into standard OpenTelemetry / Elastic Common Schema (ECS) format: + - `event.category`: `intrusion_detection` + - `event.action`: `policy_denial` + - `user.id`: `caller_subject` + - Emits alerts to PagerDuty or Slack when revocation rates exceed thresholds. + +--- + +## 6. Verification and Testing + +To verify this blueprint independently: + +1. **Compile and Type-Check**: + ```bash + go build -v ./development/examples/generic-containment-webhook/... + ``` + +2. **Verify Zero Dependency Additions**: + ```bash + git diff go.mod go.sum + ``` + *Expected output: Empty (no changes to root go.mod or go.sum).* diff --git a/development/examples/generic-containment-webhook/main.go b/development/examples/generic-containment-webhook/main.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9c9345ec --- /dev/null +++ b/development/examples/generic-containment-webhook/main.go @@ -0,0 +1,444 @@ +// Copyright 2026 Google LLC +// +// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +// You may obtain a copy of the License at +// +// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +// +// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +// limitations under the License. + +// Command generic-containment-webhook is a runnable reference receiver for +// Google Agent Mesh out-of-band security containment signals. +// +// It demonstrates how external supervisors (Kubernetes admission/container +// controllers, OpenShell sandbox supervisors, host security daemons, or SIEMs) +// consume, authenticate, and process CloudEvents 1.0 security signals emitted +// by agentmesh-node and agentmesh-control-plane. +package main + +import ( + "bytes" + "context" + "crypto/hmac" + "crypto/sha256" + "crypto/subtle" + "encoding/hex" + "errors" + "flag" + "fmt" + "io" + "log" + "net" + "net/http" + "os" + "os/signal" + "strconv" + "strings" + "sync" + "syscall" + "time" + + "github.com/google/agentmesh/api" + "google.golang.org/protobuf/encoding/protojson" +) + +// CloudEvents 1.0 and Agent Mesh header constants. +const ( + headerCESpecVersion = "ce-specversion" + headerCEID = "ce-id" + headerCEType = "ce-type" + headerCESource = "ce-source" + headerCETime = "ce-time" + headerCESubject = "ce-subject" + headerContentType = "Content-Type" + headerAgentMeshTimestamp = "X-AgentMesh-Timestamp" + headerAgentMeshSignature = "X-AgentMesh-Signature" + + maxBodyBytes = 1 << 20 // 1 MB limit + maxClockSkew = 5 * time.Minute + defaultPort = 8095 + defaultSocketURL = "" +) + +// ANSI color escape codes. +const ( + ansiReset = "\033[0m" + ansiBold = "\033[1m" + ansiRed = "\033[31m" + ansiGreen = "\033[32m" + ansiYellow = "\033[33m" + ansiBlue = "\033[34m" + ansiMagenta = "\033[35m" + ansiCyan = "\033[36m" + ansiGray = "\033[90m" +) + +// HandlerConfig configures the security webhook HTTP handler. +type HandlerConfig struct { + HMACSecret []byte + Verbose bool + NoColor bool +} + +// NewWebhookHandler constructs an http.Handler that authenticates CloudEvents 1.0 +// headers, verifies HMAC-SHA256 signatures, deserializes api.SecuritySignalEvent, +// and pretty-prints the containment signal. +func NewWebhookHandler(cfg HandlerConfig) http.Handler { + return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + // Only accept POST requests + if r.Method != http.MethodPost { + http.Error(w, "Method Not Allowed: only POST is supported for webhook events", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed) + return + } + + // 1. Validate CloudEvents 1.0 specification headers + specVersion := r.Header.Get(headerCESpecVersion) + if specVersion != "1.0" { + http.Error(w, fmt.Sprintf("Bad Request: %s header must be '1.0' (got %q)", headerCESpecVersion, specVersion), http.StatusBadRequest) + return + } + + ceID := r.Header.Get(headerCEID) + if ceID == "" { + http.Error(w, fmt.Sprintf("Bad Request: %s header is required", headerCEID), http.StatusBadRequest) + return + } + + ceType := r.Header.Get(headerCEType) + if ceType == "" { + http.Error(w, fmt.Sprintf("Bad Request: %s header is required", headerCEType), http.StatusBadRequest) + return + } + + ceSource := r.Header.Get(headerCESource) + if ceSource == "" { + http.Error(w, fmt.Sprintf("Bad Request: %s header is required", headerCESource), http.StatusBadRequest) + return + } + + // 2. Read request body safely + bodyBytes, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(r.Body, maxBodyBytes)) + if err != nil { + http.Error(w, "Bad Request: unable to read request body", http.StatusBadRequest) + return + } + defer r.Body.Close() + + // 3. Verify HMAC-SHA256 signature if secret is configured + if len(cfg.HMACSecret) > 0 { + tsStr := r.Header.Get(headerAgentMeshTimestamp) + sigHeader := r.Header.Get(headerAgentMeshSignature) + + if tsStr == "" || sigHeader == "" { + http.Error(w, "Unauthorized: missing X-AgentMesh-Timestamp or X-AgentMesh-Signature header", http.StatusUnauthorized) + return + } + + // Verify timestamp freshness + tsMillis, err := strconv.ParseInt(tsStr, 10, 64) + if err != nil { + http.Error(w, "Unauthorized: invalid X-AgentMesh-Timestamp header", http.StatusUnauthorized) + return + } + eventTime := time.UnixMilli(tsMillis) + skew := time.Since(eventTime).Abs() + if skew > maxClockSkew { + http.Error(w, fmt.Sprintf("Unauthorized: timestamp skew too large (%v > %v)", skew, maxClockSkew), http.StatusUnauthorized) + return + } + + // Compute HMAC-SHA256: secret over timestamp + "." + body + mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, cfg.HMACSecret) + mac.Write([]byte(tsStr)) + mac.Write([]byte(".")) + mac.Write(bodyBytes) + expectedSig := "sha256=" + hex.EncodeToString(mac.Sum(nil)) + + if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(sigHeader), []byte(expectedSig)) != 1 { + http.Error(w, "Unauthorized: HMAC signature verification failed", http.StatusUnauthorized) + return + } + } + + // 4. Deserialize protojson body into api.SecuritySignalEvent + event := &api.SecuritySignalEvent{} + unmarshalOpts := protojson.UnmarshalOptions{ + DiscardUnknown: false, + } + if err := unmarshalOpts.Unmarshal(bodyBytes, event); err != nil { + http.Error(w, fmt.Sprintf("Bad Request: protojson unmarshal failed: %v", err), http.StatusBadRequest) + return + } + + // 5. Format and pretty-print signal to stdout + printSecurityEvent(event, r, cfg) + + // 6. Return 200 OK acknowledgment + w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json") + w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK) + _, _ = fmt.Fprintf(w, `{"status":"acknowledged","id":%q,"type":%q}`+"\n", event.GetId(), event.GetType()) + }) +} + +func printSecurityEvent(event *api.SecuritySignalEvent, r *http.Request, cfg HandlerConfig) { + c := colorizer{!cfg.NoColor} + + bannerColor := ansiBlue + switch event.GetType() { + case "agentmesh.policy.denied": + bannerColor = ansiRed + case "agentmesh.transport.refused": + bannerColor = ansiYellow + case "agentmesh.identity.revoked": + bannerColor = ansiMagenta + case "agentmesh.enrollment.rejected": + bannerColor = ansiCyan + } + + border := strings.Repeat("=", 80) + divider := strings.Repeat("-", 80) + + fmt.Println() + fmt.Println(c.color(bannerColor+ansiBold, border)) + fmt.Printf("%s %s%s%s\n", + c.color(bannerColor+ansiBold, "[SECURITY SIGNAL RECEIVED]"), + c.color(ansiBold, "Type: "), + c.color(bannerColor+ansiBold, event.GetType()), + c.color(ansiGray, fmt.Sprintf(" (via %s)", r.RemoteAddr)), + ) + fmt.Println(c.color(ansiGray, divider)) + + // Envelope Fields + fmt.Printf(" %-16s %s\n", c.color(ansiBold, "ID:"), event.GetId()) + fmt.Printf(" %-16s %s\n", c.color(ansiBold, "Source:"), event.GetSource()) + fmt.Printf(" %-16s %s\n", c.color(ansiBold, "SpecVersion:"), event.GetSpecVersion()) + if event.GetSubject() != "" { + fmt.Printf(" %-16s %s\n", c.color(ansiBold, "Subject:"), event.GetSubject()) + } + if event.GetEventTime() != nil { + t := event.GetEventTime().AsTime() + fmt.Printf(" %-16s %s (%s)\n", c.color(ansiBold, "Event Time:"), t.Format(time.RFC3339Nano), time.Since(t).Round(time.Millisecond).String()+" ago") + } + + // Typed Data Oneof Payload + fmt.Println(c.color(ansiGray, divider)) + switch d := event.GetData().(type) { + case *api.SecuritySignalEvent_PolicyDenied: + p := d.PolicyDenied + fmt.Printf(" %s:\n", c.color(ansiRed+ansiBold, "PolicyDeniedSignal")) + fmt.Printf(" %-20s %s\n", "Direction:", p.GetDirection().String()) + fmt.Printf(" %-20s %s\n", "Reason:", c.color(ansiRed, p.GetReason().String())) + fmt.Printf(" %-20s %s\n", "Detail:", p.GetDetail()) + fmt.Printf(" %-20s %s\n", "Target Service:", c.color(ansiBold, p.GetTargetService())) + if p.GetRequestedOperation() != "" { + fmt.Printf(" %-20s %s\n", "Requested Op:", p.GetRequestedOperation()) + } + if p.GetRequestedResource() != "" { + fmt.Printf(" %-20s %s\n", "Requested Res:", p.GetRequestedResource()) + } + if p.GetCallerPeerId() != "" { + fmt.Printf(" %-20s %s\n", "Caller Peer ID:", p.GetCallerPeerId()) + } + if p.GetCallerSubject() != "" { + fmt.Printf(" %-20s %s\n", "Caller Subject:", p.GetCallerSubject()) + } + if len(p.GetCallerRoles()) > 0 { + fmt.Printf(" %-20s %s\n", "Caller Roles:", strings.Join(p.GetCallerRoles(), ", ")) + } + if len(p.GetCallerLabels()) > 0 { + labels := make([]string, 0, len(p.GetCallerLabels())) + for k, v := range p.GetCallerLabels() { + labels = append(labels, fmt.Sprintf("%s=%s", k, v)) + } + fmt.Printf(" %-20s %s\n", "Caller Labels:", strings.Join(labels, ", ")) + } + + case *api.SecuritySignalEvent_TransportRefused: + t := d.TransportRefused + fmt.Printf(" %s:\n", c.color(ansiYellow+ansiBold, "TransportRefusedSignal")) + fmt.Printf(" %-20s %s\n", "Reason:", c.color(ansiYellow, t.GetReason().String())) + fmt.Printf(" %-20s %s\n", "Detail:", t.GetDetail()) + fmt.Printf(" %-20s %s\n", "Peer ID:", t.GetPeerId()) + fmt.Printf(" %-20s %s\n", "Remote Multiaddr:", t.GetRemoteMultiaddr()) + fmt.Printf(" %-20s %s\n", "Protocol ID:", t.GetProtocolId()) + if t.GetCoalescedCount() > 1 { + fmt.Printf(" %-20s %s\n", "Coalesced Count:", c.color(ansiBold, strconv.FormatUint(uint64(t.GetCoalescedCount()), 10))) + } + + case *api.SecuritySignalEvent_IdentityRevoked: + i := d.IdentityRevoked + fmt.Printf(" %s:\n", c.color(ansiMagenta+ansiBold, "IdentityRevokedSignal")) + fmt.Printf(" %-20s %s\n", "Peer ID:", c.color(ansiMagenta+ansiBold, i.GetPeerId())) + fmt.Printf(" %-20s %s\n", "Source:", i.GetSource().String()) + fmt.Printf(" %-20s %s\n", "Reason:", i.GetReason()) + if len(i.GetRevocationIds()) > 0 { + fmt.Printf(" %-20s %s\n", "Revocation IDs:", strings.Join(i.GetRevocationIds(), ", ")) + } + if i.GetIssuerPeerId() != "" { + fmt.Printf(" %-20s %s\n", "Issuer Peer ID:", i.GetIssuerPeerId()) + } + + case *api.SecuritySignalEvent_EnrollmentRejected: + e := d.EnrollmentRejected + fmt.Printf(" %s:\n", c.color(ansiCyan+ansiBold, "EnrollmentRejectedSignal")) + fmt.Printf(" %-20s %s\n", "Peer ID:", e.GetPeerId()) + fmt.Printf(" %-20s %s\n", "Requested Role:", e.GetRequestedRole()) + fmt.Printf(" %-20s %s\n", "Reason:", c.color(ansiCyan, e.GetReason().String())) + fmt.Printf(" %-20s %s\n", "Detail:", e.GetDetail()) + if e.GetBootstrapTokenId() != "" { + fmt.Printf(" %-20s %s\n", "Token ID:", e.GetBootstrapTokenId()) + } + if e.GetRemoteAddress() != "" { + fmt.Printf(" %-20s %s\n", "Remote Address:", e.GetRemoteAddress()) + } + if e.GetIsAutonomousRecovery() { + fmt.Printf(" %-20s %s\n", "Autonomous Recov:", "true") + } + + default: + fmt.Printf(" %s\n", c.color(ansiGray, "No payload or unrecognized data type")) + } + + // Verbose Dump + if cfg.Verbose { + fmt.Println(c.color(ansiGray, divider)) + fmt.Println(c.color(ansiBold, "Raw ProtoJSON Payload:")) + m := protojson.MarshalOptions{Multiline: true, Indent: " "} + if jsonDump, err := m.Marshal(event); err == nil { + fmt.Println(string(jsonDump)) + } + } + + fmt.Println(c.color(bannerColor+ansiBold, border)) + fmt.Println() +} + +type colorizer struct { + enabled bool +} + +func (c colorizer) color(code, text string) string { + if !c.enabled { + return text + } + return code + text + ansiReset +} + +func main() { + portFlag := flag.Int("port", defaultPort, "Local TCP port for HTTP webhook receiver (0 to disable TCP)") + socketPathFlag := flag.String("socket-path", defaultSocketURL, "Unix domain socket path for webhook receiver (e.g. /tmp/containment.sock)") + hmacSecretPathFlag := flag.String("hmac-secret-path", "", "Path to file containing shared secret for HMAC-SHA256 signature verification") + verboseFlag := flag.Bool("verbose", false, "Print raw protojson event body in addition to formatted summary") + noColorFlag := flag.Bool("no-color", false, "Disable ANSI color formatting in console output") + flag.Parse() + + // Detect if NO_COLOR environment variable is set + if os.Getenv("NO_COLOR") != "" { + *noColorFlag = true + } + + if *portFlag <= 0 && *socketPathFlag == "" { + log.Fatalf("Fatal: at least one of -port (>0) or -socket-path must be specified") + } + + var hmacSecret []byte + if *hmacSecretPathFlag != "" { + secretBytes, err := os.ReadFile(*hmacSecretPathFlag) + if err != nil { + log.Fatalf("Fatal: reading HMAC secret file %q: %v", *hmacSecretPathFlag, err) + } + hmacSecret = bytes.TrimSpace(secretBytes) + log.Printf("HMAC-SHA256 verification enabled (secret loaded from %s, length: %d bytes)", *hmacSecretPathFlag, len(hmacSecret)) + } else { + log.Printf("HMAC signature verification disabled (no -hmac-secret-path provided)") + } + + handler := NewWebhookHandler(HandlerConfig{ + HMACSecret: hmacSecret, + Verbose: *verboseFlag, + NoColor: *noColorFlag, + }) + + mux := http.NewServeMux() + mux.Handle("/", handler) + mux.Handle("/events", handler) + mux.HandleFunc("/healthz", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK) + _, _ = w.Write([]byte("ok\n")) + }) + + ctx, cancel := signal.NotifyContext(context.Background(), os.Interrupt, syscall.SIGTERM) + defer cancel() + + var wg sync.WaitGroup + + // Start TCP listener if configured + if *portFlag > 0 { + tcpAddr := fmt.Sprintf("127.0.0.1:%d", *portFlag) + tcpServer := &http.Server{ + Addr: tcpAddr, + Handler: mux, + ReadHeaderTimeout: 5 * time.Second, + } + + wg.Add(1) + go func() { + defer wg.Done() + log.Printf("Listening for containment signals on HTTP http://%s/events", tcpAddr) + if err := tcpServer.ListenAndServe(); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, http.ErrServerClosed) { + log.Fatalf("HTTP listener error: %v", err) + } + }() + + go func() { + <-ctx.Done() + shutdownCtx, shutdownCancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 3*time.Second) + defer shutdownCancel() + _ = tcpServer.Shutdown(shutdownCtx) + }() + } + + // Start Unix domain socket listener if configured + if *socketPathFlag != "" { + sockPath := *socketPathFlag + _ = os.Remove(sockPath) // Clean up stale socket file if it exists + + unixListener, err := net.Listen("unix", sockPath) + if err != nil { + log.Fatalf("Fatal: creating Unix domain socket listener at %s: %v", sockPath, err) + } + defer os.Remove(sockPath) + + unixServer := &http.Server{ + Handler: mux, + ReadHeaderTimeout: 5 * time.Second, + } + + wg.Add(1) + go func() { + defer wg.Done() + log.Printf("Listening for containment signals on Unix socket unix:%s", sockPath) + if err := unixServer.Serve(unixListener); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, http.ErrServerClosed) { + log.Fatalf("Unix socket listener error: %v", err) + } + }() + + go func() { + <-ctx.Done() + shutdownCtx, shutdownCancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 3*time.Second) + defer shutdownCancel() + _ = unixServer.Shutdown(shutdownCtx) + }() + } + + log.Printf("Generic Containment Webhook receiver ready. Press Ctrl+C to exit.") + <-ctx.Done() + log.Printf("Shutting down containment webhook receiver...") + wg.Wait() + log.Printf("Receiver gracefully terminated.") +} diff --git a/development/examples/generic-containment-webhook/main_test.go b/development/examples/generic-containment-webhook/main_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..01255359 --- /dev/null +++ b/development/examples/generic-containment-webhook/main_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,483 @@ +// Copyright 2026 Google LLC +// +// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +// You may obtain a copy of the License at +// +// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +// +// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +// limitations under the License. + +package main + +import ( + "bytes" + "crypto/hmac" + "crypto/sha256" + "encoding/hex" + "fmt" + "net/http" + "net/http/httptest" + "strconv" + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/google/agentmesh/api" + "google.golang.org/protobuf/encoding/protojson" + "google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/timestamppb" +) + +func TestNewWebhookHandler_CloudEventsValidation(t *testing.T) { + handler := NewWebhookHandler(HandlerConfig{ + NoColor: true, + }) + + tests := []struct { + name string + method string + headers map[string]string + body string + wantStatus int + wantContains string + }{ + { + name: "reject GET method", + method: http.MethodGet, + wantStatus: http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, + }, + { + name: "reject missing ce-specversion", + method: http.MethodPost, + headers: map[string]string{ + headerCEID: "123", + headerCEType: "agentmesh.policy.denied", + headerCESource: "agentmesh://node/1", + }, + wantStatus: http.StatusBadRequest, + wantContains: "ce-specversion header must be '1.0'", + }, + { + name: "reject invalid ce-specversion", + method: http.MethodPost, + headers: map[string]string{ + headerCESpecVersion: "0.3", + headerCEID: "123", + headerCEType: "agentmesh.policy.denied", + headerCESource: "agentmesh://node/1", + }, + wantStatus: http.StatusBadRequest, + wantContains: "ce-specversion header must be '1.0'", + }, + { + name: "reject missing ce-id", + method: http.MethodPost, + headers: map[string]string{ + headerCESpecVersion: "1.0", + headerCEType: "agentmesh.policy.denied", + headerCESource: "agentmesh://node/1", + }, + wantStatus: http.StatusBadRequest, + wantContains: "ce-id header is required", + }, + { + name: "reject missing ce-type", + method: http.MethodPost, + headers: map[string]string{ + headerCESpecVersion: "1.0", + headerCEID: "123", + headerCESource: "agentmesh://node/1", + }, + wantStatus: http.StatusBadRequest, + wantContains: "ce-type header is required", + }, + { + name: "reject missing ce-source", + method: http.MethodPost, + headers: map[string]string{ + headerCESpecVersion: "1.0", + headerCEID: "123", + headerCEType: "agentmesh.policy.denied", + }, + wantStatus: http.StatusBadRequest, + wantContains: "ce-source header is required", + }, + { + name: "reject invalid JSON payload", + method: http.MethodPost, + headers: map[string]string{ + headerCESpecVersion: "1.0", + headerCEID: "123", + headerCEType: "agentmesh.policy.denied", + headerCESource: "agentmesh://node/1", + }, + body: "{not-valid-json}", + wantStatus: http.StatusBadRequest, + wantContains: "protojson unmarshal failed", + }, + } + + for _, tc := range tests { + t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) { + req := httptest.NewRequest(tc.method, "/events", bytes.NewBufferString(tc.body)) + for k, v := range tc.headers { + req.Header.Set(k, v) + } + rec := httptest.NewRecorder() + + handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req) + + if rec.Code != tc.wantStatus { + t.Fatalf("status code = %d, want %d (body: %s)", rec.Code, tc.wantStatus, rec.Body.String()) + } + if tc.wantContains != "" && !bytes.Contains(rec.Body.Bytes(), []byte(tc.wantContains)) { + t.Fatalf("response body %q does not contain %q", rec.Body.String(), tc.wantContains) + } + }) + } +} + +func TestNewWebhookHandler_HMACVerification(t *testing.T) { + secret := []byte("test-shared-hmac-secret-key-32b") + handler := NewWebhookHandler(HandlerConfig{ + HMACSecret: secret, + NoColor: true, + }) + + now := timestamppb.Now() + event := &api.SecuritySignalEvent{ + Id: "sig-test-1", + Source: "urn:agentmesh:node:node-1", + SpecVersion: "1.0", + Type: "agentmesh.identity.revoked", + EventTime: now, + DataContentType: "application/json", + Data: &api.SecuritySignalEvent_IdentityRevoked{ + IdentityRevoked: &api.IdentityRevokedSignal{ + PeerId: "peer-banned", + Reason: "malicious activity", + EventTime: now, + }, + }, + } + bodyBytes, err := protojson.Marshal(event) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("protojson.Marshal failed: %v", err) + } + + tsMillis := time.Now().UnixMilli() + tsStr := strconv.FormatInt(tsMillis, 10) + + mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, secret) + mac.Write([]byte(tsStr)) + mac.Write([]byte(".")) + mac.Write(bodyBytes) + validSig := "sha256=" + hex.EncodeToString(mac.Sum(nil)) + + t.Run("missing HMAC headers", func(t *testing.T) { + req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/events", bytes.NewReader(bodyBytes)) + req.Header.Set(headerCESpecVersion, "1.0") + req.Header.Set(headerCEID, event.Id) + req.Header.Set(headerCEType, event.Type) + req.Header.Set(headerCESource, event.Source) + rec := httptest.NewRecorder() + + handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req) + if rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized { + t.Fatalf("expected 401 Unauthorized, got %d", rec.Code) + } + }) + + t.Run("invalid HMAC signature", func(t *testing.T) { + req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/events", bytes.NewReader(bodyBytes)) + req.Header.Set(headerCESpecVersion, "1.0") + req.Header.Set(headerCEID, event.Id) + req.Header.Set(headerCEType, event.Type) + req.Header.Set(headerCESource, event.Source) + req.Header.Set(headerAgentMeshTimestamp, tsStr) + req.Header.Set(headerAgentMeshSignature, "sha256=0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000") + rec := httptest.NewRecorder() + + handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req) + if rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized { + t.Fatalf("expected 401 Unauthorized, got %d", rec.Code) + } + }) + + t.Run("expired timestamp", func(t *testing.T) { + expiredTs := strconv.FormatInt(time.Now().Add(-10*time.Minute).UnixMilli(), 10) + expMac := hmac.New(sha256.New, secret) + expMac.Write([]byte(expiredTs)) + expMac.Write([]byte(".")) + expMac.Write(bodyBytes) + expSig := "sha256=" + hex.EncodeToString(expMac.Sum(nil)) + + req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/events", bytes.NewReader(bodyBytes)) + req.Header.Set(headerCESpecVersion, "1.0") + req.Header.Set(headerCEID, event.Id) + req.Header.Set(headerCEType, event.Type) + req.Header.Set(headerCESource, event.Source) + req.Header.Set(headerAgentMeshTimestamp, expiredTs) + req.Header.Set(headerAgentMeshSignature, expSig) + rec := httptest.NewRecorder() + + handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req) + if rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized { + t.Fatalf("expected 401 Unauthorized for expired timestamp, got %d", rec.Code) + } + }) + + t.Run("valid HMAC signature accepted", func(t *testing.T) { + req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/events", bytes.NewReader(bodyBytes)) + req.Header.Set(headerCESpecVersion, "1.0") + req.Header.Set(headerCEID, event.Id) + req.Header.Set(headerCEType, event.Type) + req.Header.Set(headerCESource, event.Source) + req.Header.Set(headerAgentMeshTimestamp, tsStr) + req.Header.Set(headerAgentMeshSignature, validSig) + rec := httptest.NewRecorder() + + handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req) + if rec.Code != http.StatusOK { + t.Fatalf("expected 200 OK, got %d (body: %s)", rec.Code, rec.Body.String()) + } + }) +} + +func TestNewWebhookHandler_AllFourSignalTypes(t *testing.T) { + handler := NewWebhookHandler(HandlerConfig{ + NoColor: true, + }) + + now := timestamppb.Now() + + events := []*api.SecuritySignalEvent{ + { + Id: "test-policy-denied", + Source: "urn:agentmesh:node:node-1", + SpecVersion: "1.0", + Type: "agentmesh.policy.denied", + EventTime: now, + Data: &api.SecuritySignalEvent_PolicyDenied{ + PolicyDenied: &api.PolicyDeniedSignal{ + Direction: api.SignalCallerDirection_LOCAL_WORKLOAD, + Reason: api.PolicyDenialReason_DATALOG_EVALUATION_DENIED, + Detail: "denied by biscuit authority block", + TargetService: "calculator", + EventTime: now, + }, + }, + }, + { + Id: "test-transport-refused", + Source: "urn:agentmesh:node:node-1", + SpecVersion: "1.0", + Type: "agentmesh.transport.refused", + EventTime: now, + Data: &api.SecuritySignalEvent_TransportRefused{ + TransportRefused: &api.TransportRefusedSignal{ + Reason: api.TransportRefusalReason_PEER_UNAUTHENTICATED, + Detail: "auth deadline exceeded", + PeerId: "12D3KooWPeer1", + CoalescedCount: 3, + EventTime: now, + }, + }, + }, + { + Id: "test-identity-revoked", + Source: "urn:agentmesh:control-plane:cp-1", + SpecVersion: "1.0", + Type: "agentmesh.identity.revoked", + EventTime: now, + Data: &api.SecuritySignalEvent_IdentityRevoked{ + IdentityRevoked: &api.IdentityRevokedSignal{ + PeerId: "12D3KooWBannedPeer", + Reason: "security breach detected", + EventTime: now, + }, + }, + }, + { + Id: "test-enrollment-rejected", + Source: "urn:agentmesh:control-plane:cp-1", + SpecVersion: "1.0", + Type: "agentmesh.enrollment.rejected", + EventTime: now, + Data: &api.SecuritySignalEvent_EnrollmentRejected{ + EnrollmentRejected: &api.EnrollmentRejectedSignal{ + PeerId: "12D3KooWRejectedPeer", + RequestedRole: "router", + Reason: api.EnrollmentRejectionReason_REQUESTED_ROLE_UNAUTHORIZED, + Detail: "peer not authorized for router role", + EventTime: now, + }, + }, + }, + } + + for _, ev := range events { + t.Run(ev.Type, func(t *testing.T) { + body, err := protojson.Marshal(ev) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("protojson.Marshal failed for %s: %v", ev.Type, err) + } + + req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/events", bytes.NewReader(body)) + req.Header.Set(headerCESpecVersion, "1.0") + req.Header.Set(headerCEID, ev.Id) + req.Header.Set(headerCEType, ev.Type) + req.Header.Set(headerCESource, ev.Source) + rec := httptest.NewRecorder() + + handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req) + + if rec.Code != http.StatusOK { + t.Fatalf("%s: expected 200 OK, got %d (body: %s)", ev.Type, rec.Code, rec.Body.String()) + } + + wantJSON := fmt.Sprintf(`"id":%q`, ev.Id) + if !bytes.Contains(rec.Body.Bytes(), []byte(wantJSON)) { + t.Fatalf("%s: expected response to contain %s, got %s", ev.Type, wantJSON, rec.Body.String()) + } + }) + } +} + +func TestAdversarial_WebhookBoundaries(t *testing.T) { + secret := []byte("boundary-test-secret-32-bytes!!") + handler := NewWebhookHandler(HandlerConfig{ + HMACSecret: secret, + NoColor: true, + }) + + now := timestamppb.Now() + validEvent := &api.SecuritySignalEvent{ + Id: "boundary-test-1", + Source: "urn:agentmesh:node:node-1", + SpecVersion: "1.0", + Type: "agentmesh.policy.denied", + EventTime: now, + Data: &api.SecuritySignalEvent_PolicyDenied{ + PolicyDenied: &api.PolicyDeniedSignal{ + Direction: api.SignalCallerDirection_LOCAL_WORKLOAD, + Reason: api.PolicyDenialReason_DATALOG_EVALUATION_DENIED, + TargetService: "vault", + EventTime: now, + }, + }, + } + validBody, err := protojson.Marshal(validEvent) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("protojson.Marshal failed: %v", err) + } + + makeSignedReq := func(method string, tsMillis int64, body []byte) *http.Request { + tsStr := strconv.FormatInt(tsMillis, 10) + mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, secret) + mac.Write([]byte(tsStr)) + mac.Write([]byte(".")) + mac.Write(body) + sig := "sha256=" + hex.EncodeToString(mac.Sum(nil)) + + req := httptest.NewRequest(method, "/events", bytes.NewReader(body)) + req.Header.Set(headerCESpecVersion, "1.0") + req.Header.Set(headerCEID, "boundary-test-1") + req.Header.Set(headerCEType, "agentmesh.policy.denied") + req.Header.Set(headerCESource, "urn:agentmesh:node:node-1") + req.Header.Set(headerAgentMeshTimestamp, tsStr) + req.Header.Set(headerAgentMeshSignature, sig) + return req + } + + t.Run("reject non-POST HTTP methods", func(t *testing.T) { + methods := []string{http.MethodGet, http.MethodPut, http.MethodDelete, http.MethodPatch, http.MethodHead, http.MethodOptions} + for _, m := range methods { + req := makeSignedReq(m, time.Now().UnixMilli(), validBody) + rec := httptest.NewRecorder() + handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req) + if rec.Code != http.StatusMethodNotAllowed { + t.Errorf("method %s: expected 405 Method Not Allowed, got %d", m, rec.Code) + } + } + }) + + t.Run("reject payload exceeding 1MB maxBodyBytes", func(t *testing.T) { + // Create an oversized body (> 1MB) with trailing JSON padding + oversized := make([]byte, 1024*1024+100) + copy(oversized, validBody) + for i := len(validBody); i < len(oversized); i++ { + oversized[i] = ' ' + } + req := makeSignedReq(http.MethodPost, time.Now().UnixMilli(), oversized) + rec := httptest.NewRecorder() + handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req) + // Because LimitReader truncates at 1MB, the truncated body fails either + // HMAC verification (401) or ProtoJSON parsing (400). In both cases, oversized payloads are rejected. + if rec.Code != http.StatusBadRequest && rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized { + t.Errorf("oversized body: expected 400 Bad Request or 401 Unauthorized, got %d", rec.Code) + } + }) + + t.Run("reject future timestamp exceeding clock skew", func(t *testing.T) { + futureTs := time.Now().Add(10 * time.Minute).UnixMilli() + req := makeSignedReq(http.MethodPost, futureTs, validBody) + rec := httptest.NewRecorder() + handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req) + if rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized { + t.Errorf("future timestamp: expected 401 Unauthorized, got %d", rec.Code) + } + }) + + t.Run("reject non-numeric timestamp", func(t *testing.T) { + req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/events", bytes.NewReader(validBody)) + req.Header.Set(headerCESpecVersion, "1.0") + req.Header.Set(headerCEID, "boundary-test-1") + req.Header.Set(headerCEType, "agentmesh.policy.denied") + req.Header.Set(headerCESource, "urn:agentmesh:node:node-1") + req.Header.Set(headerAgentMeshTimestamp, "not-a-number") + req.Header.Set(headerAgentMeshSignature, "sha256=abcdef") + rec := httptest.NewRecorder() + handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req) + if rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized { + t.Errorf("non-numeric timestamp: expected 401 Unauthorized, got %d", rec.Code) + } + }) + + t.Run("reject unknown JSON fields (fail closed schema)", func(t *testing.T) { + injectedJSON := `{"id":"b1","specversion":"1.0","type":"agentmesh.policy.denied","source":"node1","unknown_injected_field":"exploit"}` + req := makeSignedReq(http.MethodPost, time.Now().UnixMilli(), []byte(injectedJSON)) + rec := httptest.NewRecorder() + handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req) + if rec.Code != http.StatusBadRequest { + t.Errorf("unknown field injection: expected 400 Bad Request, got %d", rec.Code) + } + }) + + t.Run("reject signature missing sha256 prefix", func(t *testing.T) { + tsMillis := time.Now().UnixMilli() + tsStr := strconv.FormatInt(tsMillis, 10) + mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, secret) + mac.Write([]byte(tsStr)) + mac.Write([]byte(".")) + mac.Write(validBody) + rawHex := hex.EncodeToString(mac.Sum(nil)) + + req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/events", bytes.NewReader(validBody)) + req.Header.Set(headerCESpecVersion, "1.0") + req.Header.Set(headerCEID, "boundary-test-1") + req.Header.Set(headerCEType, "agentmesh.policy.denied") + req.Header.Set(headerCESource, "urn:agentmesh:node:node-1") + req.Header.Set(headerAgentMeshTimestamp, tsStr) + req.Header.Set(headerAgentMeshSignature, rawHex) // missing sha256= prefix + rec := httptest.NewRecorder() + handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req) + if rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized { + t.Errorf("signature missing sha256= prefix: expected 401 Unauthorized, got %d", rec.Code) + } + }) +} + diff --git a/internal/containment/client.go b/internal/containment/client.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..be6a5b04 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/containment/client.go @@ -0,0 +1,467 @@ +// Copyright 2026 Google LLC +// +// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +// You may obtain a copy of the License at +// +// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +// +// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +// limitations under the License. + +package containment + +import ( + "bytes" + "context" + "crypto/hmac" + "crypto/sha256" + "crypto/tls" + "crypto/x509" + "encoding/hex" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" + "net" + "net/http" + "net/url" + "os" + "strconv" + "strings" + "time" + + "github.com/google/agentmesh/api" + "github.com/google/agentmesh/internal/secrets" + "google.golang.org/protobuf/encoding/protojson" + "google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/timestamppb" +) + +// CloudEvents and HTTP header constants. +const ( + HeaderCESpecVersion = "ce-specversion" + HeaderCEID = "ce-id" + HeaderCEType = "ce-type" + HeaderCESource = "ce-source" + HeaderCETime = "ce-time" + HeaderCESubject = "ce-subject" + HeaderContentType = "Content-Type" + HeaderUserAgent = "User-Agent" + HeaderAgentMeshTimestamp = "X-AgentMesh-Timestamp" + HeaderAgentMeshSignature = "X-AgentMesh-Signature" + + ContentTypeJSON = "application/json" + DefaultUserAgent = "agentmesh-containment/1.0" + MaxResponseBytes = 4096 +) + +// Client handles network delivery of security signals. +type Client interface { + Send(ctx context.Context, event *api.SecuritySignalEvent) error + Deliver(ctx context.Context, event *api.SecuritySignalEvent) error + Close() error +} + +// ClientConfig is an alias for EndpointConfig for backwards compatibility. +type ClientConfig = EndpointConfig + +type singleClient struct { + cfg EndpointConfig + httpClient *http.Client + requestURL string + isUnixSocket bool + socketPath string + eventFilter map[string]bool + hasHMAC bool + hmacSecret []byte +} + +type multiClient struct { + clients []Client +} + +// NewClient creates a Client configured for one or more target endpoints. +func NewClient(endpoints ...EndpointConfig) (Client, error) { + if len(endpoints) == 0 { + return &multiClient{}, nil + } + + var clients []Client + for _, ep := range endpoints { + if ep.URL == "" { + continue + } + c, err := NewSingleClient(ep) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + clients = append(clients, c) + } + + if len(clients) == 1 { + return clients[0], nil + } + return &multiClient{clients: clients}, nil +} + +// NewSingleClient creates a Client for a single target endpoint. +func NewSingleClient(cfg EndpointConfig) (Client, error) { + rawTarget := strings.TrimSpace(cfg.URL) + if rawTarget == "" { + return nil, errors.New("containment: target URL is required") + } + + timeout := cfg.Timeout + if timeout <= 0 { + timeout = DefaultTimeout + } + + c := &singleClient{ + cfg: cfg, + hasHMAC: false, + } + + // 1. Resolve HMAC secret (direct bytes or file path) + if len(cfg.HMACSecret) > 0 { + c.hmacSecret = append([]byte(nil), cfg.HMACSecret...) + c.hasHMAC = true + } else if cfg.HMACSecretPath != "" { + secretStr, err := secrets.FromPathOrEnv("containment-hmac-secret", cfg.HMACSecretPath, "AGENTMESH_CONTAINMENT_HMAC_SECRET") + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("containment: read hmac_secret_path %q: %w", cfg.HMACSecretPath, err) + } + if secretStr != "" { + c.hmacSecret = []byte(secretStr) + c.hasHMAC = true + } + } + + // 2. Setup event type filter + if len(cfg.EventTypes) > 0 { + c.eventFilter = make(map[string]bool, len(cfg.EventTypes)) + for _, et := range cfg.EventTypes { + if trimmed := strings.TrimSpace(et); trimmed != "" { + c.eventFilter[trimmed] = true + } + } + } + + // 3. Configure transport based on scheme + switch { + case strings.HasPrefix(rawTarget, "unix:"): + sockPath := strings.TrimPrefix(rawTarget, "unix:") + sockPath = strings.TrimPrefix(sockPath, "//") + if sockPath == "" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("containment: unix socket target %q contains empty path", rawTarget) + } + + c.isUnixSocket = true + c.socketPath = sockPath + c.requestURL = "http://unix/events" + + tr := &http.Transport{ + DialContext: func(ctx context.Context, _, _ string) (net.Conn, error) { + return (&net.Dialer{}).DialContext(ctx, "unix", sockPath) + }, + DisableKeepAlives: false, + MaxIdleConns: 10, + IdleConnTimeout: 90 * time.Second, + } + c.httpClient = &http.Client{ + Transport: tr, + Timeout: timeout, + } + + case strings.HasPrefix(rawTarget, "https://"): + u, err := url.Parse(rawTarget) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("containment: invalid https target %q: %w", rawTarget, err) + } + c.requestURL = u.String() + + tlsConfig := &tls.Config{ + MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12, + } + + if cfg.CACertPath != "" { + caBytes, err := os.ReadFile(cfg.CACertPath) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("containment: read ca_cert_path %q: %w", cfg.CACertPath, err) + } + pool := x509.NewCertPool() + if !pool.AppendCertsFromPEM(caBytes) { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("containment: ca_cert_path %q contains no valid PEM certificates", cfg.CACertPath) + } + tlsConfig.RootCAs = pool + } + + if cfg.ClientCertPath != "" || cfg.ClientKeyPath != "" { + if cfg.ClientCertPath == "" || cfg.ClientKeyPath == "" { + return nil, errors.New("containment: client_cert_path and client_key_path must both be provided for mTLS") + } + cert, err := tls.LoadX509KeyPair(cfg.ClientCertPath, cfg.ClientKeyPath) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("containment: load mTLS client keypair (%s, %s): %w", cfg.ClientCertPath, cfg.ClientKeyPath, err) + } + tlsConfig.Certificates = []tls.Certificate{cert} + } + + if cfg.InsecureSkipTLS { + tlsConfig.InsecureSkipVerify = true + } + + tr := &http.Transport{ + TLSClientConfig: tlsConfig, + DialContext: (&net.Dialer{Timeout: 5 * time.Second}).DialContext, + MaxIdleConns: 10, + IdleConnTimeout: 90 * time.Second, + } + c.httpClient = &http.Client{ + Transport: tr, + Timeout: timeout, + } + + case strings.HasPrefix(rawTarget, "http://"): + u, err := url.Parse(rawTarget) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("containment: invalid http target %q: %w", rawTarget, err) + } + host := u.Hostname() + ip := net.ParseIP(host) + isLoopback := (ip != nil && ip.IsLoopback()) || strings.EqualFold(host, "localhost") + if !isLoopback { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("containment: insecure http scheme only permitted for loopback targets (127.0.0.1, localhost, ::1); got %q", rawTarget) + } + c.requestURL = u.String() + + tr := &http.Transport{ + DialContext: (&net.Dialer{Timeout: 5 * time.Second}).DialContext, + MaxIdleConns: 10, + IdleConnTimeout: 90 * time.Second, + } + c.httpClient = &http.Client{ + Transport: tr, + Timeout: timeout, + } + + default: + return nil, fmt.Errorf("containment: unsupported scheme in URL %q: must start with https://, http://127.0.0.1, or unix:", rawTarget) + } + + return c, nil +} + +// NewClientFromProto constructs a Client directly from protobuf WebhookEndpointConfig. +func NewClientFromProto(cfg *api.WebhookEndpointConfig) (Client, error) { + if cfg == nil { + return nil, errors.New("containment: nil WebhookEndpointConfig") + } + epCfg, err := EndpointFromProto(cfg) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return NewSingleClient(epCfg) +} + +func (c *singleClient) Deliver(ctx context.Context, event *api.SecuritySignalEvent) error { + return c.Send(ctx, event) +} + +func (c *singleClient) Send(ctx context.Context, event *api.SecuritySignalEvent) error { + if event == nil { + return errors.New("containment: cannot send nil SecuritySignalEvent") + } + + // 1. Check event type filter + signalType := event.Type + if signalType == "" { + signalType = inferSignalType(event) + event.Type = signalType + } + if len(c.eventFilter) > 0 && !c.eventFilter[signalType] { + return nil + } + + // 2. Ensure envelope fields are populated + if event.Id == "" { + event.Id = generateUUID() + } + if event.SpecVersion == "" { + event.SpecVersion = "1.0" + } + if event.Source == "" { + event.Source = "agentmesh://containment/dispatcher" + } + if event.EventTime == nil { + event.EventTime = timestamppb.Now() + } + if event.DataContentType == "" { + event.DataContentType = ContentTypeJSON + } + if event.Subject == "" { + event.Subject = extractSubject(event) + } + + // 3. Serialize via protojson with UseProtoNames: true + bodyBytes, err := protojson.MarshalOptions{ + UseProtoNames: true, + EmitUnpopulated: false, + }.Marshal(event) + if err != nil { + containmentDroppedTotal.WithLabelValues(event.Type, "marshal_error").Inc() + return fmt.Errorf("containment: protojson marshal: %w", err) + } + + // 4. Compute CloudEvents headers + ceTime := event.EventTime.AsTime().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339Nano) + + // 5. Compute HMAC-SHA256 headers if configured + var tsStr, sigHeader string + if c.hasHMAC && len(c.hmacSecret) > 0 { + tsMillis := time.Now().UnixMilli() + tsStr = strconv.FormatInt(tsMillis, 10) + sigHeader = ComputeSignature(c.hmacSecret, tsStr, bodyBytes) + } + + maxRetries := c.cfg.MaxRetries + if maxRetries == 0 { + maxRetries = DefaultMaxRetries + } + + var lastErr error + totalAttempts := 1 + int(maxRetries) + + for attempt := 0; attempt < totalAttempts; attempt++ { + start := time.Now() + req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodPost, c.requestURL, bytes.NewReader(bodyBytes)) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("containment: create request: %w", err) + } + + // CloudEvents 1.0 headers + req.Header.Set(HeaderContentType, ContentTypeJSON) + req.Header.Set(HeaderUserAgent, DefaultUserAgent) + req.Header.Set(HeaderCESpecVersion, "1.0") + req.Header.Set(HeaderCEID, event.Id) + req.Header.Set(HeaderCEType, event.Type) + req.Header.Set(HeaderCESource, event.Source) + req.Header.Set(HeaderCETime, ceTime) + if event.Subject != "" { + req.Header.Set(HeaderCESubject, event.Subject) + } + + // HMAC headers + if sigHeader != "" { + req.Header.Set(HeaderAgentMeshTimestamp, tsStr) + req.Header.Set(HeaderAgentMeshSignature, sigHeader) + } + + resp, err := c.httpClient.Do(req) + duration := time.Since(start) + containmentDeliveryDuration.WithLabelValues(event.Type).Observe(duration.Seconds()) + + if err == nil { + _, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, io.LimitReader(resp.Body, MaxResponseBytes)) + resp.Body.Close() + + statusStr := strconv.Itoa(resp.StatusCode) + containmentDeliveredTotal.WithLabelValues(event.Type, statusStr).Inc() + + if resp.StatusCode >= 200 && resp.StatusCode < 300 { + return nil + } + lastErr = fmt.Errorf("webhook responded with status %d", resp.StatusCode) + if resp.StatusCode < 500 { + // Client 4xx error: do not retry + break + } + } else { + lastErr = err + if errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) || errors.Is(err, context.DeadlineExceeded) { + containmentDroppedTotal.WithLabelValues(event.Type, "client_timeout").Inc() + return err + } + } + } + + containmentDroppedTotal.WithLabelValues(event.Type, "transport_error").Inc() + logger.Warnw("Containment webhook delivery failed after retries", + "url", c.cfg.URL, + "type", event.Type, + "err", lastErr, + ) + return lastErr +} + +func (c *singleClient) Close() error { + if c.httpClient != nil { + if tr, ok := c.httpClient.Transport.(*http.Transport); ok { + tr.CloseIdleConnections() + } + } + return nil +} + +func (m *multiClient) Deliver(ctx context.Context, event *api.SecuritySignalEvent) error { + return m.Send(ctx, event) +} + +func (m *multiClient) Send(ctx context.Context, event *api.SecuritySignalEvent) error { + if len(m.clients) == 0 { + return nil + } + var errs []error + for _, c := range m.clients { + if err := c.Send(ctx, event); err != nil { + errs = append(errs, err) + } + } + return errors.Join(errs...) +} + +func (m *multiClient) Close() error { + var errs []error + for _, c := range m.clients { + if err := c.Close(); err != nil { + errs = append(errs, err) + } + } + return errors.Join(errs...) +} + +// ComputeSignature calculates the expected sha256= signature over timestamp + "." + body. +func ComputeSignature(secret []byte, timestamp string, body []byte) string { + h := hmac.New(sha256.New, secret) + h.Write([]byte(timestamp)) + h.Write([]byte(".")) + h.Write(body) + return "sha256=" + hex.EncodeToString(h.Sum(nil)) +} + +// VerifySignature verifies an incoming HMAC-SHA256 signature in constant time. +func VerifySignature(secret []byte, timestamp string, body []byte, signature string) bool { + if len(secret) == 0 || timestamp == "" || signature == "" { + return false + } + expectedSig := ComputeSignature(secret, timestamp, body) + return hmac.Equal([]byte(signature), []byte(expectedSig)) +} + +func inferSignalType(event *api.SecuritySignalEvent) string { + if event == nil { + return "" + } + switch event.Data.(type) { + case *api.SecuritySignalEvent_PolicyDenied: + return "agentmesh.policy.denied" + case *api.SecuritySignalEvent_TransportRefused: + return "agentmesh.transport.refused" + case *api.SecuritySignalEvent_IdentityRevoked: + return "agentmesh.identity.revoked" + case *api.SecuritySignalEvent_EnrollmentRejected: + return "agentmesh.enrollment.rejected" + } + return "" +} diff --git a/internal/containment/coalescer.go b/internal/containment/coalescer.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c402332c --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/containment/coalescer.go @@ -0,0 +1,256 @@ +// Copyright 2026 Google LLC +// +// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +// You may obtain a copy of the License at +// +// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +// +// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +// limitations under the License. + +package containment + +import ( + "crypto/rand" + "fmt" + "sync" + "time" + + "github.com/google/agentmesh/api" + "google.golang.org/protobuf/proto" + "google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/timestamppb" +) + +// SummaryCallback is invoked when a coalescing window closes and duplicate events occurred. +type SummaryCallback func(summary *api.SecuritySignalEvent) + +// Coalescer deduplicates repetitive security events within a bounded sliding/tumbling window. +type Coalescer struct { + window time.Duration + onSummary SummaryCallback + mu sync.Mutex + entries map[string]*coalesceEntry + closed bool +} + +type coalesceEntry struct { + key string + firstEvent *api.SecuritySignalEvent + lastEvent *api.SecuritySignalEvent + firstSeenTime time.Time + lastSeenTime time.Time + count uint32 + timer *time.Timer +} + +// NewCoalescer instantiates a coalescer with the given window duration and summary callback. +func NewCoalescer(window time.Duration, onSummary SummaryCallback) *Coalescer { + return &Coalescer{ + window: window, + onSummary: onSummary, + entries: make(map[string]*coalesceEntry), + } +} + +// Record checks whether an incoming event should be coalesced. +// Returns false if this is the first occurrence (must be dispatched immediately). +// Returns true if this event is a duplicate within the active window (suppressed). +func (c *Coalescer) Record(event *api.SecuritySignalEvent) bool { + if c == nil || c.window <= 0 || event == nil { + return false + } + + c.mu.Lock() + defer c.mu.Unlock() + + if c.closed { + return false + } + + targetService := extractTargetService(event) + subject := event.Subject + if subject == "" { + subject = extractSubject(event) + } + key := fmt.Sprintf("%s|%s|%s", event.Type, subject, targetService) + + now := time.Now() + if event.EventTime != nil { + now = event.EventTime.AsTime() + } + + entry, exists := c.entries[key] + if !exists { + newEntry := &coalesceEntry{ + key: key, + firstEvent: event, + lastEvent: event, + firstSeenTime: now, + lastSeenTime: now, + count: 0, + } + newEntry.timer = time.AfterFunc(c.window, func() { + c.flushEntry(key) + }) + c.entries[key] = newEntry + return false + } + + entry.count++ + entry.lastEvent = event + entry.lastSeenTime = now + return true +} + +func (c *Coalescer) flushEntry(key string) { + c.mu.Lock() + if c.closed { + c.mu.Unlock() + return + } + entry, exists := c.entries[key] + if !exists { + c.mu.Unlock() + return + } + delete(c.entries, key) + c.mu.Unlock() + + if entry.count > 0 && c.onSummary != nil { + summary := c.buildSummaryEvent(entry) + if summary != nil { + c.onSummary(summary) + } + } +} + +func (c *Coalescer) buildSummaryEvent(entry *coalesceEntry) *api.SecuritySignalEvent { + if entry == nil || entry.lastEvent == nil { + return nil + } + + summary := proto.Clone(entry.lastEvent).(*api.SecuritySignalEvent) + summary.Id = generateUUID() + summary.EventTime = timestamppb.New(entry.lastSeenTime) + + switch d := summary.Data.(type) { + case *api.SecuritySignalEvent_TransportRefused: + if d.TransportRefused != nil { + d.TransportRefused.CoalescedCount = entry.count + d.TransportRefused.FirstSeenTime = timestamppb.New(entry.firstSeenTime) + d.TransportRefused.EventTime = timestamppb.New(entry.lastSeenTime) + } + case *api.SecuritySignalEvent_PolicyDenied: + if d.PolicyDenied != nil { + d.PolicyDenied.Detail = fmt.Sprintf("%s (coalesced %d occurrences)", d.PolicyDenied.Detail, entry.count) + d.PolicyDenied.EventTime = timestamppb.New(entry.lastSeenTime) + } + case *api.SecuritySignalEvent_IdentityRevoked: + if d.IdentityRevoked != nil { + d.IdentityRevoked.Reason = fmt.Sprintf("%s (coalesced %d occurrences)", d.IdentityRevoked.Reason, entry.count) + d.IdentityRevoked.EventTime = timestamppb.New(entry.lastSeenTime) + } + case *api.SecuritySignalEvent_EnrollmentRejected: + if d.EnrollmentRejected != nil { + d.EnrollmentRejected.Detail = fmt.Sprintf("%s (coalesced %d occurrences)", d.EnrollmentRejected.Detail, entry.count) + d.EnrollmentRejected.EventTime = timestamppb.New(entry.lastSeenTime) + } + } + return summary +} + +// Close terminates all active timers and flushes any pending summary events. +func (c *Coalescer) Close() { + c.mu.Lock() + if c.closed { + c.mu.Unlock() + return + } + c.closed = true + + var toFlush []*coalesceEntry + for _, entry := range c.entries { + if entry.timer != nil { + entry.timer.Stop() + } + if entry.count > 0 { + toFlush = append(toFlush, entry) + } + } + c.entries = make(map[string]*coalesceEntry) + c.mu.Unlock() + + for _, entry := range toFlush { + if c.onSummary != nil { + if summary := c.buildSummaryEvent(entry); summary != nil { + c.onSummary(summary) + } + } + } +} + +func extractTargetService(event *api.SecuritySignalEvent) string { + if event == nil { + return "" + } + switch d := event.Data.(type) { + case *api.SecuritySignalEvent_PolicyDenied: + if d.PolicyDenied != nil { + return d.PolicyDenied.TargetService + } + case *api.SecuritySignalEvent_TransportRefused: + if d.TransportRefused != nil { + return d.TransportRefused.ProtocolId + } + case *api.SecuritySignalEvent_IdentityRevoked: + if d.IdentityRevoked != nil { + return d.IdentityRevoked.Source.String() + } + case *api.SecuritySignalEvent_EnrollmentRejected: + if d.EnrollmentRejected != nil { + return d.EnrollmentRejected.RequestedRole + } + } + return "" +} + +func extractSubject(event *api.SecuritySignalEvent) string { + if event == nil { + return "" + } + switch d := event.Data.(type) { + case *api.SecuritySignalEvent_PolicyDenied: + if d.PolicyDenied != nil { + if d.PolicyDenied.CallerPeerId != "" { + return d.PolicyDenied.CallerPeerId + } + return d.PolicyDenied.CallerSubject + } + case *api.SecuritySignalEvent_TransportRefused: + if d.TransportRefused != nil { + return d.TransportRefused.PeerId + } + case *api.SecuritySignalEvent_IdentityRevoked: + if d.IdentityRevoked != nil { + return d.IdentityRevoked.PeerId + } + case *api.SecuritySignalEvent_EnrollmentRejected: + if d.EnrollmentRejected != nil { + return d.EnrollmentRejected.PeerId + } + } + return "" +} + +func generateUUID() string { + var b [16]byte + _, _ = rand.Read(b[:]) + b[6] = (b[6] & 0x0f) | 0x40 // RFC 4122 version 4 + b[8] = (b[8] & 0x3f) | 0x80 // RFC 4122 variant + return fmt.Sprintf("%08x-%04x-%04x-%04x-%012x", + b[0:4], b[4:6], b[6:8], b[8:10], b[10:16]) +} diff --git a/internal/containment/config.go b/internal/containment/config.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..dfe6ab04 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/containment/config.go @@ -0,0 +1,168 @@ +// Copyright 2026 Google LLC +// +// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +// You may obtain a copy of the License at +// +// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +// +// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +// limitations under the License. + +package containment + +import ( + "fmt" + "strings" + "time" + + "github.com/google/agentmesh/api" + "github.com/google/agentmesh/internal/secrets" +) + +// Default configurations per AGENTS.md §1 (Zero config, safe defaults). +const ( + DefaultQueueCapacity = 1024 + DefaultWorkerCount = 2 + DefaultTimeout = 500 * time.Millisecond + DefaultMaxRetries = 3 + DefaultCoalescingWindow = time.Second +) + +// Config specifies runtime configuration for containment webhook dispatch. +type Config struct { + Enabled bool + QueueCapacity int + Workers int + WorkerCount int // Alias for Workers + CoalescingWindow time.Duration + Endpoints []EndpointConfig +} + +// EffectiveWorkers returns the configured worker count, applying defaults. +func (c *Config) EffectiveWorkers() int { + if c.Workers > 0 { + return c.Workers + } + if c.WorkerCount > 0 { + return c.WorkerCount + } + return DefaultWorkerCount +} + +// EffectiveQueueCapacity returns the configured queue capacity, applying defaults. +func (c *Config) EffectiveQueueCapacity() int { + if c.QueueCapacity > 0 { + return c.QueueCapacity + } + return DefaultQueueCapacity +} + +// EndpointConfig defines configuration for a single delivery target. +type EndpointConfig struct { + URL string + Timeout time.Duration + MaxRetries uint32 + EventTypes []string + HMACSecret []byte + HMACSecretPath string + CACertPath string + ClientCertPath string + ClientKeyPath string + InsecureSkipTLS bool +} + +// FromProto translates an api.SecuritySignalsConfig message into an internal Config. +func FromProto(p *api.SecuritySignalsConfig) (*Config, error) { + if p == nil { + return &Config{ + Enabled: false, + QueueCapacity: DefaultQueueCapacity, + Workers: DefaultWorkerCount, + WorkerCount: DefaultWorkerCount, + CoalescingWindow: DefaultCoalescingWindow, + }, nil + } + + cfg := &Config{ + Enabled: p.Enabled, + QueueCapacity: int(p.QueueCapacity), + Workers: DefaultWorkerCount, + WorkerCount: DefaultWorkerCount, + } + if cfg.QueueCapacity <= 0 { + cfg.QueueCapacity = DefaultQueueCapacity + } + + if p.CoalescingWindow != nil { + cfg.CoalescingWindow = p.CoalescingWindow.AsDuration() + } else { + cfg.CoalescingWindow = DefaultCoalescingWindow + } + + for _, ep := range p.Endpoints { + if ep == nil || ep.Url == "" { + continue + } + epCfg, err := EndpointFromProto(ep) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + cfg.Endpoints = append(cfg.Endpoints, epCfg) + } + + return cfg, nil +} + +// EndpointFromProto translates an api.WebhookEndpointConfig message into an EndpointConfig. +func EndpointFromProto(ep *api.WebhookEndpointConfig) (EndpointConfig, error) { + if ep == nil { + return EndpointConfig{}, fmt.Errorf("nil WebhookEndpointConfig") + } + + rawURL := strings.TrimSpace(ep.Url) + if rawURL == "" { + return EndpointConfig{}, fmt.Errorf("empty containment webhook URL") + } + + if !strings.HasPrefix(rawURL, "unix:") && + !strings.HasPrefix(rawURL, "http://") && + !strings.HasPrefix(rawURL, "https://") { + return EndpointConfig{}, fmt.Errorf("invalid containment webhook URL scheme: %s (must be unix:, http://, or https://)", rawURL) + } + + epCfg := EndpointConfig{ + URL: rawURL, + MaxRetries: ep.MaxRetries, + EventTypes: ep.EventTypes, + HMACSecretPath: ep.HmacSecretPath, + CACertPath: ep.CaCertPath, + ClientCertPath: ep.ClientCertPath, + ClientKeyPath: ep.ClientKeyPath, + } + + if ep.Timeout != nil { + epCfg.Timeout = ep.Timeout.AsDuration() + } else { + epCfg.Timeout = DefaultTimeout + } + + if epCfg.MaxRetries == 0 { + epCfg.MaxRetries = DefaultMaxRetries + } + + if ep.HmacSecretPath != "" { + secretStr, err := secrets.FromPathOrEnv("containment-hmac-secret", ep.HmacSecretPath, "AGENTMESH_CONTAINMENT_HMAC_SECRET") + if err != nil { + return EndpointConfig{}, fmt.Errorf("endpoint %s hmac secret error: %w", rawURL, err) + } + if secretStr != "" { + epCfg.HMACSecret = []byte(secretStr) + } + } + + return epCfg, nil +} diff --git a/internal/containment/containment_concurrency_test.go b/internal/containment/containment_concurrency_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..afe848a8 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/containment/containment_concurrency_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,726 @@ +// Copyright 2026 Google LLC +// +// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +// You may obtain a copy of the License at +// +// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +// +// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +// limitations under the License. + +package containment + +import ( + "context" + "fmt" + "io" + "net/http" + "net/http/httptest" + "strings" + "sync" + "sync/atomic" + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/google/agentmesh/api" + "google.golang.org/protobuf/encoding/protojson" + "google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/timestamppb" +) + +// TestStress_QueueSaturationAndSheddingMetrics tests rapid bursts exceeding QueueCapacity, +// verifying exact drop counting in containmentDroppedTotal with label reason="buffer_full", +// strictly non-blocking returns, and per-signal-type metrics. +func TestStress_QueueSaturationAndSheddingMetrics(t *testing.T) { + blockHandler := make(chan struct{}) + handlerEntered := make(chan struct{}) + var handlerEnteredOnce sync.Once + var deliveredCount atomic.Int64 + + srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + handlerEnteredOnce.Do(func() { close(handlerEntered) }) + <-blockHandler + deliveredCount.Add(1) + w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK) + })) + t.Cleanup(func() { + select { + case <-blockHandler: + default: + close(blockHandler) + } + srv.Close() + }) + + const queueCap = 20 + const numWorkers = 2 + disp, err := NewDispatcher(Config{ + QueueCapacity: queueCap, + Workers: numWorkers, + Endpoints: []EndpointConfig{{URL: srv.URL}}, + }) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("NewDispatcher: %v", err) + } + + signalType := "agentmesh.policy.denied" + initialDropped := GetDroppedCountFor(signalType, "buffer_full") + + // Send 2 events to saturate the workers (2 workers blocked) + for i := 0; i < numWorkers; i++ { + disp.Dispatch(&api.SecuritySignalEvent{ + Id: fmt.Sprintf("worker-block-%d", i), + Type: signalType, + Source: "urn:agentmesh:node:stress", + SpecVersion: "1.0", + EventTime: timestamppb.Now(), + Data: &api.SecuritySignalEvent_PolicyDenied{ + PolicyDenied: &api.PolicyDeniedSignal{ + TargetService: "vault", + Detail: "blocker", + }, + }, + }) + } + + select { + case <-handlerEntered: + case <-time.After(3 * time.Second): + t.Fatalf("timeout waiting for worker to reach blocked handler") + } + + // Now the queue can hold exactly queueCap (20) events. + // We dispatch 100 events rapidly. + // Expected: exactly 20 are queued, exactly 80 are dropped with buffer_full. + const burstSize = 100 + start := time.Now() + for i := 0; i < burstSize; i++ { + disp.Dispatch(&api.SecuritySignalEvent{ + Id: fmt.Sprintf("burst-%d", i), + Type: signalType, + Source: "urn:agentmesh:node:stress", + SpecVersion: "1.0", + EventTime: timestamppb.Now(), + Data: &api.SecuritySignalEvent_PolicyDenied{ + PolicyDenied: &api.PolicyDeniedSignal{ + TargetService: fmt.Sprintf("svc-%d", i), + Detail: "burst item", + }, + }, + }) + } + elapsed := time.Since(start) + if elapsed > 100*time.Millisecond { + t.Errorf("Dispatch burst took %v, want <100ms (strictly non-blocking)", elapsed) + } + + afterBurstDropped := GetDroppedCountFor(signalType, "buffer_full") + droppedInBurst := int(afterBurstDropped - initialDropped) + expectedDropped := burstSize - queueCap // 100 - 20 = 80 + if droppedInBurst != expectedDropped { + t.Errorf("dropped in burst = %d, want %d (QueueCapacity=%d, burst=%d)", + droppedInBurst, expectedDropped, queueCap, burstSize) + } + + // Unblock workers and allow queue to drain + close(blockHandler) + + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second) + defer cancel() + if err := disp.Close(ctx); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("disp.Close: %v", err) + } + + // Total delivered should be numWorkers (2) + queueCap (20) = 22 + expectedDelivered := int64(numWorkers + queueCap) + if deliveredCount.Load() != expectedDelivered { + t.Errorf("delivered count = %d, want %d", deliveredCount.Load(), expectedDelivered) + } +} + +// TestStress_ConcurrentBurstQueueSaturation tests high concurrency across 20 goroutines +// sending 500 events each (10,000 events total) with zero deadlocks and consistent accounting. +func TestStress_ConcurrentBurstQueueSaturation(t *testing.T) { + var deliveredCount atomic.Int64 + srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + deliveredCount.Add(1) + w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK) + })) + t.Cleanup(srv.Close) + + const queueCap = 100 + const workers = 4 + disp, err := NewDispatcher(Config{ + QueueCapacity: queueCap, + Workers: workers, + Endpoints: []EndpointConfig{{URL: srv.URL}}, + }) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("NewDispatcher: %v", err) + } + + signalTypes := []string{ + "agentmesh.policy.denied", + "agentmesh.transport.refused", + "agentmesh.identity.revoked", + "agentmesh.enrollment.rejected", + } + + initDropped := GetDroppedCount() + const goroutines = 20 + const eventsPerGoroutine = 500 + const totalEvents = goroutines * eventsPerGoroutine // 10,000 + + var wg sync.WaitGroup + startSignal := make(chan struct{}) + + for g := 0; g < goroutines; g++ { + wg.Add(1) + go func(gid int) { + defer wg.Done() + <-startSignal + for i := 0; i < eventsPerGoroutine; i++ { + st := signalTypes[(gid+i)%len(signalTypes)] + disp.Dispatch(&api.SecuritySignalEvent{ + Id: fmt.Sprintf("g%d-ev%d", gid, i), + Type: st, + Source: "urn:agentmesh:node:stress", + SpecVersion: "1.0", + EventTime: timestamppb.Now(), + Subject: fmt.Sprintf("peer-%d", gid), + }) + } + }(g) + } + + close(startSignal) + wg.Wait() + + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second) + defer cancel() + if err := disp.Close(ctx); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("disp.Close: %v", err) + } + + endDropped := GetDroppedCount() + totalDropped := endDropped - initDropped + delivered := deliveredCount.Load() + + t.Logf("10,000 event concurrent burst result: delivered=%d, dropped=%d, sum=%d", + delivered, totalDropped, delivered+totalDropped) + + if delivered+totalDropped != int64(totalEvents) { + t.Errorf("accounting discrepancy: delivered (%d) + dropped (%d) = %d, want total %d", + delivered, totalDropped, delivered+totalDropped, totalEvents) + } +} + +// TestStress_CoalescingNaturalTimerAccuracy tests high-frequency bursts for identical +// (signal_type, peer_id, service) tuples, verifying: +// 1. Exactly 1 initial event and 1 summary event on window closure via natural timer. +// 2. CoalescedCount accuracy on initial and summary event. +// 3. A second burst after window closure starts a clean new coalescing cycle. +func TestStress_CoalescingNaturalTimerAccuracy(t *testing.T) { + var receivedMu sync.Mutex + var received []*api.SecuritySignalEvent + + srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + body, err := io.ReadAll(r.Body) + if err != nil { + t.Errorf("ReadAll: %v", err) + return + } + ev := &api.SecuritySignalEvent{} + if err := protojson.Unmarshal(body, ev); err != nil { + t.Errorf("Unmarshal: %v", err) + return + } + receivedMu.Lock() + received = append(received, ev) + receivedMu.Unlock() + w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK) + })) + t.Cleanup(srv.Close) + + coalescingWin := 80 * time.Millisecond + disp, err := NewDispatcher(Config{ + QueueCapacity: 500, + Workers: 2, + CoalescingWindow: coalescingWin, + Endpoints: []EndpointConfig{{URL: srv.URL}}, + }) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("NewDispatcher: %v", err) + } + + makeRefusedEvent := func(id string, tStamp *timestamppb.Timestamp) *api.SecuritySignalEvent { + return &api.SecuritySignalEvent{ + Id: id, + Type: "agentmesh.transport.refused", + Source: "urn:agentmesh:node:test", + SpecVersion: "1.0", + EventTime: tStamp, + Subject: "peer-coalesce-target", + Data: &api.SecuritySignalEvent_TransportRefused{ + TransportRefused: &api.TransportRefusedSignal{ + PeerId: "peer-coalesce-target", + ProtocolId: "/agentmesh/auth", + Reason: api.TransportRefusalReason_PEER_UNAUTHENTICATED, + }, + }, + } + } + + // Burst 1: 50 identical events + t0 := timestamppb.Now() + for i := 0; i < 50; i++ { + disp.Dispatch(makeRefusedEvent(fmt.Sprintf("b1-ev-%d", i), t0)) + } + + // Wait for the natural timer to expire (window + buffer) + // Coalescing window is 80ms, wait 200ms + time.Sleep(200 * time.Millisecond) + + receivedMu.Lock() + countPhase1 := len(received) + var phase1Events []*api.SecuritySignalEvent + phase1Events = append(phase1Events, received...) + receivedMu.Unlock() + + // Should have received exactly 2 events: 1 initial + 1 summary + if countPhase1 != 2 { + t.Fatalf("Phase 1: got %d received events, want exactly 2 (1 initial + 1 summary)", countPhase1) + } + + evInitial := phase1Events[0] + evSummary := phase1Events[1] + + trInit := evInitial.GetTransportRefused() + if trInit == nil { + t.Fatalf("Phase 1 initial event has nil TransportRefused") + } + if trInit.CoalescedCount != 1 { + t.Errorf("Phase 1 initial CoalescedCount = %d, want 1", trInit.CoalescedCount) + } + + trSum := evSummary.GetTransportRefused() + if trSum == nil { + t.Fatalf("Phase 1 summary event has nil TransportRefused") + } + // Initial event accounted for 1; 49 duplicates were coalesced into summary + if trSum.CoalescedCount != 49 { + t.Errorf("Phase 1 summary CoalescedCount = %d, want 49", trSum.CoalescedCount) + } + if evSummary.Id == evInitial.Id { + t.Errorf("summary event reused initial event UUID: %s", evSummary.Id) + } + + // Burst 2: After the window closed, send 20 more events for the same tuple. + // This must start a fresh coalescing window. + t1 := timestamppb.Now() + for i := 0; i < 20; i++ { + disp.Dispatch(makeRefusedEvent(fmt.Sprintf("b2-ev-%d", i), t1)) + } + + // Wait for second window to expire naturally + time.Sleep(200 * time.Millisecond) + + receivedMu.Lock() + countPhase2 := len(received) + var phase2Events []*api.SecuritySignalEvent + phase2Events = append(phase2Events, received...) + receivedMu.Unlock() + + if countPhase2 != 4 { + t.Fatalf("Phase 2: got total %d received events, want 4 (2 from Phase 1 + 2 from Phase 2)", countPhase2) + } + + evInit2 := phase2Events[2] + evSum2 := phase2Events[3] + + trInit2 := evInit2.GetTransportRefused() + if trInit2.CoalescedCount != 1 { + t.Errorf("Phase 2 initial CoalescedCount = %d, want 1", trInit2.CoalescedCount) + } + + trSum2 := evSum2.GetTransportRefused() + if trSum2.CoalescedCount != 19 { + t.Errorf("Phase 2 summary CoalescedCount = %d, want 19", trSum2.CoalescedCount) + } + + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 2*time.Second) + defer cancel() + if err := disp.Close(ctx); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("disp.Close: %v", err) + } +} + +// TestStress_CoalescingSingleEventNoSummary tests that an isolated event produces +// exactly 1 delivery and NO trailing summary event when the timer expires. +func TestStress_CoalescingSingleEventNoSummary(t *testing.T) { + var receivedMu sync.Mutex + var received []*api.SecuritySignalEvent + + srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + body, _ := io.ReadAll(r.Body) + ev := &api.SecuritySignalEvent{} + _ = protojson.Unmarshal(body, ev) + receivedMu.Lock() + received = append(received, ev) + receivedMu.Unlock() + w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK) + })) + t.Cleanup(srv.Close) + + disp, err := NewDispatcher(Config{ + CoalescingWindow: 60 * time.Millisecond, + Endpoints: []EndpointConfig{{URL: srv.URL}}, + }) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("NewDispatcher: %v", err) + } + + disp.Dispatch(&api.SecuritySignalEvent{ + Id: "single-event-id", + Type: "agentmesh.transport.refused", + Source: "urn:agentmesh:node:test", + SpecVersion: "1.0", + EventTime: timestamppb.Now(), + Subject: "peer-isolated", + Data: &api.SecuritySignalEvent_TransportRefused{ + TransportRefused: &api.TransportRefusedSignal{ + PeerId: "peer-isolated", + ProtocolId: "/agentmesh/auth", + Reason: api.TransportRefusalReason_PEER_UNAUTHENTICATED, + }, + }, + }) + + // Wait well past the 60ms window + time.Sleep(150 * time.Millisecond) + + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 2*time.Second) + defer cancel() + if err := disp.Close(ctx); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("disp.Close: %v", err) + } + + receivedMu.Lock() + defer receivedMu.Unlock() + + // Should be strictly 1 event, 0 summary events + if len(received) != 1 { + t.Errorf("single event produced %d deliveries, want exactly 1 (no summary for single occurrence)", len(received)) + } +} + +// TestStress_CoalescingMultiTupleIndependence verifies that multiple distinct +// (signal_type, peer_id, service) tuples coalesce independently. +func TestStress_CoalescingMultiTupleIndependence(t *testing.T) { + var receivedMu sync.Mutex + receivedEvents := make(map[string][]*api.SecuritySignalEvent) + + srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + body, _ := io.ReadAll(r.Body) + ev := &api.SecuritySignalEvent{} + _ = protojson.Unmarshal(body, ev) + + targetService := extractTargetService(ev) + key := fmt.Sprintf("%s|%s|%s", ev.Type, ev.Subject, targetService) + + receivedMu.Lock() + receivedEvents[key] = append(receivedEvents[key], ev) + receivedMu.Unlock() + w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK) + })) + t.Cleanup(srv.Close) + + disp, err := NewDispatcher(Config{ + QueueCapacity: 500, + Workers: 2, + CoalescingWindow: 80 * time.Millisecond, + Endpoints: []EndpointConfig{{URL: srv.URL}}, + }) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("NewDispatcher: %v", err) + } + + // Define 4 tuples: + // T1: (transport.refused, peer-1, /auth) + // T2: (transport.refused, peer-2, /auth) --> different peer + // T3: (transport.refused, peer-1, /http) --> different service + // T4: (policy.denied, peer-1, /auth) --> different signal type + type tupleDef struct { + key string + signalType string + peerID string + service string + createEv func(id string) *api.SecuritySignalEvent + } + + tuples := []tupleDef{ + { + key: "agentmesh.transport.refused|peer-1|/auth", + signalType: "agentmesh.transport.refused", + peerID: "peer-1", + service: "/auth", + createEv: func(id string) *api.SecuritySignalEvent { + return &api.SecuritySignalEvent{ + Id: id, + Type: "agentmesh.transport.refused", + Subject: "peer-1", + SpecVersion: "1.0", + EventTime: timestamppb.Now(), + Data: &api.SecuritySignalEvent_TransportRefused{ + TransportRefused: &api.TransportRefusedSignal{ + PeerId: "peer-1", + ProtocolId: "/auth", + Reason: api.TransportRefusalReason_PEER_UNAUTHENTICATED, + }, + }, + } + }, + }, + { + key: "agentmesh.transport.refused|peer-2|/auth", + signalType: "agentmesh.transport.refused", + peerID: "peer-2", + service: "/auth", + createEv: func(id string) *api.SecuritySignalEvent { + return &api.SecuritySignalEvent{ + Id: id, + Type: "agentmesh.transport.refused", + Subject: "peer-2", + SpecVersion: "1.0", + EventTime: timestamppb.Now(), + Data: &api.SecuritySignalEvent_TransportRefused{ + TransportRefused: &api.TransportRefusedSignal{ + PeerId: "peer-2", + ProtocolId: "/auth", + Reason: api.TransportRefusalReason_PEER_UNAUTHENTICATED, + }, + }, + } + }, + }, + { + key: "agentmesh.transport.refused|peer-1|/http", + signalType: "agentmesh.transport.refused", + peerID: "peer-1", + service: "/http", + createEv: func(id string) *api.SecuritySignalEvent { + return &api.SecuritySignalEvent{ + Id: id, + Type: "agentmesh.transport.refused", + Subject: "peer-1", + SpecVersion: "1.0", + EventTime: timestamppb.Now(), + Data: &api.SecuritySignalEvent_TransportRefused{ + TransportRefused: &api.TransportRefusedSignal{ + PeerId: "peer-1", + ProtocolId: "/http", + Reason: api.TransportRefusalReason_PEER_UNAUTHENTICATED, + }, + }, + } + }, + }, + { + key: "agentmesh.policy.denied|peer-1|/auth", + signalType: "agentmesh.policy.denied", + peerID: "peer-1", + service: "/auth", + createEv: func(id string) *api.SecuritySignalEvent { + return &api.SecuritySignalEvent{ + Id: id, + Type: "agentmesh.policy.denied", + Subject: "peer-1", + SpecVersion: "1.0", + EventTime: timestamppb.Now(), + Data: &api.SecuritySignalEvent_PolicyDenied{ + PolicyDenied: &api.PolicyDeniedSignal{ + CallerPeerId: "peer-1", + TargetService: "/auth", + Detail: "denied", + }, + }, + } + }, + }, + } + + const eventsPerTuple = 25 + // Interleave dispatch of all 4 tuples concurrently + var wg sync.WaitGroup + for _, td := range tuples { + wg.Add(1) + go func(tDef tupleDef) { + defer wg.Done() + for i := 0; i < eventsPerTuple; i++ { + disp.Dispatch(tDef.createEv(fmt.Sprintf("%s-%d", tDef.peerID, i))) + } + }(td) + } + wg.Wait() + + // Wait for natural timer expiration + time.Sleep(200 * time.Millisecond) + + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 2*time.Second) + defer cancel() + if err := disp.Close(ctx); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("disp.Close: %v", err) + } + + receivedMu.Lock() + defer receivedMu.Unlock() + + // Each tuple must have exactly 2 deliveries: 1 initial + 1 summary + for _, td := range tuples { + evList := receivedEvents[td.key] + if len(evList) != 2 { + t.Errorf("tuple %q: got %d delivered events, want exactly 2 (1 initial + 1 summary)", td.key, len(evList)) + continue + } + + if td.signalType == "agentmesh.transport.refused" { + initTR := evList[0].GetTransportRefused() + sumTR := evList[1].GetTransportRefused() + if initTR == nil || sumTR == nil { + t.Errorf("tuple %q: nil TransportRefused in events", td.key) + continue + } + if initTR.CoalescedCount != 1 { + t.Errorf("tuple %q initial CoalescedCount = %d, want 1", td.key, initTR.CoalescedCount) + } + if sumTR.CoalescedCount != eventsPerTuple-1 { + t.Errorf("tuple %q summary CoalescedCount = %d, want %d", + td.key, sumTR.CoalescedCount, eventsPerTuple-1) + } + } else if td.signalType == "agentmesh.policy.denied" { + sumPD := evList[1].GetPolicyDenied() + if sumPD == nil { + t.Errorf("tuple %q summary has nil PolicyDenied", td.key) + continue + } + expectedSubstr := fmt.Sprintf("(coalesced %d occurrences)", eventsPerTuple-1) + if !strings.Contains(sumPD.Detail, expectedSubstr) { + t.Errorf("tuple %q summary detail %q does not contain %q", td.key, sumPD.Detail, expectedSubstr) + } + } + } +} + +// TestStress_ConcurrentDispatchAndClose stresses the dispatcher under simultaneous +// continuous event injection and Close calls across multiple iterations to detect +// any panics (e.g., send on closed channel) or deadlocks. +func TestStress_ConcurrentDispatchAndClose(t *testing.T) { + srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK) + })) + t.Cleanup(srv.Close) + + for iteration := 0; iteration < 5; iteration++ { + disp, err := NewDispatcher(Config{ + QueueCapacity: 50, + Workers: 2, + CoalescingWindow: 10 * time.Millisecond, + Endpoints: []EndpointConfig{{URL: srv.URL}}, + }) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("iteration %d NewDispatcher: %v", iteration, err) + } + + stopWorkers := make(chan struct{}) + var dispatchWg sync.WaitGroup + + for g := 0; g < 6; g++ { + dispatchWg.Add(1) + go func(gid int) { + defer dispatchWg.Done() + counter := 0 + for { + select { + case <-stopWorkers: + return + default: + counter++ + disp.Dispatch(&api.SecuritySignalEvent{ + Id: fmt.Sprintf("iter%d-g%d-%d", iteration, gid, counter), + Type: "agentmesh.transport.refused", + SpecVersion: "1.0", + EventTime: timestamppb.Now(), + Subject: fmt.Sprintf("peer-stress-%d", gid%3), + Data: &api.SecuritySignalEvent_TransportRefused{ + TransportRefused: &api.TransportRefusedSignal{ + PeerId: fmt.Sprintf("peer-stress-%d", gid%3), + ProtocolId: "/auth", + }, + }, + }) + time.Sleep(500 * time.Microsecond) + } + } + }(g) + } + + // Let dispatches run for 25ms, then initiate Close while dispatches are still actively calling Dispatch + time.Sleep(25 * time.Millisecond) + + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 2*time.Second) + err = disp.Close(ctx) + cancel() + + if err != nil && err != context.DeadlineExceeded { + t.Errorf("iteration %d: unexpected Close error: %v", iteration, err) + } + + close(stopWorkers) + dispatchWg.Wait() + } +} + +// TestStress_ZeroCoalescingWindow verifies that when CoalescingWindow is 0, +// all events are enqueued directly without deduplication. +func TestStress_ZeroCoalescingWindow(t *testing.T) { + var deliveredCount atomic.Int64 + srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + deliveredCount.Add(1) + w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK) + })) + t.Cleanup(srv.Close) + + disp, err := NewDispatcher(Config{ + QueueCapacity: 100, + Workers: 2, + CoalescingWindow: 0, // Disabled coalescing + Endpoints: []EndpointConfig{{URL: srv.URL}}, + }) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("NewDispatcher: %v", err) + } + + const n = 30 + for i := 0; i < n; i++ { + disp.Dispatch(&api.SecuritySignalEvent{ + Id: fmt.Sprintf("zero-win-%d", i), + Type: "agentmesh.policy.denied", + SpecVersion: "1.0", + EventTime: timestamppb.Now(), + Subject: "peer-zero", + }) + } + + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 2*time.Second) + defer cancel() + if err := disp.Close(ctx); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("disp.Close: %v", err) + } + + if deliveredCount.Load() != n { + t.Errorf("delivered count with zero window = %d, want %d", deliveredCount.Load(), n) + } +} diff --git a/internal/containment/containment_resilience_test.go b/internal/containment/containment_resilience_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0a30863a --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/containment/containment_resilience_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,619 @@ +// Copyright 2026 Google LLC +// +// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +// You may obtain a copy of the License at +// +// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +// +// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +// limitations under the License. + +package containment + +import ( + "context" + "fmt" + "io" + "net" + "net/http" + "net/http/httptest" + "os" + "path/filepath" + "sync" + "sync/atomic" + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/google/agentmesh/api" + "google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/timestamppb" +) + +// 1. Transport Resilience & Failure Handling +// Tests behaviour when target Unix domain socket or HTTP server is down, slow, or abruptly disconnected. + +func TestAdversarial_UnixSocketNonExistent(t *testing.T) { + // Target Unix domain socket does NOT exist + nonExistentSock := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "nonexistent.sock") + + disp, err := NewDispatcher(Config{ + QueueCapacity: 10, + Workers: 1, + Endpoints: []EndpointConfig{{ + URL: "unix:" + filepath.ToSlash(nonExistentSock), + MaxRetries: 1, + Timeout: 100 * time.Millisecond, + }}, + }) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("NewDispatcher failed: %v", err) + } + + initialDropped := GetDroppedCountFor("agentmesh.policy.denied", "transport_error") + + // Dispatch should be completely non-blocking + start := time.Now() + disp.Dispatch(&api.SecuritySignalEvent{ + Type: "agentmesh.policy.denied", + EventTime: timestamppb.Now(), + Data: &api.SecuritySignalEvent_PolicyDenied{ + PolicyDenied: &api.PolicyDeniedSignal{ + TargetService: "test-service", + Detail: "unix non-existent test", + }, + }, + }) + dispatchDuration := time.Since(start) + if dispatchDuration > 50*time.Millisecond { + t.Errorf("Dispatch blocked for %v, want <50ms", dispatchDuration) + } + + // Close cleanly + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 2*time.Second) + defer cancel() + if err := disp.Close(ctx); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("disp.Close failed: %v", err) + } + + finalDropped := GetDroppedCountFor("agentmesh.policy.denied", "transport_error") + if finalDropped-initialDropped < 1 { + t.Errorf("expected transport_error drop increment, got initial=%f, final=%f", initialDropped, finalDropped) + } +} + +func TestAdversarial_UnixSocketAbruptDisconnect(t *testing.T) { + // Use short path under TempDir to stay within AF_UNIX 108 byte limit on Windows + sockDir, err := os.MkdirTemp("", "ud*") + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("MkdirTemp: %v", err) + } + t.Cleanup(func() { _ = os.RemoveAll(sockDir) }) + sockPath := filepath.Join(sockDir, "d.sock") + + listener, err := net.Listen("unix", sockPath) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("net.Listen(unix): %v", err) + } + + // Accept a connection and immediately close/reset it abruptly + go func() { + for { + conn, err := listener.Accept() + if err != nil { + return + } + // Abruptly close connection without sending HTTP response + _ = conn.Close() + } + }() + t.Cleanup(func() { _ = listener.Close() }) + + disp, err := NewDispatcher(Config{ + QueueCapacity: 10, + Workers: 1, + Endpoints: []EndpointConfig{{ + URL: "unix:" + filepath.ToSlash(sockPath), + MaxRetries: 1, + Timeout: 200 * time.Millisecond, + }}, + }) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("NewDispatcher failed: %v", err) + } + + start := time.Now() + disp.Dispatch(&api.SecuritySignalEvent{ + Type: "agentmesh.policy.denied", + EventTime: timestamppb.Now(), + Data: &api.SecuritySignalEvent_PolicyDenied{ + PolicyDenied: &api.PolicyDeniedSignal{ + TargetService: "disconnect-service", + Detail: "abrupt disconnect test", + }, + }, + }) + if time.Since(start) > 50*time.Millisecond { + t.Errorf("Dispatch took %v, want <50ms", time.Since(start)) + } + + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 2*time.Second) + defer cancel() + if err := disp.Close(ctx); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("disp.Close failed: %v", err) + } +} + +func TestAdversarial_HTTPServer500RetriesAndMetrics(t *testing.T) { + var attempts atomic.Int64 + srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + attempts.Add(1) + w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError) + })) + t.Cleanup(srv.Close) + + initial500Delivered := GetDeliveredCountFor("agentmesh.transport.refused", "500") + initialTransportErrors := GetDroppedCountFor("agentmesh.transport.refused", "transport_error") + + maxRetries := uint32(2) + disp, err := NewDispatcher(Config{ + QueueCapacity: 10, + Workers: 1, + Endpoints: []EndpointConfig{{ + URL: srv.URL, + MaxRetries: maxRetries, + Timeout: 500 * time.Millisecond, + }}, + }) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("NewDispatcher failed: %v", err) + } + + disp.Dispatch(&api.SecuritySignalEvent{ + Type: "agentmesh.transport.refused", + EventTime: timestamppb.Now(), + Data: &api.SecuritySignalEvent_TransportRefused{ + TransportRefused: &api.TransportRefusedSignal{ + PeerId: "peer-500", + Reason: api.TransportRefusalReason_PEER_UNAUTHENTICATED, + }, + }, + }) + + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 3*time.Second) + defer cancel() + if err := disp.Close(ctx); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("disp.Close failed: %v", err) + } + + // 1 initial attempt + 2 retries = 3 attempts + expectedAttempts := int64(1 + maxRetries) + if got := attempts.Load(); got != expectedAttempts { + t.Errorf("got %d attempts, want %d", got, expectedAttempts) + } + + final500Delivered := GetDeliveredCountFor("agentmesh.transport.refused", "500") + if final500Delivered-initial500Delivered != float64(expectedAttempts) { + t.Errorf("delivered 500 count delta = %f, want %f", final500Delivered-initial500Delivered, float64(expectedAttempts)) + } + + finalTransportErrors := GetDroppedCountFor("agentmesh.transport.refused", "transport_error") + if finalTransportErrors-initialTransportErrors < 1 { + t.Errorf("expected transport_error increment, got initial=%f, final=%f", initialTransportErrors, finalTransportErrors) + } +} + +func TestAdversarial_HTTPServer403NoRetry(t *testing.T) { + var attempts atomic.Int64 + srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + attempts.Add(1) + w.WriteHeader(http.StatusForbidden) + })) + t.Cleanup(srv.Close) + + disp, err := NewDispatcher(Config{ + QueueCapacity: 10, + Workers: 1, + Endpoints: []EndpointConfig{{ + URL: srv.URL, + MaxRetries: 3, // Should NOT retry on 4xx + Timeout: 500 * time.Millisecond, + }}, + }) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("NewDispatcher failed: %v", err) + } + + disp.Dispatch(&api.SecuritySignalEvent{ + Type: "agentmesh.identity.revoked", + EventTime: timestamppb.Now(), + Data: &api.SecuritySignalEvent_IdentityRevoked{ + IdentityRevoked: &api.IdentityRevokedSignal{ + PeerId: "peer-403", + Reason: "forbidden endpoint test", + }, + }, + }) + + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 3*time.Second) + defer cancel() + if err := disp.Close(ctx); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("disp.Close failed: %v", err) + } + + // Should stop immediately after 1 attempt because 403 is a client error + if got := attempts.Load(); got != 1 { + t.Errorf("got %d attempts on HTTP 403, want exactly 1 (no retries for 4xx)", got) + } +} + +// 2. Shutdown Deadline Timeout & Graceful Drop Accounting +// Verifies remaining queue items are dropped gracefully, incrementing shutdown_timeout drops without hanging. + +func TestAdversarial_ShutdownTimeoutWithBufferedEvents(t *testing.T) { + blockServer := make(chan struct{}) + serverEntered := make(chan struct{}) + var once sync.Once + + srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + once.Do(func() { close(serverEntered) }) + <-blockServer + w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK) + })) + t.Cleanup(func() { + select { + case <-blockServer: + default: + close(blockServer) + } + srv.Close() + }) + + queueCap := 10 + disp, err := NewDispatcher(Config{ + QueueCapacity: queueCap, + Workers: 1, + Endpoints: []EndpointConfig{{ + URL: srv.URL, + Timeout: 5 * time.Second, + MaxRetries: 1, + }}, + }) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("NewDispatcher failed: %v", err) + } + + now := timestamppb.Now() + + // 1. Dispatch 1st event that causes worker 1 to block in the HTTP server + disp.Dispatch(&api.SecuritySignalEvent{ + Id: "blocking-event", + Type: "agentmesh.policy.denied", + EventTime: now, + Data: &api.SecuritySignalEvent_PolicyDenied{ + PolicyDenied: &api.PolicyDeniedSignal{ + TargetService: "blocker", + }, + }, + }) + + // Wait until worker is firmly blocked in server + select { + case <-serverEntered: + case <-time.After(3 * time.Second): + t.Fatalf("timeout waiting for worker to enter server") + } + + initialShutdownTimeoutDrops := GetDroppedCountFor("all", "shutdown_timeout") + + // 2. Now dispatch 4 more events that will sit in d.queue (buffer size 10) + for i := 1; i <= 4; i++ { + disp.Dispatch(&api.SecuritySignalEvent{ + Id: fmt.Sprintf("queued-%d", i), + Type: "agentmesh.policy.denied", + EventTime: now, + Data: &api.SecuritySignalEvent_PolicyDenied{ + PolicyDenied: &api.PolicyDeniedSignal{ + TargetService: fmt.Sprintf("queued-%d", i), + }, + }, + }) + } + + // 3. Initiate Close with an extremely tight deadline (20ms) + closeCtx, cancelClose := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 20*time.Millisecond) + defer cancelClose() + + start := time.Now() + err = disp.Close(closeCtx) + elapsed := time.Since(start) + + if err == nil { + t.Errorf("expected Close() to return deadline exceeded error, got nil") + } + if elapsed > 500*time.Millisecond { + t.Errorf("Close() took %v to timeout, want <=500ms", elapsed) + } + + // 4. Verify shutdown_timeout drop metric incremented by remaining count (4 items) + finalShutdownTimeoutDrops := GetDroppedCountFor("all", "shutdown_timeout") + delta := finalShutdownTimeoutDrops - initialShutdownTimeoutDrops + if delta != 4 { + t.Errorf("shutdown_timeout drops delta = %f, want 4", delta) + } + + // Release blocked server + close(blockServer) +} + +// 3. Cryptographic Integrity & Anti-SSRF +// Verifies tampered HMAC signatures are rejected, and non-loopback HTTP targets fail closed. + +func TestAdversarial_HMACValidationMatrix(t *testing.T) { + secretKey := []byte("correct-secret-key-32-bytes-long!") + wrongKey := []byte("wrong-secret-key-32-bytes-long-!") + validBody := []byte(`{"id":"test-event-123","type":"agentmesh.policy.denied"}`) + timestamp := "1731272400000" + + validSig := ComputeSignature(secretKey, timestamp, validBody) + + tests := []struct { + name string + secret []byte + ts string + body []byte + signature string + wantValid bool + }{ + { + name: "Valid signature matches", + secret: secretKey, + ts: timestamp, + body: validBody, + signature: validSig, + wantValid: true, + }, + { + name: "Tampered signature byte rejected", + secret: secretKey, + ts: timestamp, + body: validBody, + signature: validSig[:len(validSig)-1] + "0", + wantValid: false, + }, + { + name: "Tampered body rejected", + secret: secretKey, + ts: timestamp, + body: []byte(`{"id":"test-event-123","type":"agentmesh.policy.denied","tampered":true}`), + signature: validSig, + wantValid: false, + }, + { + name: "Tampered timestamp rejected", + secret: secretKey, + ts: "1731272400001", + body: validBody, + signature: validSig, + wantValid: false, + }, + { + name: "Wrong secret rejected", + secret: wrongKey, + ts: timestamp, + body: validBody, + signature: validSig, + wantValid: false, + }, + { + name: "Empty signature rejected", + secret: secretKey, + ts: timestamp, + body: validBody, + signature: "", + wantValid: false, + }, + { + name: "Empty timestamp rejected", + secret: secretKey, + ts: "", + body: validBody, + signature: validSig, + wantValid: false, + }, + { + name: "Empty secret rejected", + secret: nil, + ts: timestamp, + body: validBody, + signature: validSig, + wantValid: false, + }, + { + name: "Prefix-only signature rejected", + secret: secretKey, + ts: timestamp, + body: validBody, + signature: "sha256=", + wantValid: false, + }, + } + + for _, tc := range tests { + t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) { + got := VerifySignature(tc.secret, tc.ts, tc.body, tc.signature) + if got != tc.wantValid { + t.Errorf("VerifySignature() = %v, want %v", got, tc.wantValid) + } + }) + } +} + +func TestAdversarial_AntiSSRFValidationMatrix(t *testing.T) { + tests := []struct { + url string + shouldPass bool + desc string + }{ + // Permitted targets + {"http://127.0.0.1:8080/events", true, "Standard IPv4 loopback"}, + {"http://127.0.0.2:9000/events", true, "IPv4 loopback range 127.0.0.0/8"}, + {"http://127.255.255.254:80/events", true, "IPv4 loopback high boundary"}, + {"http://localhost:8080/events", true, "Named localhost"}, + {"http://[::1]:8080/events", true, "IPv6 loopback"}, + {"unix:/run/containment.sock", true, "Unix domain socket"}, + {"unix:///var/run/containment.sock", true, "Unix domain socket with triple slash"}, + {"https://remote.secure.corp/events", true, "HTTPS remote target"}, + {"unix:///run/agentmesh/containment.sock", true, "Documentation Unix domain socket (triple slash)"}, + {"http://127.0.0.1:8095/events", true, "Documentation IPv4 loopback endpoint"}, + {"https://containment-controller.agentmesh.svc:8443/events", true, "Documentation HTTPS kubernetes service"}, + {"https://containment-controller.agentmesh.svc.cluster.local:8443/events", true, "Documentation HTTPS kubernetes cluster.local"}, + {"https://siem.internal:8443/alerts", true, "Documentation HTTPS SIEM alert endpoint"}, + + // Forbidden non-loopback HTTP targets (Anti-SSRF fail closed) + {"http://containment-controller.agentmesh.svc:8095/events", false, "Old doc plain HTTP kubernetes service (anti-SSRF rejected)"}, + {"http://containment-controller.agentmesh.svc.cluster.local:8095/events", false, "Old doc plain HTTP cluster.local (anti-SSRF rejected)"}, + {"http://10.0.0.1:8080/events", false, "RFC1918 10.0.0.0/8"}, + {"http://172.16.0.1:8080/events", false, "RFC1918 172.16.0.0/12"}, + {"http://192.168.1.1:8080/events", false, "RFC1918 192.168.0.0/16"}, + {"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data", false, "Link-local cloud metadata (AWS/GCP)"}, + {"http://evil.com:8080/events", false, "Arbitrary remote domain over plain HTTP"}, + {"http://0.0.0.0:8080/events", false, "Unspecified IPv4 (INADDR_ANY)"}, + {"http://100.64.0.1:8080/events", false, "CGNAT range 100.64.0.0/10"}, + {"http://[fe80::1]:8080/events", false, "IPv6 link-local"}, + {"http://[fc00::1]:8080/events", false, "IPv6 unique local"}, + {"http://[::ffff:10.0.0.1]:8080/events", false, "IPv4-mapped IPv6 non-loopback 10.0.0.1"}, + {"http://[::ffff:169.254.169.254]:8080/events", false, "IPv4-mapped IPv6 non-loopback 169.254.169.254"}, + {"http://localhost.evil.com:8080/events", false, "Subdomain evasion localhost.evil.com"}, + {"http://evil-localhost:8080/events", false, "Suffix evasion evil-localhost"}, + {"http://127.0.0.1.nip.io:8080/events", false, "DNS wildcard resolving to 127.0.0.1"}, + + // Invalid schemes + {"ftp://127.0.0.1:21/events", false, "FTP scheme forbidden"}, + {"file:///etc/passwd", false, "File scheme forbidden"}, + {"gopher://127.0.0.1:70", false, "Gopher scheme forbidden"}, + {"unix:", false, "Empty unix path forbidden"}, + {"", false, "Empty target URL forbidden"}, + } + + for _, tc := range tests { + t.Run(tc.desc, func(t *testing.T) { + client, err := NewSingleClient(EndpointConfig{URL: tc.url}) + if tc.shouldPass { + if err != nil { + t.Errorf("expected URL %q to pass, but got error: %v", tc.url, err) + } + if client != nil { + _ = client.Close() + } + } else { + if err == nil { + t.Errorf("expected URL %q to fail closed, but it was accepted!", tc.url) + if client != nil { + _ = client.Close() + } + } + } + }) + } +} + +// 4. Concurrency & High Throughput Edge Cases + +func TestAdversarial_ConcurrentDispatchAndClose(t *testing.T) { + srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + _, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, r.Body) + w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK) + })) + t.Cleanup(srv.Close) + + disp, err := NewDispatcher(Config{ + QueueCapacity: 100, + Workers: 4, + CoalescingWindow: 50 * time.Millisecond, + Endpoints: []EndpointConfig{{URL: srv.URL}}, + }) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("NewDispatcher: %v", err) + } + + var wg sync.WaitGroup + goroutines := 10 + dispatchesPerRoutine := 100 + + // Launch concurrent dispatchers + for g := 0; g < goroutines; g++ { + wg.Add(1) + go func(gid int) { + defer wg.Done() + for i := 0; i < dispatchesPerRoutine; i++ { + disp.Dispatch(&api.SecuritySignalEvent{ + Id: fmt.Sprintf("concurrent-%d-%d", gid, i), + Type: "agentmesh.policy.denied", + EventTime: timestamppb.Now(), + Subject: fmt.Sprintf("peer-%d", gid%3), + Data: &api.SecuritySignalEvent_PolicyDenied{ + PolicyDenied: &api.PolicyDeniedSignal{ + TargetService: "db", + }, + }, + }) + } + }(g) + } + + // Close asynchronously while workers are active + time.Sleep(5 * time.Millisecond) + closeCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 3*time.Second) + defer cancel() + + _ = disp.Close(closeCtx) + wg.Wait() + + // Calling Dispatch after Close must not panic or block + disp.Dispatch(&api.SecuritySignalEvent{ + Id: "post-close-event", + Type: "agentmesh.policy.denied", + EventTime: timestamppb.Now(), + }) + + // Calling Close a second time must return nil without deadlocking + if err := disp.Close(context.Background()); err != nil { + t.Errorf("second Close() failed: %v", err) + } +} + +func TestAdversarial_NilAndEmptyEvents(t *testing.T) { + srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK) + })) + t.Cleanup(srv.Close) + + disp, err := NewDispatcher(Config{ + QueueCapacity: 10, + Workers: 1, + Endpoints: []EndpointConfig{{URL: srv.URL}}, + }) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("NewDispatcher: %v", err) + } + + initialNilDrops := GetDroppedCountFor("unknown", "nil_event") + + // 1. Dispatch nil event + disp.Dispatch(nil) + + // 2. Dispatch empty event + disp.Dispatch(&api.SecuritySignalEvent{}) + + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 2*time.Second) + defer cancel() + _ = disp.Close(ctx) + + finalNilDrops := GetDroppedCountFor("unknown", "nil_event") + if finalNilDrops-initialNilDrops != 1 { + t.Errorf("expected 1 nil_event drop, got delta %f", finalNilDrops-initialNilDrops) + } +} diff --git a/internal/containment/dispatcher.go b/internal/containment/dispatcher.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..fe7dc8e7 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/containment/dispatcher.go @@ -0,0 +1,236 @@ +// Copyright 2026 Google LLC +// +// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +// You may obtain a copy of the License at +// +// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +// +// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +// limitations under the License. + +package containment + +import ( + "context" + "fmt" + "sync" + + "github.com/google/agentmesh/api" + "google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/timestamppb" +) + +// Dispatcher manages asynchronous non-blocking event submission to external runtimes. +type Dispatcher interface { + // Dispatch enqueues an event for delivery. Never blocks or panics. + Dispatch(event *api.SecuritySignalEvent) + + // Close gracefully drains pending events up to the context deadline. + Close(ctx context.Context) error +} + +type dispatcher struct { + cfg Config + client Client + coalescer *Coalescer + queue chan *api.SecuritySignalEvent + workerWg sync.WaitGroup + mu sync.RWMutex + closed bool +} + +// NewDispatcher builds and starts a Dispatcher with bounded queue and worker pool. +func NewDispatcher(cfg Config) (Dispatcher, error) { + workers := cfg.EffectiveWorkers() + queueCap := cfg.EffectiveQueueCapacity() + + client, err := NewClient(cfg.Endpoints...) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("containment client initialization failed: %w", err) + } + + d := &dispatcher{ + cfg: cfg, + client: client, + queue: make(chan *api.SecuritySignalEvent, queueCap), + } + + if cfg.CoalescingWindow > 0 { + d.coalescer = NewCoalescer(cfg.CoalescingWindow, func(summary *api.SecuritySignalEvent) { + d.enqueueDirect(summary) + }) + } + + for i := 0; i < workers; i++ { + d.workerWg.Add(1) + go d.workerLoop() + } + + return d, nil +} + +// NewDispatcherFromPtr constructs a Dispatcher from a *Config pointer. +func NewDispatcherFromPtr(cfg *Config) (Dispatcher, error) { + if cfg == nil { + return NewDispatcher(Config{}) + } + return NewDispatcher(*cfg) +} + +// Dispatch queues an event for out-of-band delivery. Strictly non-blocking. +func (d *dispatcher) Dispatch(event *api.SecuritySignalEvent) { + if d == nil { + return + } + if event == nil { + containmentDroppedTotal.WithLabelValues("unknown", "nil_event").Inc() + return + } + + d.mu.RLock() + if d.closed { + d.mu.RUnlock() + containmentDroppedTotal.WithLabelValues(event.Type, "dispatcher_closed").Inc() + return + } + + if event.Type == "" { + event.Type = inferSignalType(event) + } + + // Ensure CloudEvents mandatory attributes + if event.SpecVersion == "" { + event.SpecVersion = "1.0" + } + if event.Id == "" { + event.Id = generateUUID() + } + if event.EventTime == nil { + event.EventTime = timestamppb.Now() + } + if event.DataContentType == "" { + event.DataContentType = ContentTypeJSON + } + if event.Subject == "" { + event.Subject = extractSubject(event) + } + + // Check coalescer + if d.coalescer != nil && d.coalescer.Record(event) { + containmentCoalescedTotal.WithLabelValues(event.Type).Inc() + d.mu.RUnlock() + return + } + + if tr := event.GetTransportRefused(); tr != nil && tr.CoalescedCount == 0 { + tr.CoalescedCount = 1 + } + + // Strictly non-blocking enqueue + select { + case d.queue <- event: + containmentQueuedTotal.WithLabelValues(event.Type).Inc() + containmentQueueDepth.Set(float64(len(d.queue))) + default: + containmentDroppedTotal.WithLabelValues(event.Type, "buffer_full").Inc() + logger.Warnw("Containment signal queue full; shedding event", + "type", event.Type, + "subject", event.Subject, + "id", event.Id, + "capacity", cap(d.queue), + "reason", "buffer_full", + ) + } + d.mu.RUnlock() +} + +func (d *dispatcher) enqueueDirect(event *api.SecuritySignalEvent) { + if d == nil || event == nil { + return + } + + d.mu.RLock() + if d.closed { + d.mu.RUnlock() + containmentDroppedTotal.WithLabelValues(event.Type, "dispatcher_closed").Inc() + return + } + + select { + case d.queue <- event: + containmentQueuedTotal.WithLabelValues(event.Type).Inc() + containmentQueueDepth.Set(float64(len(d.queue))) + default: + containmentDroppedTotal.WithLabelValues(event.Type, "buffer_full").Inc() + logger.Warnw("Containment signal queue full; shedding summary event", + "type", event.Type, + "subject", event.Subject, + "id", event.Id, + "capacity", cap(d.queue), + "reason", "buffer_full", + ) + } + d.mu.RUnlock() +} + +func (d *dispatcher) workerLoop() { + defer d.workerWg.Done() + for event := range d.queue { + containmentQueueDepth.Set(float64(len(d.queue))) + if d.client != nil { + _ = d.client.Send(context.Background(), event) + } + containmentQueueDepth.Set(float64(len(d.queue))) + } +} + +// Close gracefully stops accepting new events and drains pending events up to ctx deadline. +func (d *dispatcher) Close(ctx context.Context) error { + d.mu.Lock() + if d.closed { + d.mu.Unlock() + return nil + } + d.mu.Unlock() + + if d.coalescer != nil { + d.coalescer.Close() + } + + d.mu.Lock() + if d.closed { + d.mu.Unlock() + return nil + } + d.closed = true + close(d.queue) + d.mu.Unlock() + + drainDone := make(chan struct{}) + go func() { + d.workerWg.Wait() + close(drainDone) + }() + + select { + case <-drainDone: + if d.client != nil { + _ = d.client.Close() + } + return nil + case <-ctx.Done(): + remaining := len(d.queue) + containmentDroppedTotal.WithLabelValues("all", "shutdown_timeout").Add(float64(remaining)) + logger.Warnw("Containment dispatcher shutdown timed out; remaining events dropped", + "remaining", remaining, + "err", ctx.Err(), + ) + if d.client != nil { + _ = d.client.Close() + } + return ctx.Err() + } +} diff --git a/internal/containment/dispatcher_test.go b/internal/containment/dispatcher_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a805c2e8 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/containment/dispatcher_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,713 @@ +// Copyright 2026 Google LLC +// +// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +// You may obtain a copy of the License at +// +// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +// +// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +// limitations under the License. + +package containment + +import ( + "context" + "fmt" + "io" + "net" + "net/http" + "net/http/httptest" + "os" + "path/filepath" + "strings" + "sync" + "sync/atomic" + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/google/agentmesh/api" + "google.golang.org/protobuf/encoding/protojson" + "google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/durationpb" + "google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/timestamppb" +) + +func TestDispatcher_TableDrivenSignals(t *testing.T) { + now := timestamppb.New(time.Date(2026, 11, 10, 20, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)) + + cases := []struct { + name string + signalType string + subject string + setPayload func(ev *api.SecuritySignalEvent) + wantFieldKey string + }{ + { + name: "policy.denied", + signalType: "agentmesh.policy.denied", + subject: "peer-alpha", + setPayload: func(ev *api.SecuritySignalEvent) { + ev.Data = &api.SecuritySignalEvent_PolicyDenied{ + PolicyDenied: &api.PolicyDeniedSignal{ + Direction: api.SignalCallerDirection_LOCAL_WORKLOAD, + Reason: api.PolicyDenialReason_DATALOG_EVALUATION_DENIED, + Detail: "datalog block 0 denied egress", + TargetService: "bigquery", + RequestedResource: "//bigquery.googleapis.com/projects/p1", + EventTime: now, + }, + } + }, + wantFieldKey: "policy_denied", + }, + { + name: "transport.refused", + signalType: "agentmesh.transport.refused", + subject: "peer-bravo", + setPayload: func(ev *api.SecuritySignalEvent) { + ev.Data = &api.SecuritySignalEvent_TransportRefused{ + TransportRefused: &api.TransportRefusedSignal{ + Reason: api.TransportRefusalReason_PEER_UNAUTHENTICATED, + Detail: "handshake unauthenticated", + PeerId: "peer-bravo", + RemoteMultiaddr: "/ip4/192.168.1.50/tcp/4001", + CoalescedCount: 1, + FirstSeenTime: now, + EventTime: now, + }, + } + }, + wantFieldKey: "transport_refused", + }, + { + name: "identity.revoked", + signalType: "agentmesh.identity.revoked", + subject: "peer-charlie", + setPayload: func(ev *api.SecuritySignalEvent) { + ev.Data = &api.SecuritySignalEvent_IdentityRevoked{ + IdentityRevoked: &api.IdentityRevokedSignal{ + PeerId: "peer-charlie", + Source: api.RevocationSource_LOCAL_CONTROL_PLANE_SYNC, + Reason: "compromised credential reported", + EventTime: now, + }, + } + }, + wantFieldKey: "identity_revoked", + }, + { + name: "enrollment.rejected", + signalType: "agentmesh.enrollment.rejected", + subject: "peer-delta", + setPayload: func(ev *api.SecuritySignalEvent) { + ev.Data = &api.SecuritySignalEvent_EnrollmentRejected{ + EnrollmentRejected: &api.EnrollmentRejectedSignal{ + Reason: api.EnrollmentRejectionReason_AUTONOMOUS_RECOVERY_DISABLED, + Detail: "proof-of-possession expired", + PeerId: "peer-delta", + EventTime: now, + }, + } + }, + wantFieldKey: "enrollment_rejected", + }, + } + + for _, tc := range cases { + t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) { + received := make(chan *api.SecuritySignalEvent, 1) + srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + if r.Header.Get("ce-specversion") != "1.0" { + t.Errorf("got ce-specversion %q, want 1.0", r.Header.Get("ce-specversion")) + } + if r.Header.Get("ce-type") != tc.signalType { + t.Errorf("got ce-type %q, want %q", r.Header.Get("ce-type"), tc.signalType) + } + if r.Header.Get("Content-Type") != "application/json" { + t.Errorf("got Content-Type %q, want application/json", r.Header.Get("Content-Type")) + } + body, err := io.ReadAll(r.Body) + if err != nil { + t.Errorf("io.ReadAll: %v", err) + } + ev := &api.SecuritySignalEvent{} + if err := protojson.Unmarshal(body, ev); err != nil { + t.Errorf("protojson.Unmarshal failed: %v", err) + } + received <- ev + w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK) + })) + t.Cleanup(srv.Close) + + disp, err := NewDispatcher(Config{ + Endpoints: []EndpointConfig{{URL: srv.URL}}, + }) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("NewDispatcher: %v", err) + } + t.Cleanup(func() { _ = disp.Close(context.Background()) }) + + ev := &api.SecuritySignalEvent{ + Id: "test-id-1234", + Source: "urn:agentmesh:node:test", + SpecVersion: "1.0", + Type: tc.signalType, + EventTime: now, + DataContentType: "application/json", + Subject: tc.subject, + } + tc.setPayload(ev) + + disp.Dispatch(ev) + + select { + case got := <-received: + if got.Type != tc.signalType { + t.Errorf("got event type %q, want %q", got.Type, tc.signalType) + } + if got.Subject != tc.subject { + t.Errorf("got subject %q, want %q", got.Subject, tc.subject) + } + case <-time.After(3 * time.Second): + t.Fatalf("timeout waiting for signal delivery") + } + }) + } +} + +func TestDispatcher_NonBlockingEnqueueAndShedding(t *testing.T) { + blockWorker := make(chan struct{}) + workerStarted := make(chan struct{}) + var workerStartedOnce sync.Once + var deliveredCount atomic.Int64 + + srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + workerStartedOnce.Do(func() { close(workerStarted) }) + <-blockWorker // Hold worker + deliveredCount.Add(1) + w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK) + })) + t.Cleanup(func() { + select { + case <-blockWorker: + default: + close(blockWorker) + } + srv.Close() + }) + + // Queue capacity of 2 with 1 worker + disp, err := NewDispatcher(Config{ + QueueCapacity: 2, + Workers: 1, + Endpoints: []EndpointConfig{{URL: srv.URL}}, + }) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("NewDispatcher: %v", err) + } + + now := timestamppb.Now() + makeEvent := func(i int) *api.SecuritySignalEvent { + return &api.SecuritySignalEvent{ + Id: fmt.Sprintf("id-%d", i), + Type: "agentmesh.policy.denied", + Source: "urn:agentmesh:node:test", + SpecVersion: "1.0", + EventTime: now, + Data: &api.SecuritySignalEvent_PolicyDenied{ + PolicyDenied: &api.PolicyDeniedSignal{ + TargetService: fmt.Sprintf("service-%d", i), + Detail: "denied", + }, + }, + } + } + + // Dispatch 1 event to enter worker loop and block in HTTP handler + disp.Dispatch(makeEvent(0)) + select { + case <-workerStarted: + case <-time.After(3 * time.Second): + t.Fatalf("timeout waiting for worker to reach blocked handler") + } + + initialDropped := GetDroppedCount() + + // Dispatch 10 events rapidly. Must return immediately without blocking. + start := time.Now() + for i := 1; i <= 10; i++ { + disp.Dispatch(makeEvent(i)) + } + elapsed := time.Since(start) + if elapsed > 100*time.Millisecond { + t.Errorf("Dispatch loop took %v, want <100ms (strictly non-blocking)", elapsed) + } + + // Unblock worker and shut down + close(blockWorker) + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 3*time.Second) + defer cancel() + if err := disp.Close(ctx); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("disp.Close: %v", err) + } + + finalDropped := GetDroppedCount() + droppedDelta := finalDropped - initialDropped + // 2 in queue = delivered; 8 dropped + if droppedDelta != 8 { + t.Errorf("dropped events = %d, want 8", droppedDelta) + } + if deliveredCount.Load() != 3 { + t.Errorf("delivered count = %d, want 3", deliveredCount.Load()) + } +} + +func TestDispatcher_CoalescingWindow(t *testing.T) { + var receivedMu sync.Mutex + var received []*api.SecuritySignalEvent + + srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + body, _ := io.ReadAll(r.Body) + ev := &api.SecuritySignalEvent{} + _ = protojson.Unmarshal(body, ev) + receivedMu.Lock() + received = append(received, ev) + receivedMu.Unlock() + w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK) + })) + t.Cleanup(srv.Close) + + disp, err := NewDispatcher(Config{ + CoalescingWindow: 100 * time.Millisecond, + Endpoints: []EndpointConfig{{URL: srv.URL}}, + }) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("NewDispatcher: %v", err) + } + + now := timestamppb.Now() + // Rapidly emit 30 duplicate transport refused events for peer-target + for i := 0; i < 30; i++ { + disp.Dispatch(&api.SecuritySignalEvent{ + Id: fmt.Sprintf("ev-%d", i), + Type: "agentmesh.transport.refused", + Source: "urn:agentmesh:node:test", + SpecVersion: "1.0", + EventTime: now, + Subject: "peer-target", + Data: &api.SecuritySignalEvent_TransportRefused{ + TransportRefused: &api.TransportRefusedSignal{ + PeerId: "peer-target", + ProtocolId: "/agentmesh/auth", + Reason: api.TransportRefusalReason_PEER_UNAUTHENTICATED, + }, + }, + }) + } + + // Close forces synchronous flush of active coalescing window + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 3*time.Second) + defer cancel() + if err := disp.Close(ctx); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("disp.Close: %v", err) + } + + receivedMu.Lock() + defer receivedMu.Unlock() + + // Should have coalesced 30 events into initial (count=0 or 1) + summary with total count 30 + var totalCount uint32 + for _, ev := range received { + if tr := ev.GetTransportRefused(); tr != nil { + if tr.CoalescedCount > 0 { + totalCount += tr.CoalescedCount + } else { + totalCount++ + } + } + } + if totalCount != 30 { + t.Errorf("total coalesced count = %d, want 30 across %d delivered batches", totalCount, len(received)) + } +} + +func TestDispatcher_MultiKeyCoalescing(t *testing.T) { + var receivedMu sync.Mutex + countsByPeer := make(map[string]uint32) + + srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + body, _ := io.ReadAll(r.Body) + ev := &api.SecuritySignalEvent{} + _ = protojson.Unmarshal(body, ev) + if tr := ev.GetTransportRefused(); tr != nil { + receivedMu.Lock() + c := tr.CoalescedCount + if c == 0 { + c = 1 + } + countsByPeer[tr.PeerId] += c + receivedMu.Unlock() + } + w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK) + })) + t.Cleanup(srv.Close) + + disp, err := NewDispatcher(Config{ + CoalescingWindow: 100 * time.Millisecond, + Endpoints: []EndpointConfig{{URL: srv.URL}}, + }) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("NewDispatcher: %v", err) + } + + now := timestamppb.Now() + // Interleave 20 events for peer-A and 20 events for peer-B + for i := 0; i < 20; i++ { + disp.Dispatch(&api.SecuritySignalEvent{ + Id: fmt.Sprintf("ev-a-%d", i), + Type: "agentmesh.transport.refused", + Source: "urn:agentmesh:node:test", + SpecVersion: "1.0", + EventTime: now, + Subject: "peer-A", + Data: &api.SecuritySignalEvent_TransportRefused{ + TransportRefused: &api.TransportRefusedSignal{ + PeerId: "peer-A", + ProtocolId: "/agentmesh/auth", + Reason: api.TransportRefusalReason_PEER_UNAUTHENTICATED, + }, + }, + }) + disp.Dispatch(&api.SecuritySignalEvent{ + Id: fmt.Sprintf("ev-b-%d", i), + Type: "agentmesh.transport.refused", + Source: "urn:agentmesh:node:test", + SpecVersion: "1.0", + EventTime: now, + Subject: "peer-B", + Data: &api.SecuritySignalEvent_TransportRefused{ + TransportRefused: &api.TransportRefusedSignal{ + PeerId: "peer-B", + ProtocolId: "/agentmesh/auth", + Reason: api.TransportRefusalReason_PEER_UNAUTHENTICATED, + }, + }, + }) + } + + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 3*time.Second) + defer cancel() + if err := disp.Close(ctx); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("disp.Close: %v", err) + } + + receivedMu.Lock() + defer receivedMu.Unlock() + + if countsByPeer["peer-A"] != 20 { + t.Errorf("peer-A count = %d, want 20", countsByPeer["peer-A"]) + } + if countsByPeer["peer-B"] != 20 { + t.Errorf("peer-B count = %d, want 20", countsByPeer["peer-B"]) + } +} + +func TestDispatcher_HMACSHA256SignatureAndSecretHygiene(t *testing.T) { + secretKey := []byte("test-hmac-containment-secret-key-32b!") + secretDir := t.TempDir() + secretFile := filepath.Join(secretDir, "containment.hmac") + if err := os.WriteFile(secretFile, secretKey, 0600); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("WriteFile: %v", err) + } + + var verified atomic.Bool + srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + ts := r.Header.Get("X-AgentMesh-Timestamp") + sig := r.Header.Get("X-AgentMesh-Signature") + if ts == "" || sig == "" { + t.Errorf("missing HMAC headers: ts=%q sig=%q", ts, sig) + w.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest) + return + } + + body, err := io.ReadAll(r.Body) + if err != nil { + t.Errorf("io.ReadAll: %v", err) + return + } + + if VerifySignature(secretKey, ts, body, sig) { + verified.Store(true) + w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK) + } else { + t.Errorf("signature verification failed: ts=%s sig=%s", ts, sig) + w.WriteHeader(http.StatusForbidden) + } + })) + t.Cleanup(srv.Close) + + disp, err := NewDispatcher(Config{ + Endpoints: []EndpointConfig{{ + URL: srv.URL, + HMACSecretPath: secretFile, + }}, + }) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("NewDispatcher: %v", err) + } + + disp.Dispatch(&api.SecuritySignalEvent{ + Id: "test-hmac-id", + Type: "agentmesh.policy.denied", + Source: "urn:agentmesh:node:test", + SpecVersion: "1.0", + EventTime: timestamppb.Now(), + Data: &api.SecuritySignalEvent_PolicyDenied{ + PolicyDenied: &api.PolicyDeniedSignal{ + TargetService: "vault", + Detail: "access denied", + }, + }, + }) + + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 3*time.Second) + defer cancel() + if err := disp.Close(ctx); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("disp.Close: %v", err) + } + + if !verified.Load() { + t.Errorf("HMAC signature was not successfully verified by receiver") + } + + // Verify tampering detection + fakeBody := []byte(`{"tampered":true}`) + if VerifySignature(secretKey, "12345678", fakeBody, "sha256=invalid") { + t.Errorf("VerifySignature unexpectedly passed for tampered signature") + } +} + +func TestDispatcher_UnixDomainSocket(t *testing.T) { + sockDir := t.TempDir() + sockPath := filepath.Join(sockDir, "containment.sock") + + listener, err := net.Listen("unix", sockPath) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("net.Listen(unix): %v", err) + } + t.Cleanup(func() { _ = listener.Close() }) + + received := make(chan string, 1) + handler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + body, _ := io.ReadAll(r.Body) + received <- string(body) + w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK) + }) + + srv := &http.Server{Handler: handler} + go func() { _ = srv.Serve(listener) }() + t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.Close() }) + + disp, err := NewDispatcher(Config{ + Endpoints: []EndpointConfig{{URL: "unix:" + filepath.ToSlash(sockPath)}}, + }) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("NewDispatcher: %v", err) + } + + disp.Dispatch(&api.SecuritySignalEvent{ + Id: "unix-test-id", + Type: "agentmesh.identity.revoked", + Source: "urn:agentmesh:node:local", + SpecVersion: "1.0", + EventTime: timestamppb.Now(), + Data: &api.SecuritySignalEvent_IdentityRevoked{ + IdentityRevoked: &api.IdentityRevokedSignal{ + PeerId: "peer-banned", + Reason: "administrative eviction", + }, + }, + }) + + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 3*time.Second) + defer cancel() + if err := disp.Close(ctx); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("disp.Close: %v", err) + } + + select { + case body := <-received: + if !strings.Contains(body, "agentmesh.identity.revoked") { + t.Errorf("Unix socket body missing event type: %s", body) + } + case <-time.After(3 * time.Second): + t.Fatalf("timeout waiting for Unix domain socket delivery") + } +} + +func TestDispatcher_GracefulShutdownAndDrain(t *testing.T) { + var count atomic.Int64 + srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + count.Add(1) + w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK) + })) + t.Cleanup(srv.Close) + + disp, err := NewDispatcher(Config{ + QueueCapacity: 50, + Workers: 2, + Endpoints: []EndpointConfig{{URL: srv.URL}}, + }) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("NewDispatcher: %v", err) + } + + now := timestamppb.Now() + for i := 0; i < 20; i++ { + disp.Dispatch(&api.SecuritySignalEvent{ + Id: fmt.Sprintf("id-%d", i), + Type: "agentmesh.policy.denied", + Source: "urn:agentmesh:node:test", + SpecVersion: "1.0", + EventTime: now, + Data: &api.SecuritySignalEvent_PolicyDenied{ + PolicyDenied: &api.PolicyDeniedSignal{ + TargetService: fmt.Sprintf("service-%d", i), + Detail: "drain test", + }, + }, + }) + } + + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 3*time.Second) + defer cancel() + if err := disp.Close(ctx); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("disp.Close: %v", err) + } + + if got := count.Load(); got != 20 { + t.Errorf("delivered during shutdown = %d, want 20", got) + } +} + +func TestDispatcher_UnresponsiveServerShutdownTimeout(t *testing.T) { + releaseHandler := make(chan struct{}) + serverEntered := make(chan struct{}) + var serverEnteredOnce sync.Once + + hangServer := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + serverEnteredOnce.Do(func() { close(serverEntered) }) + select { + case <-releaseHandler: + case <-r.Context().Done(): + } + })) + t.Cleanup(func() { + select { + case <-releaseHandler: + default: + close(releaseHandler) + } + hangServer.Close() + }) + + disp, err := NewDispatcher(Config{ + QueueCapacity: 10, + Workers: 1, + Endpoints: []EndpointConfig{{ + URL: hangServer.URL, + Timeout: 5 * time.Second, + }}, + }) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("NewDispatcher: %v", err) + } + + disp.Dispatch(&api.SecuritySignalEvent{ + Id: "hang-event", + Type: "agentmesh.policy.denied", + Source: "urn:agentmesh:node:test", + SpecVersion: "1.0", + EventTime: timestamppb.Now(), + }) + + // Wait until the handler has actually been entered + select { + case <-serverEntered: + case <-time.After(3 * time.Second): + t.Fatalf("timeout waiting for server handler entry") + } + + // Close with very short 20ms deadline; worker is stuck in hangServer handler + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 20*time.Millisecond) + defer cancel() + + start := time.Now() + err = disp.Close(ctx) + elapsed := time.Since(start) + + if err == nil { + t.Errorf("expected Close timeout error; got nil") + } + if elapsed > 1*time.Second { + t.Errorf("Close took %v, want <=1s", elapsed) + } +} + +func TestClient_InsecureHTTPRejection(t *testing.T) { + // Non-loopback plain HTTP target must fail closed + _, err := NewSingleClient(EndpointConfig{ + URL: "http://example.com/events", + }) + if err == nil { + t.Errorf("expected error for non-loopback http URL, got nil") + } + + // Loopback plain HTTP must succeed + c, err := NewSingleClient(EndpointConfig{ + URL: "http://127.0.0.1:8080/events", + }) + if err != nil { + t.Errorf("unexpected error for loopback http URL: %v", err) + } + _ = c.Close() +} + +func TestConfig_FromProto(t *testing.T) { + protoCfg := &api.SecuritySignalsConfig{ + Enabled: true, + QueueCapacity: 512, + CoalescingWindow: durationpb.New(2 * time.Second), + Endpoints: []*api.WebhookEndpointConfig{ + { + Url: "http://127.0.0.1:9090/events", + Timeout: durationpb.New(1 * time.Second), + MaxRetries: 2, + EventTypes: []string{"agentmesh.policy.denied"}, + }, + }, + } + + cfg, err := FromProto(protoCfg) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("FromProto: %v", err) + } + if !cfg.Enabled { + t.Errorf("got Enabled false, want true") + } + if cfg.QueueCapacity != 512 { + t.Errorf("got QueueCapacity %d, want 512", cfg.QueueCapacity) + } + if cfg.CoalescingWindow != 2*time.Second { + t.Errorf("got CoalescingWindow %v, want 2s", cfg.CoalescingWindow) + } + if len(cfg.Endpoints) != 1 { + t.Fatalf("got %d endpoints, want 1", len(cfg.Endpoints)) + } + if cfg.Endpoints[0].URL != "http://127.0.0.1:9090/events" { + t.Errorf("got endpoint URL %q, want http://127.0.0.1:9090/events", cfg.Endpoints[0].URL) + } +} diff --git a/internal/containment/metrics.go b/internal/containment/metrics.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..986b235d --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/containment/metrics.go @@ -0,0 +1,129 @@ +// Copyright 2026 Google LLC +// +// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +// You may obtain a copy of the License at +// +// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +// +// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +// limitations under the License. + +package containment + +import ( + golog "github.com/ipfs/go-log/v2" + "github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus" + "github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus/promauto" + dto "github.com/prometheus/client_model/go" +) + +var logger = golog.Logger("agentmesh-containment") + +var ( + containmentQueuedTotal = promauto.NewCounterVec( + prometheus.CounterOpts{ + Name: "agentmesh_containment_events_queued_total", + Help: "Total security signals queued for containment webhook delivery.", + }, + []string{"signal_type"}, + ) + + containmentDeliveredTotal = promauto.NewCounterVec( + prometheus.CounterOpts{ + Name: "agentmesh_containment_events_delivered_total", + Help: "Total containment webhook events delivered, by signal type and HTTP status code.", + }, + []string{"signal_type", "status_code"}, + ) + + containmentDroppedTotal = promauto.NewCounterVec( + prometheus.CounterOpts{ + Name: "agentmesh_containment_events_dropped_total", + Help: "Total containment webhook events dropped, by signal type and reason (buffer_full, client_timeout, transport_error, shutdown_timeout).", + }, + []string{"signal_type", "reason"}, + ) + + containmentCoalescedTotal = promauto.NewCounterVec( + prometheus.CounterOpts{ + Name: "agentmesh_containment_events_coalesced_total", + Help: "Total rapid duplicate security signals coalesced within the deduplication window.", + }, + []string{"signal_type"}, + ) + + containmentDeliveryDuration = promauto.NewHistogramVec( + prometheus.HistogramOpts{ + Name: "agentmesh_containment_delivery_duration_seconds", + Help: "Webhook HTTP delivery duration in seconds.", + Buckets: []float64{0.005, 0.01, 0.025, 0.05, 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 1.0}, + }, + []string{"signal_type"}, + ) + + containmentQueueDepth = promauto.NewGauge( + prometheus.GaugeOpts{ + Name: "agentmesh_containment_queue_depth", + Help: "Current depth of the containment webhook ring buffer queue.", + }, + ) +) + +// GetDroppedCount returns the sum of dropped events across all reasons and types. +func GetDroppedCount() int64 { + mfs, err := prometheus.DefaultGatherer.Gather() + if err != nil { + return 0 + } + var total float64 + for _, mf := range mfs { + if mf.GetName() == "agentmesh_containment_events_dropped_total" { + for _, m := range mf.GetMetric() { + if m.GetCounter() != nil { + total += m.GetCounter().GetValue() + } + } + } + } + return int64(total) +} + +// GetDroppedCountFor returns the count of dropped events for a specific signal type and reason. +func GetDroppedCountFor(signalType, reason string) float64 { + m := &dto.Metric{} + if err := containmentDroppedTotal.WithLabelValues(signalType, reason).Write(m); err != nil { + return 0 + } + return m.GetCounter().GetValue() +} + +// GetQueuedCountFor returns the count of queued events for a specific signal type. +func GetQueuedCountFor(signalType string) float64 { + m := &dto.Metric{} + if err := containmentQueuedTotal.WithLabelValues(signalType).Write(m); err != nil { + return 0 + } + return m.GetCounter().GetValue() +} + +// GetDeliveredCountFor returns the count of delivered events for a specific signal type and status code. +func GetDeliveredCountFor(signalType, statusCode string) float64 { + m := &dto.Metric{} + if err := containmentDeliveredTotal.WithLabelValues(signalType, statusCode).Write(m); err != nil { + return 0 + } + return m.GetCounter().GetValue() +} + +// GetCoalescedCountFor returns the count of coalesced events for a specific signal type. +func GetCoalescedCountFor(signalType string) float64 { + m := &dto.Metric{} + if err := containmentCoalescedTotal.WithLabelValues(signalType).Write(m); err != nil { + return 0 + } + return m.GetCounter().GetValue() +} diff --git a/internal/controlplane/config.go b/internal/controlplane/config.go index 162a8053..7f539970 100644 --- a/internal/controlplane/config.go +++ b/internal/controlplane/config.go @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ import ( "time" "github.com/google/agentmesh/api" + "github.com/google/agentmesh/internal/containment" ) // Options holds configuration for the control plane. @@ -86,6 +87,10 @@ type Options struct { // STSRateBurst is the per-node burst size for /token/exchange and // /sts/token (defaults to STSRateBurstDefault). STSRateBurst int + // Containment configures outbound containment webhook dispatching. + Containment containment.Config + // ContainmentDispatcher allows injecting a pre-built Dispatcher (e.g. for testing). + ContainmentDispatcher containment.Dispatcher } const ( diff --git a/internal/controlplane/containment_controlplane_test.go b/internal/controlplane/containment_controlplane_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6b393f0c --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/controlplane/containment_controlplane_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,366 @@ +// Copyright 2026 Google LLC +// +// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +// You may obtain a copy of the License at +// +// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +// +// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +// limitations under the License. + +package controlplane + +import ( + "context" + "crypto/ed25519" + "crypto/rand" + "net/http" + "strings" + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/google/agentmesh/api" + "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/crypto" + "google.golang.org/protobuf/proto" +) + +type cpChanDispatcher struct { + events chan *api.SecuritySignalEvent +} + +func newCPChanDispatcher(buf int) *cpChanDispatcher { + return &cpChanDispatcher{ + events: make(chan *api.SecuritySignalEvent, buf), + } +} + +func (d *cpChanDispatcher) Dispatch(event *api.SecuritySignalEvent) { + select { + case d.events <- event: + default: + } +} + +func (d *cpChanDispatcher) Close(ctx context.Context) error { + return nil +} + +func expectCPEvent(t *testing.T, d *cpChanDispatcher, expectedType string) *api.SecuritySignalEvent { + t.Helper() + select { + case evt := <-d.events: + if evt.Type != expectedType { + t.Fatalf("expected event type %q, got %q", expectedType, evt.Type) + } + return evt + case <-time.After(2 * time.Second): + t.Fatalf("timed out waiting for event type %q", expectedType) + return nil + } +} + +func TestControlPlaneContainment_EnrollmentRejected_InvalidBootstrapToken(t *testing.T) { + h := newLifecycleHarness(t) + disp := newCPChanDispatcher(10) + h.srv.SetContainmentDispatcher(disp) + + status, httpCode, errMsg := h.enroll("non-existent-bootstrap-token-12345") + if httpCode != http.StatusOK || status != api.EnrollmentStatus_ENROLLMENT_STATUS_REJECTED { + t.Fatalf("enroll: got status=%v code=%d msg=%q, want REJECTED", status, httpCode, errMsg) + } + + evt := expectCPEvent(t, disp, "agentmesh.enrollment.rejected") + sig := evt.GetEnrollmentRejected() + if sig == nil { + t.Fatal("expected EnrollmentRejected signal, got nil") + } + if sig.Reason != api.EnrollmentRejectionReason_EXPIRED_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN { + t.Errorf("expected EXPIRED_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN, got %v", sig.Reason) + } + if !strings.Contains(sig.Detail, "Invalid bootstrap token") { + t.Errorf("expected detail to mention 'Invalid bootstrap token', got %q", sig.Detail) + } +} + +func TestControlPlaneContainment_EnrollmentRejected_BannedNode(t *testing.T) { + h := newLifecycleHarness(t) + disp := newCPChanDispatcher(10) + + // First register the node cleanly + priv, id := h.register("banned-alice") + + // Now attach dispatcher and ban the node in store + h.srv.SetContainmentDispatcher(disp) + if err := h.store.SetNodeBanned(context.Background(), id.String(), true); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("SetNodeBanned: %v", err) + } + + pub, err := crypto.MarshalPublicKey(priv.GetPublic()) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + ts, sig := registerPoP(t, priv, id.String()) + data, err := proto.Marshal(&api.EnrollRequest{ + Jwt: h.mintToken(map[string]interface{}{"sub": "banned-alice"}), + PeerId: id.String(), + PublicKey: pub, + RequestedRole: api.RoleNode, + ChallengeUnixMs: ts, + ChallengeSignature: sig, + }) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + code, body := h.do(http.MethodPost, "/register", "", data, "application/x-protobuf") + if code != http.StatusForbidden { + t.Fatalf("/register: expected 403, got %d: %s", code, body) + } + + evt := expectCPEvent(t, disp, "agentmesh.enrollment.rejected") + rejectedSig := evt.GetEnrollmentRejected() + if rejectedSig == nil { + t.Fatal("expected EnrollmentRejected data, got nil") + } + if rejectedSig.Reason != api.EnrollmentRejectionReason_PEER_PREVIOUSLY_BANNED { + t.Errorf("expected PEER_PREVIOUSLY_BANNED, got %v", rejectedSig.Reason) + } + if rejectedSig.PeerId != id.String() { + t.Errorf("expected PeerId %q, got %q", id.String(), rejectedSig.PeerId) + } +} + +func TestControlPlaneContainment_EnrollmentRejected_RoleUnauthorized(t *testing.T) { + h := newLifecycleHarness(t) + disp := newCPChanDispatcher(10) + h.srv.SetContainmentDispatcher(disp) + + priv, id := newTestKey(t) + pub, err := crypto.MarshalPublicKey(priv.GetPublic()) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + ts, sig := registerPoP(t, priv, id.String()) + data, err := proto.Marshal(&api.EnrollRequest{ + Jwt: h.mintToken(map[string]interface{}{"sub": "alice"}), + PeerId: id.String(), + PublicKey: pub, + RequestedRole: "mesh:role:unbound-custom-role", + ChallengeUnixMs: ts, + ChallengeSignature: sig, + }) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + code, body := h.do(http.MethodPost, "/register", "", data, "application/x-protobuf") + if code != http.StatusForbidden { + t.Fatalf("/register: expected 403, got %d: %s", code, body) + } + + evt := expectCPEvent(t, disp, "agentmesh.enrollment.rejected") + rejectedSig := evt.GetEnrollmentRejected() + if rejectedSig == nil { + t.Fatal("expected EnrollmentRejected data, got nil") + } + if rejectedSig.Reason != api.EnrollmentRejectionReason_REQUESTED_ROLE_UNAUTHORIZED { + t.Errorf("expected REQUESTED_ROLE_UNAUTHORIZED, got %v", rejectedSig.Reason) + } + if rejectedSig.RequestedRole != "mesh:role:unbound-custom-role" { + t.Errorf("expected RequestedRole mesh:role:unbound-custom-role, got %q", rejectedSig.RequestedRole) + } +} + +func TestControlPlaneContainment_EnrollmentRejected_UnattestedLabels(t *testing.T) { + h := newLifecycleHarness(t) + disp := newCPChanDispatcher(10) + h.srv.SetContainmentDispatcher(disp) + + priv, id := newTestKey(t) + pub, err := crypto.MarshalPublicKey(priv.GetPublic()) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + ts, sig := registerPoP(t, priv, id.String()) + data, err := proto.Marshal(&api.EnrollRequest{ + Jwt: h.mintToken(map[string]interface{}{"sub": "alice"}), + PeerId: id.String(), + PublicKey: pub, + RequestedRole: api.RoleNode, + Labels: map[string]string{"unattested_key": "forbidden_value"}, + ChallengeUnixMs: ts, + ChallengeSignature: sig, + }) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + code, body := h.do(http.MethodPost, "/register", "", data, "application/x-protobuf") + if code != http.StatusForbidden { + t.Fatalf("/register: expected 403, got %d: %s", code, body) + } + + evt := expectCPEvent(t, disp, "agentmesh.enrollment.rejected") + rejectedSig := evt.GetEnrollmentRejected() + if rejectedSig == nil { + t.Fatal("expected EnrollmentRejected data, got nil") + } + if rejectedSig.Reason != api.EnrollmentRejectionReason_UNATTESTED_LABELS_REJECTED { + t.Errorf("expected UNATTESTED_LABELS_REJECTED, got %v", rejectedSig.Reason) + } + if rejectedSig.SubmittedLabels["unattested_key"] != "forbidden_value" { + t.Errorf("expected submitted label unattested_key, got %v", rejectedSig.SubmittedLabels) + } +} + +func TestControlPlaneContainment_Refresh_BannedNode(t *testing.T) { + h := newLifecycleHarness(t) + priv, id := h.register("bob") + record, err := h.store.GetNode(context.Background(), id.String()) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("GetNode: %v", err) + } + + disp := newCPChanDispatcher(10) + h.srv.SetContainmentDispatcher(disp) + + if err := h.store.SetNodeBanned(context.Background(), id.String(), true); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("SetNodeBanned: %v", err) + } + + code, body := refreshAs(t, h.baseURL, priv, record.Biscuit, id.String()) + if code != http.StatusForbidden { + t.Fatalf("/refresh: expected 403, got %d: %s", code, body) + } + + // Expect identity.revoked + evt1 := expectCPEvent(t, disp, "agentmesh.identity.revoked") + ir := evt1.GetIdentityRevoked() + if ir.Source != api.RevocationSource_TOKEN_REFRESH_REJECTION { + t.Errorf("expected TOKEN_REFRESH_REJECTION, got %v", ir.Source) + } + if ir.PeerId != id.String() { + t.Errorf("expected PeerId %q, got %q", id.String(), ir.PeerId) + } + + // Expect enrollment.rejected + evt2 := expectCPEvent(t, disp, "agentmesh.enrollment.rejected") + er := evt2.GetEnrollmentRejected() + if er.Reason != api.EnrollmentRejectionReason_PEER_PREVIOUSLY_BANNED { + t.Errorf("expected PEER_PREVIOUSLY_BANNED, got %v", er.Reason) + } +} + +func TestControlPlaneContainment_Refresh_AutonomousRecoveryDisabled(t *testing.T) { + h := newLifecycleHarness(t) + priv, id := h.register("charlie") + record, err := h.store.GetNode(context.Background(), id.String()) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("GetNode: %v", err) + } + + disp := newCPChanDispatcher(10) + h.srv.SetContainmentDispatcher(disp) + + // Disable autonomous recovery + record.AutonomousRecovery = false + if err := h.store.EnrollNode(context.Background(), record); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("EnrollNode: %v", err) + } + + // Retire active key + newPub, newPriv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if err := h.store.RotateKeys(context.Background(), newPriv, newPub, -time.Second); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + code, body := refreshAs(t, h.baseURL, priv, record.Biscuit, id.String()) + if code != http.StatusUnauthorized { + t.Fatalf("/refresh: expected 401, got %d: %s", code, body) + } + + evt := expectCPEvent(t, disp, "agentmesh.enrollment.rejected") + er := evt.GetEnrollmentRejected() + if er == nil { + t.Fatal("expected EnrollmentRejected data, got nil") + } + if er.Reason != api.EnrollmentRejectionReason_AUTONOMOUS_RECOVERY_DISABLED { + t.Errorf("expected AUTONOMOUS_RECOVERY_DISABLED, got %v", er.Reason) + } + if !er.IsAutonomousRecovery { + t.Error("expected IsAutonomousRecovery true") + } +} + +func TestControlPlaneContainment_AdminRevoke(t *testing.T) { + h := newLifecycleHarness(t) + disp := newCPChanDispatcher(10) + h.srv.SetContainmentDispatcher(disp) + + _, id := h.register("dave") + h.revoke(id) + + evt := expectCPEvent(t, disp, "agentmesh.identity.revoked") + ir := evt.GetIdentityRevoked() + if ir == nil { + t.Fatal("expected IdentityRevoked data, got nil") + } + if ir.Source != api.RevocationSource_CONTROL_PLANE_ADMIN { + t.Errorf("expected CONTROL_PLANE_ADMIN, got %v", ir.Source) + } + if ir.PeerId != id.String() { + t.Errorf("expected PeerId %q, got %q", id.String(), ir.PeerId) + } +} + +func TestControlPlaneContainment_AdminEnrollmentReject(t *testing.T) { + h := newLifecycleHarness(t) + disp := newCPChanDispatcher(10) + h.srv.SetContainmentDispatcher(disp) + + h.srv.config.AutoApproveEnrollment = false + + status, out := h.userToken("admin", `{"role":"mesh:role:node"}`) + if status != http.StatusCreated && status != http.StatusOK { + t.Fatalf("userToken: %d", status) + } + token, ok := out["token"].(string) + if !ok || token == "" { + t.Fatalf("no token in response: %v", out) + } + + enrollStatus, httpCode, _ := h.enroll(token) + if httpCode != http.StatusOK || enrollStatus != api.EnrollmentStatus_ENROLLMENT_STATUS_PENDING { + t.Fatalf("enroll: expected PENDING, got %v (http %d)", enrollStatus, httpCode) + } + + reqs, err := h.store.ListEnrollmentRequests(context.Background()) + if err != nil || len(reqs) == 0 { + t.Fatalf("ListEnrollmentRequests: %v (len %d)", err, len(reqs)) + } + reqID := reqs[0].ID + + rejectCode, rejectBody := h.do(http.MethodPost, "/admin/enrollments/"+reqID+"/reject", "super-secret-admin-token", nil, "") + if rejectCode != http.StatusOK { + t.Fatalf("reject: %d %s", rejectCode, rejectBody) + } + + evt := expectCPEvent(t, disp, "agentmesh.enrollment.rejected") + er := evt.GetEnrollmentRejected() + if er == nil { + t.Fatal("expected EnrollmentRejected data, got nil") + } + if er.Reason != api.EnrollmentRejectionReason_REQUESTED_ROLE_UNAUTHORIZED { + t.Errorf("expected REQUESTED_ROLE_UNAUTHORIZED, got %v", er.Reason) + } + if !strings.Contains(er.Detail, "rejected by admin") { + t.Errorf("expected detail to mention 'rejected by admin', got %q", er.Detail) + } +} diff --git a/internal/controlplane/containment_edge_test.go b/internal/controlplane/containment_edge_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8103604a --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/controlplane/containment_edge_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,502 @@ +// Copyright 2026 Google LLC +// +// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +// You may obtain a copy of the License at +// +// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +// +// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +// limitations under the License. + +package controlplane + +import ( + "context" + "crypto/ed25519" + "crypto/rand" + "crypto/sha256" + "encoding/base64" + "fmt" + "net/http" + "net/http/httptest" + "strings" + "sync/atomic" + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/google/agentmesh/api" + "github.com/google/agentmesh/internal/containment" + "github.com/google/agentmesh/internal/storage" + "google.golang.org/protobuf/proto" +) + +// TestControlPlaneContainment_EnrollmentRejected_TrulyExpiredBootstrapToken tests +// that a bootstrap token whose expiry has passed triggers an agentmesh.enrollment.rejected +// signal with EXPIRED_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN and appropriate detail. +func TestControlPlaneContainment_EnrollmentRejected_TrulyExpiredBootstrapToken(t *testing.T) { + h := newLifecycleHarness(t) + disp := newCPChanDispatcher(10) + h.srv.SetContainmentDispatcher(disp) + + rawToken := "expired-bootstrap-token-adversarial-test-12345" + tokenID := fmt.Sprintf("%x", sha256.Sum256([]byte(rawToken))) + + tok := &storage.BootstrapToken{ + ID: tokenID, + TokenHash: tokenID, + Role: api.RoleNode, + MaxUsages: 10, + UsagesCount: 0, + Description: "expired test token", + CreatedAt: time.Now().Add(-2 * time.Hour), + ExpiresAt: time.Now().Add(-30 * time.Minute), // expired in the past + } + if err := h.store.SaveBootstrapToken(context.Background(), tok); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("SaveBootstrapToken: %v", err) + } + + status, httpCode, errMsg := h.enroll(rawToken) + if httpCode != http.StatusOK || status != api.EnrollmentStatus_ENROLLMENT_STATUS_REJECTED { + t.Fatalf("enroll: expected REJECTED with code 200, got status=%v code=%d msg=%q", status, httpCode, errMsg) + } + + evt := expectCPEvent(t, disp, "agentmesh.enrollment.rejected") + sig := evt.GetEnrollmentRejected() + if sig == nil { + t.Fatal("expected EnrollmentRejected signal, got nil") + } + if sig.Reason != api.EnrollmentRejectionReason_EXPIRED_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN { + t.Errorf("expected EXPIRED_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN, got %v", sig.Reason) + } + if !strings.Contains(sig.Detail, "Bootstrap token expired") { + t.Errorf("expected detail to mention 'Bootstrap token expired', got %q", sig.Detail) + } +} + +// TestControlPlaneContainment_EnrollmentRejected_RevokedBootstrapToken tests +// that an explicitly revoked bootstrap token emits agentmesh.enrollment.rejected. +func TestControlPlaneContainment_EnrollmentRejected_RevokedBootstrapToken(t *testing.T) { + h := newLifecycleHarness(t) + disp := newCPChanDispatcher(10) + h.srv.SetContainmentDispatcher(disp) + + rawToken := "revoked-bootstrap-token-adversarial-test-67890" + tokenID := fmt.Sprintf("%x", sha256.Sum256([]byte(rawToken))) + + tok := &storage.BootstrapToken{ + ID: tokenID, + TokenHash: tokenID, + Role: api.RoleNode, + MaxUsages: 10, + UsagesCount: 0, + Description: "revoked test token", + CreatedAt: time.Now().Add(-1 * time.Hour), + ExpiresAt: time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour), + } + if err := h.store.SaveBootstrapToken(context.Background(), tok); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("SaveBootstrapToken: %v", err) + } + + if err := h.store.RevokeBootstrapToken(context.Background(), tokenID); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("RevokeBootstrapToken: %v", err) + } + + status, httpCode, errMsg := h.enroll(rawToken) + if httpCode != http.StatusOK || status != api.EnrollmentStatus_ENROLLMENT_STATUS_REJECTED { + t.Fatalf("enroll: expected REJECTED with code 200, got status=%v code=%d msg=%q", status, httpCode, errMsg) + } + + evt := expectCPEvent(t, disp, "agentmesh.enrollment.rejected") + sig := evt.GetEnrollmentRejected() + if sig == nil { + t.Fatal("expected EnrollmentRejected signal, got nil") + } + if sig.Reason != api.EnrollmentRejectionReason_EXPIRED_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN { + t.Errorf("expected EXPIRED_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN, got %v", sig.Reason) + } + if !strings.Contains(sig.Detail, "Bootstrap token revoked") { + t.Errorf("expected detail to mention 'Bootstrap token revoked', got %q", sig.Detail) + } +} + +// TestControlPlaneContainment_EnrollmentRejected_MaxUsagesExceeded tests +// that exhausting the allowed usages on a bootstrap token emits agentmesh.enrollment.rejected +// with BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_USAGE_EXCEEDED. +func TestControlPlaneContainment_EnrollmentRejected_MaxUsagesExceeded(t *testing.T) { + h := newLifecycleHarness(t) + disp := newCPChanDispatcher(10) + h.srv.SetContainmentDispatcher(disp) + + rawToken := "single-use-bootstrap-token-11223" + tokenID := fmt.Sprintf("%x", sha256.Sum256([]byte(rawToken))) + + tok := &storage.BootstrapToken{ + ID: tokenID, + TokenHash: tokenID, + Role: api.RoleNode, + MaxUsages: 1, + UsagesCount: 1, // already exhausted + Description: "exhausted token", + CreatedAt: time.Now().Add(-1 * time.Hour), + ExpiresAt: time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour), + } + if err := h.store.SaveBootstrapToken(context.Background(), tok); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("SaveBootstrapToken: %v", err) + } + + status, httpCode, errMsg := h.enroll(rawToken) + if httpCode != http.StatusOK || status != api.EnrollmentStatus_ENROLLMENT_STATUS_REJECTED { + t.Fatalf("enroll: expected REJECTED with code 200, got status=%v code=%d msg=%q", status, httpCode, errMsg) + } + + evt := expectCPEvent(t, disp, "agentmesh.enrollment.rejected") + sig := evt.GetEnrollmentRejected() + if sig == nil { + t.Fatal("expected EnrollmentRejected signal, got nil") + } + if sig.Reason != api.EnrollmentRejectionReason_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_USAGE_EXCEEDED { + t.Errorf("expected BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_USAGE_EXCEEDED, got %v", sig.Reason) + } + if !strings.Contains(sig.Detail, "max usages exceeded") { + t.Errorf("expected detail to mention 'max usages exceeded', got %q", sig.Detail) + } +} + +// TestControlPlaneContainment_EnrollmentRejected_MalformedProtoRequestBody tests +// that corrupt non-protobuf POST body to /enroll returns 400 Bad Request safely +// without crashing or panicking the server. +func TestControlPlaneContainment_EnrollmentRejected_MalformedProtoRequestBody(t *testing.T) { + h := newLifecycleHarness(t) + disp := newCPChanDispatcher(10) + h.srv.SetContainmentDispatcher(disp) + + code, body := h.do(http.MethodPost, "/enroll", "", []byte("malformed-non-protobuf-binary-data"), "application/x-protobuf") + if code != http.StatusBadRequest { + t.Fatalf("expected 400 Bad Request, got %d: %s", code, body) + } + + // Verify no spurious events leaked + select { + case evt := <-disp.events: + t.Fatalf("unexpected event emitted on malformed proto: %v", evt) + default: + } +} + +// TestControlPlaneContainment_Refresh_AutonomousRecoveryRefused_And_Granted tests both branches: +// refusal when AutonomousRecovery is disabled vs success when enabled. +func TestControlPlaneContainment_Refresh_AutonomousRecoveryRefused_And_Granted(t *testing.T) { + h := newLifecycleHarness(t) + disp := newCPChanDispatcher(10) + h.srv.SetContainmentDispatcher(disp) + + // Branch 1: AutonomousRecovery = false -> Refusal + priv1, id1 := h.register("node-disabled-recovery") + rec1, err := h.store.GetNode(context.Background(), id1.String()) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("GetNode: %v", err) + } + rec1.AutonomousRecovery = false + if err := h.store.EnrollNode(context.Background(), rec1); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("EnrollNode: %v", err) + } + + // Rotate active key past grace period to trigger retired-key fallback + newPub, newPriv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if err := h.store.RotateKeys(context.Background(), newPriv, newPub, -time.Second); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + code1, body1 := refreshAs(t, h.baseURL, priv1, rec1.Biscuit, id1.String()) + if code1 != http.StatusUnauthorized { + t.Fatalf("/refresh: expected 401 Unauthorized, got %d: %s", code1, body1) + } + + evt := expectCPEvent(t, disp, "agentmesh.enrollment.rejected") + sig := evt.GetEnrollmentRejected() + if sig == nil { + t.Fatal("expected EnrollmentRejected signal, got nil") + } + if sig.Reason != api.EnrollmentRejectionReason_AUTONOMOUS_RECOVERY_DISABLED { + t.Errorf("expected AUTONOMOUS_RECOVERY_DISABLED, got %v", sig.Reason) + } + if !sig.IsAutonomousRecovery { + t.Error("expected IsAutonomousRecovery true") + } + if !strings.Contains(sig.Detail, "autonomous recovery") { + t.Errorf("expected detail to mention 'autonomous recovery', got %q", sig.Detail) + } + + // Branch 2: AutonomousRecovery = true -> Succeeded, NO rejection emitted + priv2, id2 := h.register("node-enabled-recovery") + rec2, err := h.store.GetNode(context.Background(), id2.String()) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("GetNode: %v", err) + } + rec2.AutonomousRecovery = true + if err := h.store.EnrollNode(context.Background(), rec2); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("EnrollNode: %v", err) + } + + // Rotate again past grace period + newPub2, newPriv2, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if err := h.store.RotateKeys(context.Background(), newPriv2, newPub2, -time.Second); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + code2, body2 := refreshAs(t, h.baseURL, priv2, rec2.Biscuit, id2.String()) + if code2 != http.StatusOK { + t.Fatalf("/refresh: expected 200 OK for enabled autonomous recovery, got %d: %s", code2, body2) + } + + // Verify NO rejection event was emitted for the successful recovery + select { + case e := <-disp.events: + t.Fatalf("unexpected event for successful autonomous recovery: %v", e) + default: + } +} + +// TestControlPlaneContainment_Refresh_BannedNode_BothValidAndInvalidChallenge verifies +// that CheckAdmission blocks banned nodes before challenge evaluation, ensuring fail-closed +// emission of agentmesh.identity.revoked with source=TOKEN_REFRESH_REJECTION. +func TestControlPlaneContainment_Refresh_BannedNode_BothValidAndInvalidChallenge(t *testing.T) { + h := newLifecycleHarness(t) + priv, id := h.register("banned-refresher") + rec, err := h.store.GetNode(context.Background(), id.String()) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("GetNode: %v", err) + } + + disp := newCPChanDispatcher(10) + h.srv.SetContainmentDispatcher(disp) + + if err := h.store.SetNodeBanned(context.Background(), id.String(), true); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("SetNodeBanned: %v", err) + } + + // 1. Refresh with valid challenge + code, body := refreshAs(t, h.baseURL, priv, rec.Biscuit, id.String()) + if code != http.StatusForbidden { + t.Fatalf("/refresh: expected 403 Forbidden, got %d: %s", code, body) + } + + evtRevoked := expectCPEvent(t, disp, "agentmesh.identity.revoked") + ir := evtRevoked.GetIdentityRevoked() + if ir.Source != api.RevocationSource_TOKEN_REFRESH_REJECTION { + t.Errorf("expected source TOKEN_REFRESH_REJECTION, got %v", ir.Source) + } + if ir.PeerId != id.String() { + t.Errorf("expected PeerId %q, got %q", id.String(), ir.PeerId) + } + + evtRejected := expectCPEvent(t, disp, "agentmesh.enrollment.rejected") + er := evtRejected.GetEnrollmentRejected() + if er.Reason != api.EnrollmentRejectionReason_PEER_PREVIOUSLY_BANNED { + t.Errorf("expected PEER_PREVIOUSLY_BANNED, got %v", er.Reason) + } + + // 2. Refresh with forged/invalid challenge signature - CheckAdmission still fires first + corruptReq := &api.TokenRefreshRequest{ + PeerId: id.String(), + ChallengeUnixMs: time.Now().UnixMilli(), + ChallengeSignature: []byte("completely-invalid-signature"), + } + corruptData, err := proto.Marshal(corruptReq) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + corruptCode, corruptBody := h.do(http.MethodPost, "/refresh", base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(rec.Biscuit), corruptData, "application/x-protobuf") + if corruptCode != http.StatusForbidden { + t.Fatalf("expected 403 Forbidden even with invalid challenge signature, got %d: %s", corruptCode, corruptBody) + } + + evtRevoked2 := expectCPEvent(t, disp, "agentmesh.identity.revoked") + if evtRevoked2.GetIdentityRevoked().Source != api.RevocationSource_TOKEN_REFRESH_REJECTION { + t.Errorf("expected TOKEN_REFRESH_REJECTION, got %v", evtRevoked2.GetIdentityRevoked().Source) + } + _ = expectCPEvent(t, disp, "agentmesh.enrollment.rejected") +} + +// TestControlPlaneContainment_Revocation_AdminAndUserRevoke verifies that both +// POST /admin/revoke and POST /user/revoke emit agentmesh.identity.revoked with +// source=CONTROL_PLANE_ADMIN. +func TestControlPlaneContainment_Revocation_AdminAndUserRevoke(t *testing.T) { + h := newLifecycleHarness(t) + disp := newCPChanDispatcher(10) + h.srv.SetContainmentDispatcher(disp) + + // Admin revoke + _, idAdmin := h.register("admin-victim") + h.revoke(idAdmin) + + evt1 := expectCPEvent(t, disp, "agentmesh.identity.revoked") + ir1 := evt1.GetIdentityRevoked() + if ir1.Source != api.RevocationSource_CONTROL_PLANE_ADMIN { + t.Errorf("expected CONTROL_PLANE_ADMIN, got %v", ir1.Source) + } + if ir1.PeerId != idAdmin.String() { + t.Errorf("expected PeerId %q, got %q", idAdmin.String(), ir1.PeerId) + } + + // User revoke + if err := h.store.SaveUser(context.Background(), &storage.User{ + ID: "user-victim", + Email: "user-victim@example.com", + Role: "user", + CreatedAt: time.Now(), + }); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("SaveUser: %v", err) + } + + _, idUser := h.register("user-victim") + userToken := h.mintToken(map[string]interface{}{"sub": "user-victim"}) + code, body := h.do(http.MethodPost, "/user/revoke?id="+idUser.String(), userToken, nil, "") + if code != http.StatusOK { + t.Fatalf("/user/revoke: expected 200 OK, got %d: %s", code, body) + } + + evt2 := expectCPEvent(t, disp, "agentmesh.identity.revoked") + ir2 := evt2.GetIdentityRevoked() + if ir2.Source != api.RevocationSource_CONTROL_PLANE_ADMIN { + t.Errorf("expected CONTROL_PLANE_ADMIN, got %v", ir2.Source) + } + if ir2.PeerId != idUser.String() { + t.Errorf("expected PeerId %q, got %q", idUser.String(), ir2.PeerId) + } + if !strings.Contains(ir2.Reason, "Revoked by user") { + t.Errorf("expected reason to mention 'Revoked by user', got %q", ir2.Reason) + } +} + +// TestControlPlaneContainment_ServerClose_NilDispatcher verifies that Server.Close() +// runs safely when ContainmentDispatcher is nil without panicking or leaking goroutines. +func TestControlPlaneContainment_ServerClose_NilDispatcher(t *testing.T) { + issuer, _ := startCustomMockOIDC(t) + srv, store, _ := setupTestServer(t, issuer) + defer store.Close() + + srv.SetContainmentDispatcher(nil) + if err := srv.Close(); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("Server.Close() with nil containment dispatcher failed: %v", err) + } + + // Calling Close() a second time should be idempotent and not panic + if err := srv.Close(); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("second Server.Close() failed: %v", err) + } +} + +// TestControlPlaneContainment_ServerClose_DrainsDispatcher verifies that Server.Close() +// drains pending containment events to an external webhook receiver before shutting down. +func TestControlPlaneContainment_ServerClose_DrainsDispatcher(t *testing.T) { + var receivedCount atomic.Int32 + webhookServer := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + receivedCount.Add(1) + w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK) + })) + defer webhookServer.Close() + + disp, err := containment.NewDispatcher(containment.Config{ + Endpoints: []containment.EndpointConfig{{URL: webhookServer.URL}}, + QueueCapacity: 50, + Workers: 2, + }) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("failed to create dispatcher: %v", err) + } + + issuer, _ := startCustomMockOIDC(t) + srv, store, _ := setupTestServer(t, issuer, func(o *Options) { + o.ContainmentDispatcher = disp + }) + defer store.Close() + + const numEvents = 5 + for i := 0; i < numEvents; i++ { + srv.emitEnrollmentRejected( + fmt.Sprintf("peer-drain-%d", i), + "drain-test", + api.EnrollmentRejectionReason_EXPIRED_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN, + api.RoleNode, + nil, + time.Now(), + false, + ) + } + + if err := srv.Close(); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("Server.Close() failed: %v", err) + } + + if got := receivedCount.Load(); got != int32(numEvents) { + t.Fatalf("expected all %d events to be drained on Close(), got %d", numEvents, got) + } +} + +// TestControlPlaneContainment_ServerClose_DrainTimeoutOnHangingWebhook verifies that +// when an external webhook endpoint hangs, Server.Close() respects the 3-second drain +// deadline rather than hanging indefinitely. +func TestControlPlaneContainment_ServerClose_DrainTimeoutOnHangingWebhook(t *testing.T) { + handlerDone := make(chan struct{}) + webhookServer := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + select { + case <-r.Context().Done(): + case <-handlerDone: + } + })) + defer func() { + close(handlerDone) + webhookServer.Close() + }() + + disp, err := containment.NewDispatcher(containment.Config{ + Endpoints: []containment.EndpointConfig{{ + URL: webhookServer.URL, + Timeout: 10 * time.Second, // client timeout longer than 3s shutdown drain timeout + }}, + QueueCapacity: 50, + Workers: 1, + }) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("failed to create dispatcher: %v", err) + } + + issuer, _ := startCustomMockOIDC(t) + srv, store, _ := setupTestServer(t, issuer, func(o *Options) { + o.ContainmentDispatcher = disp + }) + defer store.Close() + + srv.emitEnrollmentRejected( + "peer-hanging", + "drain-timeout-test", + api.EnrollmentRejectionReason_EXPIRED_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN, + api.RoleNode, + nil, + time.Now(), + false, + ) + + start := time.Now() + err = srv.Close() + elapsed := time.Since(start) + + // drainCtx is 3s; elapsed should be around 3s (2.5s - 6s), NOT 10s or hanging indefinitely + if elapsed < 2500*time.Millisecond || elapsed > 6*time.Second { + t.Fatalf("expected drain to timeout around 3s, took %v", elapsed) + } + if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "containment dispatcher close") { + t.Fatalf("expected containment dispatcher close timeout error, got %v", err) + } +} diff --git a/internal/controlplane/server.go b/internal/controlplane/server.go index be0b8fdd..a6f17378 100644 --- a/internal/controlplane/server.go +++ b/internal/controlplane/server.go @@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ import ( "github.com/eclipse-biscuit/biscuit-go/v2/parser" jwt "github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5" "github.com/google/agentmesh/api" + "github.com/google/agentmesh/internal/containment" "github.com/google/agentmesh/internal/identity" "github.com/google/agentmesh/internal/ratelimit" "github.com/google/agentmesh/internal/storage" @@ -167,6 +168,8 @@ type Server struct { cancel context.CancelFunc wg sync.WaitGroup shutdown bool + + containmentDispatcher containment.Dispatcher } func parseWorkloadIssuers(raw string) (map[string]bool, map[string][]string) { @@ -229,7 +232,7 @@ func NewServer(config Options, store storage.Store) (*Server, error) { workloadIssuers, workloadEmailSuffixes := parseWorkloadIssuers(config.WorkloadIssuer) - return &Server{ + srv := &Server{ config: config, store: store, mesh: NewNopMeshAdapter(), @@ -248,7 +251,20 @@ func NewServer(config Options, store storage.Store) (*Server, error) { metricsRegistry: reg, ctx: ctx, cancel: cancel, - }, nil + } + + if config.ContainmentDispatcher != nil { + srv.containmentDispatcher = config.ContainmentDispatcher + } else if config.Containment.Enabled || len(config.Containment.Endpoints) > 0 { + disp, err := containment.NewDispatcher(config.Containment) + if err != nil { + cancel() + return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create containment dispatcher: %w", err) + } + srv.containmentDispatcher = disp + } + + return srv, nil } // SetMeshAdapter sets a custom MeshAdapter implementation for the control plane. @@ -928,6 +944,7 @@ func (s *Server) HandleRegister(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { claims, token, err := identity.VerifyJWT(ctx, req.Jwt, s.config.AllowedAudiences, s.getProviders()) if err != nil { logger.Errorw("JWT verification failed", "peer_id", req.PeerId, "error", err) + s.emitEnrollmentRejected(req.PeerId, s.jwtRefusalMessage(err), api.EnrollmentRejectionReason_INVALID_JWT, req.RequestedRole, req.Labels, time.Now(), false) http.Error(w, s.jwtRefusalMessage(err), http.StatusUnauthorized) return } @@ -935,6 +952,7 @@ func (s *Server) HandleRegister(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { // subject would enroll an identity that can never be banned. if oidcIdentityKey(claims) == "" { logger.Warnw("JWT without a subject refused", "peer_id", req.PeerId) + s.emitEnrollmentRejected(req.PeerId, "JWT validation failed: token has no sub claim", api.EnrollmentRejectionReason_INVALID_JWT, req.RequestedRole, req.Labels, time.Now(), false) http.Error(w, "JWT validation failed: token has no sub claim", http.StatusUnauthorized) return } @@ -964,11 +982,13 @@ func (s *Server) HandleRegister(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { } if !pID.MatchesPublicKey(enrolleeKey) { logger.Warnw("Registration peer_id does not match public_key", "peer_id", canonical) + s.emitEnrollmentRejected(canonical, "peer_id is not derived from public_key", api.EnrollmentRejectionReason_INVALID_CHALLENGE_SIGNATURE, req.RequestedRole, req.Labels, time.Now(), false) http.Error(w, "peer_id is not derived from public_key", http.StatusBadRequest) return } if err := verifyFreshChallenge(enrolleeKey, api.RegisterChallenge(canonical, req.ChallengeUnixMs), req.ChallengeUnixMs, req.ChallengeSignature); err != nil { logger.Warnw("Register challenge verification failed", "peer_id", canonical, "error", err) + s.emitEnrollmentRejected(canonical, "Invalid registration challenge: "+err.Error(), api.EnrollmentRejectionReason_INVALID_CHALLENGE_SIGNATURE, req.RequestedRole, req.Labels, time.Now(), false) writeChallengeError(w, "Invalid registration challenge: "+err.Error()) return } @@ -981,6 +1001,7 @@ func (s *Server) HandleRegister(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { return } else if banned { logger.Warnw("Banned node attempted enrollment", "peer_id", canonical) + s.emitEnrollmentRejected(canonical, "Node is banned", api.EnrollmentRejectionReason_PEER_PREVIOUSLY_BANNED, req.RequestedRole, req.Labels, time.Now(), false) http.Error(w, "Node is banned", http.StatusForbidden) return } @@ -991,6 +1012,7 @@ func (s *Server) HandleRegister(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { return } else if banned { logger.Warnw("Banned identity attempted enrollment", "peer_id", canonical, "identity", key) + s.emitEnrollmentRejected(canonical, "Identity is banned", api.EnrollmentRejectionReason_PEER_PREVIOUSLY_BANNED, req.RequestedRole, req.Labels, time.Now(), false) http.Error(w, "Identity is banned", http.StatusForbidden) return } @@ -1007,6 +1029,7 @@ func (s *Server) HandleRegister(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { } if req.RequestedRole == "" { + s.emitEnrollmentRejected(canonical, "requested_role must be specified", api.EnrollmentRejectionReason_REQUESTED_ROLE_UNAUTHORIZED, "", req.Labels, time.Now(), false) http.Error(w, "requested_role must be specified", http.StatusBadRequest) return } @@ -1014,6 +1037,7 @@ func (s *Server) HandleRegister(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { // Fail closed on malformed labels; they get attested into the biscuit // and persisted for refreshes. if err := api.ValidateLabels(req.Labels); err != nil { + s.emitEnrollmentRejected(canonical, "Invalid labels: "+err.Error(), api.EnrollmentRejectionReason_UNATTESTED_LABELS_REJECTED, req.RequestedRole, req.Labels, time.Now(), false) http.Error(w, "Invalid labels: "+err.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest) return } @@ -1041,6 +1065,7 @@ func (s *Server) HandleRegister(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { // to mesh:system:authenticated, instead of getting it by omission. if !resolvedMap[req.RequestedRole] { logger.Warnw("Rejected enrollment for a role not bound to the identity", "peer_id", canonical, "requested_role", req.RequestedRole, "identity", oidcIdentityKey(claims), "resolved_roles", resolvedRoles) + s.emitEnrollmentRejected(canonical, fmt.Sprintf("requested role %q is not bound to this identity; bind it in mesh policy (to mesh:system:authenticated to open enrollment to every authenticated identity)", req.RequestedRole), api.EnrollmentRejectionReason_REQUESTED_ROLE_UNAUTHORIZED, req.RequestedRole, req.Labels, time.Now(), false) http.Error(w, fmt.Sprintf("requested role %q is not bound to this identity; bind it in mesh policy (to mesh:system:authenticated to open enrollment to every authenticated identity)", req.RequestedRole), http.StatusForbidden) return } @@ -1052,6 +1077,7 @@ func (s *Server) HandleRegister(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { // a role it resolves to says it may carry them. if err := api.LabelPatternsAllow(allowedLabelPatterns(finalRoles, policyRoles), req.Labels); err != nil { logger.Warnw("Rejected undeclarable label at enrollment", "peer_id", canonical, "error", err) + s.emitEnrollmentRejected(canonical, "Label not permitted: "+err.Error(), api.EnrollmentRejectionReason_UNATTESTED_LABELS_REJECTED, req.RequestedRole, req.Labels, time.Now(), false) http.Error(w, "Label not permitted: "+err.Error(), http.StatusForbidden) return } @@ -1236,6 +1262,7 @@ func (s *Server) HandleRefresh(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { nodeRecord, err := s.store.GetNode(ctx, canonical) if err == storage.ErrNotFound { logger.Warnw("Node not found for refresh", "peer_id", canonical) + s.emitEnrollmentRejected(canonical, "Node not enrolled", api.EnrollmentRejectionReason_EXPIRED_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN, "", nil, time.Now(), recovering) unauthorized("Node not enrolled") return } else if err != nil { @@ -1247,6 +1274,8 @@ func (s *Server) HandleRefresh(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { if err := nodeRecord.CheckAdmission(time.Now()); err != nil { if errors.Is(err, storage.ErrNodeBanned) { logger.Warnw("Banned node attempted refresh", "peer_id", canonical) + s.emitIdentityRevoked(canonical, api.RevocationSource_TOKEN_REFRESH_REJECTION, "Node is banned", nil) + s.emitEnrollmentRejected(canonical, "Node is banned", api.EnrollmentRejectionReason_PEER_PREVIOUSLY_BANNED, nodeRecord.Role, nodeRecord.Labels, time.Now(), recovering) http.Error(w, "Node is banned", http.StatusForbidden) return } @@ -1255,6 +1284,7 @@ func (s *Server) HandleRefresh(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { // biscuit, and JWT identity all verify below. if req.Jwt == "" || nodeRecord.EnrollmentType != "OIDC" { logger.Warnw("Session expired for node", "peer_id", canonical, "expires_at", nodeRecord.ExpiresAt) + s.emitEnrollmentRejected(canonical, "Session expired, please re-enroll interactively", api.EnrollmentRejectionReason_EXPIRED_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN, nodeRecord.Role, nodeRecord.Labels, time.Now(), recovering) unauthorized("Session expired, please re-enroll interactively") return } @@ -1270,6 +1300,7 @@ func (s *Server) HandleRefresh(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { if err := verifyFreshChallenge(pubKey, api.RefreshChallenge(canonical, req.ChallengeUnixMs), req.ChallengeUnixMs, req.ChallengeSignature); err != nil { logger.Warnw("Refresh challenge verification failed", "peer_id", canonical, "error", err) + s.emitEnrollmentRejected(canonical, "Challenge verification failed: "+err.Error(), api.EnrollmentRejectionReason_INVALID_CHALLENGE_SIGNATURE, nodeRecord.Role, nodeRecord.Labels, time.Now(), recovering) unauthorized("Challenge verification failed: " + err.Error()) return } @@ -1282,6 +1313,7 @@ func (s *Server) HandleRefresh(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { // all, standing in for the signature that could not be checked. if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(currentBiscuitBytes, nodeRecord.Biscuit) != 1 { logger.Warnw("Refresh presented an already-rotated biscuit (possible replay)", "peer_id", nodeRecord.PeerID) + s.emitEnrollmentRejected(canonical, "Biscuit already rotated: only the latest issued token can be refreshed, re-enroll instead", api.EnrollmentRejectionReason_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_USAGE_EXCEEDED, nodeRecord.Role, nodeRecord.Labels, time.Now(), recovering) unauthorized("Biscuit already rotated: only the latest issued token can be refreshed, re-enroll instead") return } @@ -1295,6 +1327,7 @@ func (s *Server) HandleRefresh(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { if recovering { if !nodeRecord.AutonomousRecovery { logger.Warnw("Refused retired-key refresh: node is not opted in to autonomous recovery", "peer_id", canonical, "error", verifyErr) + s.emitEnrollmentRejected(canonical, "Biscuit signing key has been retired and this node is not opted in to autonomous recovery: re-enroll with a new bootstrap token", api.EnrollmentRejectionReason_AUTONOMOUS_RECOVERY_DISABLED, nodeRecord.Role, nodeRecord.Labels, time.Now(), true) http.Error(w, "Biscuit signing key has been retired and this node is not opted in to autonomous recovery: re-enroll with a new bootstrap token", http.StatusUnauthorized) return } @@ -1315,6 +1348,7 @@ func (s *Server) HandleRefresh(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { cancel() if err != nil { logger.Warnw("Refresh JWT verification failed", "peer_id", canonical, "error", err) + s.emitEnrollmentRejected(canonical, s.jwtRefusalMessage(err), api.EnrollmentRejectionReason_INVALID_JWT, nodeRecord.Role, nodeRecord.Labels, time.Now(), recovering) http.Error(w, s.jwtRefusalMessage(err), http.StatusUnauthorized) return } @@ -1331,6 +1365,7 @@ func (s *Server) HandleRefresh(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { storedKey := oidcIdentityKey(storedClaims) if freshKey == "" || freshKey != storedKey { logger.Warnw("Refresh JWT identity mismatch", "peer_id", canonical, "expected", storedKey, "got", freshKey) + s.emitEnrollmentRejected(canonical, "JWT identity does not match enrolled node identity", api.EnrollmentRejectionReason_INVALID_JWT, nodeRecord.Role, nodeRecord.Labels, time.Now(), recovering) http.Error(w, "JWT identity does not match enrolled node identity", http.StatusForbidden) return } @@ -1340,6 +1375,8 @@ func (s *Server) HandleRefresh(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { return } else if banned { logger.Warnw("Banned identity attempted refresh", "peer_id", canonical, "identity", freshKey) + s.emitIdentityRevoked(canonical, api.RevocationSource_TOKEN_REFRESH_REJECTION, "Identity is banned", nil) + s.emitEnrollmentRejected(canonical, "Identity is banned", api.EnrollmentRejectionReason_PEER_PREVIOUSLY_BANNED, nodeRecord.Role, nodeRecord.Labels, time.Now(), recovering) http.Error(w, "Identity is banned", http.StatusForbidden) return } @@ -1365,6 +1402,8 @@ func (s *Server) HandleRefresh(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { return } else if banned { logger.Warnw("Banned identity attempted refresh without JWT", "peer_id", canonical, "identity", storedKey) + s.emitIdentityRevoked(canonical, api.RevocationSource_TOKEN_REFRESH_REJECTION, "Identity is banned", nil) + s.emitEnrollmentRejected(canonical, "Identity is banned", api.EnrollmentRejectionReason_PEER_PREVIOUSLY_BANNED, nodeRecord.Role, nodeRecord.Labels, time.Now(), recovering) http.Error(w, "Identity is banned", http.StatusForbidden) return } @@ -1379,6 +1418,8 @@ func (s *Server) HandleRefresh(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { return } else if banned { logger.Warnw("Node owned by banned user attempted refresh", "peer_id", canonical, "owner_id", nodeRecord.OwnerID) + s.emitIdentityRevoked(canonical, api.RevocationSource_TOKEN_REFRESH_REJECTION, "Node owner is banned", nil) + s.emitEnrollmentRejected(canonical, "Node owner is banned", api.EnrollmentRejectionReason_PEER_PREVIOUSLY_BANNED, nodeRecord.Role, nodeRecord.Labels, time.Now(), recovering) http.Error(w, "Node owner is banned", http.StatusForbidden) return } @@ -1428,6 +1469,7 @@ func (s *Server) HandleRefresh(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { // Same rule as enrollment, re-evaluated against current policy: a mesh // that unbinds the role revokes the identity's seat at the next refresh. if !resolvedMap[nodeRecord.Role] { + s.emitEnrollmentRejected(canonical, fmt.Sprintf("role %q is no longer bound to this identity", nodeRecord.Role), api.EnrollmentRejectionReason_REQUESTED_ROLE_UNAUTHORIZED, nodeRecord.Role, nodeRecord.Labels, time.Now(), recovering) http.Error(w, fmt.Sprintf("role %q is no longer bound to this identity", nodeRecord.Role), http.StatusForbidden) return } @@ -2152,10 +2194,93 @@ func (s *Server) Close() error { errs = append(errs, err) } } + if s.containmentDispatcher != nil { + drainCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 3*time.Second) + defer cancel() + if err := s.containmentDispatcher.Close(drainCtx); err != nil { + errs = append(errs, fmt.Errorf("containment dispatcher close: %w", err)) + } + } s.wg.Wait() return errors.Join(errs...) } +// ContainmentDispatcher returns the active containment Dispatcher, or nil if unconfigured. +func (s *Server) ContainmentDispatcher() containment.Dispatcher { + if s == nil { + return nil + } + return s.containmentDispatcher +} + +// SetContainmentDispatcher injects a containment Dispatcher into the server. +func (s *Server) SetContainmentDispatcher(d containment.Dispatcher) { + if s == nil { + return + } + s.containmentDispatcher = d +} + +func (s *Server) eventSource() string { + if s != nil && s.config.ListenAddr != "" { + return fmt.Sprintf("agentmesh://controlplane/%s", s.config.ListenAddr) + } + return "agentmesh://controlplane" +} + +func (s *Server) emitEnrollmentRejected(peerID, detail string, reason api.EnrollmentRejectionReason, role string, labels map[string]string, reqTime time.Time, isAutoRecovery bool) { + if s == nil || s.containmentDispatcher == nil { + return + } + now := timestamppb.Now() + event := &api.SecuritySignalEvent{ + Type: "agentmesh.enrollment.rejected", + Subject: peerID, + Source: s.eventSource(), + EventTime: now, + DataContentType: "application/json", + SpecVersion: "1.0", + Data: &api.SecuritySignalEvent_EnrollmentRejected{ + EnrollmentRejected: &api.EnrollmentRejectedSignal{ + Reason: reason, + Detail: detail, + PeerId: peerID, + RequestedRole: role, + SubmittedLabels: labels, + IsAutonomousRecovery: isAutoRecovery, + EventTime: now, + }, + }, + } + s.containmentDispatcher.Dispatch(event) +} + +func (s *Server) emitIdentityRevoked(peerID string, source api.RevocationSource, reason string, revocationIDs []string) { + if s == nil || s.containmentDispatcher == nil { + return + } + now := timestamppb.Now() + event := &api.SecuritySignalEvent{ + Type: "agentmesh.identity.revoked", + Subject: peerID, + Source: s.eventSource(), + EventTime: now, + DataContentType: "application/json", + SpecVersion: "1.0", + Data: &api.SecuritySignalEvent_IdentityRevoked{ + IdentityRevoked: &api.IdentityRevokedSignal{ + PeerId: peerID, + Source: source, + Reason: reason, + RevocationIds: revocationIDs, + IssuerPeerId: "controlplane", + EventTime: now, + }, + }, + } + s.containmentDispatcher.Dispatch(event) +} + // shutdownTimeout bounds the HTTP drain in Close; it stays under the 30s // Kubernetes grants a pod by default. const shutdownTimeout = 20 * time.Second @@ -2226,6 +2351,7 @@ func (s *Server) HandleEnroll(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { tokenRecord, err := s.store.GetBootstrapToken(ctx, tokenID) if err == storage.ErrNotFound { logger.Errorw("Invalid bootstrap token attempt", "peer_id", req.PeerId) + s.emitEnrollmentRejected(req.PeerId, "Invalid bootstrap token", api.EnrollmentRejectionReason_EXPIRED_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN, req.RequestedRole, req.Labels, time.Now(), false) s.writeEnrollError(w, api.EnrollmentStatus_ENROLLMENT_STATUS_REJECTED, "Invalid bootstrap token") return } else if err != nil { @@ -2236,18 +2362,21 @@ func (s *Server) HandleEnroll(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { if time.Now().After(tokenRecord.ExpiresAt) { logger.Warnw("Expired bootstrap token used", "peer_id", req.PeerId, "token_id", tokenRecord.ID) + s.emitEnrollmentRejected(req.PeerId, "Bootstrap token expired", api.EnrollmentRejectionReason_EXPIRED_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN, req.RequestedRole, req.Labels, time.Now(), false) s.writeEnrollError(w, api.EnrollmentStatus_ENROLLMENT_STATUS_REJECTED, "Bootstrap token expired") return } if tokenRecord.IsRevoked() { logger.Warnw("Revoked bootstrap token used", "peer_id", req.PeerId, "token_id", tokenRecord.ID) + s.emitEnrollmentRejected(req.PeerId, "Bootstrap token revoked", api.EnrollmentRejectionReason_EXPIRED_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN, req.RequestedRole, req.Labels, time.Now(), false) s.writeEnrollError(w, api.EnrollmentStatus_ENROLLMENT_STATUS_REJECTED, "Bootstrap token revoked") return } if tokenRecord.UsagesCount >= tokenRecord.MaxUsages { logger.Warnw("Max usages exceeded for bootstrap token", "peer_id", req.PeerId, "token_id", tokenRecord.ID) + s.emitEnrollmentRejected(req.PeerId, "Bootstrap token max usages exceeded", api.EnrollmentRejectionReason_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_USAGE_EXCEEDED, req.RequestedRole, req.Labels, time.Now(), false) s.writeEnrollError(w, api.EnrollmentStatus_ENROLLMENT_STATUS_REJECTED, "Bootstrap token max usages exceeded") return } @@ -2259,22 +2388,26 @@ func (s *Server) HandleEnroll(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { return } else if banned { logger.Warnw("Bootstrap token from a banned identity used", "peer_id", req.PeerId, "token_id", tokenRecord.ID, "owner", tokenRecord.OwnerID) + s.emitEnrollmentRejected(req.PeerId, "Bootstrap token owner is banned", api.EnrollmentRejectionReason_PEER_PREVIOUSLY_BANNED, req.RequestedRole, req.Labels, time.Now(), false) s.writeEnrollError(w, api.EnrollmentStatus_ENROLLMENT_STATUS_REJECTED, "Bootstrap token owner is banned") return } if req.RequestedRole == "" { + s.emitEnrollmentRejected(req.PeerId, "requested_role must be specified", api.EnrollmentRejectionReason_REQUESTED_ROLE_UNAUTHORIZED, req.RequestedRole, req.Labels, time.Now(), false) s.writeEnrollError(w, api.EnrollmentStatus_ENROLLMENT_STATUS_REJECTED, "requested_role must be specified") return } if req.RequestedRole != tokenRecord.Role { logger.Warnw("Requested role does not match bootstrap token role", "peer_id", req.PeerId, "requested", req.RequestedRole, "token_role", tokenRecord.Role) + s.emitEnrollmentRejected(req.PeerId, fmt.Sprintf("requested role %q does not match bootstrap token role %q", req.RequestedRole, tokenRecord.Role), api.EnrollmentRejectionReason_REQUESTED_ROLE_UNAUTHORIZED, req.RequestedRole, req.Labels, time.Now(), false) s.writeEnrollError(w, api.EnrollmentStatus_ENROLLMENT_STATUS_REJECTED, fmt.Sprintf("requested role %q does not match bootstrap token role %q", req.RequestedRole, tokenRecord.Role)) return } if err := api.ValidateLabels(req.Labels); err != nil { + s.emitEnrollmentRejected(req.PeerId, "Invalid labels: "+err.Error(), api.EnrollmentRejectionReason_UNATTESTED_LABELS_REJECTED, req.RequestedRole, req.Labels, time.Now(), false) s.writeEnrollError(w, api.EnrollmentStatus_ENROLLMENT_STATUS_REJECTED, "Invalid labels: "+err.Error()) return } @@ -2292,11 +2425,13 @@ func (s *Server) HandleEnroll(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { // peer's biscuit. enrolleeKey, err := crypto.UnmarshalPublicKey(req.PublicKey) if err != nil { + s.emitEnrollmentRejected(canonical, "Invalid public key", api.EnrollmentRejectionReason_INVALID_CHALLENGE_SIGNATURE, req.RequestedRole, req.Labels, time.Now(), false) s.writeEnrollError(w, api.EnrollmentStatus_ENROLLMENT_STATUS_REJECTED, "Invalid public key") return } if !pID.MatchesPublicKey(enrolleeKey) { logger.Warnw("Enrollment peer_id does not match public_key", "peer_id", canonical) + s.emitEnrollmentRejected(canonical, "peer_id is not derived from public_key", api.EnrollmentRejectionReason_INVALID_CHALLENGE_SIGNATURE, req.RequestedRole, req.Labels, time.Now(), false) s.writeEnrollError(w, api.EnrollmentStatus_ENROLLMENT_STATUS_REJECTED, "peer_id is not derived from public_key") return } @@ -2306,6 +2441,7 @@ func (s *Server) HandleEnroll(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { writeChallengeError(w, "Invalid enrollment challenge: "+err.Error()) return } + s.emitEnrollmentRejected(canonical, "Invalid enrollment challenge: "+err.Error(), api.EnrollmentRejectionReason_INVALID_CHALLENGE_SIGNATURE, req.RequestedRole, req.Labels, time.Now(), false) s.writeEnrollError(w, api.EnrollmentStatus_ENROLLMENT_STATUS_REJECTED, "Invalid enrollment challenge: "+err.Error()) return } @@ -2319,6 +2455,7 @@ func (s *Server) HandleEnroll(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { return } else if banned { logger.Warnw("Banned node attempted bootstrap enrollment", "peer_id", canonical) + s.emitEnrollmentRejected(canonical, "Node is banned", api.EnrollmentRejectionReason_PEER_PREVIOUSLY_BANNED, req.RequestedRole, req.Labels, time.Now(), false) s.writeEnrollError(w, api.EnrollmentStatus_ENROLLMENT_STATUS_REJECTED, "Node is banned") return } @@ -2333,6 +2470,7 @@ func (s *Server) HandleEnroll(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { if refreshErr != nil { if errors.Is(refreshErr, storage.ErrNodeBanned) || errors.Is(refreshErr, storage.ErrNodeSessionExpired) || errors.Is(refreshErr, errBootstrapRoleMismatch) || errors.Is(refreshErr, storage.ErrBootstrapTokenUnusable) { logger.Warnw("Refused bootstrap re-enrollment", "peer_id", req.PeerId, "error", refreshErr) + s.emitEnrollmentRejected(canonical, "Enrollment no longer valid: "+refreshErr.Error(), api.EnrollmentRejectionReason_PEER_PREVIOUSLY_BANNED, req.RequestedRole, req.Labels, time.Now(), false) s.writeEnrollError(w, api.EnrollmentStatus_ENROLLMENT_STATUS_REJECTED, "Enrollment no longer valid: "+refreshErr.Error()) return } @@ -2394,6 +2532,7 @@ func (s *Server) HandleEnroll(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { // label and a signed one. Manual approval attests them separately. if err := api.LabelPatternsAllow(allowedLabelPatterns([]string{tokenRecord.Role}, policyRoles), req.Labels); err != nil { logger.Warnw("Rejected undeclarable label at bootstrap enrollment", "peer_id", canonical, "error", err) + s.emitEnrollmentRejected(canonical, "Label not permitted: "+err.Error(), api.EnrollmentRejectionReason_UNATTESTED_LABELS_REJECTED, req.RequestedRole, req.Labels, time.Now(), false) s.writeEnrollError(w, api.EnrollmentStatus_ENROLLMENT_STATUS_REJECTED, "Label not permitted: "+err.Error()) return } @@ -2402,6 +2541,7 @@ func (s *Server) HandleEnroll(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { if err := s.store.ConsumeBootstrapTokenUsage(ctx, tokenRecord.ID, time.Now()); err != nil { if errors.Is(err, storage.ErrBootstrapTokenUnusable) { logger.Warnw("Bootstrap token no longer usable at enrollment", "peer_id", canonical, "token_id", tokenRecord.ID) + s.emitEnrollmentRejected(canonical, "Bootstrap token expired, revoked or exhausted", api.EnrollmentRejectionReason_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_USAGE_EXCEEDED, req.RequestedRole, req.Labels, time.Now(), false) s.writeEnrollError(w, api.EnrollmentStatus_ENROLLMENT_STATUS_REJECTED, "Bootstrap token expired, revoked or exhausted") return } @@ -2945,6 +3085,7 @@ func (s *Server) HandleAdminEnrollmentAction(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Requ http.Error(w, "Internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError) return } + s.emitEnrollmentRejected(enrollReq.PeerID, "Enrollment request rejected by admin", api.EnrollmentRejectionReason_REQUESTED_ROLE_UNAUTHORIZED, "", enrollReq.Labels, enrollReq.CreatedAt, false) w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK) _, _ = w.Write([]byte("Enrollment rejected")) return @@ -3219,6 +3360,9 @@ func (s *Server) HandleAdminRevoke(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { logger.Warnf("Failed to publish BANNED event for node %s to mesh: %v", node.PeerID, err) } + revokeReason := "Administrative revocation via /admin/revoke" + s.emitIdentityRevoked(node.PeerID, api.RevocationSource_CONTROL_PLANE_ADMIN, revokeReason, nil) + resp := &api.TokenRevokeResponse{ Success: true, } @@ -3627,6 +3771,8 @@ func (s *Server) HandleUserRevoke(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { logger.Warnf("Failed to publish BANNED event for node %s to mesh: %v", node.PeerID, err) } + s.emitIdentityRevoked(node.PeerID, api.RevocationSource_CONTROL_PLANE_ADMIN, fmt.Sprintf("Revoked by user %s", user.ID), nil) + w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK) _, _ = w.Write([]byte("Node revoked successfully")) } diff --git a/internal/node/auth_gate.go b/internal/node/auth_gate.go index 128b8d73..9c06808e 100644 --- a/internal/node/auth_gate.go +++ b/internal/node/auth_gate.go @@ -20,10 +20,12 @@ import ( "fmt" "time" + "github.com/google/agentmesh/api" "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/host" "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/network" "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/peer" "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/protocol" + "github.com/multiformats/go-multiaddr" ) // streamScopeUnauthenticated labels a stream the gate refused: its peer @@ -135,6 +137,16 @@ func (n *AgentMeshNode) requireAuthenticated(next network.StreamHandler) network if n.config.OnStreamRefused != nil { n.config.OnStreamRefused(streamScopeUnauthenticated, string(s.Protocol())) } + reason := api.TransportRefusalReason_PEER_UNAUTHENTICATED + if n.revokedPeers != nil && n.revokedPeers.Contains(p.String()) { + reason = api.TransportRefusalReason_PEER_BANNED + } + var maddr multiaddr.Multiaddr + if s.Conn() != nil { + maddr = s.Conn().RemoteMultiaddr() + } + n.emitTransportRefused(p, maddr, s.Protocol(), reason, + fmt.Sprintf("peer %s did not authenticate within deadline: %v", p, err)) logger.Debugf("[AuthZ] Refusing %s stream from %s: %v", s.Protocol(), p, err) _ = s.Reset() return @@ -155,6 +167,13 @@ func (n *AgentMeshNode) requireRouter(next network.StreamHandler) network.Stream if n.config.OnStreamRefused != nil { n.config.OnStreamRefused(streamScopeNotRouter, string(s.Protocol())) } + var maddr multiaddr.Multiaddr + if s.Conn() != nil { + maddr = s.Conn().RemoteMultiaddr() + } + n.emitTransportRefused(p, maddr, s.Protocol(), + api.TransportRefusalReason_NOT_ROUTER_ROLE, + fmt.Sprintf("peer %s authenticated but lacks mesh:role:router for protocol %s", p, s.Protocol())) logger.Warnf("[AuthZ] Refusing %s stream from %s: peer is authenticated but not a router", s.Protocol(), p) _ = s.Reset() return diff --git a/internal/node/config.go b/internal/node/config.go index f0be11c9..638093fd 100644 --- a/internal/node/config.go +++ b/internal/node/config.go @@ -18,10 +18,12 @@ import ( "fmt" "os" "strings" + "time" "github.com/eclipse-biscuit/biscuit-go/v2" "github.com/eclipse-biscuit/biscuit-go/v2/parser" "github.com/google/agentmesh/api" + "github.com/google/agentmesh/internal/containment" "gopkg.in/yaml.v2" ) @@ -36,6 +38,9 @@ type NodeConfigComplete struct { // means no floor, so a caller's requirement — or the absence of one — // stands on its own, as it always has. EgressRequireLabels map[string]string + + // SecuritySignals holds parsed containment webhook configuration. + SecuritySignals *containment.Config } // LoadNodeConfig loads the node configuration from the specified path. @@ -104,6 +109,47 @@ func CompleteNodeConfig(config api.NodeConfig) (*NodeConfigComplete, error) { complete.EgressRequireLabels = config.Egress.RequireLabels } + if config.SecuritySignals.Enabled || len(config.SecuritySignals.Endpoints) > 0 { + sigCfg := &containment.Config{ + Enabled: config.SecuritySignals.Enabled, + QueueCapacity: config.SecuritySignals.QueueCapacity, + } + if config.SecuritySignals.CoalescingWindow != "" { + win, err := time.ParseDuration(config.SecuritySignals.CoalescingWindow) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid security_signals.coalescing_window: %w", err) + } + sigCfg.CoalescingWindow = win + } + for i, ep := range config.SecuritySignals.Endpoints { + if ep.URL == "" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("security_signals.endpoints[%d]: missing url", i) + } + target := strings.TrimSpace(ep.URL) + if !strings.HasPrefix(target, "unix:") && !strings.HasPrefix(target, "http://") && !strings.HasPrefix(target, "https://") { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("security_signals.endpoints[%d]: invalid url scheme %q (must be unix:, http://, or https://)", i, target) + } + wep := containment.EndpointConfig{ + URL: target, + HMACSecretPath: ep.HMACSecretPath, + CACertPath: ep.CACertPath, + ClientCertPath: ep.ClientCertPath, + ClientKeyPath: ep.ClientKeyPath, + MaxRetries: ep.MaxRetries, + EventTypes: ep.EventTypes, + } + if ep.Timeout != "" { + timeout, err := time.ParseDuration(ep.Timeout) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("security_signals.endpoints[%d]: invalid timeout: %w", i, err) + } + wep.Timeout = timeout + } + sigCfg.Endpoints = append(sigCfg.Endpoints, wep) + } + complete.SecuritySignals = sigCfg + } + for i, svc := range config.Services { if err := api.ValidateServiceFormat(svc.Type + "://" + svc.Name); err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid service config at index %d: %w", i, err) diff --git a/internal/node/containment_classifier_test.go b/internal/node/containment_classifier_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f6374a84 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/node/containment_classifier_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,361 @@ +// Copyright 2026 Google LLC +// +// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +// You may obtain a copy of the License at +// +// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +// +// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +// limitations under the License. + +package node + +import ( + "errors" + "fmt" + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/eclipse-biscuit/biscuit-go/v2" + "github.com/eclipse-biscuit/biscuit-go/v2/datalog" + "github.com/google/agentmesh/api" + "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/peer" +) + +type customError struct { + message string +} + +func (c *customError) Error() string { + return c.message +} + +func TestPolicyDenialClassifier_ServiceSubstring_DatalogEvaluationDenials(t *testing.T) { + services := []string{ + "db-service", + "auth-service", + "payment-service", + "user-service", + "customer-service", + "service-catalog", + "microservice-alpha", + "service", + "my-service-v2", + "orders-service-api", + "service_mesh_registry", + } + + formats := []string{ + "authorization check failed: missing fact: right(#authority, %q, \"execute\")", + "datalog check failed: missing fact: right(#authority, %q, \"read\")", + "missing fact: right(#authority, %q, \"write\")", + "biscuit: verification failed: check 0: check if right(%q)", + "failed to verify check: right(#authority, %q)", + "failed to verify block 1: check if permit(%q)", + "authorizer failure: no fact matches right(%q)", + "allow_network_target: datalog rule rejected %q", + "untrusted biscuit token targeting %q", + "not bound to peer for target service %q", + } + + for _, svc := range services { + for i, fmtStr := range formats { + t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("%s/format_%d", svc, i), func(t *testing.T) { + msg := fmt.Sprintf(fmtStr, svc) + err := errors.New(msg) + reason := classifyPolicyDenialReason(err) + if reason != api.PolicyDenialReason_DATALOG_EVALUATION_DENIED { + t.Fatalf("service %q with error %q: expected DATALOG_EVALUATION_DENIED, got %v", + svc, msg, reason) + } + }) + } + } +} + +func TestPolicyDenialClassifier_OperationSubstring_DatalogEvaluationDenials(t *testing.T) { + operations := []string{ + "method", + "path", + "http_method", + "method_call", + "get_path", + "path_eval", + "method_dispatch", + "request_path", + "custom_method_handler", + "path_traversal_validator", + } + + formats := []string{ + "authorization check failed: missing fact: operation(#ambient, %q)", + "datalog check failed: missing fact: method(#authority, %q)", + "missing fact: action(#ambient, %q)", + "failed to verify check: path(#ambient, %q)", + "biscuit: verification failed: check 1: check if authorized_method(%q)", + } + + for _, op := range operations { + for i, fmtStr := range formats { + t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("%s/format_%d", op, i), func(t *testing.T) { + msg := fmt.Sprintf(fmtStr, op) + err := errors.New(msg) + reason := classifyPolicyDenialReason(err) + if reason != api.PolicyDenialReason_DATALOG_EVALUATION_DENIED { + t.Fatalf("operation %q with error %q: expected DATALOG_EVALUATION_DENIED, got %v", + op, msg, reason) + } + }) + } + } +} + +func TestPolicyDenialClassifier_SubjectRoleSubstring_DatalogEvaluationDenials(t *testing.T) { + roles := []string{ + "role", + "admin-role", + "role_operator", + "auditor_role", + "role_user", + "super_role", + "role_service_caller", + "security_role_admin", + } + + formats := []string{ + "authorization check failed: missing fact: role(#authority, %q)", + "datalog check failed: missing fact: subject_role(#authority, %q)", + "missing fact: caller_role(#ambient, %q)", + "failed to verify check: has_role(#ambient, %q)", + "authorizer failure: required fact: role(%q)", + } + + for _, r := range roles { + for i, fmtStr := range formats { + t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("%s/format_%d", r, i), func(t *testing.T) { + msg := fmt.Sprintf(fmtStr, r) + err := errors.New(msg) + reason := classifyPolicyDenialReason(err) + if reason != api.PolicyDenialReason_DATALOG_EVALUATION_DENIED { + t.Fatalf("role %q with error %q: expected DATALOG_EVALUATION_DENIED, got %v", + r, msg, reason) + } + }) + } + } +} + +func TestPolicyDenialClassifier_BoundaryConditions(t *testing.T) { + testCases := []struct { + name string + err error + expected api.PolicyDenialReason + }{ + { + name: "nil_error", + err: nil, + expected: api.PolicyDenialReason_POLICY_DENIAL_REASON_UNSPECIFIED, + }, + { + name: "empty_string_error", + err: errors.New(""), + expected: api.PolicyDenialReason_DATALOG_EVALUATION_DENIED, + }, + { + name: "whitespace_only_error", + err: errors.New(" \t\n "), + expected: api.PolicyDenialReason_DATALOG_EVALUATION_DENIED, + }, + { + name: "arbitrary_unclassified_error", + err: errors.New("unexpected internal authorizer error 500"), + expected: api.PolicyDenialReason_DATALOG_EVALUATION_DENIED, + }, + { + name: "custom_error_struct", + err: &customError{message: "datalog evaluation timeout on facts"}, + expected: api.PolicyDenialReason_DATALOG_EVALUATION_DENIED, + }, + { + name: "custom_error_struct_empty", + err: &customError{message: ""}, + expected: api.PolicyDenialReason_DATALOG_EVALUATION_DENIED, + }, + } + + for _, tc := range testCases { + t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) { + got := classifyPolicyDenialReason(tc.err) + if got != tc.expected { + t.Fatalf("classifyPolicyDenialReason(%v) = %v, expected %v", tc.err, got, tc.expected) + } + }) + } +} + +func TestPolicyDenialClassifier_MultiErrorChains_And_Sentinels(t *testing.T) { + testCases := []struct { + name string + err error + expected api.PolicyDenialReason + }{ + { + name: "sentinel_biscuit_ErrPolicyDenied", + err: biscuit.ErrPolicyDenied, + expected: api.PolicyDenialReason_DATALOG_EVALUATION_DENIED, + }, + { + name: "wrapped_sentinel_biscuit_ErrPolicyDenied", + err: fmt.Errorf("layer3: %w", fmt.Errorf("layer2: %w", fmt.Errorf("layer1: %w", biscuit.ErrPolicyDenied))), + expected: api.PolicyDenialReason_DATALOG_EVALUATION_DENIED, + }, + { + name: "sentinel_biscuit_ErrNoMatchingPolicy", + err: fmt.Errorf("eval failed: %w", biscuit.ErrNoMatchingPolicy), + expected: api.PolicyDenialReason_DATALOG_EVALUATION_DENIED, + }, + { + name: "sentinel_biscuit_ErrInvalidSignature", + err: fmt.Errorf("signature bad: %w", biscuit.ErrInvalidSignature), + expected: api.PolicyDenialReason_DATALOG_EVALUATION_DENIED, + }, + { + name: "sentinel_datalog_ErrWorldRunLimitTimeout", + err: fmt.Errorf("datalog limit: %w", datalog.ErrWorldRunLimitTimeout), + expected: api.PolicyDenialReason_DATALOG_EVALUATION_DENIED, + }, + { + name: "sentinel_datalog_ErrWorldRunLimitMaxFacts", + err: fmt.Errorf("max facts exceeded: %w", datalog.ErrWorldRunLimitMaxFacts), + expected: api.PolicyDenialReason_DATALOG_EVALUATION_DENIED, + }, + { + name: "sentinel_datalog_ErrWorldRunLimitMaxIterations", + err: fmt.Errorf("max iterations exceeded: %w", datalog.ErrWorldRunLimitMaxIterations), + expected: api.PolicyDenialReason_DATALOG_EVALUATION_DENIED, + }, + { + name: "sentinel_ErrAuthRejected", + err: fmt.Errorf("pre-auth: %w", ErrAuthRejected), + expected: api.PolicyDenialReason_DATALOG_EVALUATION_DENIED, + }, + { + name: "wrapped_ErrProviderNotGranted", + err: fmt.Errorf("layer2: %w", fmt.Errorf("layer1: %w", ErrProviderNotGranted)), + expected: api.PolicyDenialReason_UNAUTHORIZED_SERVICE, + }, + { + name: "tar_block_precedence_over_datalog", + err: errors.New("tar_block[1]: denied due to authorization check failed missing fact"), + expected: api.PolicyDenialReason_TASK_AUTHORIZATION_RULE_VIOLATION, + }, + { + name: "revocation_precedence_over_datalog", + err: errors.New("biscuit token authority is revoked by control plane during datalog check"), + expected: api.PolicyDenialReason_EXPIRED_CREDENTIAL, + }, + } + + for _, tc := range testCases { + t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) { + got := classifyPolicyDenialReason(tc.err) + if got != tc.expected { + t.Fatalf("classifyPolicyDenialReason(%v) = %v, expected %v", tc.err, got, tc.expected) + } + }) + } +} + +func TestPolicyDenialClassifier_EndToEnd_PEP_RejectionSignals(t *testing.T) { + disp := newChanDispatcher(20) + n := &AgentMeshNode{ + containmentDispatcher: disp, + } + + callerPID := peer.ID("12D3KooWTestCallerPeerID") + + services := []struct { + name string + op string + errText string + expected api.PolicyDenialReason + }{ + { + name: "db-service", + op: "query_records", + errText: "authorization check failed: missing fact: right(#authority, \"db-service\", \"query_records\")", + expected: api.PolicyDenialReason_DATALOG_EVALUATION_DENIED, + }, + { + name: "auth-service", + op: "validate_token_method", + errText: "datalog check failed: missing fact: right(#authority, \"auth-service\", \"validate_token_method\")", + expected: api.PolicyDenialReason_DATALOG_EVALUATION_DENIED, + }, + { + name: "payment-service", + op: "process_path_payment", + errText: "authorization check failed: missing fact: right(#authority, \"payment-service\", \"process_path_payment\")", + expected: api.PolicyDenialReason_DATALOG_EVALUATION_DENIED, + }, + { + name: "unauthorized-service-explicit", + op: "any_op", + errText: "unauthorized service: external provider not in manifest", + expected: api.PolicyDenialReason_UNAUTHORIZED_SERVICE, + }, + { + name: "role-mismatch-explicit", + op: "admin_op", + errText: "role mismatch: caller has role 'auditor' but requires 'admin'", + expected: api.PolicyDenialReason_ROLE_MISMATCH, + }, + { + name: "method-not-allowed-explicit", + op: "DELETE", + errText: "method not allowed: DELETE /api/v1/resource", + expected: api.PolicyDenialReason_UNAUTHORIZED_PATH_OR_METHOD, + }, + } + + for _, s := range services { + t.Run(s.name, func(t *testing.T) { + req := RequestContext{ + PeerID: callerPID, + Target: s.name, + Protocol: "/agentmesh/test/1.0.0", + MCPTool: s.op, + } + + n.emitMiddlewarePolicyDenied(req, nil, errors.New(s.errText)) + + evt := expectEventTimeout(t, disp, "agentmesh.policy.denied", time.Second) + if evt == nil { + t.Fatalf("expected event for %s, got nil", s.name) + } + if evt.SpecVersion != "1.0" { + t.Errorf("expected SpecVersion 1.0, got %s", evt.SpecVersion) + } + if evt.EventTime == nil || evt.EventTime.AsTime().IsZero() { + t.Errorf("expected non-zero EventTime, got %v", evt.EventTime) + } + pd := evt.GetPolicyDenied() + if pd == nil { + t.Fatalf("expected PolicyDenied payload, got nil") + } + if pd.Reason != s.expected { + t.Fatalf("for service %s: expected reason %v, got %v", s.name, s.expected, pd.Reason) + } + if pd.TargetService != s.name { + t.Errorf("expected TargetService %q, got %q", s.name, pd.TargetService) + } + if pd.RequestedOperation != s.op { + t.Errorf("expected RequestedOperation %q, got %q", s.op, pd.RequestedOperation) + } + }) + } +} diff --git a/internal/node/containment_node_test.go b/internal/node/containment_node_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..607b3b40 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/node/containment_node_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,411 @@ +// Copyright 2026 Google LLC +// +// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +// You may obtain a copy of the License at +// +// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +// +// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +// limitations under the License. + +package node + +import ( + "context" + "crypto/ed25519" + "crypto/rand" + "errors" + "fmt" + "net/http" + "os" + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/eclipse-biscuit/biscuit-go/v2" + "github.com/google/agentmesh/api" + "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/crypto" + "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/peer" + "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/protocol" + "github.com/multiformats/go-multiaddr" + "google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/timestamppb" +) + +type chanDispatcher struct { + events chan *api.SecuritySignalEvent +} + +func newChanDispatcher(buf int) *chanDispatcher { + return &chanDispatcher{ + events: make(chan *api.SecuritySignalEvent, buf), + } +} + +func (d *chanDispatcher) Dispatch(event *api.SecuritySignalEvent) { + select { + case d.events <- event: + default: + } +} + +func (d *chanDispatcher) Close(ctx context.Context) error { + return nil +} + +func expectEvent(t *testing.T, d *chanDispatcher, expectedType string) *api.SecuritySignalEvent { + t.Helper() + select { + case evt := <-d.events: + if evt.Type != expectedType { + t.Fatalf("expected event type %q, got %q", expectedType, evt.Type) + } + return evt + case <-time.After(2 * time.Second): + t.Fatalf("timed out waiting for event type %q", expectedType) + return nil + } +} + +func TestContainmentNode_PolicyDenied_EmitDirect(t *testing.T) { + disp := newChanDispatcher(10) + n := &AgentMeshNode{ + containmentDispatcher: disp, + } + + now := time.Now() + n.EmitPolicyDenied(PolicyDeniedParams{ + Direction: api.SignalCallerDirection_LOCAL_WORKLOAD, + Reason: api.PolicyDenialReason_DATALOG_EVALUATION_DENIED, + Detail: "query authorization failed", + TargetService: "bigquery", + RequestedOperation: "SELECT", + RequestedResource: "datasets/prod/*", + CallerPeerID: "12D3KooWDummyCallerPeerID", + CallerSubject: "service-account-1@gserviceaccount.com", + CallerRoles: []string{"mesh:role:node", "analytics-reader"}, + CallerLabels: map[string]string{"env": "prod"}, + EventTime: now, + }) + + evt := expectEvent(t, disp, "agentmesh.policy.denied") + if evt.SpecVersion != "1.0" { + t.Errorf("expected SpecVersion 1.0, got %q", evt.SpecVersion) + } + if evt.Subject != "12D3KooWDummyCallerPeerID" { + t.Errorf("expected Subject '12D3KooWDummyCallerPeerID', got %q", evt.Subject) + } + pd := evt.GetPolicyDenied() + if pd == nil { + t.Fatal("expected PolicyDenied data, got nil") + } + if pd.Direction != api.SignalCallerDirection_LOCAL_WORKLOAD { + t.Errorf("expected LOCAL_WORKLOAD, got %v", pd.Direction) + } + if pd.Reason != api.PolicyDenialReason_DATALOG_EVALUATION_DENIED { + t.Errorf("expected DATALOG_EVALUATION_DENIED, got %v", pd.Reason) + } + if pd.TargetService != "bigquery" { + t.Errorf("expected TargetService bigquery, got %q", pd.TargetService) + } + if pd.RequestedOperation != "SELECT" { + t.Errorf("expected RequestedOperation SELECT, got %q", pd.RequestedOperation) + } + if pd.RequestedResource != "datasets/prod/*" { + t.Errorf("expected RequestedResource datasets/prod/*, got %q", pd.RequestedResource) + } + if pd.CallerSubject != "service-account-1@gserviceaccount.com" { + t.Errorf("expected CallerSubject service-account-1@gserviceaccount.com, got %q", pd.CallerSubject) + } + if len(pd.CallerRoles) != 2 || pd.CallerRoles[1] != "analytics-reader" { + t.Errorf("unexpected CallerRoles: %v", pd.CallerRoles) + } + if pd.CallerLabels["env"] != "prod" { + t.Errorf("unexpected CallerLabels: %v", pd.CallerLabels) + } +} + +func TestContainmentNode_PolicyDenied_MiddlewareClassification(t *testing.T) { + disp := newChanDispatcher(10) + n := &AgentMeshNode{ + containmentDispatcher: disp, + } + + req := RequestContext{ + PeerID: peer.ID("12D3KooWTestPeerID"), + User: "bob", + Group: "eng", + Target: "calculator-mcp", + Protocol: "/agentmesh/mcp/1.0.0", + } + + // 1. Datalog denial + datalogErr := errors.New("datalog check failed: authorize check: missing fact: right(#authority, \"calculator-mcp\", \"execute\")") + n.emitMiddlewarePolicyDenied(req, nil, datalogErr) + evt1 := expectEvent(t, disp, "agentmesh.policy.denied") + pd1 := evt1.GetPolicyDenied() + if pd1.Reason != api.PolicyDenialReason_DATALOG_EVALUATION_DENIED { + t.Errorf("expected DATALOG_EVALUATION_DENIED, got %v", pd1.Reason) + } + if pd1.TargetService != "calculator-mcp" { + t.Errorf("expected TargetService calculator-mcp, got %q", pd1.TargetService) + } + + // 2. TAR rule denial + tarErr := errors.New("tar_block: task authorization rule failed: rule 1: operation denied for untrusted input") + n.emitMiddlewarePolicyDenied(req, nil, tarErr) + evt2 := expectEvent(t, disp, "agentmesh.policy.denied") + pd2 := evt2.GetPolicyDenied() + if pd2.Reason != api.PolicyDenialReason_TASK_AUTHORIZATION_RULE_VIOLATION { + t.Errorf("expected TASK_AUTHORIZATION_RULE_VIOLATION, got %v", pd2.Reason) + } + + // 3. Biscuit revocation denial + revokedErr := errors.New("biscuit token authority is revoked by control plane") + n.emitMiddlewarePolicyDenied(req, nil, revokedErr) + evt3 := expectEvent(t, disp, "agentmesh.policy.denied") + pd3 := evt3.GetPolicyDenied() + if pd3.Reason != api.PolicyDenialReason_EXPIRED_CREDENTIAL { + t.Errorf("expected EXPIRED_CREDENTIAL, got %v", pd3.Reason) + } + + // 4. Role mismatch denial (anchored phrase) + roleErr := errors.New("unauthorized role: caller requires admin role") + n.emitMiddlewarePolicyDenied(req, nil, roleErr) + evt4 := expectEvent(t, disp, "agentmesh.policy.denied") + pd4 := evt4.GetPolicyDenied() + if pd4.Reason != api.PolicyDenialReason_ROLE_MISMATCH { + t.Errorf("expected ROLE_MISMATCH, got %v", pd4.Reason) + } + + // 5. Unauthorized service denial (anchored phrase and ErrProviderNotGranted) + svcErr := fmt.Errorf("%w: calculator-mcp", ErrProviderNotGranted) + n.emitMiddlewarePolicyDenied(req, nil, svcErr) + evt5 := expectEvent(t, disp, "agentmesh.policy.denied") + pd5 := evt5.GetPolicyDenied() + if pd5.Reason != api.PolicyDenialReason_UNAUTHORIZED_SERVICE { + t.Errorf("expected UNAUTHORIZED_SERVICE, got %v", pd5.Reason) + } + + // 6. Unauthorized path or method denial (anchored phrase) + methodErr := errors.New("method not allowed: POST /admin/config") + n.emitMiddlewarePolicyDenied(req, nil, methodErr) + evt6 := expectEvent(t, disp, "agentmesh.policy.denied") + pd6 := evt6.GetPolicyDenied() + if pd6.Reason != api.PolicyDenialReason_UNAUTHORIZED_PATH_OR_METHOD { + t.Errorf("expected UNAUTHORIZED_PATH_OR_METHOD, got %v", pd6.Reason) + } + + // 7. Biscuit sentinel ErrPolicyDenied + sentinelErr := biscuit.ErrPolicyDenied + n.emitMiddlewarePolicyDenied(req, nil, sentinelErr) + evt7 := expectEvent(t, disp, "agentmesh.policy.denied") + pd7 := evt7.GetPolicyDenied() + if pd7.Reason != api.PolicyDenialReason_DATALOG_EVALUATION_DENIED { + t.Errorf("expected DATALOG_EVALUATION_DENIED, got %v", pd7.Reason) + } +} + +func TestContainmentNode_PolicyDenied_EgressInspection(t *testing.T) { + disp := newChanDispatcher(10) + n := &AgentMeshNode{ + containmentDispatcher: disp, + } + svc := &EgressService{ + node: n, + info: &api.ServiceInfo{ + Name: "api-partner", + }, + } + + httpReq, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "http://localhost/mesh/dummy/http/api/v1/query", nil) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("http.NewRequest: %v", err) + } + + callerCtx := egressCallerContext{ + actorNode: "12D3KooWInspectionCaller", + principal: "remote-agent-42", + roles: []string{"mesh:role:node"}, + task: "summarize-report", + } + + // ModelArmor request block + svc.emitInspectionDenied(httpReq, callerCtx, "model_armor", "request", "jailbreak attempt detected by ModelArmor filter") + evt1 := expectEvent(t, disp, "agentmesh.policy.denied") + pd1 := evt1.GetPolicyDenied() + if pd1.Reason != api.PolicyDenialReason_INSPECTION_FILTER_BLOCKED { + t.Errorf("expected INSPECTION_FILTER_BLOCKED, got %v", pd1.Reason) + } + if pd1.CallerSubject != "remote-agent-42" { + t.Errorf("expected remote-agent-42, got %q", pd1.CallerSubject) + } + if pd1.TargetService != api.EgressServicePrefix+"api-partner" { + t.Errorf("expected %sapi-partner, got %q", api.EgressServicePrefix, pd1.TargetService) + } + + // ExtProc response block + svc.emitInspectionDenied(httpReq, callerCtx, "ext_proc", "response", "data exfiltration blocked by ExtProc filter") + evt2 := expectEvent(t, disp, "agentmesh.policy.denied") + pd2 := evt2.GetPolicyDenied() + if pd2.Reason != api.PolicyDenialReason_INSPECTION_FILTER_BLOCKED { + t.Errorf("expected INSPECTION_FILTER_BLOCKED, got %v", pd2.Reason) + } +} + +func TestContainmentNode_TransportRefused(t *testing.T) { + disp := newChanDispatcher(10) + n := &AgentMeshNode{ + containmentDispatcher: disp, + } + + testPeer := peer.ID("12D3KooWRefusedPeer") + maddr, err := multiaddr.NewMultiaddr("/ip4/192.168.1.100/tcp/4001") + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("multiaddr: %v", err) + } + + // 1. Unauthenticated peer + n.emitTransportRefused(testPeer, maddr, protocol.ID("/agentmesh/auth/1.0.0"), api.TransportRefusalReason_PEER_UNAUTHENTICATED, "peer not authenticated") + evt1 := expectEvent(t, disp, "agentmesh.transport.refused") + tr1 := evt1.GetTransportRefused() + if tr1.Reason != api.TransportRefusalReason_PEER_UNAUTHENTICATED { + t.Errorf("expected PEER_UNAUTHENTICATED, got %v", tr1.Reason) + } + if tr1.PeerId != testPeer.String() { + t.Errorf("expected PeerId %q, got %q", testPeer.String(), tr1.PeerId) + } + if tr1.RemoteMultiaddr != "/ip4/192.168.1.100/tcp/4001" { + t.Errorf("expected RemoteMultiaddr /ip4/192.168.1.100/tcp/4001, got %q", tr1.RemoteMultiaddr) + } + if tr1.CoalescedCount != 1 { + t.Errorf("expected CoalescedCount 1, got %d", tr1.CoalescedCount) + } + + // 2. Not router role + n.emitTransportRefused(testPeer, maddr, protocol.ID("/agentmesh/router/1.0.0"), api.TransportRefusalReason_NOT_ROUTER_ROLE, "peer does not hold mesh:role:router") + evt2 := expectEvent(t, disp, "agentmesh.transport.refused") + tr2 := evt2.GetTransportRefused() + if tr2.Reason != api.TransportRefusalReason_NOT_ROUTER_ROLE { + t.Errorf("expected NOT_ROUTER_ROLE, got %v", tr2.Reason) + } +} + +func TestContainmentNode_IdentityRevoked_GossipBan(t *testing.T) { + disp := newChanDispatcher(10) + n := &AgentMeshNode{ + containmentDispatcher: disp, + } + + _, pub, err := crypto.GenerateEd25519Key(rand.Reader) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("GenerateEd25519Key: %v", err) + } + bannedPID, err := peer.IDFromPublicKey(pub) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("IDFromPublicKey: %v", err) + } + + n.handleBannedEvent(&api.MeshEvent{ + Type: api.MeshEvent_BANNED, + PeerId: bannedPID.String(), + EventTime: timestamppb.Now(), + }) + + evt := expectEvent(t, disp, "agentmesh.identity.revoked") + if evt.Subject != bannedPID.String() { + t.Errorf("expected Subject %q, got %q", bannedPID.String(), evt.Subject) + } + ir := evt.GetIdentityRevoked() + if ir == nil { + t.Fatal("expected IdentityRevoked data, got nil") + } + if ir.Source != api.RevocationSource_MESH_EVENT_BANNED_GOSSIP { + t.Errorf("expected MESH_EVENT_BANNED_GOSSIP, got %v", ir.Source) + } + if ir.PeerId != bannedPID.String() { + t.Errorf("expected PeerId %q, got %q", bannedPID.String(), ir.PeerId) + } +} + +func TestContainmentNode_IdentityRevoked_ControlPlaneSync(t *testing.T) { + dir, err := os.MkdirTemp("", "node-containment-store-*") + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("MkdirTemp: %v", err) + } + defer func() { _ = os.RemoveAll(dir) }() + + store, err := NewStore(dir) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("NewStore: %v", err) + } + defer func() { _ = store.Close() }() + + disp := newChanDispatcher(10) + privKey, _, err := crypto.GenerateEd25519Key(rand.Reader) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("GenerateEd25519Key: %v", err) + } + + cpPub, _, _ := ed25519.GenerateKey(nil) + + node, err := NewAgentMeshNode(Options{ + PrivKey: privKey, + Store: store, + ControlPlanePubKey: cpPub, + ContainmentDispatcher: disp, + }) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("NewAgentMeshNode: %v", err) + } + defer func() { _ = node.Teardown() }() + + _, pub, err := crypto.GenerateEd25519Key(rand.Reader) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("GenerateEd25519Key: %v", err) + } + bannedPID, err := peer.IDFromPublicKey(pub) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("IDFromPublicKey: %v", err) + } + + node.reconcileBannedPeers([]string{bannedPID.String()}, time.Now()) + + evt := expectEvent(t, disp, "agentmesh.identity.revoked") + if evt.Subject != bannedPID.String() { + t.Errorf("expected Subject %q, got %q", bannedPID.String(), evt.Subject) + } + ir := evt.GetIdentityRevoked() + if ir == nil { + t.Fatal("expected IdentityRevoked data, got nil") + } + if ir.Source != api.RevocationSource_LOCAL_CONTROL_PLANE_SYNC { + t.Errorf("expected LOCAL_CONTROL_PLANE_SYNC, got %v", ir.Source) + } +} + +func TestContainmentNode_CallerDirectionContext(t *testing.T) { + ctx := context.Background() + + // Default when unset returns unspecified with false + dir, ok := CallerDirectionFromContext(ctx) + if ok || dir != api.SignalCallerDirection_SIGNAL_CALLER_DIRECTION_UNSPECIFIED { + t.Errorf("expected unspecified false, got %v, %v", dir, ok) + } + + // Explicit REMOTE_PEER + remoteCtx := WithCallerDirection(ctx, api.SignalCallerDirection_REMOTE_PEER) + dir, ok = CallerDirectionFromContext(remoteCtx) + if !ok || dir != api.SignalCallerDirection_REMOTE_PEER { + t.Errorf("expected REMOTE_PEER true, got %v, %v", dir, ok) + } + + // Explicit LOCAL_WORKLOAD + localCtx := WithCallerDirection(ctx, api.SignalCallerDirection_LOCAL_WORKLOAD) + dir, ok = CallerDirectionFromContext(localCtx) + if !ok || dir != api.SignalCallerDirection_LOCAL_WORKLOAD { + t.Errorf("expected LOCAL_WORKLOAD true, got %v, %v", dir, ok) + } +} diff --git a/internal/node/containment_security_test.go b/internal/node/containment_security_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5ecb7033 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/node/containment_security_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,836 @@ +// Copyright 2026 Google LLC +// +// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +// You may obtain a copy of the License at +// +// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +// +// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +// limitations under the License. + +package node + +import ( + "context" + "crypto/rand" + "errors" + "fmt" + "net/http" + "net/http/httptest" + "sync" + "sync/atomic" + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/google/agentmesh/api" + "github.com/google/agentmesh/internal/containment" + "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/crypto" + "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/peer" + "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/protocol" + "github.com/multiformats/go-multiaddr" + "google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/timestamppb" +) + +// expectEventTimeout collects an event from chanDispatcher with a strict bounded wait. +func expectEventTimeout(t *testing.T, d *chanDispatcher, expectedType string, timeout time.Duration) *api.SecuritySignalEvent { + t.Helper() + select { + case evt := <-d.events: + if evt.Type != expectedType { + t.Fatalf("expected event type %q, got %q", expectedType, evt.Type) + } + return evt + case <-time.After(timeout): + t.Fatalf("timed out after %v waiting for event type %q", timeout, expectedType) + return nil + } +} + +// 1. Empirical test of Node PEP policy rejections and emitted api.SecuritySignalEvent +func TestContainmentSecurity_PEP_PolicyRejections(t *testing.T) { + disp := newChanDispatcher(20) + n := &AgentMeshNode{ + containmentDispatcher: disp, + } + + callerPID := peer.ID("12D3KooWAdversarialCallerPeerID") + + t.Run("DatalogEvaluationDenial", func(t *testing.T) { + req := RequestContext{ + PeerID: callerPID, + Target: "database", + Protocol: "/agentmesh/sql/1.0.0", + } + + datalogErr := errors.New("authorization check failed: missing fact: right(#authority, \"database\", \"execute\")") + n.emitMiddlewarePolicyDenied(req, nil, datalogErr) + + evt := expectEventTimeout(t, disp, "agentmesh.policy.denied", time.Second) + if evt.SpecVersion != "1.0" { + t.Errorf("expected SpecVersion '1.0', got %q", evt.SpecVersion) + } + if evt.DataContentType != "application/json" { + t.Errorf("expected DataContentType 'application/json', got %q", evt.DataContentType) + } + if evt.Subject != callerPID.String() { + t.Errorf("expected Subject %q, got %q", callerPID.String(), evt.Subject) + } + if evt.EventTime == nil || evt.EventTime.AsTime().IsZero() { + t.Errorf("expected valid non-zero EventTime, got %v", evt.EventTime) + } + + pd := evt.GetPolicyDenied() + if pd == nil { + t.Fatal("expected PolicyDenied signal payload, got nil") + } + if pd.Reason != api.PolicyDenialReason_DATALOG_EVALUATION_DENIED { + t.Errorf("expected DATALOG_EVALUATION_DENIED, got %v", pd.Reason) + } + if pd.TargetService != "database" { + t.Errorf("expected TargetService 'database', got %q", pd.TargetService) + } + if pd.RequestedOperation != "/agentmesh/sql/1.0.0" { + t.Errorf("expected RequestedOperation '/agentmesh/sql/1.0.0', got %q", pd.RequestedOperation) + } + if pd.Direction != api.SignalCallerDirection_REMOTE_PEER { + t.Errorf("expected REMOTE_PEER for remote peer request, got %v", pd.Direction) + } + }) + + t.Run("DatalogEvaluationDenial_ServiceSubstringClassification", func(t *testing.T) { + // When the target service name contains the word "service" (e.g. "db-service"), + // Datalog evaluation denials must not be misclassified as UNAUTHORIZED_SERVICE. + req := RequestContext{ + PeerID: callerPID, + Target: "db-service", + Protocol: "/agentmesh/sql/1.0.0", + } + + datalogErr := errors.New("authorization check failed: missing fact: right(#authority, \"db-service\", \"execute\")") + n.emitMiddlewarePolicyDenied(req, nil, datalogErr) + + evt := expectEventTimeout(t, disp, "agentmesh.policy.denied", time.Second) + pd := evt.GetPolicyDenied() + if pd == nil { + t.Fatal("expected PolicyDenied signal payload, got nil") + } + if pd.Reason != api.PolicyDenialReason_DATALOG_EVALUATION_DENIED { + t.Fatalf("expected DATALOG_EVALUATION_DENIED, got %v", pd.Reason) + } + }) + + t.Run("TaskAuthorizationRuleViolation_DeniedTarget", func(t *testing.T) { + req := RequestContext{ + PeerID: callerPID, + Target: "mcp://production-storage", + Protocol: "/agentmesh/mcp/1.0.0", + MCPTool: "delete_all_records", + } + + tarErr := fmt.Errorf("tar_block[1] (\"scoped-task\") denied request to mcp://production-storage") + n.emitMiddlewarePolicyDenied(req, nil, tarErr) + + evt := expectEventTimeout(t, disp, "agentmesh.policy.denied", time.Second) + pd := evt.GetPolicyDenied() + if pd == nil { + t.Fatal("expected PolicyDenied signal, got nil") + } + if pd.Reason != api.PolicyDenialReason_TASK_AUTHORIZATION_RULE_VIOLATION { + t.Errorf("expected TASK_AUTHORIZATION_RULE_VIOLATION, got %v", pd.Reason) + } + if pd.RequestedOperation != "delete_all_records" { + t.Errorf("expected RequestedOperation 'delete_all_records', got %q", pd.RequestedOperation) + } + if pd.TargetService != "mcp://production-storage" { + t.Errorf("expected TargetService 'mcp://production-storage', got %q", pd.TargetService) + } + }) + + t.Run("TaskAuthorizationRuleViolation_ExpiredTARBlock", func(t *testing.T) { + req := RequestContext{ + PeerID: callerPID, + Target: "mcp://weather", + Protocol: "/agentmesh/mcp/1.0.0", + } + + tarExpiredErr := fmt.Errorf("tar_block[2] (\"weather-read\") expired at 2026-10-01T00:00:00Z") + n.emitMiddlewarePolicyDenied(req, nil, tarExpiredErr) + + evt := expectEventTimeout(t, disp, "agentmesh.policy.denied", time.Second) + pd := evt.GetPolicyDenied() + if pd == nil { + t.Fatal("expected PolicyDenied signal, got nil") + } + if pd.Reason != api.PolicyDenialReason_TASK_AUTHORIZATION_RULE_VIOLATION { + t.Errorf("expected TASK_AUTHORIZATION_RULE_VIOLATION, got %v", pd.Reason) + } + }) + + t.Run("ModelArmor_PromptSanitizationBlock_Request", func(t *testing.T) { + svc := &EgressService{ + node: n, + info: &api.ServiceInfo{ + Name: "llm-gateway", + }, + } + + req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "http://localhost/mesh/dummy/http/v1/chat/completions", nil) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("http.NewRequest: %v", err) + } + + callerCtx := egressCallerContext{ + actorNode: callerPID.String(), + principal: "agent-adversary", + roles: []string{"mesh:role:node", "researcher"}, + task: "prompt-injection-test", + } + + svc.emitInspectionDenied(req, callerCtx, "model_armor", "request", "prompt matched sanitization filter: prompt_injection_detected") + + evt := expectEventTimeout(t, disp, "agentmesh.policy.denied", time.Second) + pd := evt.GetPolicyDenied() + if pd == nil { + t.Fatal("expected PolicyDenied signal, got nil") + } + if pd.Reason != api.PolicyDenialReason_INSPECTION_FILTER_BLOCKED { + t.Errorf("expected INSPECTION_FILTER_BLOCKED, got %v", pd.Reason) + } + if pd.TargetService != api.EgressServicePrefix+"llm-gateway" { + t.Errorf("expected TargetService '%sllm-gateway', got %q", api.EgressServicePrefix, pd.TargetService) + } + if pd.CallerSubject != "agent-adversary" { + t.Errorf("expected CallerSubject 'agent-adversary', got %q", pd.CallerSubject) + } + if pd.CallerPeerId != callerPID.String() { + t.Errorf("expected CallerPeerId %q, got %q", callerPID.String(), pd.CallerPeerId) + } + }) + + t.Run("ModelArmor_PromptSanitizationBlock_Response", func(t *testing.T) { + svc := &EgressService{ + node: n, + info: &api.ServiceInfo{ + Name: "llm-gateway", + }, + } + + req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "http://localhost/mesh/dummy/http/v1/chat/completions", nil) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("http.NewRequest: %v", err) + } + + callerCtx := egressCallerContext{ + actorNode: callerPID.String(), + principal: "agent-adversary", + roles: []string{"mesh:role:node"}, + } + + svc.emitInspectionDenied(req, callerCtx, "model_armor", "response", "response matched sanitization filter: pii_leak") + + evt := expectEventTimeout(t, disp, "agentmesh.policy.denied", time.Second) + pd := evt.GetPolicyDenied() + if pd.Reason != api.PolicyDenialReason_INSPECTION_FILTER_BLOCKED { + t.Errorf("expected INSPECTION_FILTER_BLOCKED, got %v", pd.Reason) + } + }) + + t.Run("ExtProc_FilterBlock", func(t *testing.T) { + svc := &EgressService{ + node: n, + info: &api.ServiceInfo{ + Name: "secure-api", + }, + } + + req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://localhost/mesh/dummy/http/data", nil) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("http.NewRequest: %v", err) + } + + callerCtx := egressCallerContext{ + actorNode: callerPID.String(), + principal: "worker-1", + } + + svc.emitInspectionDenied(req, callerCtx, "ext_proc", "request", "blocked by custom DLP rule 42") + + evt := expectEventTimeout(t, disp, "agentmesh.policy.denied", time.Second) + pd := evt.GetPolicyDenied() + if pd.Reason != api.PolicyDenialReason_INSPECTION_FILTER_BLOCKED { + t.Errorf("expected INSPECTION_FILTER_BLOCKED, got %v", pd.Reason) + } + }) +} + +// 2. Empirical test of Caller Direction Accuracy across all code paths +func TestContainmentSecurity_CallerDirection_Accuracy(t *testing.T) { + disp := newChanDispatcher(20) + n := &AgentMeshNode{ + containmentDispatcher: disp, + } + + _, pub, err := crypto.GenerateEd25519Key(rand.Reader) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("GenerateEd25519Key: %v", err) + } + remotePID, err := peer.IDFromPublicKey(pub) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("IDFromPublicKey: %v", err) + } + + t.Run("Stream_LocalWorkload_Tagged", func(t *testing.T) { + req := RequestContext{ + PeerID: remotePID, + Target: "local-echo", + Protocol: "/agentmesh/echo/1.0.0", + Local: true, // Marked local + } + + n.emitMiddlewarePolicyDenied(req, nil, errors.New("datalog check failed: denial")) + evt := expectEventTimeout(t, disp, "agentmesh.policy.denied", time.Second) + pd := evt.GetPolicyDenied() + if pd.Direction != api.SignalCallerDirection_LOCAL_WORKLOAD { + t.Errorf("expected LOCAL_WORKLOAD when req.Local=true, got %v", pd.Direction) + } + }) + + t.Run("Stream_RemotePeer_Tagged", func(t *testing.T) { + req := RequestContext{ + PeerID: remotePID, + Target: "remote-service", + Protocol: "/agentmesh/echo/1.0.0", + Local: false, // Marked remote + } + + n.emitMiddlewarePolicyDenied(req, nil, errors.New("datalog check failed: denial")) + evt := expectEventTimeout(t, disp, "agentmesh.policy.denied", time.Second) + pd := evt.GetPolicyDenied() + if pd.Direction != api.SignalCallerDirection_REMOTE_PEER { + t.Errorf("expected REMOTE_PEER when req.Local=false, got %v", pd.Direction) + } + }) + + t.Run("HTTP_LocalSocket_ContextTagged", func(t *testing.T) { + req, _ := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://localhost/service", nil) + // Attach local socket context key + reqWithLocal := req.WithContext(context.WithValue(req.Context(), localSocketContextKey{}, true)) + + dir := n.detectCallerDirection(reqWithLocal, nil) + if dir != api.SignalCallerDirection_LOCAL_WORKLOAD { + t.Errorf("expected LOCAL_WORKLOAD from localSocketContextKey, got %v", dir) + } + }) + + t.Run("HTTP_RemotePeer_RemoteAddrDecoded", func(t *testing.T) { + req, _ := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://localhost/service", nil) + req.RemoteAddr = remotePID.String() + + dir := n.detectCallerDirection(req, nil) + if dir != api.SignalCallerDirection_REMOTE_PEER { + t.Errorf("expected REMOTE_PEER from RemoteAddr peer string, got %v", dir) + } + }) + + t.Run("HTTP_ContextOverride_RemotePeer", func(t *testing.T) { + req, _ := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://localhost/service", nil) + reqWithDir := req.WithContext(WithCallerDirection(req.Context(), api.SignalCallerDirection_REMOTE_PEER)) + + dir := n.detectCallerDirection(reqWithDir, nil) + if dir != api.SignalCallerDirection_REMOTE_PEER { + t.Errorf("expected REMOTE_PEER from WithCallerDirection, got %v", dir) + } + }) + + t.Run("HTTP_ContextOverride_LocalWorkload", func(t *testing.T) { + req, _ := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://localhost/service", nil) + // Even if RemoteAddr is a remote peer, context override takes precedence + req.RemoteAddr = remotePID.String() + reqWithDir := req.WithContext(WithCallerDirection(req.Context(), api.SignalCallerDirection_LOCAL_WORKLOAD)) + + dir := n.detectCallerDirection(reqWithDir, nil) + if dir != api.SignalCallerDirection_LOCAL_WORKLOAD { + t.Errorf("expected LOCAL_WORKLOAD from WithCallerDirection override, got %v", dir) + } + }) +} + +// 3. Empirical test of Stream Refusal and Ban Gossip Emission +func TestContainmentSecurity_StreamRefusal_And_BanGossip(t *testing.T) { + disp := newChanDispatcher(20) + n := &AgentMeshNode{ + containmentDispatcher: disp, + } + + testPeer := peer.ID("12D3KooWAdversarialRefusalPeer") + maddr, err := multiaddr.NewMultiaddr("/ip4/10.0.0.42/tcp/5001") + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("NewMultiaddr: %v", err) + } + + t.Run("TransportRefused_PeerUnauthenticated", func(t *testing.T) { + n.emitTransportRefused(testPeer, maddr, protocol.ID("/agentmesh/data/1.0.0"), + api.TransportRefusalReason_PEER_UNAUTHENTICATED, "handshake timeout") + + evt := expectEventTimeout(t, disp, "agentmesh.transport.refused", time.Second) + if evt.Type != "agentmesh.transport.refused" { + t.Errorf("expected agentmesh.transport.refused, got %q", evt.Type) + } + if evt.Subject != testPeer.String() { + t.Errorf("expected Subject %q, got %q", testPeer.String(), evt.Subject) + } + tr := evt.GetTransportRefused() + if tr == nil { + t.Fatal("expected TransportRefused signal, got nil") + } + if tr.Reason != api.TransportRefusalReason_PEER_UNAUTHENTICATED { + t.Errorf("expected PEER_UNAUTHENTICATED, got %v", tr.Reason) + } + if tr.RemoteMultiaddr != "/ip4/10.0.0.42/tcp/5001" { + t.Errorf("expected RemoteMultiaddr '/ip4/10.0.0.42/tcp/5001', got %q", tr.RemoteMultiaddr) + } + }) + + t.Run("TransportRefused_NotRouterRole", func(t *testing.T) { + n.emitTransportRefused(testPeer, maddr, protocol.ID("/agentmesh/router/1.0.0"), + api.TransportRefusalReason_NOT_ROUTER_ROLE, "role mismatch") + + evt := expectEventTimeout(t, disp, "agentmesh.transport.refused", time.Second) + tr := evt.GetTransportRefused() + if tr.Reason != api.TransportRefusalReason_NOT_ROUTER_ROLE { + t.Errorf("expected NOT_ROUTER_ROLE, got %v", tr.Reason) + } + }) + + t.Run("IdentityRevoked_GossipBanEvent", func(t *testing.T) { + _, pub, err := crypto.GenerateEd25519Key(rand.Reader) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("GenerateEd25519Key: %v", err) + } + bannedPID, err := peer.IDFromPublicKey(pub) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("IDFromPublicKey: %v", err) + } + + nowProto := timestamppb.Now() + n.handleBannedEvent(&api.MeshEvent{ + Type: api.MeshEvent_BANNED, + PeerId: bannedPID.String(), + EventTime: nowProto, + }) + + evt := expectEventTimeout(t, disp, "agentmesh.identity.revoked", time.Second) + if evt.Subject != bannedPID.String() { + t.Errorf("expected Subject %q, got %q", bannedPID.String(), evt.Subject) + } + ir := evt.GetIdentityRevoked() + if ir == nil { + t.Fatal("expected IdentityRevoked signal, got nil") + } + if ir.Source != api.RevocationSource_MESH_EVENT_BANNED_GOSSIP { + t.Errorf("expected MESH_EVENT_BANNED_GOSSIP, got %v", ir.Source) + } + if ir.PeerId != bannedPID.String() { + t.Errorf("expected PeerId %q, got %q", bannedPID.String(), ir.PeerId) + } + + // Out-of-order older ban event MUST be dropped without emitting duplicate + olderProto := timestamppb.New(nowProto.AsTime().Add(-10 * time.Minute)) + n.handleBannedEvent(&api.MeshEvent{ + Type: api.MeshEvent_BANNED, + PeerId: bannedPID.String(), + EventTime: olderProto, + }) + + // Channel should have no new events + select { + case unexpected := <-disp.events: + t.Fatalf("unexpected event emitted for out-of-order ban: %v", unexpected) + case <-time.After(50 * time.Millisecond): + // Passed: dropped silently + } + }) +} + +// 4. Empirical test of High-Concurrency, Deadlock-Freedom, and Queue Saturation +func TestContainmentSecurity_Concurrency_DeadlockFreedom_UnderSaturation(t *testing.T) { + var receivedCount atomic.Int64 + server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + receivedCount.Add(1) + w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK) + })) + defer server.Close() + + // Small queue to force buffer saturation and shedding + realDisp, err := containment.NewDispatcher(containment.Config{ + Endpoints: []containment.EndpointConfig{ + { + URL: server.URL, + Timeout: time.Second, + }, + }, + QueueCapacity: 20, + Workers: 4, + }) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("NewDispatcher: %v", err) + } + + node := &AgentMeshNode{ + containmentDispatcher: realDisp, + } + + const goroutines = 30 + const iterations = 50 + + var wg sync.WaitGroup + wg.Add(goroutines) + + for g := 0; g < goroutines; g++ { + go func(gid int) { + defer wg.Done() + for i := 0; i < iterations; i++ { + // Rapid interleaved emissions across all hook types + switch (gid + i) % 4 { + case 0: + node.EmitPolicyDenied(PolicyDeniedParams{ + Direction: api.SignalCallerDirection_REMOTE_PEER, + Reason: api.PolicyDenialReason_DATALOG_EVALUATION_DENIED, + Detail: "stress denial", + TargetService: "calculator", + CallerPeerID: "12D3KooWConcurrentCaller", + EventTime: time.Now(), + }) + case 1: + node.emitTransportRefused(peer.ID("12D3KooWConcurrentRefused"), nil, + protocol.ID("/agentmesh/test"), api.TransportRefusalReason_PEER_UNAUTHENTICATED, "stress refusal") + case 2: + node.handleBannedEvent(&api.MeshEvent{ + Type: api.MeshEvent_BANNED, + PeerId: fmt.Sprintf("12D3KooWBanned%d_%d", gid, i), + EventTime: timestamppb.Now(), + }) + case 3: + node.emitIdentityRevoked(fmt.Sprintf("12D3KooWRevoked%d", gid), + api.RevocationSource_LOCAL_CONTROL_PLANE_SYNC, "stress revoked", nil) + } + } + }(g) + } + + // Wait with a hard timeout to empirically prove zero deadlock + done := make(chan struct{}) + go func() { + wg.Wait() + close(done) + }() + + select { + case <-done: + // Succeeded without deadlock + case <-time.After(5 * time.Second): + t.Fatal("deadlock detected during concurrent containment signal dispatch") + } + + // Clean drain and close within bounded deadline + closeCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 2*time.Second) + defer cancel() + if err := realDisp.Close(closeCtx); err != nil { + t.Logf("Close returned: %v (expected under queue shedding saturation)", err) + } +} + +// 5. Empirical test verifying that nil dispatcher never panics +func TestContainmentSecurity_NilDispatcher_ZeroPanic(t *testing.T) { + n := &AgentMeshNode{ + containmentDispatcher: nil, + } + + // Every hook call must safely no-op without panicking + n.EmitPolicyDenied(PolicyDeniedParams{ + Reason: api.PolicyDenialReason_DATALOG_EVALUATION_DENIED, + }) + n.emitMiddlewarePolicyDenied(RequestContext{}, nil, errors.New("err")) + n.emitTransportRefused(peer.ID("dummy"), nil, protocol.ID("/test"), api.TransportRefusalReason_PEER_UNAUTHENTICATED, "refused") + n.emitIdentityRevoked("dummy", api.RevocationSource_LOCAL_CONTROL_PLANE_SYNC, "revoked", nil) + n.handleBannedEvent(&api.MeshEvent{ + Type: api.MeshEvent_BANNED, + PeerId: "12D3KooWDummyPeerID", + EventTime: timestamppb.Now(), + }) +} + + +// 6. Empirical high-volume stress tests verifying zero panic, zero deadlock, and clean bounded drain + +func TestContainmentSecurity_Concurrency_HighVolume_10000Emissions_ZeroPanic_BoundedDrain(t *testing.T) { + var deliveredCount atomic.Int64 + server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + deliveredCount.Add(1) + w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK) + })) + defer server.Close() + + disp, err := containment.NewDispatcher(containment.Config{ + Endpoints: []containment.EndpointConfig{ + { + URL: server.URL, + Timeout: 2 * time.Second, + }, + }, + QueueCapacity: 200, + Workers: 8, + }) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("NewDispatcher: %v", err) + } + + // Generate 20 real cryptographic peer IDs for realistic multihash decoding + var realPeers [20]peer.ID + for i := 0; i < 20; i++ { + _, pub, err := crypto.GenerateEd25519Key(rand.Reader) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("GenerateEd25519Key: %v", err) + } + pid, err := peer.IDFromPublicKey(pub) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("IDFromPublicKey: %v", err) + } + realPeers[i] = pid + } + + node := &AgentMeshNode{ + containmentDispatcher: disp, + peerLastEventTime: make(map[string]int64), + } + + const goroutines = 50 + const iterationsPerGoroutine = 200 // 50 * 200 = 10,000 total events + var wg sync.WaitGroup + wg.Add(goroutines) + + startGate := make(chan struct{}) + var closeOnce sync.Once + closeTrigger := make(chan struct{}) + + // Concurrently close node when trigger fires + go func() { + <-closeTrigger + closeCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 3*time.Second) + defer cancel() + _ = node.CloseWithContext(closeCtx) + }() + + for g := 0; g < goroutines; g++ { + go func(gid int) { + defer wg.Done() + <-startGate + + for i := 0; i < iterationsPerGoroutine; i++ { + // Trigger concurrent close halfway through + if gid == 0 && i == iterationsPerGoroutine/2 { + closeOnce.Do(func() { close(closeTrigger) }) + } + + pID := realPeers[(gid+i)%20] + + switch (gid + i) % 4 { + case 0: + node.EmitPolicyDenied(PolicyDeniedParams{ + Direction: api.SignalCallerDirection_LOCAL_WORKLOAD, + Reason: api.PolicyDenialReason_DATALOG_EVALUATION_DENIED, + Detail: fmt.Sprintf("stress denial %d-%d", gid, i), + TargetService: fmt.Sprintf("service-%d", i%10), + RequestedOperation: "query", + RequestedResource: "/data", + CallerPeerID: pID.String(), + CallerSubject: fmt.Sprintf("agent-%d", gid), + CallerRoles: []string{"worker"}, + EventTime: time.Now(), + }) + case 1: + node.emitTransportRefused( + pID, + nil, + protocol.ID("/agentmesh/test/1.0"), + api.TransportRefusalReason_PEER_UNAUTHENTICATED, + fmt.Sprintf("handshake rejected %d-%d", gid, i), + ) + case 2: + node.handleBannedEvent(&api.MeshEvent{ + Type: api.MeshEvent_BANNED, + PeerId: pID.String(), + EventTime: timestamppb.New(time.Now().Add(time.Duration(i) * time.Millisecond)), + }) + case 3: + node.emitIdentityRevoked( + pID.String(), + api.RevocationSource_LOCAL_CONTROL_PLANE_SYNC, + "policy revocation", + []string{"rev-1", "rev-2"}, + ) + } + } + }(g) + } + + // Release all workers simultaneously + close(startGate) + + // Await completion with hard timeout to detect deadlock + done := make(chan struct{}) + go func() { + wg.Wait() + close(done) + }() + + select { + case <-done: + // Succeeded: all goroutines completed without deadlock or panic + case <-time.After(10 * time.Second): + t.Fatal("DEADLOCK DETECTED: 10,000 concurrent event emissions did not complete within 10s") + } + + // Ensure close trigger was pulled + closeOnce.Do(func() { close(closeTrigger) }) + + // Ensure final node close completes cleanly + finalCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 3*time.Second) + defer cancel() + if err := node.CloseWithContext(finalCtx); err != nil { + t.Logf("Final node close returned: %v (clean idempotent teardown)", err) + } + + t.Logf("Empirical stress test completed successfully: delivered=%d", deliveredCount.Load()) +} + +func TestContainmentSecurity_Concurrency_GossipBan_BurstMonotonicTracking(t *testing.T) { + node := &AgentMeshNode{ + peerLastEventTime: make(map[string]int64), + } + + // Pre-generate 10 real cryptographic peer IDs + var realPeers [10]peer.ID + for i := 0; i < 10; i++ { + _, pub, err := crypto.GenerateEd25519Key(rand.Reader) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("GenerateEd25519Key: %v", err) + } + pid, err := peer.IDFromPublicKey(pub) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("IDFromPublicKey: %v", err) + } + realPeers[i] = pid + } + + const goroutines = 30 + const iterations = 100 + var wg sync.WaitGroup + wg.Add(goroutines) + + baseTime := time.Now() + + for g := 0; g < goroutines; g++ { + go func(gid int) { + defer wg.Done() + for i := 0; i < iterations; i++ { + // Mix of out-of-order and newer events + eventTime := baseTime.Add(time.Duration((i*7)%iterations) * time.Millisecond) + targetPeer := realPeers[i%10].String() + + node.handleBannedEvent(&api.MeshEvent{ + Type: api.MeshEvent_BANNED, + PeerId: targetPeer, + EventTime: timestamppb.New(eventTime), + }) + } + }(g) + } + + done := make(chan struct{}) + go func() { + wg.Wait() + close(done) + }() + + select { + case <-done: + case <-time.After(5 * time.Second): + t.Fatal("DEADLOCK DETECTED in concurrent gossip ban processing") + } + + node.mu.Lock() + defer node.mu.Unlock() + if len(node.peerLastEventTime) != 10 { + t.Errorf("expected 10 distinct tracked peers, got %d", len(node.peerLastEventTime)) + } +} + +func TestContainmentSecurity_Concurrency_DispatcherCloseRace_ZeroPanic(t *testing.T) { + const trials = 10 + for trial := 0; trial < trials; trial++ { + disp, err := containment.NewDispatcher(containment.Config{ + QueueCapacity: 50, + Workers: 2, + }) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("NewDispatcher: %v", err) + } + + node := &AgentMeshNode{ + containmentDispatcher: disp, + } + + var wg sync.WaitGroup + const emitters = 20 + wg.Add(emitters) + + stopCh := make(chan struct{}) + var emissionCount atomic.Int64 + + for e := 0; e < emitters; e++ { + go func(id int) { + defer wg.Done() + for { + select { + case <-stopCh: + return + default: + if id%2 == 0 { + node.EmitPolicyDenied(PolicyDeniedParams{ + Direction: api.SignalCallerDirection_REMOTE_PEER, + Reason: api.PolicyDenialReason_ROLE_MISMATCH, + Detail: "close race", + EventTime: time.Now(), + }) + } else { + node.emitTransportRefused( + peer.ID("12D3KooWRacePeer"), + nil, + protocol.ID("/agentmesh/test"), + api.TransportRefusalReason_PEER_UNAUTHENTICATED, + "close race", + ) + } + emissionCount.Add(1) + } + } + }(e) + } + + time.Sleep(5 * time.Millisecond) + + closeCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), time.Second) + if err := disp.Close(closeCtx); err != nil { + t.Logf("Trial %d close returned: %v", trial, err) + } + cancel() + + close(stopCh) + wg.Wait() + } +} diff --git a/internal/node/controlplane_sync.go b/internal/node/controlplane_sync.go index 5329c614..92da72a2 100644 --- a/internal/node/controlplane_sync.go +++ b/internal/node/controlplane_sync.go @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ import ( "time" cpclient "github.com/google/agentmesh/internal/controlplane/client" + "github.com/google/agentmesh/api" "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/peer" "github.com/multiformats/go-multiaddr" "github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus" @@ -106,6 +107,9 @@ func (n *AgentMeshNode) syncRevocations(ctx context.Context, controlPlaneURL str for _, revID := range resp.GetRevocationIds() { n.RevokeBiscuitID(revID, expiry) } + if len(resp.GetRevocationIds()) > 0 { + n.emitIdentityRevoked("", api.RevocationSource_LOCAL_CONTROL_PLANE_SYNC, "biscuit revocation IDs synchronized from control plane", resp.GetRevocationIds()) + } if len(resp.GetBannedPeerIds()) > 0 { n.reconcileBannedPeers(resp.GetBannedPeerIds(), fetchedAt) } @@ -289,6 +293,7 @@ func (n *AgentMeshNode) reconcileBannedPeers(peerIDs []string, fetchedAt time.Ti } logger.Infow("peer banned by the control plane", "event", meshEventBanned, "peer", key) n.banPeer(p, fetchedAtMs) + n.emitIdentityRevoked(key, api.RevocationSource_LOCAL_CONTROL_PLANE_SYNC, "peer ban reconciled from control plane sync", nil) } } diff --git a/internal/node/egress_inspect.go b/internal/node/egress_inspect.go index 36a7fb72..9cd98692 100644 --- a/internal/node/egress_inspect.go +++ b/internal/node/egress_inspect.go @@ -272,6 +272,7 @@ func (s *EgressService) serveInspectedEgress(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Requ "verdict", "block", "phase", "request", ) + s.emitInspectionDenied(r, callerCtx, "model_armor", "request", "prompt matched sanitization filter") w.Header().Set("Proxy-Status", fmt.Sprintf("agentmesh-node; error=%s; details=\"model_armor\"", proxyStatusDenied)) http.Error(w, "Request blocked by Model Armor policy", http.StatusForbidden) return @@ -318,6 +319,7 @@ func (s *EgressService) serveInspectedEgress(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Requ if session != nil { session.Close() } + s.emitInspectionDenied(r, callerCtx, "ext_proc", "request", imm.GetDetails()) writeImmediateResponse(w, imm, s.info.Name, callerCtx.task) return } @@ -384,6 +386,7 @@ func (s *EgressService) serveInspectedEgress(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Requ continue } if imm != nil { + s.emitInspectionDenied(r, callerCtx, "ext_proc", "response", imm.GetDetails()) writeImmediateResponse(w, imm, s.info.Name, callerCtx.task) return } @@ -446,6 +449,7 @@ func (s *EgressService) serveInspectedEgress(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Requ "verdict", "block", "phase", "response", ) + s.emitInspectionDenied(r, callerCtx, "model_armor", "response", "response matched sanitization filter") w.Header().Set("Proxy-Status", fmt.Sprintf("agentmesh-node; error=%s; details=\"model_armor_response\"", proxyStatusDenied)) http.Error(w, "Response blocked by Model Armor policy", http.StatusForbidden) return @@ -856,3 +860,36 @@ func replaceStringInJSONValue(v any, original, replacement string) (any, bool) { return v, false } } + +func (s *EgressService) emitInspectionDenied(r *http.Request, callerCtx egressCallerContext, tier, phase, detail string) { + if s == nil || s.node == nil { + return + } + dir := s.node.detectCallerDirection(r, nil) + + var op, res string + if r != nil { + op = r.Method + if r.URL != nil { + res = r.URL.Path + } + } + + var targetService string + if s.info != nil && s.info.Name != "" { + targetService = api.EgressServicePrefix + s.info.Name + } + + s.node.EmitPolicyDenied(PolicyDeniedParams{ + Direction: dir, + Reason: api.PolicyDenialReason_INSPECTION_FILTER_BLOCKED, + Detail: fmt.Sprintf("%s %s blocked: %s", tier, phase, detail), + TargetService: targetService, + RequestedOperation: op, + RequestedResource: res, + CallerPeerID: callerCtx.actorNode, + CallerSubject: callerCtx.principal, + CallerRoles: callerCtx.roles, + EventTime: time.Now(), + }) +} diff --git a/internal/node/middleware.go b/internal/node/middleware.go index dbc13993..65009a00 100644 --- a/internal/node/middleware.go +++ b/internal/node/middleware.go @@ -19,10 +19,12 @@ import ( "errors" "fmt" "runtime/debug" + "strings" "sync/atomic" "time" "github.com/eclipse-biscuit/biscuit-go/v2" + "github.com/eclipse-biscuit/biscuit-go/v2/datalog" "github.com/google/agentmesh/api" "github.com/google/agentmesh/internal/identity" "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/network" @@ -203,6 +205,184 @@ func (n *AgentMeshNode) WithBiscuitAuth(next func(network.Stream, RequestContext } } +func classifyPolicyDenialReason(err error) api.PolicyDenialReason { + if err == nil { + return api.PolicyDenialReason_POLICY_DENIAL_REASON_UNSPECIFIED + } + + msg := strings.ToLower(err.Error()) + + // 1. Task Authorization Rule (TAR) block violations take precedence. + // EvaluateTaskRules returns errors prefixed with "tar_block[...]" or "tar_block:". + // Even if a TAR block expired, it is classified as TASK_AUTHORIZATION_RULE_VIOLATION. + if strings.Contains(msg, "tar_block") { + return api.PolicyDenialReason_TASK_AUTHORIZATION_RULE_VIOLATION + } + + // 2. Credential revocation and token expiration. + // Applies to revoked peer IDs, revoked authority/delegation Biscuits, and expired tokens. + if strings.Contains(msg, "revoked") || + strings.Contains(msg, "expired") || + strings.Contains(msg, "expiration") { + return api.PolicyDenialReason_EXPIRED_CREDENTIAL + } + + // 3. Biscuit sentinel errors, Datalog runtime limits, and check failure phrases. + // Must be matched BEFORE any route or ACL checks to avoid false positives when + // service names (e.g. "db-service") or check formulas contain those words. + if errors.Is(err, biscuit.ErrNoMatchingPolicy) || + errors.Is(err, biscuit.ErrPolicyDenied) || + errors.Is(err, biscuit.ErrInvalidSignature) || + errors.Is(err, datalog.ErrWorldRunLimitTimeout) || + errors.Is(err, datalog.ErrWorldRunLimitMaxFacts) || + errors.Is(err, datalog.ErrWorldRunLimitMaxIterations) || + errors.Is(err, ErrAuthRejected) || + strings.Contains(msg, "biscuit: verification failed") || + strings.Contains(msg, "failed to verify check") || + strings.Contains(msg, "failed to verify block") || + strings.Contains(msg, "authorization check failed") || + strings.Contains(msg, "datalog check failed") || + strings.Contains(msg, "missing fact") || + strings.Contains(msg, "untrusted biscuit token") || + strings.Contains(msg, "not bound to peer") || + strings.Contains(msg, "authorization check") || + strings.Contains(msg, "authorization failed") || + strings.Contains(msg, "authorizer failure") || + strings.Contains(msg, "allow_network_target") || + strings.Contains(msg, "datalog") || + strings.Contains(msg, "biscuit") { + return api.PolicyDenialReason_DATALOG_EVALUATION_DENIED + } + + // 4. Explicit non-Datalog route or ACL checks (anchored multi-word phrases only). + // Never match single-token "service", "role", "method", or "path" which collide with + // resource identifiers and URI components. + switch { + case strings.Contains(msg, "role mismatch") || + strings.Contains(msg, "role required") || + strings.Contains(msg, "insufficient role") || + strings.Contains(msg, "not router role") || + strings.Contains(msg, "unauthorized role") || + strings.Contains(msg, "invalid role") || + strings.Contains(msg, "forbidden: role") || + strings.Contains(msg, "missing role") || + strings.Contains(msg, "admin role required"): + return api.PolicyDenialReason_ROLE_MISMATCH + + case errors.Is(err, ErrProviderNotGranted) || + strings.Contains(msg, "unauthorized service") || + strings.Contains(msg, "unknown service") || + strings.Contains(msg, "service not allowed") || + strings.Contains(msg, "service not granted") || + strings.Contains(msg, "service not permitted") || + strings.Contains(msg, "provider not granted") || + strings.Contains(msg, "unregistered service"): + return api.PolicyDenialReason_UNAUTHORIZED_SERVICE + + case strings.Contains(msg, "method not allowed") || + strings.Contains(msg, "unauthorized path") || + strings.Contains(msg, "unauthorized method") || + strings.Contains(msg, "path not allowed") || + strings.Contains(msg, "path not permitted") || + strings.Contains(msg, "method not permitted") || + strings.Contains(msg, "invalid path") || + strings.Contains(msg, "invalid method") || + strings.Contains(msg, "http grant"): + return api.PolicyDenialReason_UNAUTHORIZED_PATH_OR_METHOD + + case strings.Contains(msg, "model_armor") || + strings.Contains(msg, "modelarmor") || + strings.Contains(msg, "ext_proc") || + strings.Contains(msg, "extproc") || + strings.Contains(msg, "inspection"): + return api.PolicyDenialReason_INSPECTION_FILTER_BLOCKED + + default: + // 5. Default fallback to Datalog evaluation denial for any unclassified policy check rejection. + return api.PolicyDenialReason_DATALOG_EVALUATION_DENIED + } +} + +func extractCallerClaimsFromAuthorizer(authorizer biscuit.Authorizer) (string, []string) { + if authorizer == nil { + return "", nil + } + var subject string + if facts, _ := authorizer.Query(biscuit.Rule{ + Head: biscuit.Predicate{Name: "get_user", IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.Variable("u")}}, + Body: []biscuit.Predicate{{Name: api.FactUser, IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.Variable("u")}}}, + }); len(facts) > 0 && len(facts[0].IDs) > 0 { + if s, ok := facts[0].IDs[0].(biscuit.String); ok { + subject = string(s) + } + } + if subject == "" { + if facts, _ := authorizer.Query(biscuit.Rule{ + Head: biscuit.Predicate{Name: "get_email", IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.Variable("e")}}, + Body: []biscuit.Predicate{{Name: api.FactEmail, IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.Variable("e")}}}, + }); len(facts) > 0 && len(facts[0].IDs) > 0 { + if s, ok := facts[0].IDs[0].(biscuit.String); ok { + subject = string(s) + } + } + } + var roles []string + if facts, _ := authorizer.Query(biscuit.Rule{ + Head: biscuit.Predicate{Name: "get_role", IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.Variable("r")}}, + Body: []biscuit.Predicate{{Name: api.FactRole, IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.Variable("r")}}}, + }); len(facts) > 0 { + for _, f := range facts { + if len(f.IDs) > 0 { + if s, ok := f.IDs[0].(biscuit.String); ok { + roles = append(roles, string(s)) + } + } + } + } + return subject, roles +} + +func (n *AgentMeshNode) emitMiddlewarePolicyDenied(req RequestContext, authorizer biscuit.Authorizer, denialErr error) { + if n == nil || n.containmentDispatcher == nil || denialErr == nil { + return + } + reason := classifyPolicyDenialReason(denialErr) + dir := api.SignalCallerDirection_REMOTE_PEER + if req.Local { + dir = api.SignalCallerDirection_LOCAL_WORKLOAD + } + + op := req.Protocol + res := req.Target + if req.HTTP != nil { + op = req.HTTP.Method + res = req.HTTP.Path + } else if req.MCPTool != "" { + op = req.MCPTool + } else if req.Egress != nil { + res = fmt.Sprintf("%s:%d", req.Egress.Host, req.Egress.Port) + } + + var subject string + var roles []string + if authorizer != nil { + subject, roles = extractCallerClaimsFromAuthorizer(authorizer) + } + + n.EmitPolicyDenied(PolicyDeniedParams{ + Direction: dir, + Reason: reason, + Detail: denialErr.Error(), + TargetService: req.Target, + RequestedOperation: op, + RequestedResource: res, + CallerPeerID: req.PeerID.String(), + CallerSubject: subject, + CallerRoles: roles, + EventTime: time.Now(), + }) +} + // VerifyBiscuitToken checks revocation, cache, and evaluates the token against trusted keys and local policies. func (n *AgentMeshNode) VerifyBiscuitToken(biscuitBytes []byte, reqCtx RequestContext) error { _, err := n.verifyBiscuitTokenWithRules(biscuitBytes, reqCtx) @@ -216,7 +396,9 @@ func (n *AgentMeshNode) verifyBiscuitTokenWithRules(biscuitBytes []byte, reqCtx if n.revokedPeers != nil { if _, isRevoked := n.revokedPeers.Get(remotePeer.String()); isRevoked { logger.Warnf("[Auth] Peer %s is revoked", remotePeer) - return nil, fmt.Errorf("peer is revoked") + err := fmt.Errorf("peer is revoked") + n.emitMiddlewarePolicyDenied(reqCtx, nil, err) + return nil, err } } @@ -243,9 +425,14 @@ func (n *AgentMeshNode) verifyBiscuitTokenWithRules(biscuitBytes []byte, reqCtx if !authorized { if lastErr != nil { + if errors.Is(lastErr, biscuit.ErrInvalidSignature) { + n.emitMiddlewarePolicyDenied(reqCtx, nil, fmt.Errorf("untrusted biscuit token signature: %w", lastErr)) + } return nil, lastErr } - return nil, fmt.Errorf("authorization failed") + err := fmt.Errorf("authorization failed") + n.emitMiddlewarePolicyDenied(reqCtx, nil, err) + return nil, err } return taskRules, nil @@ -266,7 +453,9 @@ func (n *AgentMeshNode) authorizeWithRules(rawToken []byte, req RequestContext, } if n.IsBiscuitRevoked(b) { logger.Infow("Audit Traceability", append(req.auditFields(), "decision", "deny", "reason", "biscuit is revoked")...) - return nil, fmt.Errorf("biscuit is revoked") + err := fmt.Errorf("biscuit is revoked") + n.emitMiddlewarePolicyDenied(req, nil, err) + return nil, err } authorizer, err := b.Authorizer(pubKey, identity.AuthorizerOptions(n.BiscuitTimeout)...) @@ -275,6 +464,7 @@ func (n *AgentMeshNode) authorizeWithRules(rawToken []byte, req RequestContext, } if err := identity.RequireAuthorityRequestBinding(b, req.PeerID); err != nil { + n.emitMiddlewarePolicyDenied(req, authorizer, err) return nil, err } @@ -313,12 +503,14 @@ func (n *AgentMeshNode) authorizeWithRules(rawToken []byte, req RequestContext, logger.Infow("Audit Traceability", append(req.auditFields(), "decision", "deny", "reason", err.Error())...) logger.Debugf("Authorizer failure: %v, token: %s", err, b.String()) logger.Debugf("Authorizer state: %s", authorizer.PrintWorld()) + n.emitMiddlewarePolicyDenied(req, authorizer, err) return nil, err } if len(taskRules) > 0 { if err := api.EvaluateTaskRules(taskRules, meshReq.TaskRequest(), time.Now()); err != nil { logger.Infow("Audit Traceability", append(req.auditFields(), "decision", "deny", "reason", err.Error())...) + n.emitMiddlewarePolicyDenied(req, authorizer, err) return nil, err } } @@ -372,7 +564,9 @@ func (n *AgentMeshNode) authorizeWithRules(rawToken []byte, req RequestContext, if actorPID, pErr := peer.Decode(actorNodeStr); pErr == nil { if _, isRevoked := n.revokedPeers.Get(actorPID.String()); isRevoked { logger.Infow("Audit Traceability", append(req.auditFields(), "decision", "deny", "reason", "actor_node is revoked")...) - return nil, fmt.Errorf("actor_node %s is revoked", actorPID.String()) + err := fmt.Errorf("actor_node %s is revoked", actorPID.String()) + n.emitMiddlewarePolicyDenied(req, authorizer, err) + return nil, err } } } diff --git a/internal/node/node.go b/internal/node/node.go index d65839c8..27031b8c 100644 --- a/internal/node/node.go +++ b/internal/node/node.go @@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ import ( "github.com/eclipse-biscuit/biscuit-go/v2" "github.com/google/agentmesh/api" + "github.com/google/agentmesh/internal/containment" cpclient "github.com/google/agentmesh/internal/controlplane/client" "github.com/google/agentmesh/internal/identity" "github.com/google/agentmesh/internal/p2plimits" @@ -54,6 +55,7 @@ import ( "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/network" "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/peer" "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/peerstore" + "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/protocol" "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/p2p/host/autorelay" "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/p2p/net/connmgr" "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/p2p/net/swarm" @@ -65,6 +67,7 @@ import ( madns "github.com/multiformats/go-multiaddr-dns" "github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus" "google.golang.org/protobuf/proto" + "google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/timestamppb" ) // PeerstoreKeyPrivateIPFailed is the key used in the libp2p Peerstore to track @@ -282,6 +285,8 @@ type AgentMeshNode struct { catalogMCPServer *mcp.Server egressOnce sync.Once egressHandler http.Handler + + containmentDispatcher containment.Dispatcher } // SetTokenSource configures the live platform/OIDC token source presented as @@ -529,6 +534,16 @@ func NewAgentMeshNode(cfg Options) (*AgentMeshNode, error) { return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create label gate cache: %w", err) } + if cfg.ContainmentDispatcher != nil { + node.containmentDispatcher = cfg.ContainmentDispatcher + } else if cfg.Containment.Enabled || len(cfg.Containment.Endpoints) > 0 { + disp, err := containment.NewDispatcher(cfg.Containment) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create containment dispatcher: %w", err) + } + node.containmentDispatcher = disp + } + return node, nil } @@ -1730,6 +1745,12 @@ func (n *AgentMeshNode) RefreshEnrollment(ctx context.Context) error { // only a verified MeshEvent_BANNED is the control plane's word. The // node keeps serving on its current biscuit until that expires. body, _ := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, maxControlPlaneBodyBytes)) + var pidStr string + if pid, err := n.localPeerID(); err == nil { + pidStr = pid.String() + } + n.emitIdentityRevoked(pidStr, api.RevocationSource_TOKEN_REFRESH_REJECTION, + fmt.Sprintf("control plane refused token refresh (403 Forbidden): %s", string(body)), nil) return &RefreshError{ StatusCode: resp.StatusCode, Message: fmt.Sprintf("refresh refused (403 Forbidden): %s", string(body)), @@ -1935,6 +1956,7 @@ func (n *AgentMeshNode) handleBannedEvent(event *api.MeshEvent) { // Not written to disk: a restarted node picks the ban back up from the // control plane's ban set in /info, which is also how an unban reaches it. n.banPeer(p, eventMs) + n.emitIdentityRevoked(canonicalID, api.RevocationSource_MESH_EVENT_BANNED_GOSSIP, "peer banned via control-plane gossip broadcast", nil) } func containsTrustedKey(keys []TrustedKey, key ed25519.PublicKey) bool { @@ -2220,6 +2242,13 @@ func (n *AgentMeshNode) Teardown() error { n.services.TeardownAll() } var errs []error + if n.containmentDispatcher != nil { + drainCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 3*time.Second) + defer cancel() + if err := n.containmentDispatcher.Close(drainCtx); err != nil { + errs = append(errs, fmt.Errorf("containment dispatcher close: %w", err)) + } + } if n.Host != nil { if err := n.Host.Close(); err != nil { errs = append(errs, err) @@ -2228,6 +2257,231 @@ func (n *AgentMeshNode) Teardown() error { return errors.Join(errs...) } +// ContainmentDispatcher returns the active containment Dispatcher, or nil if unconfigured. +func (n *AgentMeshNode) ContainmentDispatcher() containment.Dispatcher { + if n == nil { + return nil + } + return n.containmentDispatcher +} + +// SetContainmentDispatcher injects a containment Dispatcher into the node. +func (n *AgentMeshNode) SetContainmentDispatcher(d containment.Dispatcher) { + if n == nil { + return + } + n.mu.Lock() + defer n.mu.Unlock() + n.containmentDispatcher = d +} + +// Close gracefully closes the containment dispatcher and tears down the node. +func (n *AgentMeshNode) Close() error { + return n.CloseWithContext(context.Background()) +} + +// CloseWithContext gracefully closes the containment dispatcher and tears down the node with ctx. +func (n *AgentMeshNode) CloseWithContext(ctx context.Context) error { + var errs []error + if n.containmentDispatcher != nil { + drainCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, 3*time.Second) + defer cancel() + if err := n.containmentDispatcher.Close(drainCtx); err != nil { + errs = append(errs, fmt.Errorf("containment dispatcher close: %w", err)) + } + } + if err := n.Teardown(); err != nil { + errs = append(errs, err) + } + return errors.Join(errs...) +} + +type callerDirectionKey struct{} + +// WithCallerDirection attaches an api.SignalCallerDirection to a context. +func WithCallerDirection(ctx context.Context, dir api.SignalCallerDirection) context.Context { + return context.WithValue(ctx, callerDirectionKey{}, dir) +} + +// CallerDirectionFromContext extracts an api.SignalCallerDirection from a context. +func CallerDirectionFromContext(ctx context.Context) (api.SignalCallerDirection, bool) { + if ctx == nil { + return api.SignalCallerDirection_SIGNAL_CALLER_DIRECTION_UNSPECIFIED, false + } + if val, ok := ctx.Value(callerDirectionKey{}).(api.SignalCallerDirection); ok { + return val, true + } + return api.SignalCallerDirection_SIGNAL_CALLER_DIRECTION_UNSPECIFIED, false +} + +func (n *AgentMeshNode) detectCallerDirection(r *http.Request, reqCtx *RequestContext) api.SignalCallerDirection { + if reqCtx != nil && reqCtx.Local { + return api.SignalCallerDirection_LOCAL_WORKLOAD + } + if r != nil { + if dir, ok := CallerDirectionFromContext(r.Context()); ok && dir != api.SignalCallerDirection_SIGNAL_CALLER_DIRECTION_UNSPECIFIED { + return dir + } + if fromLocalSocket(r) { + return api.SignalCallerDirection_LOCAL_WORKLOAD + } + if r.RemoteAddr != "" { + if _, err := peer.Decode(r.RemoteAddr); err == nil { + return api.SignalCallerDirection_REMOTE_PEER + } + } + } + if reqCtx != nil && reqCtx.PeerID != "" { + if n.Host != nil && reqCtx.PeerID == n.Host.ID() { + return api.SignalCallerDirection_LOCAL_WORKLOAD + } + return api.SignalCallerDirection_REMOTE_PEER + } + return api.SignalCallerDirection_LOCAL_WORKLOAD +} + +func (n *AgentMeshNode) eventSource() string { + if n != nil && n.Host != nil { + return fmt.Sprintf("agentmesh://node/%s", n.Host.ID().String()) + } + return "agentmesh://node/local" +} + +// PolicyDeniedParams bundles inputs for building a PolicyDeniedSignal. +type PolicyDeniedParams struct { + Direction api.SignalCallerDirection + Reason api.PolicyDenialReason + Detail string + TargetService string + RequestedOperation string + RequestedResource string + CallerPeerID string + CallerSubject string + CallerRoles []string + CallerLabels map[string]string + EventTime time.Time +} + +// EmitPolicyDenied constructs a CloudEvents 1.0 compliant SecuritySignalEvent +// and submits it to the containment Dispatcher asynchronously. Strictly non-blocking. +func (n *AgentMeshNode) EmitPolicyDenied(params PolicyDeniedParams) { + if n == nil || n.containmentDispatcher == nil { + return + } + + eventTime := params.EventTime + if eventTime.IsZero() { + eventTime = time.Now() + } + + var localPID string + if n.Host != nil { + localPID = n.Host.ID().String() + } + + callerPeer := params.CallerPeerID + if callerPeer == "" && params.Direction == api.SignalCallerDirection_LOCAL_WORKLOAD { + callerPeer = localPID + } + + subject := callerPeer + if subject == "" { + subject = params.CallerSubject + } + if subject == "" { + subject = localPID + } + + event := &api.SecuritySignalEvent{ + Source: n.eventSource(), + SpecVersion: "1.0", + Type: "agentmesh.policy.denied", + EventTime: timestamppb.New(eventTime), + DataContentType: "application/json", + Subject: subject, + Data: &api.SecuritySignalEvent_PolicyDenied{ + PolicyDenied: &api.PolicyDeniedSignal{ + Direction: params.Direction, + Reason: params.Reason, + Detail: params.Detail, + TargetService: params.TargetService, + RequestedOperation: params.RequestedOperation, + RequestedResource: params.RequestedResource, + CallerPeerId: callerPeer, + CallerSubject: params.CallerSubject, + CallerRoles: params.CallerRoles, + CallerLabels: params.CallerLabels, + EventTime: timestamppb.New(eventTime), + }, + }, + } + + n.containmentDispatcher.Dispatch(event) +} + +func (n *AgentMeshNode) emitTransportRefused(p peer.ID, maddr multiaddr.Multiaddr, proto protocol.ID, reason api.TransportRefusalReason, detail string) { + if n == nil || n.containmentDispatcher == nil { + return + } + var remoteMaddr string + if maddr != nil { + remoteMaddr = maddr.String() + } + peerIDStr := p.String() + now := timestamppb.Now() + event := &api.SecuritySignalEvent{ + Type: "agentmesh.transport.refused", + Subject: peerIDStr, + Source: n.eventSource(), + EventTime: now, + DataContentType: "application/json", + SpecVersion: "1.0", + Data: &api.SecuritySignalEvent_TransportRefused{ + TransportRefused: &api.TransportRefusedSignal{ + Reason: reason, + Detail: detail, + PeerId: peerIDStr, + RemoteMultiaddr: remoteMaddr, + ProtocolId: string(proto), + CoalescedCount: 1, + FirstSeenTime: now, + EventTime: now, + }, + }, + } + n.containmentDispatcher.Dispatch(event) +} + +func (n *AgentMeshNode) emitIdentityRevoked(peerID string, source api.RevocationSource, reason string, revocationIDs []string) { + if n == nil || n.containmentDispatcher == nil { + return + } + now := timestamppb.Now() + var issuer string + if n.Host != nil { + issuer = n.Host.ID().String() + } + event := &api.SecuritySignalEvent{ + Type: "agentmesh.identity.revoked", + Subject: peerID, + Source: n.eventSource(), + EventTime: now, + DataContentType: "application/json", + SpecVersion: "1.0", + Data: &api.SecuritySignalEvent_IdentityRevoked{ + IdentityRevoked: &api.IdentityRevokedSignal{ + PeerId: peerID, + Source: source, + Reason: reason, + RevocationIds: revocationIDs, + IssuerPeerId: issuer, + EventTime: now, + }, + }, + } + n.containmentDispatcher.Dispatch(event) +} + func (n *AgentMeshNode) IsServiceRegistered(serviceName string) bool { _, ok := n.services.Get(serviceName) return ok diff --git a/internal/node/options.go b/internal/node/options.go index 473e12f8..985cdc4d 100644 --- a/internal/node/options.go +++ b/internal/node/options.go @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ import ( "time" "github.com/google/agentmesh/api" + "github.com/google/agentmesh/internal/containment" "github.com/google/agentmesh/internal/identity" "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/crypto" "github.com/multiformats/go-multiaddr" @@ -184,6 +185,10 @@ type Options struct { // OnStreamRefused, when non-nil, is invoked whenever the libp2p auth gate // refuses an unauthenticated or non-router stream. OnStreamRefused func(scope, protocol string) + // Containment configures outbound containment webhook dispatching. + Containment containment.Config + // ContainmentDispatcher allows injecting a pre-built Dispatcher (e.g. for testing). + ContainmentDispatcher containment.Dispatcher } // Default applies default values to Options if they are not specified. diff --git a/sdk/js/src/gen/agentmesh_pb.ts b/sdk/js/src/gen/agentmesh_pb.ts index 7956a12f..b2405bd3 100644 --- a/sdk/js/src/gen/agentmesh_pb.ts +++ b/sdk/js/src/gen/agentmesh_pb.ts @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ import type { Message } from "@bufbuild/protobuf"; * Describes the file agentmesh.proto. */ export const file_agentmesh: GenFile = /*@__PURE__*/ - 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IMCgRyb2xlGAIgASgJEhAKCG93bmVyX2lkGAMgASgJEhIKCm1heF91c2FnZXMYBCABKAUSFAoMdXNhZ2VzX2NvdW50GAUgASgFEhMKC2Rlc2NyaXB0aW9uGAYgASgJEi8KC2NyZWF0ZV90aW1lGAcgASgLMhouZ29vZ2xlLnByb3RvYnVmLlRpbWVzdGFtcBIvCgtleHBpcmVfdGltZRgIIAEoCzIaLmdvb2dsZS5wcm90b2J1Zi5UaW1lc3RhbXASLwoLcmV2b2tlX3RpbWUYCSABKAsyGi5nb29nbGUucHJvdG9idWYuVGltZXN0YW1wEhsKE2F1dG9ub21vdXNfcmVjb3ZlcnkYCiABKAgSEQoJZXBoZW1lcmFsGAsgASgIIkoKGkJvb3RzdHJhcFRva2VuTGlzdFJlc3BvbnNlEiwKBnRva2VucxgBIAMoCzIcLmFnZW50bWVzaC52MS5Cb290c3RyYXBUb2tlbiLWAgoRRW5yb2xsbWVudFJlcXVlc3QSCgoCaWQYASABKAkSDwoHcGVlcl9pZBgCIAEoCRIQCgh0b2tlbl9pZBgDIAEoCRIuCgZzdGF0dXMYBCABKA4yHi5hZ2VudG1lc2gudjEuRW5yb2xsbWVudFN0YXR1cxI7CgZsYWJlbHMYBSADKAsyKy5hZ2VudG1lc2gudjEuRW5yb2xsbWVudFJlcXVlc3QuTGFiZWxzRW50cnkSLwoLY3JlYXRlX3RpbWUYBiABKAsyGi5nb29nbGUucHJvdG9idWYuVGltZXN0YW1wEjAKDHJlc29sdmVfdGltZRgHIAEoCzIaLmdvb2dsZS5wcm90b2J1Zi5UaW1lc3RhbXASEwoLcmVzb2x2ZWRfYnkYCCABKAkaLQoLTGFiZWxzRW50cnkSCwoDa2V5GAEgASgJEg0KBXZhbHVlGAIgASgJOgI4ASJSCh1FbnJvbGxtZW50UmVxdWVzdExpc3RSZXNwb25zZRIxCghyZXF1ZXN0cxgBIAMoCzIfLmFnZW50bWVzaC52MS5FbnJvbGxtZW50UmVxdWVzdCJwCgRVc2VyEgoKAmlkGAEgASgJEg4KBmlzc3VlchgCIAEoCRINCgVlbWFpbBgDIAEoCRIMCgRyb2xlGAQgASgJEi8KC2NyZWF0ZV90aW1lGAUgASgLMhouZ29vZ2xlLnByb3RvYnVmLlRpbWVzdGFtcCL2AgoMRW5yb2xsZWROb2RlEg8KB3BlZXJfaWQYASABKAkSDAoEcm9sZRgCIAEoCRIXCg9lbnJvbGxtZW50X3R5cGUYAyABKAkSEwoLY2xhaW1zX2pzb24YBCABKAkSEAoIb3duZXJfaWQYBSABKAkSNgoGbGFiZWxzGAYgAygLMiYuYWdlbnRtZXNoLnYxLkVucm9sbGVkTm9kZS5MYWJlbHNFbnRyeRIvCgtlbnJvbGxfdGltZRgHIAEoCzIaLmdvb2dsZS5wcm90b2J1Zi5UaW1lc3RhbXASLwoLZXhwaXJlX3RpbWUYCCABKAsyGi5nb29nbGUucHJvdG9idWYuVGltZXN0YW1wEg4KBmJhbm5lZBgJIAEoCBIbChNhdXRvbm9tb3VzX3JlY292ZXJ5GAogASgIEhEKCWVwaGVtZXJhbBgLIAEoCBotCgtMYWJlbHNFbnRyeRILCgNrZXkYASABKAkSDQoFdmFsdWUYAiABKAk6AjgBItkBCgtSb3V0ZXJMZWFzZRIPCgdwZWVyX2lkGAEgASgJEhEKCWFkZHJlc3NlcxgCIAMoCRI1ChFsYXN0X3JlbmV3YWxfdGltZRgDIAEoCzIaLmdvb2dsZS5wcm90b2J1Zi5UaW1lc3RhbXASLwoLZXhwaXJlX3RpbWUYBCABKAsyGi5nb29nbGUucHJvdG9idWYuVGltZXN0YW1wEhcKD2Nvbm5lY3RlZF9wZWVycxgFIAMoCRIQCghkaHRfc2l6ZRgGIAEoBRITCgtpbmdyZXNzX3VybBgHIAEoCSJsCgxOb2RlU2VydmljZXMSKwoIc2VydmljZXMYASADKAsyGS5hZ2VudG1lc2gudjEuU2VydmljZUluZm8SLwoLcmVwb3J0X3RpbWUYAiABKAsyGi5nb29nbGUucHJvdG9idWYuVGltZXN0YW1wItsDChNBZG1pblN0YXR1c1Jlc3BvbnNlEiEKBXVzZXJzGAEgAygLMhIuYWdlbnRtZXNoLnYxLlVzZXISMQoOYWN0aXZlX3JvdXRlcnMYAiADKAsyGS5hZ2VudG1lc2gudjEuUm91dGVyTGVhc2USMgoOZW5yb2xsZWRfbm9kZXMYAyADKAsyGi5hZ2VudG1lc2gudjEuRW5yb2xsZWROb2RlEjwKE2Vucm9sbG1lbnRfcmVxdWVzdHMYBCADKAsyHy5hZ2VudG1lc2gudjEuRW5yb2xsbWVudFJlcXVlc3QSNgoQYm9vdHN0cmFwX3Rva2VucxgFIAMoCzIcLmFnZW50bWVzaC52MS5Cb290c3RyYXBUb2tlbhIqCgZwb2xpY3kYBiABKAsyGi5hZ2VudG1lc2gudjEuUG9saWN5Q29uZmlnEkgKDG5vZGVfY2F0YWxvZxgHIAMoCzIyLmFnZW50bWVzaC52MS5BZG1pblN0YXR1c1Jlc3BvbnNlLk5vZGVDYXRhbG9nRW50cnkaTgoQTm9kZUNhdGFsb2dFbnRyeRILCgNrZXkYASABKAkSKQoFdmFsdWUYAiABKAsyGi5hZ2VudG1lc2gudjEuTm9kZVNlcnZpY2VzOgI4ASKBAgoSVXNlclN0YXR1c1Jlc3BvbnNlEiAKBHVzZXIYASABKAsyEi5hZ2VudG1lc2gudjEuVXNlchIyCg5lbnJvbGxlZF9ub2RlcxgCIAMoCzIaLmFnZW50bWVzaC52MS5FbnJvbGxlZE5vZGUSNgoQYm9vdHN0cmFwX3Rva2VucxgDIAMoCzIcLmFnZW50bWVzaC52MS5Cb290c3RyYXBUb2tlbhIxCg5hY3RpdmVfcm91dGVycxgEIAMoCzIZLmFnZW50bWVzaC52MS5Sb3V0ZXJMZWFzZRIqCgZwb2xpY3kYBSABKAsyGi5hZ2VudG1lc2gudjEuUG9saWN5Q29uZmlnIlYKEE5vZGVMaXN0UmVzcG9uc2USKQoFbm9kZXMYASADKAsyGi5hZ2VudG1lc2gudjEuRW5yb2xsZWROb2RlEhcKD25leHRfcGFnZV90b2tlbhgCIAEoCSLkAQoYSWRlbnRpdHlFdmlkZW5jZVJlc3BvbnNlEg8KB3BlZXJfaWQYASABKAkSDwoHYmlzY3VpdBgCIAEoDBI3ChNiaXNjdWl0X2V4cGlyZV90aW1lGAMgASgLMhouZ29vZ2xlLnByb3RvYnVmLlRpbWVzdGFtcBIZChFjb250cm9sX3BsYW5lX3VybBgEIAEoCRIiChp0cnVzdGVkX2NvbnRyb2xfcGxhbmVfa2V5cxgFIAMoDBIuCgpjaGVja190aW1lGAYgASgLMhouZ29vZ2xlLnByb3RvYnVmLlRpbWVzdGFtcCLGAgoUUGVlckV2aWRlbmNlUmVzcG9uc2USDwoHcGVlcl9pZBgBIAEoCRIPCgdiaXNjdWl0GAIgASgMEhUKDXZlcmlmeWluZ19rZXkYAyABKAwSDQoFcm9sZXMYBCADKAkSPgoGbGFiZWxzGAUgAygLMi4uYWdlbnRtZXNoLnYxLlBlZXJFdmlkZW5jZVJlc3BvbnNlLkxhYmVsc0VudHJ5Ei8KC2V4cGlyZV90aW1lGAYgASgLMhouZ29vZ2xlLnByb3RvYnVmLlRpbWVzdGFtcBIWCg5yZXZvY2F0aW9uX2lkcxgHIAMoCRIuCgpjaGVja190aW1lGAggASgLMhouZ29vZ2xlLnByb3RvYnVmLlRpbWVzdGFtcBotCgtMYWJlbHNFbnRyeRILCgNrZXkYASABKAkSDQoFdmFsdWUYAiABKAk6AjgBIowCChBNZW1iZXJDcmVkZW50aWFsEhkKEWNvbnRyb2xfcGxhbmVfdXJsGAEgASgJEg8KB2Jpc2N1aXQYAiABKAwSLwoLZXhwaXJlX3RpbWUYAyABKAsyGi5nb29nbGUucHJvdG9idWYuVGltZXN0YW1wEjUKDHRydXN0ZWRfa2V5cxgEIAMoCzIfLmFnZW50bWVzaC52MS5UcnVzdGVkU2lnbmluZ0tleRIZChFpc3N1ZWRfdW5kZXJfa2V5cxgFIAMoDBIYChByb3V0ZXJfYWRkcmVzc2VzGAYgAygJEi8KDG9pZGNfc2Vzc2lvbhgHIAEoCzIZLmFnZW50bWVzaC52MS5PSURDU2Vzc2lvbiJZChFUcnVzdGVkU2lnbmluZ0tleRISCgpwdWJsaWNfa2V5GAEgASgMEjAKDHJlY2VpdmVfdGltZRgCIAEoCzIaLmdvb2dsZS5wcm90b2J1Zi5UaW1lc3RhbXAiWQoLT0lEQ1Nlc3Npb24SDgoGaXNzdWVyGAEgASgJEhEKCWNsaWVudF9pZBgCIAEoCRIQCghhdWRpZW5jZRgDIAEoCRIVCg1yZWZyZXNoX3Rva2VuGAQgASgJIpMBChVUYXNrQXV0aG9yaXphdGlvblJ1bGUSDAoEbmFtZRgBIAEoCRIUCgxkaXNwbGF5X25hbWUYAiABKAkSJQoFcnVsZXMYAyADKAsyFi5hZ2VudG1lc2gudjEuVGFza1J1bGUSLwoLZXhwaXJlX3RpbWUYBCABKAsyGi5nb29nbGUucHJvdG9idWYuVGltZXN0YW1wIoQBCghUYXNrUnVsZRITCgtkZXNjcmlwdGlvbhgBIAEoCRIYChBhbGxvd2VkX3NlcnZpY2VzGAIgAygJEi4KCW9wZXJhdGlvbhgDIAEoCzIbLmFnZW50bWVzaC52MS5UYXNrT3BlcmF0aW9uEhkKEWFsbG93ZWRfcmVzb3VyY2VzGAQgAygJInMKDVRhc2tPcGVyYXRpb24SFQoNYWxsb3dlZF90b29scxgBIAMoCRIXCg9hbGxvd2VkX21ldGhvZHMYAiADKAkSFQoNYWxsb3dlZF9wYXRocxgDIAMoCRIbChNhbGxvd2VkX3Blcm1pc3Npb25zGAQgAygJIqsBChRUb2tlbkV4Y2hhbmdlUmVxdWVzdBIVCg1zdWJqZWN0X3Rva2VuGAEgASgJEjYKCXRhc2tfcnVsZRgCIAEoCzIjLmFnZW50bWVzaC52MS5UYXNrQXV0aG9yaXphdGlvblJ1bGUSDAoEc2VhbBgDIAEoCBIZChFjaGFsbGVuZ2VfdW5peF9tcxgEIAEoAxIbChNjaGFsbGVuZ2Vfc2lnbmF0dXJlGAUgASgMIn8KFVRva2VuRXhjaGFuZ2VSZXNwb25zZRIVCg1iaXNjdWl0X3Rva2VuGAEgASgMEi8KC2V4cGlyZV90aW1lGAIgASgLMhouZ29vZ2xlLnByb3RvYnVmLlRpbWVzdGFtcBINCgVyb2xlcxgDIAMoCRIPCgdzdWJqZWN0GAQgASgJIoEBCg9TVFNUb2tlblJlcXVlc3QSDwoHYmlzY3VpdBgBIAEoDBITCgtkZXN0aW5hdGlvbhgCIAEoCRIQCghhdWRpZW5jZRgDIAEoCRIZChFjaGFsbGVuZ2VfdW5peF9tcxgEIAEoAxIbChNjaGFsbGVuZ2Vfc2lnbmF0dXJlGAUgASgMIoMBChBTVFNUb2tlblJlc3BvbnNlEgsKA2p3dBgBIAEoCRIvCgtleHBpcmVfdGltZRgCIAEoCzIaLmdvb2dsZS5wcm90b2J1Zi5UaW1lc3RhbXASDwoHc3ViamVjdBgDIAEoCRINCgVyb2xlcxgEIAMoCRIRCgl0YXNrX25hbWUYBSABKAkiRgoTUmV2b2NhdGlvbnNSZXNwb25zZRIWCg5yZXZvY2F0aW9uX2lkcxgBIAMoCRIXCg9iYW5uZWRfcGVlcl9pZHMYAiADKAki1QMKElBvbGljeURlbmllZFNpZ25hbBI2CglkaXJlY3Rpb24YASABKA4yIy5hZ2VudG1lc2gudjEuU2lnbmFsQ2FsbGVyRGlyZWN0aW9uEjAKBnJlYXNvbhgCIAEoDjIgLmFnZW50bWVzaC52MS5Qb2xpY3lEZW5pYWxSZWFzb24SDgoGZGV0YWlsGAMgASgJEhYKDnRhcmdldF9zZXJ2aWNlGAQgASgJEhsKE3JlcXVlc3RlZF9vcGVyYXRpb24YBSABKAkSGgoScmVxdWVzdGVkX3Jlc291cmNlGAYgASgJEhYKDmNhbGxlcl9wZWVyX2lkGAcgASgJEhYKDmNhbGxlcl9zdWJqZWN0GAggASgJEhQKDGNhbGxlcl9yb2xlcxgJIAMoCRJJCg1jYWxsZXJfbGFiZWxzGAogAygLMjIuYWdlbnRtZXNoLnYxLlBvbGljeURlbmllZFNpZ25hbC5DYWxsZXJMYWJlbHNFbnRyeRIuCgpldmVudF90aW1lGAsgASgLMhouZ29vZ2xlLnByb3RvYnVmLlRpbWVzdGFtcBozChFDYWxsZXJMYWJlbHNFbnRyeRILCgNrZXkYASABKAkSDQoFdmFsdWUYAiABKAk6AjgBIpwCChZUcmFuc3BvcnRSZWZ1c2VkU2lnbmFsEjQKBnJlYXNvbhgBIAEoDjIkLmFnZW50bWVzaC52MS5UcmFuc3BvcnRSZWZ1c2FsUmVhc29uEg4KBmRldGFpbBgCIAEoCRIPCgdwZWVyX2lkGAMgASgJEhgKEHJlbW90ZV9tdWx0aWFkZHIYBCABKAkSEwoLcHJvdG9jb2xfaWQYBSABKAkSFwoPY29hbGVzY2VkX2NvdW50GAYgASgNEjMKD2ZpcnN0X3NlZW5fdGltZRgHIAEoCzIaLmdvb2dsZS5wcm90b2J1Zi5UaW1lc3RhbXASLgoKZXZlbnRfdGltZRgIIAEoCzIaLmdvb2dsZS5wcm90b2J1Zi5UaW1lc3RhbXAiyAEKFUlkZW50aXR5UmV2b2tlZFNpZ25hbBIPCgdwZWVyX2lkGAEgASgJEi4KBnNvdXJjZRgCIAEoDjIeLmFnZW50bWVzaC52MS5SZXZvY2F0aW9uU291cmNlEg4KBnJlYXNvbhgDIAEoCRIWCg5yZXZvY2F0aW9uX2lkcxgEIAMoCRIWCg5pc3N1ZXJfcGVlcl9pZBgFIAEoCRIuCgpldmVudF90aW1lGAYgASgLMhouZ29vZ2xlLnByb3RvYnVmLlRpbWVzdGFtcCKfAwoYRW5yb2xsbWVudFJlamVjdGVkU2lnbmFsEg8KB3BlZXJfaWQYASABKAkSFgoOcmVxdWVzdGVkX3JvbGUYAiABKAkSNwoGcmVhc29uGAMgASgOMicuYWdlbnRtZXNoLnYxLkVucm9sbG1lbnRSZWplY3Rpb25SZWFzb24SDgoGZGV0YWlsGAQgASgJEhoKEmJvb3RzdHJhcF90b2tlbl9pZBgFIAEoCRIWCg5yZW1vdGVfYWRkcmVzcxgGIAEoCRJVChBzdWJtaXR0ZWRfbGFiZWxzGAcgAygLMjsuYWdlbnRtZXNoLnYxLkVucm9sbG1lbnRSZWplY3RlZFNpZ25hbC5TdWJtaXR0ZWRMYWJlbHNFbnRyeRIeChZpc19hdXRvbm9tb3VzX3JlY292ZXJ5GAggASgIEi4KCmV2ZW50X3RpbWUYCSABKAsyGi5nb29nbGUucHJvdG9idWYuVGltZXN0YW1wGjYKFFN1Ym1pdHRlZExhYmVsc0VudHJ5EgsKA2tleRgBIAEoCRINCgV2YWx1ZRgCIAEoCToCOAEivwMKE1NlY3VyaXR5U2lnbmFsRXZlbnQSCgoCaWQYASABKAkSDgoGc291cmNlGAIgASgJEhQKDHNwZWNfdmVyc2lvbhgDIAEoCRIMCgR0eXBlGAQgASgJEi4KCmV2ZW50X3RpbWUYBSABKAsyGi5nb29nbGUucHJvdG9idWYuVGltZXN0YW1wEhkKEWRhdGFfY29udGVudF90eXBlGAYgASgJEg8KB3N1YmplY3QYByABKAkSOQoNcG9saWN5X2RlbmllZBgIIAEoCzIgLmFnZW50bWVzaC52MS5Qb2xpY3lEZW5pZWRTaWduYWxIABJBChF0cmFuc3BvcnRfcmVmdXNlZBgJIAEoCzIkLmFnZW50bWVzaC52MS5UcmFuc3BvcnRSZWZ1c2VkU2lnbmFsSAASPwoQaWRlbnRpdHlfcmV2b2tlZBgKIAEoCzIjLmFnZW50bWVzaC52MS5JZGVudGl0eVJldm9rZWRTaWduYWxIABJFChNlbnJvbGxtZW50X3JlamVjdGVkGAsgASgLMiYuYWdlbnRtZXNoLnYxLkVucm9sbG1lbnRSZWplY3RlZFNpZ25hbEgAQgYKBGRhdGEi3QEKFVdlYmhvb2tFbmRwb2ludENvbmZpZxILCgN1cmwYASABKAkSGAoQaG1hY19zZWNyZXRfcGF0aBgCIAEoCRIUCgxjYV9jZXJ0X3BhdGgYAyABKAkSGAoQY2xpZW50X2NlcnRfcGF0aBgEIAEoCRIXCg9jbGllbnRfa2V5X3BhdGgYBSABKAkSKgoHdGltZW91dBgGIAEoCzIZLmdvb2dsZS5wcm90b2J1Zi5EdXJhdGlvbhITCgttYXhfcmV0cmllcxgHIAEoDRITCgtldmVudF90eXBlcxgIIAMoCSKuAQoVU2VjdXJpdHlTaWduYWxzQ29uZmlnEg8KB2VuYWJsZWQYASABKAgSNgoJZW5kcG9pbnRzGAIgAygLMiMuYWdlbnRtZXNoLnYxLldlYmhvb2tFbmRwb2ludENvbmZpZxIWCg5xdWV1ZV9jYXBhY2l0eRgDIAEoDRI0ChFjb2FsZXNjaW5nX3dpbmRvdxgEIAEoCzIZLmdvb2dsZS5wcm90b2J1Zi5EdXJhdGlvbiqUAQoQRW5yb2xsbWVudFN0YXR1cxIhCh1FTlJPTExNRU5UX1NUQVRVU19VTlNQRUNJRklFRBAAEh0KGUVOUk9MTE1FTlRfU1RBVFVTX1BFTkRJTkcQARIeChpFTlJPTExNRU5UX1NUQVRVU19BUFBST1ZFRBACEh4KGkVOUk9MTE1FTlRfU1RBVFVTX1JFSkVDVEVEEAMqjAEKC1NlcnZpY2VUeXBlEhwKGFNFUlZJQ0VfVFlQRV9VTlNQRUNJRklFRBAAEhQKEFNFUlZJQ0VfVFlQRV9NQ1AQARIaChZTRVJWSUNFX1RZUEVfSU5GRVJFTkNFEAISFAoQU0VSVklDRV9UWVBFX0EyQRADEhcKE1NFUlZJQ0VfVFlQRV9FR1JFU1MQBCpzCg9JbmdyZXNzQXV0aE1vZGUSIQodSU5HUkVTU19BVVRIX01PREVfVU5TUEVDSUZJRUQQABIaChZJTkdSRVNTX0FVVEhfTU9ERV9FREdFEAESIQodSU5HUkVTU19BVVRIX01PREVfUEFTU1RIUk9VR0gQAio3CgpFZ3Jlc3NNb2RlEhQKEEVHUkVTU19NT0RFX0hUVFAQABITCg9FR1JFU1NfTU9ERV9UQ1AQASpcChJSZXNwb25zZUluc3BlY3Rpb24SIAocUkVTUE9OU0VfSU5TUEVDVElPTl9CVUZGRVJFRBAAEiQKIFJFU1BPTlNFX0lOU1BFQ1RJT05fUkVRVUVTVF9PTkxZEAEqZQoVU2lnbmFsQ2FsbGVyRGlyZWN0aW9uEicKI1NJR05BTF9DQUxMRVJfRElSRUNUSU9OX1VOU1BFQ0lGSUVEEAASEgoOTE9DQUxfV09SS0xPQUQQARIPCgtSRU1PVEVfUEVFUhACKoUCChJQb2xpY3lEZW5pYWxSZWFzb24SJAogUE9MSUNZX0RFTklBTF9SRUFTT05fVU5TUEVDSUZJRUQQABIdChlEQVRBTE9HX0VWQUxVQVRJT05fREVOSUVEEAESJQohVEFTS19BVVRIT1JJWkFUSU9OX1JVTEVfVklPTEFUSU9OEAISHQoZSU5TUEVDVElPTl9GSUxURVJfQkxPQ0tFRBADEhEKDVJPTEVfTUlTTUFUQ0gQBBIWChJFWFBJUkVEX0NSRURFTlRJQUwQBRIYChRVTkFVVEhPUklaRURfU0VSVklDRRAGEh8KG1VOQVVUSE9SSVpFRF9QQVRIX09SX01FVEhPRBAHKrkBChZUcmFuc3BvcnRSZWZ1c2FsUmVhc29uEigKJFRSQU5TUE9SVF9SRUZVU0FMX1JFQVNPTl9VTlNQRUNJRklFRBAAEhgKFFBFRVJfVU5BVVRIRU5USUNBVEVEEAESEwoPTk9UX1JPVVRFUl9ST0xFEAISGgoWQVVUSF9ERUFETElORV9FWENFRURFRBADEg8KC1BFRVJfQkFOTkVEEAQSGQoVUFJPVE9DT0xfVU5BVVRIT1JJWkVEEAUqpwEKEFJldm9jYXRpb25Tb3VyY2USIQodUkVWT0NBVElPTl9TT1VSQ0VfVU5TUEVDSUZJRUQQABIXChNDT05UUk9MX1BMQU5FX0FETUlOEAESHAoYTUVTSF9FVkVOVF9CQU5ORURfR09TU0lQEAISHAoYTE9DQUxfQ09OVFJPTF9QTEFORV9TWU5DEAMSGwoXVE9LRU5fUkVGUkVTSF9SRUpFQ1RJT04QBCq6AgoZRW5yb2xsbWVudFJlamVjdGlvblJlYXNvbhIrCidFTlJPTExNRU5UX1JFSkVDVElPTl9SRUFTT05fVU5TUEVDSUZJRUQQABIPCgtJTlZBTElEX0pXVBABEhsKF0VYUElSRURfQk9PVFNUUkFQX1RPS0VOEAISIgoeQk9PVFNUUkFQX1RPS0VOX1VTQUdFX0VYQ0VFREVEEAMSHgoaVU5BVFRFU1RFRF9MQUJFTFNfUkVKRUNURUQQBBIfChtJTlZBTElEX0NIQUxMRU5HRV9TSUdOQVRVUkUQBRIfChtSRVFVRVNURURfUk9MRV9VTkFVVEhPUklaRUQQBhIaChZQRUVSX1BSRVZJT1VTTFlfQkFOTkVEEAcSIAocQVVUT05PTU9VU19SRUNPVkVSWV9ESVNBQkxFRBAIQiFaH2dpdGh1Yi5jb20vZ29vZ2xlL2FnZW50bWVzaC9hcGliBnByb3RvMw", [file_google_protobuf_duration, file_google_protobuf_timestamp]); /** * @generated from message agentmesh.v1.AuthFrame @@ -3228,6 +3228,512 @@ export type RevocationsResponse = Message<"agentmesh.v1.RevocationsResponse"> & export const RevocationsResponseSchema: GenMessage = /*@__PURE__*/ messageDesc(file_agentmesh, 76); +/** + * Emitted as CloudEvents type "agentmesh.policy.denied" when an authorization check, + * TAR rule narrowing, or inspection filter rejects a request. + * + * @generated from message agentmesh.v1.PolicyDeniedSignal + */ +export type PolicyDeniedSignal = Message<"agentmesh.v1.PolicyDeniedSignal"> & { + /** + * Direction of the caller: LOCAL_WORKLOAD vs REMOTE_PEER. + * + * @generated from field: agentmesh.v1.SignalCallerDirection direction = 1; + */ + direction: SignalCallerDirection; + + /** + * Structured policy denial reason code. + * + * @generated from field: agentmesh.v1.PolicyDenialReason reason = 2; + */ + reason: PolicyDenialReason; + + /** + * Human-readable detail or rejection explanation. + * + * @generated from field: string detail = 3; + */ + detail: string; + + /** + * Target service requested (e.g. "bigquery", "calculator-mcp"). + * + * @generated from field: string target_service = 4; + */ + targetService: string; + + /** + * Requested operation (e.g. HTTP method "POST" or MCP tool "execute"). + * + * @generated from field: string requested_operation = 5; + */ + requestedOperation: string; + + /** + * Requested path or resource pattern (e.g. "/v1/projects/*"). + * + * @generated from field: string requested_resource = 6; + */ + requestedResource: string; + + /** + * Caller peer ID (if REMOTE_PEER or known). + * + * @generated from field: string caller_peer_id = 7; + */ + callerPeerId: string; + + /** + * Caller principal/subject from Biscuit or JWT. + * + * @generated from field: string caller_subject = 8; + */ + callerSubject: string; + + /** + * Caller roles extracted from Biscuit authority/delegation blocks. + * + * @generated from field: repeated string caller_roles = 9; + */ + callerRoles: string[]; + + /** + * Attested caller labels from Biscuit. + * + * @generated from field: map caller_labels = 10; + */ + callerLabels: { [key: string]: string }; + + /** + * Instant when policy denial occurred. Per AGENTS.md, MUST be named *_time. + * + * @generated from field: google.protobuf.Timestamp event_time = 11; + */ + eventTime?: Timestamp | undefined; +}; + +/** + * Describes the message agentmesh.v1.PolicyDeniedSignal. + * Use `create(PolicyDeniedSignalSchema)` to create a new message. + */ +export const PolicyDeniedSignalSchema: GenMessage = /*@__PURE__*/ + messageDesc(file_agentmesh, 77); + +/** + * Emitted as CloudEvents type "agentmesh.transport.refused" when the connection + * or stream auth gate (internal/node/auth_gate.go) rejects an incoming stream/peer. + * + * @generated from message agentmesh.v1.TransportRefusedSignal + */ +export type TransportRefusedSignal = Message<"agentmesh.v1.TransportRefusedSignal"> & { + /** + * Structured reason code for transport refusal. + * + * @generated from field: agentmesh.v1.TransportRefusalReason reason = 1; + */ + reason: TransportRefusalReason; + + /** + * Human-readable detail message. + * + * @generated from field: string detail = 2; + */ + detail: string; + + /** + * Remote libp2p peer ID string. + * + * @generated from field: string peer_id = 3; + */ + peerId: string; + + /** + * Remote multiaddr string (e.g. "/ip4/192.168.1.10/tcp/4001"). + * + * @generated from field: string remote_multiaddr = 4; + */ + remoteMultiaddr: string; + + /** + * Protocol ID requested (e.g. "/agentmesh/auth", "/libp2p-http"). + * + * @generated from field: string protocol_id = 5; + */ + protocolId: string; + + /** + * Coalesced refusal count within the deduplication window (>= 1). + * + * @generated from field: uint32 coalesced_count = 6; + */ + coalescedCount: number; + + /** + * Timestamp of the first observed rejection in this coalescing window. + * + * @generated from field: google.protobuf.Timestamp first_seen_time = 7; + */ + firstSeenTime?: Timestamp | undefined; + + /** + * Timestamp of the most recent rejection. Per AGENTS.md, MUST be named *_time. + * + * @generated from field: google.protobuf.Timestamp event_time = 8; + */ + eventTime?: Timestamp | undefined; +}; + +/** + * Describes the message agentmesh.v1.TransportRefusedSignal. + * Use `create(TransportRefusedSignalSchema)` to create a new message. + */ +export const TransportRefusedSignalSchema: GenMessage = /*@__PURE__*/ + messageDesc(file_agentmesh, 78); + +/** + * Emitted as CloudEvents type "agentmesh.identity.revoked" when a peer identity + * or Biscuit token is revoked or banned. + * + * @generated from message agentmesh.v1.IdentityRevokedSignal + */ +export type IdentityRevokedSignal = Message<"agentmesh.v1.IdentityRevokedSignal"> & { + /** + * Subject peer ID that has been revoked or banned. + * + * @generated from field: string peer_id = 1; + */ + peerId: string; + + /** + * Source or trigger of the revocation. + * + * @generated from field: agentmesh.v1.RevocationSource source = 2; + */ + source: RevocationSource; + + /** + * Revocation reason provided by administrator or policy. + * + * @generated from field: string reason = 3; + */ + reason: string; + + /** + * Hex-encoded Biscuit authority revocation IDs (RevocationIds()[0]). + * + * @generated from field: repeated string revocation_ids = 4; + */ + revocationIds: string[]; + + /** + * Peer ID of the node or control plane emitting the revocation. + * + * @generated from field: string issuer_peer_id = 5; + */ + issuerPeerId: string; + + /** + * Instant when the revocation occurred. Per AGENTS.md, MUST be named *_time. + * + * @generated from field: google.protobuf.Timestamp event_time = 6; + */ + eventTime?: Timestamp | undefined; +}; + +/** + * Describes the message agentmesh.v1.IdentityRevokedSignal. + * Use `create(IdentityRevokedSignalSchema)` to create a new message. + */ +export const IdentityRevokedSignalSchema: GenMessage = /*@__PURE__*/ + messageDesc(file_agentmesh, 79); + +/** + * Emitted as CloudEvents type "agentmesh.enrollment.rejected" when enrollment + * or autonomous token recovery is rejected on /enroll or /refresh. + * + * @generated from message agentmesh.v1.EnrollmentRejectedSignal + */ +export type EnrollmentRejectedSignal = Message<"agentmesh.v1.EnrollmentRejectedSignal"> & { + /** + * Peer ID attempting enrollment or recovery. + * + * @generated from field: string peer_id = 1; + */ + peerId: string; + + /** + * Role requested in the enrollment attempt. + * + * @generated from field: string requested_role = 2; + */ + requestedRole: string; + + /** + * Structured reason code for rejection. + * + * @generated from field: agentmesh.v1.EnrollmentRejectionReason reason = 3; + */ + reason: EnrollmentRejectionReason; + + /** + * Human-readable detail message. + * + * @generated from field: string detail = 4; + */ + detail: string; + + /** + * Bootstrap token ID used (if bootstrap enrollment). + * + * @generated from field: string bootstrap_token_id = 5; + */ + bootstrapTokenId: string; + + /** + * Remote IP address or multiaddr of the enrollment requester. + * + * @generated from field: string remote_address = 6; + */ + remoteAddress: string; + + /** + * Labels submitted in the enrollment request. + * + * @generated from field: map submitted_labels = 7; + */ + submittedLabels: { [key: string]: string }; + + /** + * True if this rejection occurred during an autonomous recovery attempt on /refresh. + * + * @generated from field: bool is_autonomous_recovery = 8; + */ + isAutonomousRecovery: boolean; + + /** + * Instant when rejection occurred. Per AGENTS.md, MUST be named *_time. + * + * @generated from field: google.protobuf.Timestamp event_time = 9; + */ + eventTime?: Timestamp | undefined; +}; + +/** + * Describes the message agentmesh.v1.EnrollmentRejectedSignal. + * Use `create(EnrollmentRejectedSignalSchema)` to create a new message. + */ +export const EnrollmentRejectedSignalSchema: GenMessage = /*@__PURE__*/ + messageDesc(file_agentmesh, 80); + +/** + * SecuritySignalEvent is the CloudEvents 1.0 compliant envelope for dispatching + * security state transitions to external runtimes over HTTP or Unix sockets. + * + * @generated from message agentmesh.v1.SecuritySignalEvent + */ +export type SecuritySignalEvent = Message<"agentmesh.v1.SecuritySignalEvent"> & { + /** + * CloudEvents 'id': Unique event identifier (UUID v4). + * + * @generated from field: string id = 1; + */ + id: string; + + /** + * CloudEvents 'source': URI identifying the emitting context (e.g. "urn:agentmesh:node:"). + * + * @generated from field: string source = 2; + */ + source: string; + + /** + * CloudEvents 'specversion': The CloudEvents specification version (always "1.0"). + * + * @generated from field: string spec_version = 3; + */ + specVersion: string; + + /** + * CloudEvents 'type': Event type (e.g. "agentmesh.policy.denied"). + * + * @generated from field: string type = 4; + */ + type: string; + + /** + * CloudEvents 'time': Event generation instant. Per AGENTS.md, MUST be named *_time. + * + * @generated from field: google.protobuf.Timestamp event_time = 5; + */ + eventTime?: Timestamp | undefined; + + /** + * CloudEvents 'datacontenttype': MIME type ("application/json" or "application/x-protobuf"). + * + * @generated from field: string data_content_type = 6; + */ + dataContentType: string; + + /** + * CloudEvents 'subject': Subject peer ID or identifier. + * + * @generated from field: string subject = 7; + */ + subject: string; + + /** + * Typed signal payload (mutually exclusive). + * + * @generated from oneof agentmesh.v1.SecuritySignalEvent.data + */ + data: { + /** + * @generated from field: agentmesh.v1.PolicyDeniedSignal policy_denied = 8; + */ + value: PolicyDeniedSignal; + case: "policyDenied"; + } | { + /** + * @generated from field: agentmesh.v1.TransportRefusedSignal transport_refused = 9; + */ + value: TransportRefusedSignal; + case: "transportRefused"; + } | { + /** + * @generated from field: agentmesh.v1.IdentityRevokedSignal identity_revoked = 10; + */ + value: IdentityRevokedSignal; + case: "identityRevoked"; + } | { + /** + * @generated from field: agentmesh.v1.EnrollmentRejectedSignal enrollment_rejected = 11; + */ + value: EnrollmentRejectedSignal; + case: "enrollmentRejected"; + } | { case: undefined; value?: undefined }; +}; + +/** + * Describes the message agentmesh.v1.SecuritySignalEvent. + * Use `create(SecuritySignalEventSchema)` to create a new message. + */ +export const SecuritySignalEventSchema: GenMessage = /*@__PURE__*/ + messageDesc(file_agentmesh, 81); + +/** + * WebhookEndpointConfig defines a single outbound destination for security signals. + * + * @generated from message agentmesh.v1.WebhookEndpointConfig + */ +export type WebhookEndpointConfig = Message<"agentmesh.v1.WebhookEndpointConfig"> & { + /** + * Target URL: https://..., http://127.0.0.1:, or unix:/path/to.sock. + * + * @generated from field: string url = 1; + */ + url: string; + + /** + * File path to the shared secret for HMAC-SHA256 signing (X-AgentMesh-Signature). + * Per AGENTS.md secret hygiene, MUST be a file path, never an inline secret string. + * + * @generated from field: string hmac_secret_path = 2; + */ + hmacSecretPath: string; + + /** + * File path to CA certificate bundle for server TLS verification. + * + * @generated from field: string ca_cert_path = 3; + */ + caCertPath: string; + + /** + * File path to client TLS certificate for mTLS authentication. + * + * @generated from field: string client_cert_path = 4; + */ + clientCertPath: string; + + /** + * File path to client TLS private key for mTLS authentication. + * + * @generated from field: string client_key_path = 5; + */ + clientKeyPath: string; + + /** + * Per-dispatch HTTP request / socket write deadline. + * + * @generated from field: google.protobuf.Duration timeout = 6; + */ + timeout?: Duration | undefined; + + /** + * Maximum retry attempts for transient delivery failures (default: 3). + * + * @generated from field: uint32 max_retries = 7; + */ + maxRetries: number; + + /** + * Filter list of event types to dispatch. If empty, all signals are sent. + * + * @generated from field: repeated string event_types = 8; + */ + eventTypes: string[]; +}; + +/** + * Describes the message agentmesh.v1.WebhookEndpointConfig. + * Use `create(WebhookEndpointConfigSchema)` to create a new message. + */ +export const WebhookEndpointConfigSchema: GenMessage = /*@__PURE__*/ + messageDesc(file_agentmesh, 82); + +/** + * SecuritySignalsConfig configures out-of-band security signal dispatching. + * + * @generated from message agentmesh.v1.SecuritySignalsConfig + */ +export type SecuritySignalsConfig = Message<"agentmesh.v1.SecuritySignalsConfig"> & { + /** + * True if security signal dispatching is enabled. + * + * @generated from field: bool enabled = 1; + */ + enabled: boolean; + + /** + * Destination endpoints. + * + * @generated from field: repeated agentmesh.v1.WebhookEndpointConfig endpoints = 2; + */ + endpoints: WebhookEndpointConfig[]; + + /** + * Bounded ring-buffer queue capacity (default: 1024). + * + * @generated from field: uint32 queue_capacity = 3; + */ + queueCapacity: number; + + /** + * Window duration for coalescing repetitive events. + * + * @generated from field: google.protobuf.Duration coalescing_window = 4; + */ + coalescingWindow?: Duration | undefined; +}; + +/** + * Describes the message agentmesh.v1.SecuritySignalsConfig. + * Use `create(SecuritySignalsConfigSchema)` to create a new message. + */ +export const SecuritySignalsConfigSchema: GenMessage = /*@__PURE__*/ + messageDesc(file_agentmesh, 83); + /** * @generated from enum agentmesh.v1.EnrollmentStatus */ @@ -3375,3 +3881,275 @@ export enum ResponseInspection { export const ResponseInspectionSchema: GenEnum = /*@__PURE__*/ enumDesc(file_agentmesh, 4); +/** + * Direction of the caller when a security event or policy evaluation occurs. + * + * @generated from enum agentmesh.v1.SignalCallerDirection + */ +export enum SignalCallerDirection { + /** + * @generated from enum value: SIGNAL_CALLER_DIRECTION_UNSPECIFIED = 0; + */ + SIGNAL_CALLER_DIRECTION_UNSPECIFIED = 0, + + /** + * A local workload/agent process invoking the agentmesh-node sidecar. + * + * @generated from enum value: LOCAL_WORKLOAD = 1; + */ + LOCAL_WORKLOAD = 1, + + /** + * An external or remote peer sending traffic across the mesh network. + * + * @generated from enum value: REMOTE_PEER = 2; + */ + REMOTE_PEER = 2, +} + +/** + * Describes the enum agentmesh.v1.SignalCallerDirection. + */ +export const SignalCallerDirectionSchema: GenEnum = /*@__PURE__*/ + enumDesc(file_agentmesh, 5); + +/** + * Reason codes for policy evaluation denial. + * + * @generated from enum agentmesh.v1.PolicyDenialReason + */ +export enum PolicyDenialReason { + /** + * @generated from enum value: POLICY_DENIAL_REASON_UNSPECIFIED = 0; + */ + POLICY_DENIAL_REASON_UNSPECIFIED = 0, + + /** + * Denied by Biscuit Datalog authorization policy evaluation. + * + * @generated from enum value: DATALOG_EVALUATION_DENIED = 1; + */ + DATALOG_EVALUATION_DENIED = 1, + + /** + * Denied by TaskAuthorizationRule (tar_block) narrowing or operation constraints. + * + * @generated from enum value: TASK_AUTHORIZATION_RULE_VIOLATION = 2; + */ + TASK_AUTHORIZATION_RULE_VIOLATION = 2, + + /** + * Blocked by an inspection filter (ModelArmor or ExtProc). + * + * @generated from enum value: INSPECTION_FILTER_BLOCKED = 3; + */ + INSPECTION_FILTER_BLOCKED = 3, + + /** + * Caller does not possess the required PolicyRole. + * + * @generated from enum value: ROLE_MISMATCH = 4; + */ + ROLE_MISMATCH = 4, + + /** + * Caller credential or Biscuit has expired. + * + * @generated from enum value: EXPIRED_CREDENTIAL = 5; + */ + EXPIRED_CREDENTIAL = 5, + + /** + * Requested service name is not allowed by policy. + * + * @generated from enum value: UNAUTHORIZED_SERVICE = 6; + */ + UNAUTHORIZED_SERVICE = 6, + + /** + * Requested HTTP method or path pattern is not permitted by HTTPGrant. + * + * @generated from enum value: UNAUTHORIZED_PATH_OR_METHOD = 7; + */ + UNAUTHORIZED_PATH_OR_METHOD = 7, +} + +/** + * Describes the enum agentmesh.v1.PolicyDenialReason. + */ +export const PolicyDenialReasonSchema: GenEnum = /*@__PURE__*/ + enumDesc(file_agentmesh, 6); + +/** + * Reason codes for libp2p connection or stream gate refusals. + * + * @generated from enum agentmesh.v1.TransportRefusalReason + */ +export enum TransportRefusalReason { + /** + * @generated from enum value: TRANSPORT_REFUSAL_REASON_UNSPECIFIED = 0; + */ + TRANSPORT_REFUSAL_REASON_UNSPECIFIED = 0, + + /** + * Remote peer did not complete authentication within deadline. + * + * @generated from enum value: PEER_UNAUTHENTICATED = 1; + */ + PEER_UNAUTHENTICATED = 1, + + /** + * Remote peer attempted to access a router-only protocol without mesh:role:router. + * + * @generated from enum value: NOT_ROUTER_ROLE = 2; + */ + NOT_ROUTER_ROLE = 2, + + /** + * Auth handshake wait timed out. + * + * @generated from enum value: AUTH_DEADLINE_EXCEEDED = 3; + */ + AUTH_DEADLINE_EXCEEDED = 3, + + /** + * Remote peer is in the banned/revocation set. + * + * @generated from enum value: PEER_BANNED = 4; + */ + PEER_BANNED = 4, + + /** + * Protocol requested is not permitted for the peer's role. + * + * @generated from enum value: PROTOCOL_UNAUTHORIZED = 5; + */ + PROTOCOL_UNAUTHORIZED = 5, +} + +/** + * Describes the enum agentmesh.v1.TransportRefusalReason. + */ +export const TransportRefusalReasonSchema: GenEnum = /*@__PURE__*/ + enumDesc(file_agentmesh, 7); + +/** + * Provenance/source of an identity revocation. + * + * @generated from enum agentmesh.v1.RevocationSource + */ +export enum RevocationSource { + /** + * @generated from enum value: REVOCATION_SOURCE_UNSPECIFIED = 0; + */ + REVOCATION_SOURCE_UNSPECIFIED = 0, + + /** + * Administrative action on agentmesh-control-plane. + * + * @generated from enum value: CONTROL_PLANE_ADMIN = 1; + */ + CONTROL_PLANE_ADMIN = 1, + + /** + * MeshEvent.BANNED received via gossip / SSE broadcast. + * + * @generated from enum value: MESH_EVENT_BANNED_GOSSIP = 2; + */ + MESH_EVENT_BANNED_GOSSIP = 2, + + /** + * Reconciled during control-plane synchronization. + * + * @generated from enum value: LOCAL_CONTROL_PLANE_SYNC = 3; + */ + LOCAL_CONTROL_PLANE_SYNC = 3, + + /** + * Token refresh endpoint refused due to active ban. + * + * @generated from enum value: TOKEN_REFRESH_REJECTION = 4; + */ + TOKEN_REFRESH_REJECTION = 4, +} + +/** + * Describes the enum agentmesh.v1.RevocationSource. + */ +export const RevocationSourceSchema: GenEnum = /*@__PURE__*/ + enumDesc(file_agentmesh, 8); + +/** + * Reason codes for enrollment rejection. + * + * @generated from enum agentmesh.v1.EnrollmentRejectionReason + */ +export enum EnrollmentRejectionReason { + /** + * @generated from enum value: ENROLLMENT_REJECTION_REASON_UNSPECIFIED = 0; + */ + ENROLLMENT_REJECTION_REASON_UNSPECIFIED = 0, + + /** + * Platform JWT token validation failed (signature, audience, issuer). + * + * @generated from enum value: INVALID_JWT = 1; + */ + INVALID_JWT = 1, + + /** + * Bootstrap token has expired. + * + * @generated from enum value: EXPIRED_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN = 2; + */ + EXPIRED_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN = 2, + + /** + * Bootstrap token max usage limit reached. + * + * @generated from enum value: BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_USAGE_EXCEEDED = 3; + */ + BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_USAGE_EXCEEDED = 3, + + /** + * Requested labels failed policy attestation. + * + * @generated from enum value: UNATTESTED_LABELS_REJECTED = 4; + */ + UNATTESTED_LABELS_REJECTED = 4, + + /** + * Proof of possession challenge signature is invalid. + * + * @generated from enum value: INVALID_CHALLENGE_SIGNATURE = 5; + */ + INVALID_CHALLENGE_SIGNATURE = 5, + + /** + * Requested role is not permitted for the caller identity. + * + * @generated from enum value: REQUESTED_ROLE_UNAUTHORIZED = 6; + */ + REQUESTED_ROLE_UNAUTHORIZED = 6, + + /** + * Peer is in the banned peer list. + * + * @generated from enum value: PEER_PREVIOUSLY_BANNED = 7; + */ + PEER_PREVIOUSLY_BANNED = 7, + + /** + * Autonomous token recovery is disabled for the token or node. + * + * @generated from enum value: AUTONOMOUS_RECOVERY_DISABLED = 8; + */ + AUTONOMOUS_RECOVERY_DISABLED = 8, +} + +/** + * Describes the enum agentmesh.v1.EnrollmentRejectionReason. + */ +export const EnrollmentRejectionReasonSchema: GenEnum = /*@__PURE__*/ + enumDesc(file_agentmesh, 9); + diff --git a/sdk/python/src/agent_mesh/_proto/agentmesh_pb2.py b/sdk/python/src/agent_mesh/_proto/agentmesh_pb2.py index 2d918739..66f4ac58 100644 --- a/sdk/python/src/agent_mesh/_proto/agentmesh_pb2.py +++ b/sdk/python/src/agent_mesh/_proto/agentmesh_pb2.py @@ -1,11 +1,22 @@ # -*- coding: utf-8 -*- # Generated by the protocol buffer compiler. DO NOT EDIT! +# NO CHECKED-IN PROTOBUF GENCODE # source: agentmesh.proto +# Protobuf Python Version: 5.28.3 """Generated protocol buffer code.""" -from google.protobuf.internal import builder as _builder from google.protobuf import descriptor as _descriptor from google.protobuf import descriptor_pool as _descriptor_pool +from google.protobuf import runtime_version as _runtime_version from google.protobuf import symbol_database as _symbol_database +from google.protobuf.internal import builder as _builder +_runtime_version.ValidateProtobufRuntimeVersion( + _runtime_version.Domain.PUBLIC, + 5, + 28, + 3, + '', + 'agentmesh.proto' +) # @@protoc_insertion_point(imports) _sym_db = _symbol_database.Default() @@ -15,216 +26,248 @@ from google.protobuf import timestamp_pb2 as google_dot_protobuf_dot_timestamp__pb2 -DESCRIPTOR = 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_EGRESSASSIGNMENTSREQUEST._serialized_end=6643 - _EGRESSASSIGNMENTSRESPONSE._serialized_start=6645 - _EGRESSASSIGNMENTSRESPONSE._serialized_end=6721 - _KEYSRESPONSE._serialized_start=6723 - _KEYSRESPONSE._serialized_end=6825 - _TOKENREFRESHREQUEST._serialized_start=6827 - _TOKENREFRESHREQUEST._serialized_end=6934 - _TOKENREFRESHRESPONSE._serialized_start=6936 - _TOKENREFRESHRESPONSE._serialized_end=7053 - _NODECATALOGREPORT._serialized_start=7055 - _NODECATALOGREPORT._serialized_end=7119 - _TOKENREVOKEREQUEST._serialized_start=7121 - _TOKENREVOKEREQUEST._serialized_end=7158 - _TOKENREVOKERESPONSE._serialized_start=7160 - _TOKENREVOKERESPONSE._serialized_end=7213 - _BOOTSTRAPTOKENCREATEREQUEST._serialized_start=7216 - _BOOTSTRAPTOKENCREATEREQUEST._serialized_end=7385 - _BOOTSTRAPTOKENCREATERESPONSE._serialized_start=7388 - _BOOTSTRAPTOKENCREATERESPONSE._serialized_end=7526 - _BOOTSTRAPTOKEN._serialized_start=7529 - _BOOTSTRAPTOKEN._serialized_end=7847 - _BOOTSTRAPTOKENLISTRESPONSE._serialized_start=7849 - _BOOTSTRAPTOKENLISTRESPONSE._serialized_end=7923 - _ENROLLMENTREQUEST._serialized_start=7926 - _ENROLLMENTREQUEST._serialized_end=8268 - _ENROLLMENTREQUEST_LABELSENTRY._serialized_start=825 - _ENROLLMENTREQUEST_LABELSENTRY._serialized_end=870 - _ENROLLMENTREQUESTLISTRESPONSE._serialized_start=8270 - _ENROLLMENTREQUESTLISTRESPONSE._serialized_end=8352 - _USER._serialized_start=8354 - _USER._serialized_end=8466 - _ENROLLEDNODE._serialized_start=8469 - _ENROLLEDNODE._serialized_end=8843 - _ENROLLEDNODE_LABELSENTRY._serialized_start=825 - _ENROLLEDNODE_LABELSENTRY._serialized_end=870 - _ROUTERLEASE._serialized_start=8846 - _ROUTERLEASE._serialized_end=9063 - _NODESERVICES._serialized_start=9065 - _NODESERVICES._serialized_end=9173 - _ADMINSTATUSRESPONSE._serialized_start=9176 - _ADMINSTATUSRESPONSE._serialized_end=9651 - _ADMINSTATUSRESPONSE_NODECATALOGENTRY._serialized_start=9573 - _ADMINSTATUSRESPONSE_NODECATALOGENTRY._serialized_end=9651 - _USERSTATUSRESPONSE._serialized_start=9654 - _USERSTATUSRESPONSE._serialized_end=9911 - _NODELISTRESPONSE._serialized_start=9913 - _NODELISTRESPONSE._serialized_end=9999 - _IDENTITYEVIDENCERESPONSE._serialized_start=10002 - _IDENTITYEVIDENCERESPONSE._serialized_end=10230 - _PEEREVIDENCERESPONSE._serialized_start=10233 - _PEEREVIDENCERESPONSE._serialized_end=10559 - _PEEREVIDENCERESPONSE_LABELSENTRY._serialized_start=825 - _PEEREVIDENCERESPONSE_LABELSENTRY._serialized_end=870 - _MEMBERCREDENTIAL._serialized_start=10562 - _MEMBERCREDENTIAL._serialized_end=10830 - _TRUSTEDSIGNINGKEY._serialized_start=10832 - _TRUSTEDSIGNINGKEY._serialized_end=10921 - _OIDCSESSION._serialized_start=10923 - _OIDCSESSION._serialized_end=11012 - _TASKAUTHORIZATIONRULE._serialized_start=11015 - _TASKAUTHORIZATIONRULE._serialized_end=11162 - _TASKRULE._serialized_start=11165 - _TASKRULE._serialized_end=11297 - _TASKOPERATION._serialized_start=11299 - _TASKOPERATION._serialized_end=11414 - _TOKENEXCHANGEREQUEST._serialized_start=11417 - _TOKENEXCHANGEREQUEST._serialized_end=11588 - _TOKENEXCHANGERESPONSE._serialized_start=11590 - _TOKENEXCHANGERESPONSE._serialized_end=11717 - _STSTOKENREQUEST._serialized_start=11720 - _STSTOKENREQUEST._serialized_end=11849 - _STSTOKENRESPONSE._serialized_start=11852 - _STSTOKENRESPONSE._serialized_end=11983 - _REVOCATIONSRESPONSE._serialized_start=11985 - _REVOCATIONSRESPONSE._serialized_end=12055 +_globals = globals() +_builder.BuildMessageAndEnumDescriptors(DESCRIPTOR, _globals) +_builder.BuildTopDescriptorsAndMessages(DESCRIPTOR, 'agentmesh_pb2', _globals) +if not _descriptor._USE_C_DESCRIPTORS: + _globals['DESCRIPTOR']._loaded_options = None + _globals['DESCRIPTOR']._serialized_options = b'Z\037github.com/google/agentmesh/api' + _globals['_ENROLLREQUEST_LABELSENTRY']._loaded_options = None + _globals['_ENROLLREQUEST_LABELSENTRY']._serialized_options = b'8\001' + _globals['_BOOTSTRAPENROLLREQUEST_LABELSENTRY']._loaded_options = None + _globals['_BOOTSTRAPENROLLREQUEST_LABELSENTRY']._serialized_options = b'8\001' + _globals['_COMMANDBACKEND_ENVENTRY']._loaded_options = None + _globals['_COMMANDBACKEND_ENVENTRY']._serialized_options = b'8\001' + _globals['_ROUTERINFO_LABELSENTRY']._loaded_options = None + _globals['_ROUTERINFO_LABELSENTRY']._serialized_options = b'8\001' + _globals['_ENROLLMENTREQUEST_LABELSENTRY']._loaded_options = None + _globals['_ENROLLMENTREQUEST_LABELSENTRY']._serialized_options = b'8\001' + _globals['_ENROLLEDNODE_LABELSENTRY']._loaded_options = None + _globals['_ENROLLEDNODE_LABELSENTRY']._serialized_options = b'8\001' + _globals['_ADMINSTATUSRESPONSE_NODECATALOGENTRY']._loaded_options = None + _globals['_ADMINSTATUSRESPONSE_NODECATALOGENTRY']._serialized_options = b'8\001' + _globals['_PEEREVIDENCERESPONSE_LABELSENTRY']._loaded_options = None + _globals['_PEEREVIDENCERESPONSE_LABELSENTRY']._serialized_options = b'8\001' + _globals['_POLICYDENIEDSIGNAL_CALLERLABELSENTRY']._loaded_options = None + _globals['_POLICYDENIEDSIGNAL_CALLERLABELSENTRY']._serialized_options = b'8\001' + _globals['_ENROLLMENTREJECTEDSIGNAL_SUBMITTEDLABELSENTRY']._loaded_options = None + _globals['_ENROLLMENTREJECTEDSIGNAL_SUBMITTEDLABELSENTRY']._serialized_options = b'8\001' + _globals['_ENROLLMENTSTATUS']._serialized_start=14289 + _globals['_ENROLLMENTSTATUS']._serialized_end=14437 + _globals['_SERVICETYPE']._serialized_start=14440 + _globals['_SERVICETYPE']._serialized_end=14580 + _globals['_INGRESSAUTHMODE']._serialized_start=14582 + _globals['_INGRESSAUTHMODE']._serialized_end=14697 + _globals['_EGRESSMODE']._serialized_start=14699 + _globals['_EGRESSMODE']._serialized_end=14754 + _globals['_RESPONSEINSPECTION']._serialized_start=14756 + _globals['_RESPONSEINSPECTION']._serialized_end=14848 + _globals['_SIGNALCALLERDIRECTION']._serialized_start=14850 + _globals['_SIGNALCALLERDIRECTION']._serialized_end=14951 + _globals['_POLICYDENIALREASON']._serialized_start=14954 + _globals['_POLICYDENIALREASON']._serialized_end=15215 + _globals['_TRANSPORTREFUSALREASON']._serialized_start=15218 + _globals['_TRANSPORTREFUSALREASON']._serialized_end=15403 + _globals['_REVOCATIONSOURCE']._serialized_start=15406 + _globals['_REVOCATIONSOURCE']._serialized_end=15573 + _globals['_ENROLLMENTREJECTIONREASON']._serialized_start=15576 + _globals['_ENROLLMENTREJECTIONREASON']._serialized_end=15890 + _globals['_AUTHFRAME']._serialized_start=98 + _globals['_AUTHFRAME']._serialized_end=150 + _globals['_AUTHRESPONSE']._serialized_start=152 + _globals['_AUTHRESPONSE']._serialized_end=215 + _globals['_ROUTERGOAWAY']._serialized_start=218 + _globals['_ROUTERGOAWAY']._serialized_end=395 + _globals['_ROUTERGOAWAY_REASON']._serialized_start=333 + _globals['_ROUTERGOAWAY_REASON']._serialized_end=395 + _globals['_MESHEVENT']._serialized_start=398 + _globals['_MESHEVENT']._serialized_end=618 + _globals['_MESHEVENT_TYPE']._serialized_start=563 + _globals['_MESHEVENT_TYPE']._serialized_end=618 + _globals['_ENROLLREQUEST']._serialized_start=621 + _globals['_ENROLLREQUEST']._serialized_end=870 + _globals['_ENROLLREQUEST_LABELSENTRY']._serialized_start=825 + _globals['_ENROLLREQUEST_LABELSENTRY']._serialized_end=870 + _globals['_ENROLLRESPONSE']._serialized_start=873 + _globals['_ENROLLRESPONSE']._serialized_end=1044 + _globals['_BOOTSTRAPENROLLREQUEST']._serialized_start=1047 + _globals['_BOOTSTRAPENROLLREQUEST']._serialized_end=1326 + _globals['_BOOTSTRAPENROLLREQUEST_LABELSENTRY']._serialized_start=825 + _globals['_BOOTSTRAPENROLLREQUEST_LABELSENTRY']._serialized_end=870 + _globals['_BOOTSTRAPENROLLRESPONSE']._serialized_start=1329 + _globals['_BOOTSTRAPENROLLRESPONSE']._serialized_end=1588 + _globals['_SERVICEINGRESS']._serialized_start=1590 + _globals['_SERVICEINGRESS']._serialized_end=1671 + _globals['_SERVICEINFO']._serialized_start=1674 + _globals['_SERVICEINFO']._serialized_end=1810 + _globals['_COMMANDBACKEND']._serialized_start=1813 + _globals['_COMMANDBACKEND']._serialized_end=1942 + _globals['_COMMANDBACKEND_ENVENTRY']._serialized_start=1900 + _globals['_COMMANDBACKEND_ENVENTRY']._serialized_end=1942 + _globals['_REGISTERSERVICEREQUEST']._serialized_start=1945 + _globals['_REGISTERSERVICEREQUEST']._serialized_end=2095 + _globals['_DISCOVEREDPROVIDER']._serialized_start=2097 + _globals['_DISCOVEREDPROVIDER']._serialized_end=2202 + _globals['_CONTROLPLANEINFORESPONSE']._serialized_start=2205 + _globals['_CONTROLPLANEINFORESPONSE']._serialized_end=2437 + _globals['_DIRECTORYPARAMETERS']._serialized_start=2440 + _globals['_DIRECTORYPARAMETERS']._serialized_end=2584 + _globals['_DIRECTORYREQUEST']._serialized_start=2587 + _globals['_DIRECTORYREQUEST']._serialized_end=2838 + _globals['_DIRECTORYPROVIDE']._serialized_start=2841 + _globals['_DIRECTORYPROVIDE']._serialized_end=2969 + _globals['_DIRECTORYWITHDRAW']._serialized_start=2971 + _globals['_DIRECTORYWITHDRAW']._serialized_end=3021 + _globals['_DIRECTORYFINDPROVIDERS']._serialized_start=3023 + _globals['_DIRECTORYFINDPROVIDERS']._serialized_end=3075 + _globals['_DIRECTORYFINDPEER']._serialized_start=3077 + _globals['_DIRECTORYFINDPEER']._serialized_end=3113 + _globals['_DIRECTORYRESPONSE']._serialized_start=3115 + _globals['_DIRECTORYRESPONSE']._serialized_end=3234 + _globals['_PEERRECORD']._serialized_start=3236 + _globals['_PEERRECORD']._serialized_end=3327 + _globals['_ROUTERINFO']._serialized_start=3330 + _globals['_ROUTERINFO']._serialized_end=3547 + _globals['_ROUTERINFO_LABELSENTRY']._serialized_start=825 + _globals['_ROUTERINFO_LABELSENTRY']._serialized_end=870 + _globals['_ROUTERLEASEREQUEST']._serialized_start=3550 + _globals['_ROUTERLEASEREQUEST']._serialized_end=3830 + _globals['_ROUTERLEASERESPONSE']._serialized_start=3832 + _globals['_ROUTERLEASERESPONSE']._serialized_end=3934 + _globals['_POLICYROLE']._serialized_start=3937 + _globals['_POLICYROLE']._serialized_end=4179 + _globals['_INGRESSGRANT']._serialized_start=4181 + _globals['_INGRESSGRANT']._serialized_end=4272 + _globals['_HTTPGRANT']._serialized_start=4274 + _globals['_HTTPGRANT']._serialized_end=4334 + _globals['_EGRESSDESTINATION']._serialized_start=4337 + _globals['_EGRESSDESTINATION']._serialized_end=4626 + _globals['_INSPECTION']._serialized_start=4628 + _globals['_INSPECTION']._serialized_end=4685 + _globals['_INSPECTOR']._serialized_start=4687 + _globals['_INSPECTOR']._serialized_end=4798 + _globals['_MODELARMOR']._serialized_start=4801 + _globals['_MODELARMOR']._serialized_end=4946 + _globals['_EXTPROC']._serialized_start=4949 + _globals['_EXTPROC']._serialized_end=5213 + _globals['_EXTPROCPROCESSINGMODE']._serialized_start=5216 + _globals['_EXTPROCPROCESSINGMODE']._serialized_end=5855 + _globals['_EXTPROCPROCESSINGMODE_HEADERMODE']._serialized_start=5700 + _globals['_EXTPROCPROCESSINGMODE_HEADERMODE']._serialized_end=5757 + _globals['_EXTPROCPROCESSINGMODE_BODYMODE']._serialized_start=5759 + _globals['_EXTPROCPROCESSINGMODE_BODYMODE']._serialized_end=5855 + _globals['_CREDENTIALBROKER']._serialized_start=5858 + _globals['_CREDENTIALBROKER']._serialized_end=6083 + _globals['_OIDCFEDERATION']._serialized_start=6085 + _globals['_OIDCFEDERATION']._serialized_end=6180 + _globals['_AWSASSUMEROLE']._serialized_start=6182 + _globals['_AWSASSUMEROLE']._serialized_end=6239 + _globals['_PLATFORMIDENTITY']._serialized_start=6241 + _globals['_PLATFORMIDENTITY']._serialized_end=6275 + _globals['_POLICYBINDING']._serialized_start=6277 + _globals['_POLICYBINDING']._serialized_end=6323 + _globals['_POLICYCONFIG']._serialized_start=6326 + _globals['_POLICYCONFIG']._serialized_end=6477 + _globals['_POLICYCONFIGGETREQUEST']._serialized_start=6479 + _globals['_POLICYCONFIGGETREQUEST']._serialized_end=6503 + _globals['_POLICYCONFIGGETRESPONSE']._serialized_start=6505 + _globals['_POLICYCONFIGGETRESPONSE']._serialized_end=6553 + _globals['_POLICYCONFIGUPDATERESPONSE']._serialized_start=6555 + _globals['_POLICYCONFIGUPDATERESPONSE']._serialized_end=6615 + _globals['_EGRESSASSIGNMENTSREQUEST']._serialized_start=6617 + _globals['_EGRESSASSIGNMENTSREQUEST']._serialized_end=6643 + _globals['_EGRESSASSIGNMENTSRESPONSE']._serialized_start=6645 + _globals['_EGRESSASSIGNMENTSRESPONSE']._serialized_end=6721 + _globals['_KEYSRESPONSE']._serialized_start=6723 + _globals['_KEYSRESPONSE']._serialized_end=6825 + _globals['_TOKENREFRESHREQUEST']._serialized_start=6827 + _globals['_TOKENREFRESHREQUEST']._serialized_end=6934 + _globals['_TOKENREFRESHRESPONSE']._serialized_start=6936 + _globals['_TOKENREFRESHRESPONSE']._serialized_end=7053 + _globals['_NODECATALOGREPORT']._serialized_start=7055 + _globals['_NODECATALOGREPORT']._serialized_end=7119 + _globals['_TOKENREVOKEREQUEST']._serialized_start=7121 + _globals['_TOKENREVOKEREQUEST']._serialized_end=7158 + _globals['_TOKENREVOKERESPONSE']._serialized_start=7160 + _globals['_TOKENREVOKERESPONSE']._serialized_end=7213 + _globals['_BOOTSTRAPTOKENCREATEREQUEST']._serialized_start=7216 + _globals['_BOOTSTRAPTOKENCREATEREQUEST']._serialized_end=7385 + _globals['_BOOTSTRAPTOKENCREATERESPONSE']._serialized_start=7388 + _globals['_BOOTSTRAPTOKENCREATERESPONSE']._serialized_end=7526 + _globals['_BOOTSTRAPTOKEN']._serialized_start=7529 + _globals['_BOOTSTRAPTOKEN']._serialized_end=7847 + _globals['_BOOTSTRAPTOKENLISTRESPONSE']._serialized_start=7849 + _globals['_BOOTSTRAPTOKENLISTRESPONSE']._serialized_end=7923 + _globals['_ENROLLMENTREQUEST']._serialized_start=7926 + _globals['_ENROLLMENTREQUEST']._serialized_end=8268 + _globals['_ENROLLMENTREQUEST_LABELSENTRY']._serialized_start=825 + _globals['_ENROLLMENTREQUEST_LABELSENTRY']._serialized_end=870 + _globals['_ENROLLMENTREQUESTLISTRESPONSE']._serialized_start=8270 + _globals['_ENROLLMENTREQUESTLISTRESPONSE']._serialized_end=8352 + _globals['_USER']._serialized_start=8354 + _globals['_USER']._serialized_end=8466 + _globals['_ENROLLEDNODE']._serialized_start=8469 + _globals['_ENROLLEDNODE']._serialized_end=8843 + _globals['_ENROLLEDNODE_LABELSENTRY']._serialized_start=825 + _globals['_ENROLLEDNODE_LABELSENTRY']._serialized_end=870 + _globals['_ROUTERLEASE']._serialized_start=8846 + _globals['_ROUTERLEASE']._serialized_end=9063 + _globals['_NODESERVICES']._serialized_start=9065 + _globals['_NODESERVICES']._serialized_end=9173 + _globals['_ADMINSTATUSRESPONSE']._serialized_start=9176 + _globals['_ADMINSTATUSRESPONSE']._serialized_end=9651 + _globals['_ADMINSTATUSRESPONSE_NODECATALOGENTRY']._serialized_start=9573 + _globals['_ADMINSTATUSRESPONSE_NODECATALOGENTRY']._serialized_end=9651 + _globals['_USERSTATUSRESPONSE']._serialized_start=9654 + _globals['_USERSTATUSRESPONSE']._serialized_end=9911 + _globals['_NODELISTRESPONSE']._serialized_start=9913 + _globals['_NODELISTRESPONSE']._serialized_end=9999 + _globals['_IDENTITYEVIDENCERESPONSE']._serialized_start=10002 + _globals['_IDENTITYEVIDENCERESPONSE']._serialized_end=10230 + _globals['_PEEREVIDENCERESPONSE']._serialized_start=10233 + _globals['_PEEREVIDENCERESPONSE']._serialized_end=10559 + _globals['_PEEREVIDENCERESPONSE_LABELSENTRY']._serialized_start=825 + _globals['_PEEREVIDENCERESPONSE_LABELSENTRY']._serialized_end=870 + _globals['_MEMBERCREDENTIAL']._serialized_start=10562 + _globals['_MEMBERCREDENTIAL']._serialized_end=10830 + _globals['_TRUSTEDSIGNINGKEY']._serialized_start=10832 + _globals['_TRUSTEDSIGNINGKEY']._serialized_end=10921 + _globals['_OIDCSESSION']._serialized_start=10923 + _globals['_OIDCSESSION']._serialized_end=11012 + _globals['_TASKAUTHORIZATIONRULE']._serialized_start=11015 + _globals['_TASKAUTHORIZATIONRULE']._serialized_end=11162 + _globals['_TASKRULE']._serialized_start=11165 + _globals['_TASKRULE']._serialized_end=11297 + _globals['_TASKOPERATION']._serialized_start=11299 + _globals['_TASKOPERATION']._serialized_end=11414 + _globals['_TOKENEXCHANGEREQUEST']._serialized_start=11417 + _globals['_TOKENEXCHANGEREQUEST']._serialized_end=11588 + _globals['_TOKENEXCHANGERESPONSE']._serialized_start=11590 + _globals['_TOKENEXCHANGERESPONSE']._serialized_end=11717 + _globals['_STSTOKENREQUEST']._serialized_start=11720 + _globals['_STSTOKENREQUEST']._serialized_end=11849 + _globals['_STSTOKENRESPONSE']._serialized_start=11852 + _globals['_STSTOKENRESPONSE']._serialized_end=11983 + _globals['_REVOCATIONSRESPONSE']._serialized_start=11985 + _globals['_REVOCATIONSRESPONSE']._serialized_end=12055 + _globals['_POLICYDENIEDSIGNAL']._serialized_start=12058 + _globals['_POLICYDENIEDSIGNAL']._serialized_end=12527 + _globals['_POLICYDENIEDSIGNAL_CALLERLABELSENTRY']._serialized_start=12476 + _globals['_POLICYDENIEDSIGNAL_CALLERLABELSENTRY']._serialized_end=12527 + _globals['_TRANSPORTREFUSEDSIGNAL']._serialized_start=12530 + _globals['_TRANSPORTREFUSEDSIGNAL']._serialized_end=12814 + _globals['_IDENTITYREVOKEDSIGNAL']._serialized_start=12817 + _globals['_IDENTITYREVOKEDSIGNAL']._serialized_end=13017 + _globals['_ENROLLMENTREJECTEDSIGNAL']._serialized_start=13020 + _globals['_ENROLLMENTREJECTEDSIGNAL']._serialized_end=13435 + _globals['_ENROLLMENTREJECTEDSIGNAL_SUBMITTEDLABELSENTRY']._serialized_start=13381 + _globals['_ENROLLMENTREJECTEDSIGNAL_SUBMITTEDLABELSENTRY']._serialized_end=13435 + _globals['_SECURITYSIGNALEVENT']._serialized_start=13438 + _globals['_SECURITYSIGNALEVENT']._serialized_end=13885 + _globals['_WEBHOOKENDPOINTCONFIG']._serialized_start=13888 + _globals['_WEBHOOKENDPOINTCONFIG']._serialized_end=14109 + _globals['_SECURITYSIGNALSCONFIG']._serialized_start=14112 + _globals['_SECURITYSIGNALSCONFIG']._serialized_end=14286 # @@protoc_insertion_point(module_scope) diff --git a/sdk/python/src/agent_mesh/_proto/agentmesh_pb2.pyi b/sdk/python/src/agent_mesh/_proto/agentmesh_pb2.pyi index 2cc8fbfe..d96e2712 100644 --- a/sdk/python/src/agent_mesh/_proto/agentmesh_pb2.pyi +++ b/sdk/python/src/agent_mesh/_proto/agentmesh_pb2.pyi @@ -7,58 +7,133 @@ from google.protobuf import message as _message from typing import ClassVar as _ClassVar, Iterable as _Iterable, Mapping as _Mapping, Optional as _Optional, Union as _Union DESCRIPTOR: _descriptor.FileDescriptor -EGRESS_MODE_HTTP: EgressMode -EGRESS_MODE_TCP: EgressMode -ENROLLMENT_STATUS_APPROVED: EnrollmentStatus + +class EnrollmentStatus(int, metaclass=_enum_type_wrapper.EnumTypeWrapper): + __slots__ = () + ENROLLMENT_STATUS_UNSPECIFIED: _ClassVar[EnrollmentStatus] + ENROLLMENT_STATUS_PENDING: _ClassVar[EnrollmentStatus] + ENROLLMENT_STATUS_APPROVED: _ClassVar[EnrollmentStatus] + ENROLLMENT_STATUS_REJECTED: _ClassVar[EnrollmentStatus] + +class ServiceType(int, metaclass=_enum_type_wrapper.EnumTypeWrapper): + __slots__ = () + SERVICE_TYPE_UNSPECIFIED: _ClassVar[ServiceType] + SERVICE_TYPE_MCP: _ClassVar[ServiceType] + SERVICE_TYPE_INFERENCE: _ClassVar[ServiceType] + SERVICE_TYPE_A2A: _ClassVar[ServiceType] + SERVICE_TYPE_EGRESS: _ClassVar[ServiceType] + +class IngressAuthMode(int, metaclass=_enum_type_wrapper.EnumTypeWrapper): + __slots__ = () + INGRESS_AUTH_MODE_UNSPECIFIED: _ClassVar[IngressAuthMode] + INGRESS_AUTH_MODE_EDGE: _ClassVar[IngressAuthMode] + INGRESS_AUTH_MODE_PASSTHROUGH: _ClassVar[IngressAuthMode] + +class EgressMode(int, metaclass=_enum_type_wrapper.EnumTypeWrapper): + __slots__ = () + EGRESS_MODE_HTTP: _ClassVar[EgressMode] + EGRESS_MODE_TCP: _ClassVar[EgressMode] + +class ResponseInspection(int, metaclass=_enum_type_wrapper.EnumTypeWrapper): + __slots__ = () + RESPONSE_INSPECTION_BUFFERED: _ClassVar[ResponseInspection] + RESPONSE_INSPECTION_REQUEST_ONLY: _ClassVar[ResponseInspection] + +class SignalCallerDirection(int, metaclass=_enum_type_wrapper.EnumTypeWrapper): + __slots__ = () + SIGNAL_CALLER_DIRECTION_UNSPECIFIED: _ClassVar[SignalCallerDirection] + LOCAL_WORKLOAD: _ClassVar[SignalCallerDirection] + REMOTE_PEER: _ClassVar[SignalCallerDirection] + +class PolicyDenialReason(int, metaclass=_enum_type_wrapper.EnumTypeWrapper): + __slots__ = () + POLICY_DENIAL_REASON_UNSPECIFIED: _ClassVar[PolicyDenialReason] + DATALOG_EVALUATION_DENIED: _ClassVar[PolicyDenialReason] + TASK_AUTHORIZATION_RULE_VIOLATION: _ClassVar[PolicyDenialReason] + INSPECTION_FILTER_BLOCKED: _ClassVar[PolicyDenialReason] + ROLE_MISMATCH: _ClassVar[PolicyDenialReason] + EXPIRED_CREDENTIAL: _ClassVar[PolicyDenialReason] + UNAUTHORIZED_SERVICE: _ClassVar[PolicyDenialReason] + UNAUTHORIZED_PATH_OR_METHOD: _ClassVar[PolicyDenialReason] + +class TransportRefusalReason(int, metaclass=_enum_type_wrapper.EnumTypeWrapper): + __slots__ = () + TRANSPORT_REFUSAL_REASON_UNSPECIFIED: _ClassVar[TransportRefusalReason] + PEER_UNAUTHENTICATED: _ClassVar[TransportRefusalReason] + NOT_ROUTER_ROLE: _ClassVar[TransportRefusalReason] + AUTH_DEADLINE_EXCEEDED: _ClassVar[TransportRefusalReason] + PEER_BANNED: _ClassVar[TransportRefusalReason] + PROTOCOL_UNAUTHORIZED: _ClassVar[TransportRefusalReason] + +class RevocationSource(int, metaclass=_enum_type_wrapper.EnumTypeWrapper): + __slots__ = () + REVOCATION_SOURCE_UNSPECIFIED: _ClassVar[RevocationSource] + CONTROL_PLANE_ADMIN: _ClassVar[RevocationSource] + MESH_EVENT_BANNED_GOSSIP: _ClassVar[RevocationSource] + LOCAL_CONTROL_PLANE_SYNC: _ClassVar[RevocationSource] + TOKEN_REFRESH_REJECTION: _ClassVar[RevocationSource] + +class EnrollmentRejectionReason(int, metaclass=_enum_type_wrapper.EnumTypeWrapper): + __slots__ = () + ENROLLMENT_REJECTION_REASON_UNSPECIFIED: _ClassVar[EnrollmentRejectionReason] + INVALID_JWT: _ClassVar[EnrollmentRejectionReason] + EXPIRED_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN: _ClassVar[EnrollmentRejectionReason] + BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_USAGE_EXCEEDED: _ClassVar[EnrollmentRejectionReason] + UNATTESTED_LABELS_REJECTED: _ClassVar[EnrollmentRejectionReason] + INVALID_CHALLENGE_SIGNATURE: _ClassVar[EnrollmentRejectionReason] + REQUESTED_ROLE_UNAUTHORIZED: _ClassVar[EnrollmentRejectionReason] + PEER_PREVIOUSLY_BANNED: _ClassVar[EnrollmentRejectionReason] + AUTONOMOUS_RECOVERY_DISABLED: _ClassVar[EnrollmentRejectionReason] +ENROLLMENT_STATUS_UNSPECIFIED: EnrollmentStatus ENROLLMENT_STATUS_PENDING: EnrollmentStatus +ENROLLMENT_STATUS_APPROVED: EnrollmentStatus ENROLLMENT_STATUS_REJECTED: EnrollmentStatus -ENROLLMENT_STATUS_UNSPECIFIED: EnrollmentStatus +SERVICE_TYPE_UNSPECIFIED: ServiceType +SERVICE_TYPE_MCP: ServiceType +SERVICE_TYPE_INFERENCE: ServiceType +SERVICE_TYPE_A2A: ServiceType +SERVICE_TYPE_EGRESS: ServiceType +INGRESS_AUTH_MODE_UNSPECIFIED: IngressAuthMode INGRESS_AUTH_MODE_EDGE: IngressAuthMode INGRESS_AUTH_MODE_PASSTHROUGH: IngressAuthMode -INGRESS_AUTH_MODE_UNSPECIFIED: IngressAuthMode +EGRESS_MODE_HTTP: EgressMode +EGRESS_MODE_TCP: EgressMode RESPONSE_INSPECTION_BUFFERED: ResponseInspection RESPONSE_INSPECTION_REQUEST_ONLY: ResponseInspection -SERVICE_TYPE_A2A: ServiceType -SERVICE_TYPE_EGRESS: ServiceType -SERVICE_TYPE_INFERENCE: ServiceType -SERVICE_TYPE_MCP: ServiceType -SERVICE_TYPE_UNSPECIFIED: ServiceType - -class AWSAssumeRole(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["role_arn", "session_policy"] - ROLE_ARN_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - SESSION_POLICY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - role_arn: str - session_policy: str - def __init__(self, role_arn: _Optional[str] = ..., session_policy: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... - -class AdminStatusResponse(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["active_routers", "bootstrap_tokens", "enrolled_nodes", "enrollment_requests", "node_catalog", "policy", "users"] - class NodeCatalogEntry(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["key", "value"] - KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - VALUE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - key: str - value: NodeServices - def __init__(self, key: _Optional[str] = ..., value: _Optional[_Union[NodeServices, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... - ACTIVE_ROUTERS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - BOOTSTRAP_TOKENS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ENROLLED_NODES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ENROLLMENT_REQUESTS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - NODE_CATALOG_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - POLICY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - USERS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - active_routers: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[RouterLease] - bootstrap_tokens: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[BootstrapToken] - enrolled_nodes: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[EnrolledNode] - enrollment_requests: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[EnrollmentRequest] - node_catalog: _containers.MessageMap[str, NodeServices] - policy: PolicyConfig - users: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[User] - def __init__(self, users: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[User, _Mapping]]] = ..., active_routers: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[RouterLease, _Mapping]]] = ..., enrolled_nodes: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[EnrolledNode, _Mapping]]] = ..., enrollment_requests: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[EnrollmentRequest, _Mapping]]] = ..., bootstrap_tokens: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[BootstrapToken, _Mapping]]] = ..., policy: _Optional[_Union[PolicyConfig, _Mapping]] = ..., node_catalog: _Optional[_Mapping[str, NodeServices]] = ...) -> None: ... +SIGNAL_CALLER_DIRECTION_UNSPECIFIED: SignalCallerDirection +LOCAL_WORKLOAD: SignalCallerDirection +REMOTE_PEER: SignalCallerDirection +POLICY_DENIAL_REASON_UNSPECIFIED: PolicyDenialReason +DATALOG_EVALUATION_DENIED: PolicyDenialReason +TASK_AUTHORIZATION_RULE_VIOLATION: PolicyDenialReason +INSPECTION_FILTER_BLOCKED: PolicyDenialReason +ROLE_MISMATCH: PolicyDenialReason +EXPIRED_CREDENTIAL: PolicyDenialReason +UNAUTHORIZED_SERVICE: PolicyDenialReason +UNAUTHORIZED_PATH_OR_METHOD: PolicyDenialReason +TRANSPORT_REFUSAL_REASON_UNSPECIFIED: TransportRefusalReason +PEER_UNAUTHENTICATED: TransportRefusalReason +NOT_ROUTER_ROLE: TransportRefusalReason +AUTH_DEADLINE_EXCEEDED: TransportRefusalReason +PEER_BANNED: TransportRefusalReason +PROTOCOL_UNAUTHORIZED: TransportRefusalReason +REVOCATION_SOURCE_UNSPECIFIED: RevocationSource +CONTROL_PLANE_ADMIN: RevocationSource +MESH_EVENT_BANNED_GOSSIP: RevocationSource +LOCAL_CONTROL_PLANE_SYNC: RevocationSource +TOKEN_REFRESH_REJECTION: RevocationSource +ENROLLMENT_REJECTION_REASON_UNSPECIFIED: EnrollmentRejectionReason +INVALID_JWT: EnrollmentRejectionReason +EXPIRED_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN: EnrollmentRejectionReason +BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_USAGE_EXCEEDED: EnrollmentRejectionReason +UNATTESTED_LABELS_REJECTED: EnrollmentRejectionReason +INVALID_CHALLENGE_SIGNATURE: EnrollmentRejectionReason +REQUESTED_ROLE_UNAUTHORIZED: EnrollmentRejectionReason +PEER_PREVIOUSLY_BANNED: EnrollmentRejectionReason +AUTONOMOUS_RECOVERY_DISABLED: EnrollmentRejectionReason class AuthFrame(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["biscuit", "target_service"] + __slots__ = ("biscuit", "target_service") BISCUIT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] TARGET_SERVICE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] biscuit: bytes @@ -66,126 +141,159 @@ class AuthFrame(_message.Message): def __init__(self, biscuit: _Optional[bytes] = ..., target_service: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... class AuthResponse(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["biscuit", "error", "success"] - BISCUIT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ERROR_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + __slots__ = ("success", "error", "biscuit") SUCCESS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - biscuit: bytes - error: str + ERROR_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + BISCUIT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] success: bool + error: str + biscuit: bytes def __init__(self, success: bool = ..., error: _Optional[str] = ..., biscuit: _Optional[bytes] = ...) -> None: ... +class RouterGoAway(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ("reason", "retry_after") + class Reason(int, metaclass=_enum_type_wrapper.EnumTypeWrapper): + __slots__ = () + REASON_UNSPECIFIED: _ClassVar[RouterGoAway.Reason] + DRAINING: _ClassVar[RouterGoAway.Reason] + OVERLOADED: _ClassVar[RouterGoAway.Reason] + REASON_UNSPECIFIED: RouterGoAway.Reason + DRAINING: RouterGoAway.Reason + OVERLOADED: RouterGoAway.Reason + REASON_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + RETRY_AFTER_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + reason: RouterGoAway.Reason + retry_after: _duration_pb2.Duration + def __init__(self, reason: _Optional[_Union[RouterGoAway.Reason, str]] = ..., retry_after: _Optional[_Union[_duration_pb2.Duration, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... + +class MeshEvent(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ("type", "peer_id", "event_time", "new_public_key", "signature") + class Type(int, metaclass=_enum_type_wrapper.EnumTypeWrapper): + __slots__ = () + BANNED: _ClassVar[MeshEvent.Type] + KEY_ROTATION: _ClassVar[MeshEvent.Type] + POLICY_UPDATE: _ClassVar[MeshEvent.Type] + BANNED: MeshEvent.Type + KEY_ROTATION: MeshEvent.Type + POLICY_UPDATE: MeshEvent.Type + TYPE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + EVENT_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + NEW_PUBLIC_KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + SIGNATURE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + type: MeshEvent.Type + peer_id: str + event_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp + new_public_key: bytes + signature: bytes + def __init__(self, type: _Optional[_Union[MeshEvent.Type, str]] = ..., peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., event_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., new_public_key: _Optional[bytes] = ..., signature: _Optional[bytes] = ...) -> None: ... + +class EnrollRequest(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ("jwt", "peer_id", "public_key", "requested_role", "labels", "challenge_unix_ms", "challenge_signature") + class LabelsEntry(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ("key", "value") + KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + VALUE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + key: str + value: str + def __init__(self, key: _Optional[str] = ..., value: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... + JWT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + PUBLIC_KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + REQUESTED_ROLE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + LABELS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + CHALLENGE_UNIX_MS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + CHALLENGE_SIGNATURE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + jwt: str + peer_id: str + public_key: bytes + requested_role: str + labels: _containers.ScalarMap[str, str] + challenge_unix_ms: int + challenge_signature: bytes + def __init__(self, jwt: _Optional[str] = ..., peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., public_key: _Optional[bytes] = ..., requested_role: _Optional[str] = ..., labels: _Optional[_Mapping[str, str]] = ..., challenge_unix_ms: _Optional[int] = ..., challenge_signature: _Optional[bytes] = ...) -> None: ... + +class EnrollResponse(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ("biscuit_token", "error_message", "control_plane_public_key", "router_addresses", "expire_time") + BISCUIT_TOKEN_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ERROR_MESSAGE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + CONTROL_PLANE_PUBLIC_KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ROUTER_ADDRESSES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + EXPIRE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + biscuit_token: bytes + error_message: str + control_plane_public_key: bytes + router_addresses: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] + expire_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp + def __init__(self, biscuit_token: _Optional[bytes] = ..., error_message: _Optional[str] = ..., control_plane_public_key: _Optional[bytes] = ..., router_addresses: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., expire_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... + class BootstrapEnrollRequest(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["bootstrap_token", "challenge_signature", "challenge_unix_ms", "labels", "peer_id", "public_key", "requested_role"] + __slots__ = ("bootstrap_token", "peer_id", "public_key", "requested_role", "labels", "challenge_unix_ms", "challenge_signature") class LabelsEntry(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["key", "value"] + __slots__ = ("key", "value") KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] VALUE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] key: str value: str def __init__(self, key: _Optional[str] = ..., value: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - CHALLENGE_SIGNATURE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - CHALLENGE_UNIX_MS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - LABELS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] PUBLIC_KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] REQUESTED_ROLE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + LABELS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + CHALLENGE_UNIX_MS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + CHALLENGE_SIGNATURE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] bootstrap_token: str - challenge_signature: bytes - challenge_unix_ms: int - labels: _containers.ScalarMap[str, str] peer_id: str public_key: bytes requested_role: str + labels: _containers.ScalarMap[str, str] + challenge_unix_ms: int + challenge_signature: bytes def __init__(self, bootstrap_token: _Optional[str] = ..., peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., public_key: _Optional[bytes] = ..., requested_role: _Optional[str] = ..., labels: _Optional[_Mapping[str, str]] = ..., challenge_unix_ms: _Optional[int] = ..., challenge_signature: _Optional[bytes] = ...) -> None: ... class BootstrapEnrollResponse(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["biscuit_token", "control_plane_public_key", "error_message", "expire_time", "poll_interval_seconds", "router_addresses", "status"] + __slots__ = ("status", "biscuit_token", "poll_interval_seconds", "error_message", "control_plane_public_key", "router_addresses", "expire_time") + STATUS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] BISCUIT_TOKEN_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - CONTROL_PLANE_PUBLIC_KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ERROR_MESSAGE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - EXPIRE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] POLL_INTERVAL_SECONDS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ERROR_MESSAGE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + CONTROL_PLANE_PUBLIC_KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] ROUTER_ADDRESSES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - STATUS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + EXPIRE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + status: EnrollmentStatus biscuit_token: bytes - control_plane_public_key: bytes - error_message: str - expire_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp poll_interval_seconds: int + error_message: str + control_plane_public_key: bytes router_addresses: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] - status: EnrollmentStatus + expire_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp def __init__(self, status: _Optional[_Union[EnrollmentStatus, str]] = ..., biscuit_token: _Optional[bytes] = ..., poll_interval_seconds: _Optional[int] = ..., error_message: _Optional[str] = ..., control_plane_public_key: _Optional[bytes] = ..., router_addresses: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., expire_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... -class BootstrapToken(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["autonomous_recovery", "create_time", "description", "ephemeral", "expire_time", "id", "max_usages", "owner_id", "revoke_time", "role", "usages_count"] - AUTONOMOUS_RECOVERY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - CREATE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - DESCRIPTION_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - EPHEMERAL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - EXPIRE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - MAX_USAGES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - OWNER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - REVOKE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ROLE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - USAGES_COUNT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - autonomous_recovery: bool - create_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp - description: str - ephemeral: bool - expire_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp - id: str - max_usages: int - owner_id: str - revoke_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp - role: str - usages_count: int - def __init__(self, id: _Optional[str] = ..., role: _Optional[str] = ..., owner_id: _Optional[str] = ..., max_usages: _Optional[int] = ..., usages_count: _Optional[int] = ..., description: _Optional[str] = ..., create_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., expire_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., revoke_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., autonomous_recovery: bool = ..., ephemeral: bool = ...) -> None: ... +class ServiceIngress(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ("auth_mode", "allow") + AUTH_MODE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ALLOW_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + auth_mode: IngressAuthMode + allow: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] + def __init__(self, auth_mode: _Optional[_Union[IngressAuthMode, str]] = ..., allow: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ...) -> None: ... -class BootstrapTokenCreateRequest(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["autonomous_recovery", "description", "ephemeral", "max_usages", "owner_id", "role", "ttl_hours"] - AUTONOMOUS_RECOVERY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] +class ServiceInfo(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ("type", "name", "description", "ingress") + TYPE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + NAME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] DESCRIPTION_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - EPHEMERAL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - MAX_USAGES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - OWNER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ROLE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - TTL_HOURS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - autonomous_recovery: bool + INGRESS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + type: ServiceType + name: str description: str - ephemeral: bool - max_usages: int - owner_id: str - role: str - ttl_hours: int - def __init__(self, role: _Optional[str] = ..., owner_id: _Optional[str] = ..., ttl_hours: _Optional[int] = ..., max_usages: _Optional[int] = ..., description: _Optional[str] = ..., autonomous_recovery: bool = ..., ephemeral: bool = ...) -> None: ... - -class BootstrapTokenCreateResponse(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["expire_time", "id", "owner_id", "role", "token"] - EXPIRE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - OWNER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ROLE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - TOKEN_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - expire_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp - id: str - owner_id: str - role: str - token: str - def __init__(self, id: _Optional[str] = ..., token: _Optional[str] = ..., role: _Optional[str] = ..., owner_id: _Optional[str] = ..., expire_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... - -class BootstrapTokenListResponse(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["tokens"] - TOKENS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - tokens: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[BootstrapToken] - def __init__(self, tokens: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[BootstrapToken, _Mapping]]] = ...) -> None: ... + ingress: ServiceIngress + def __init__(self, type: _Optional[_Union[ServiceType, str]] = ..., name: _Optional[str] = ..., description: _Optional[str] = ..., ingress: _Optional[_Union[ServiceIngress, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... class CommandBackend(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["command", "env"] + __slots__ = ("command", "env") class EnvEntry(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["key", "value"] + __slots__ = ("key", "value") KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] VALUE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] key: str @@ -197,763 +305,813 @@ class CommandBackend(_message.Message): env: _containers.ScalarMap[str, str] def __init__(self, command: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., env: _Optional[_Mapping[str, str]] = ...) -> None: ... +class RegisterServiceRequest(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ("service", "target_url", "command") + SERVICE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + TARGET_URL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + COMMAND_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + service: ServiceInfo + target_url: str + command: CommandBackend + def __init__(self, service: _Optional[_Union[ServiceInfo, _Mapping]] = ..., target_url: _Optional[str] = ..., command: _Optional[_Union[CommandBackend, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... + +class DiscoveredProvider(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ("peer_id", "local_proxy_url", "srv_name", "srv_description") + PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + LOCAL_PROXY_URL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + SRV_NAME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + SRV_DESCRIPTION_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + peer_id: str + local_proxy_url: str + srv_name: str + srv_description: str + def __init__(self, peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., local_proxy_url: _Optional[str] = ..., srv_name: _Optional[str] = ..., srv_description: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... + class ControlPlaneInfoResponse(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["audience", "banned_peer_ids", "client_id", "directory", "oidc_issuer", "router_addresses", "routers"] + __slots__ = ("oidc_issuer", "client_id", "audience", "router_addresses", "banned_peer_ids", "routers", "directory") + OIDC_ISSUER_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + CLIENT_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] AUDIENCE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ROUTER_ADDRESSES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] BANNED_PEER_IDS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - CLIENT_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - DIRECTORY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - OIDC_ISSUER_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] ROUTERS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ROUTER_ADDRESSES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - audience: str - banned_peer_ids: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] - client_id: str - directory: DirectoryParameters + DIRECTORY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] oidc_issuer: str + client_id: str + audience: str router_addresses: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] + banned_peer_ids: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] routers: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[RouterInfo] + directory: DirectoryParameters def __init__(self, oidc_issuer: _Optional[str] = ..., client_id: _Optional[str] = ..., audience: _Optional[str] = ..., router_addresses: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., banned_peer_ids: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., routers: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[RouterInfo, _Mapping]]] = ..., directory: _Optional[_Union[DirectoryParameters, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... -class CredentialBroker(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["aws_assume_role", "oidc_federation", "platform_identity", "static_secret"] - AWS_ASSUME_ROLE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - OIDC_FEDERATION_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - PLATFORM_IDENTITY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - STATIC_SECRET_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - aws_assume_role: AWSAssumeRole - oidc_federation: OIDCFederation - platform_identity: PlatformIdentity - static_secret: str - def __init__(self, static_secret: _Optional[str] = ..., oidc_federation: _Optional[_Union[OIDCFederation, _Mapping]] = ..., aws_assume_role: _Optional[_Union[AWSAssumeRole, _Mapping]] = ..., platform_identity: _Optional[_Union[PlatformIdentity, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... - -class DirectoryFindPeer(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["peer_id"] - PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - peer_id: str - def __init__(self, peer_id: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... - -class DirectoryFindProviders(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["key", "limit"] - KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - LIMIT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - key: bytes - limit: int - def __init__(self, key: _Optional[bytes] = ..., limit: _Optional[int] = ...) -> None: ... - class DirectoryParameters(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["record_ttl", "replication", "reprovide_interval"] - RECORD_TTL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + __slots__ = ("replication", "reprovide_interval", "record_ttl") REPLICATION_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] REPROVIDE_INTERVAL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - record_ttl: _duration_pb2.Duration + RECORD_TTL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] replication: int reprovide_interval: _duration_pb2.Duration + record_ttl: _duration_pb2.Duration def __init__(self, replication: _Optional[int] = ..., reprovide_interval: _Optional[_Union[_duration_pb2.Duration, _Mapping]] = ..., record_ttl: _Optional[_Union[_duration_pb2.Duration, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... +class DirectoryRequest(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ("provide", "find_providers", "find_peer", "withdraw") + PROVIDE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + FIND_PROVIDERS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + FIND_PEER_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + WITHDRAW_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + provide: DirectoryProvide + find_providers: DirectoryFindProviders + find_peer: DirectoryFindPeer + withdraw: DirectoryWithdraw + def __init__(self, provide: _Optional[_Union[DirectoryProvide, _Mapping]] = ..., find_providers: _Optional[_Union[DirectoryFindProviders, _Mapping]] = ..., find_peer: _Optional[_Union[DirectoryFindPeer, _Mapping]] = ..., withdraw: _Optional[_Union[DirectoryWithdraw, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... + class DirectoryProvide(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["addrs", "ingress", "key", "provider", "service"] - ADDRS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - INGRESS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + __slots__ = ("key", "addrs", "provider", "service", "ingress") KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ADDRS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] PROVIDER_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] SERVICE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - addrs: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] - ingress: ServiceIngress + INGRESS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] key: bytes + addrs: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] provider: str service: str + ingress: ServiceIngress def __init__(self, key: _Optional[bytes] = ..., addrs: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., provider: _Optional[str] = ..., service: _Optional[str] = ..., ingress: _Optional[_Union[ServiceIngress, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... -class DirectoryRequest(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["find_peer", "find_providers", "provide", "withdraw"] - FIND_PEER_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - FIND_PROVIDERS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - PROVIDE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - WITHDRAW_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - find_peer: DirectoryFindPeer - find_providers: DirectoryFindProviders - provide: DirectoryProvide - withdraw: DirectoryWithdraw - def __init__(self, provide: _Optional[_Union[DirectoryProvide, _Mapping]] = ..., find_providers: _Optional[_Union[DirectoryFindProviders, _Mapping]] = ..., find_peer: _Optional[_Union[DirectoryFindPeer, _Mapping]] = ..., withdraw: _Optional[_Union[DirectoryWithdraw, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... - -class DirectoryResponse(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["error", "peer", "providers"] - ERROR_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - PEER_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - PROVIDERS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - error: str - peer: PeerRecord - providers: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[PeerRecord] - def __init__(self, providers: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[PeerRecord, _Mapping]]] = ..., peer: _Optional[_Union[PeerRecord, _Mapping]] = ..., error: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... - class DirectoryWithdraw(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["key", "provider"] + __slots__ = ("key", "provider") KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] PROVIDER_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] key: bytes provider: str def __init__(self, key: _Optional[bytes] = ..., provider: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... -class DiscoveredProvider(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["local_proxy_url", "peer_id", "srv_description", "srv_name"] - LOCAL_PROXY_URL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] +class DirectoryFindProviders(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ("key", "limit") + KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + LIMIT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + key: bytes + limit: int + def __init__(self, key: _Optional[bytes] = ..., limit: _Optional[int] = ...) -> None: ... + +class DirectoryFindPeer(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ("peer_id",) PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - SRV_DESCRIPTION_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - SRV_NAME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - local_proxy_url: str peer_id: str - srv_description: str - srv_name: str - def __init__(self, peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., local_proxy_url: _Optional[str] = ..., srv_name: _Optional[str] = ..., srv_description: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... - -class EgressAssignmentsRequest(_message.Message): - __slots__ = [] - def __init__(self) -> None: ... - -class EgressAssignmentsResponse(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["egress"] - EGRESS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - egress: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[EgressDestination] - def __init__(self, egress: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[EgressDestination, _Mapping]]] = ...) -> None: ... + def __init__(self, peer_id: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... -class EgressDestination(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["broker", "credential", "forward_context", "inspection", "mode", "name", "ports", "preserve_host", "served_by", "target_url"] - BROKER_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - CREDENTIAL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - FORWARD_CONTEXT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - INSPECTION_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - MODE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - NAME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - PORTS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - PRESERVE_HOST_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - SERVED_BY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - TARGET_URL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - broker: CredentialBroker - credential: str - forward_context: bool - inspection: Inspection - mode: EgressMode - name: str - ports: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[int] - preserve_host: bool - served_by: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] - target_url: str - def __init__(self, name: _Optional[str] = ..., target_url: _Optional[str] = ..., credential: _Optional[str] = ..., served_by: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., broker: _Optional[_Union[CredentialBroker, _Mapping]] = ..., inspection: _Optional[_Union[Inspection, _Mapping]] = ..., mode: _Optional[_Union[EgressMode, str]] = ..., ports: _Optional[_Iterable[int]] = ..., preserve_host: bool = ..., forward_context: bool = ...) -> None: ... +class DirectoryResponse(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ("providers", "peer", "error") + PROVIDERS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + PEER_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ERROR_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + providers: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[PeerRecord] + peer: PeerRecord + error: str + def __init__(self, providers: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[PeerRecord, _Mapping]]] = ..., peer: _Optional[_Union[PeerRecord, _Mapping]] = ..., error: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... -class EnrollRequest(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["challenge_signature", "challenge_unix_ms", "jwt", "labels", "peer_id", "public_key", "requested_role"] - class LabelsEntry(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["key", "value"] - KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - VALUE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - key: str - value: str - def __init__(self, key: _Optional[str] = ..., value: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... - CHALLENGE_SIGNATURE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - CHALLENGE_UNIX_MS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - JWT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - LABELS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] +class PeerRecord(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ("peer_id", "addrs", "ingress") PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - PUBLIC_KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - REQUESTED_ROLE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - challenge_signature: bytes - challenge_unix_ms: int - jwt: str - labels: _containers.ScalarMap[str, str] + ADDRS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + INGRESS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] peer_id: str - public_key: bytes - requested_role: str - def __init__(self, jwt: _Optional[str] = ..., peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., public_key: _Optional[bytes] = ..., requested_role: _Optional[str] = ..., labels: _Optional[_Mapping[str, str]] = ..., challenge_unix_ms: _Optional[int] = ..., challenge_signature: _Optional[bytes] = ...) -> None: ... - -class EnrollResponse(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["biscuit_token", "control_plane_public_key", "error_message", "expire_time", "router_addresses"] - BISCUIT_TOKEN_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - CONTROL_PLANE_PUBLIC_KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ERROR_MESSAGE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - EXPIRE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ROUTER_ADDRESSES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - biscuit_token: bytes - control_plane_public_key: bytes - error_message: str - expire_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp - router_addresses: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] - def __init__(self, biscuit_token: _Optional[bytes] = ..., error_message: _Optional[str] = ..., control_plane_public_key: _Optional[bytes] = ..., router_addresses: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., expire_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... + addrs: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] + ingress: ServiceIngress + def __init__(self, peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., addrs: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., ingress: _Optional[_Union[ServiceIngress, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... -class EnrolledNode(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["autonomous_recovery", "banned", "claims_json", "enroll_time", "enrollment_type", "ephemeral", "expire_time", "labels", "owner_id", "peer_id", "role"] +class RouterInfo(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ("peer_id", "addresses", "labels", "connections", "connection_limit", "ingress_url") class LabelsEntry(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["key", "value"] + __slots__ = ("key", "value") KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] VALUE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] key: str value: str def __init__(self, key: _Optional[str] = ..., value: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... - AUTONOMOUS_RECOVERY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - BANNED_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - CLAIMS_JSON_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ENROLLMENT_TYPE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ENROLL_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - EPHEMERAL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - EXPIRE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - LABELS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - OWNER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ROLE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - autonomous_recovery: bool - banned: bool - claims_json: str - enroll_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp - enrollment_type: str - ephemeral: bool - expire_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp - labels: _containers.ScalarMap[str, str] - owner_id: str + ADDRESSES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + LABELS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + CONNECTIONS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + CONNECTION_LIMIT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + INGRESS_URL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] peer_id: str - role: str - def __init__(self, peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., role: _Optional[str] = ..., enrollment_type: _Optional[str] = ..., claims_json: _Optional[str] = ..., owner_id: _Optional[str] = ..., labels: _Optional[_Mapping[str, str]] = ..., enroll_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., expire_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., banned: bool = ..., autonomous_recovery: bool = ..., ephemeral: bool = ...) -> None: ... + addresses: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] + labels: _containers.ScalarMap[str, str] + connections: int + connection_limit: int + ingress_url: str + def __init__(self, peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., addresses: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., labels: _Optional[_Mapping[str, str]] = ..., connections: _Optional[int] = ..., connection_limit: _Optional[int] = ..., ingress_url: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... -class EnrollmentRequest(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["create_time", "id", "labels", "peer_id", "resolve_time", "resolved_by", "status", "token_id"] - class LabelsEntry(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["key", "value"] - KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - VALUE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - key: str - value: str - def __init__(self, key: _Optional[str] = ..., value: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... - CREATE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - LABELS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] +class RouterLeaseRequest(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ("peer_id", "addresses", "biscuit", "connected_peers", "dht_size", "challenge_unix_ms", "challenge_signature", "ttl", "connections", "connection_limit", "ingress_url") PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - RESOLVED_BY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - RESOLVE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - STATUS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - TOKEN_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - create_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp - id: str - labels: _containers.ScalarMap[str, str] + ADDRESSES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + BISCUIT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + CONNECTED_PEERS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + DHT_SIZE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + CHALLENGE_UNIX_MS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + CHALLENGE_SIGNATURE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + TTL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + CONNECTIONS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + CONNECTION_LIMIT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + INGRESS_URL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] peer_id: str - resolve_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp - resolved_by: str - status: EnrollmentStatus - token_id: str - def __init__(self, id: _Optional[str] = ..., peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., token_id: _Optional[str] = ..., status: _Optional[_Union[EnrollmentStatus, str]] = ..., labels: _Optional[_Mapping[str, str]] = ..., create_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., resolve_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., resolved_by: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... - -class EnrollmentRequestListResponse(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["requests"] - REQUESTS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - requests: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[EnrollmentRequest] - def __init__(self, requests: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[EnrollmentRequest, _Mapping]]] = ...) -> None: ... + addresses: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] + biscuit: bytes + connected_peers: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] + dht_size: int + challenge_unix_ms: int + challenge_signature: bytes + ttl: _duration_pb2.Duration + connections: int + connection_limit: int + ingress_url: str + def __init__(self, peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., addresses: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., biscuit: _Optional[bytes] = ..., connected_peers: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., dht_size: _Optional[int] = ..., challenge_unix_ms: _Optional[int] = ..., challenge_signature: _Optional[bytes] = ..., ttl: _Optional[_Union[_duration_pb2.Duration, _Mapping]] = ..., connections: _Optional[int] = ..., connection_limit: _Optional[int] = ..., ingress_url: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... -class ExtProc(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["allow_mode_override", "ca", "client_certificate", "failure_mode_allow", "max_buffered_bytes", "message_timeout", "processing_mode", "target"] - ALLOW_MODE_OVERRIDE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - CA_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - FAILURE_MODE_ALLOW_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - MAX_BUFFERED_BYTES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - MESSAGE_TIMEOUT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - PROCESSING_MODE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - TARGET_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - allow_mode_override: bool - ca: str - client_certificate: str - failure_mode_allow: bool - max_buffered_bytes: int - message_timeout: _duration_pb2.Duration - processing_mode: ExtProcProcessingMode - target: str - def __init__(self, target: _Optional[str] = ..., ca: _Optional[str] = ..., client_certificate: _Optional[str] = ..., processing_mode: _Optional[_Union[ExtProcProcessingMode, _Mapping]] = ..., allow_mode_override: bool = ..., message_timeout: _Optional[_Union[_duration_pb2.Duration, _Mapping]] = ..., failure_mode_allow: bool = ..., max_buffered_bytes: _Optional[int] = ...) -> None: ... +class RouterLeaseResponse(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ("success", "error", "expire_time") + SUCCESS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ERROR_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + EXPIRE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + success: bool + error: str + expire_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp + def __init__(self, success: bool = ..., error: _Optional[str] = ..., expire_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... -class ExtProcProcessingMode(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["request_body_mode", "request_header_mode", "request_trailer_mode", "response_body_mode", "response_header_mode", "response_trailer_mode"] - class BodyMode(int, metaclass=_enum_type_wrapper.EnumTypeWrapper): - __slots__ = [] - class HeaderMode(int, metaclass=_enum_type_wrapper.EnumTypeWrapper): - __slots__ = [] - BUFFERED: ExtProcProcessingMode.BodyMode - BUFFERED_PARTIAL: ExtProcProcessingMode.BodyMode - FULL_DUPLEX_STREAMED: ExtProcProcessingMode.BodyMode - HEADER_MODE_DEFAULT: ExtProcProcessingMode.HeaderMode - NONE: ExtProcProcessingMode.BodyMode - REQUEST_BODY_MODE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - REQUEST_HEADER_MODE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - REQUEST_TRAILER_MODE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - RESPONSE_BODY_MODE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - RESPONSE_HEADER_MODE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - RESPONSE_TRAILER_MODE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - SEND: ExtProcProcessingMode.HeaderMode - SKIP: ExtProcProcessingMode.HeaderMode - STREAMED: ExtProcProcessingMode.BodyMode - request_body_mode: ExtProcProcessingMode.BodyMode - request_header_mode: ExtProcProcessingMode.HeaderMode - request_trailer_mode: ExtProcProcessingMode.HeaderMode - response_body_mode: ExtProcProcessingMode.BodyMode - response_header_mode: ExtProcProcessingMode.HeaderMode - response_trailer_mode: ExtProcProcessingMode.HeaderMode - def __init__(self, request_header_mode: _Optional[_Union[ExtProcProcessingMode.HeaderMode, str]] = ..., response_header_mode: _Optional[_Union[ExtProcProcessingMode.HeaderMode, str]] = ..., request_body_mode: _Optional[_Union[ExtProcProcessingMode.BodyMode, str]] = ..., response_body_mode: _Optional[_Union[ExtProcProcessingMode.BodyMode, str]] = ..., request_trailer_mode: _Optional[_Union[ExtProcProcessingMode.HeaderMode, str]] = ..., response_trailer_mode: _Optional[_Union[ExtProcProcessingMode.HeaderMode, str]] = ...) -> None: ... +class PolicyRole(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ("name", "allowed_targets", "allowed_services", "custom_datalog", "allowed_labels", "http", "allowed_publish", "allowed_ingress") + NAME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ALLOWED_TARGETS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ALLOWED_SERVICES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + CUSTOM_DATALOG_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ALLOWED_LABELS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + HTTP_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ALLOWED_PUBLISH_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ALLOWED_INGRESS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + name: str + allowed_targets: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] + allowed_services: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] + custom_datalog: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] + allowed_labels: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] + http: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[HTTPGrant] + allowed_publish: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] + allowed_ingress: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[IngressGrant] + def __init__(self, name: _Optional[str] = ..., allowed_targets: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., allowed_services: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., custom_datalog: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., allowed_labels: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., http: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[HTTPGrant, _Mapping]]] = ..., allowed_publish: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., allowed_ingress: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[IngressGrant, _Mapping]]] = ...) -> None: ... + +class IngressGrant(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ("services", "allowed_auth_modes") + SERVICES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ALLOWED_AUTH_MODES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + services: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] + allowed_auth_modes: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[IngressAuthMode] + def __init__(self, services: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., allowed_auth_modes: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[IngressAuthMode, str]]] = ...) -> None: ... class HTTPGrant(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["methods", "paths", "service"] + __slots__ = ("service", "methods", "paths") + SERVICE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] METHODS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] PATHS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - SERVICE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + service: str methods: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] paths: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] - service: str def __init__(self, service: _Optional[str] = ..., methods: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., paths: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ...) -> None: ... -class IdentityEvidenceResponse(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["biscuit", "biscuit_expire_time", "check_time", "control_plane_url", "peer_id", "trusted_control_plane_keys"] - BISCUIT_EXPIRE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - BISCUIT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - CHECK_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - CONTROL_PLANE_URL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - TRUSTED_CONTROL_PLANE_KEYS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - biscuit: bytes - biscuit_expire_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp - check_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp - control_plane_url: str - peer_id: str - trusted_control_plane_keys: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[bytes] - def __init__(self, peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., biscuit: _Optional[bytes] = ..., biscuit_expire_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., control_plane_url: _Optional[str] = ..., trusted_control_plane_keys: _Optional[_Iterable[bytes]] = ..., check_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... - -class IngressGrant(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["allowed_auth_modes", "services"] - ALLOWED_AUTH_MODES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - SERVICES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - allowed_auth_modes: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[IngressAuthMode] - services: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] - def __init__(self, services: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., allowed_auth_modes: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[IngressAuthMode, str]]] = ...) -> None: ... +class EgressDestination(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ("name", "target_url", "credential", "served_by", "broker", "inspection", "mode", "ports", "preserve_host", "forward_context") + NAME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + TARGET_URL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + CREDENTIAL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + SERVED_BY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + BROKER_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + INSPECTION_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + MODE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + PORTS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + PRESERVE_HOST_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + FORWARD_CONTEXT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + name: str + target_url: str + credential: str + served_by: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] + broker: CredentialBroker + inspection: Inspection + mode: EgressMode + ports: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[int] + preserve_host: bool + forward_context: bool + def __init__(self, name: _Optional[str] = ..., target_url: _Optional[str] = ..., credential: _Optional[str] = ..., served_by: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., broker: _Optional[_Union[CredentialBroker, _Mapping]] = ..., inspection: _Optional[_Union[Inspection, _Mapping]] = ..., mode: _Optional[_Union[EgressMode, str]] = ..., ports: _Optional[_Iterable[int]] = ..., preserve_host: bool = ..., forward_context: bool = ...) -> None: ... class Inspection(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["inspectors"] + __slots__ = ("inspectors",) INSPECTORS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] inspectors: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[Inspector] def __init__(self, inspectors: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[Inspector, _Mapping]]] = ...) -> None: ... class Inspector(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["ext_proc", "model_armor"] - EXT_PROC_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + __slots__ = ("model_armor", "ext_proc") MODEL_ARMOR_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ext_proc: ExtProc + EXT_PROC_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] model_armor: ModelArmor + ext_proc: ExtProc def __init__(self, model_armor: _Optional[_Union[ModelArmor, _Mapping]] = ..., ext_proc: _Optional[_Union[ExtProc, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... -class KeysResponse(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["public_keys", "sign_time", "signatures"] - PUBLIC_KEYS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - SIGNATURES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - SIGN_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - public_keys: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[bytes] - sign_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp - signatures: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[bytes] - def __init__(self, public_keys: _Optional[_Iterable[bytes]] = ..., sign_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., signatures: _Optional[_Iterable[bytes]] = ...) -> None: ... - -class MemberCredential(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["biscuit", "control_plane_url", "expire_time", "issued_under_keys", "oidc_session", "router_addresses", "trusted_keys"] - BISCUIT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - CONTROL_PLANE_URL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - EXPIRE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ISSUED_UNDER_KEYS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - OIDC_SESSION_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ROUTER_ADDRESSES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - TRUSTED_KEYS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - biscuit: bytes - control_plane_url: str - expire_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp - issued_under_keys: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[bytes] - oidc_session: OIDCSession - router_addresses: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] - trusted_keys: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[TrustedSigningKey] - def __init__(self, control_plane_url: _Optional[str] = ..., biscuit: _Optional[bytes] = ..., expire_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., trusted_keys: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[TrustedSigningKey, _Mapping]]] = ..., issued_under_keys: _Optional[_Iterable[bytes]] = ..., router_addresses: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., oidc_session: _Optional[_Union[OIDCSession, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... - -class MeshEvent(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["event_time", "new_public_key", "peer_id", "signature", "type"] - class Type(int, metaclass=_enum_type_wrapper.EnumTypeWrapper): - __slots__ = [] - BANNED: MeshEvent.Type - EVENT_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - KEY_ROTATION: MeshEvent.Type - NEW_PUBLIC_KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - POLICY_UPDATE: MeshEvent.Type - SIGNATURE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - TYPE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - event_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp - new_public_key: bytes - peer_id: str - signature: bytes - type: MeshEvent.Type - def __init__(self, type: _Optional[_Union[MeshEvent.Type, str]] = ..., peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., event_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., new_public_key: _Optional[bytes] = ..., signature: _Optional[bytes] = ...) -> None: ... - class ModelArmor(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["fail_open", "response", "template", "timeout"] - FAIL_OPEN_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - RESPONSE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + __slots__ = ("template", "response", "fail_open", "timeout") TEMPLATE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + RESPONSE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + FAIL_OPEN_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] TIMEOUT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - fail_open: bool - response: ResponseInspection template: str + response: ResponseInspection + fail_open: bool timeout: _duration_pb2.Duration def __init__(self, template: _Optional[str] = ..., response: _Optional[_Union[ResponseInspection, str]] = ..., fail_open: bool = ..., timeout: _Optional[_Union[_duration_pb2.Duration, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... -class NodeCatalogReport(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["services"] - SERVICES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - services: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[ServiceInfo] - def __init__(self, services: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[ServiceInfo, _Mapping]]] = ...) -> None: ... +class ExtProc(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ("target", "ca", "client_certificate", "processing_mode", "allow_mode_override", "message_timeout", "failure_mode_allow", "max_buffered_bytes") + TARGET_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + CA_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + PROCESSING_MODE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ALLOW_MODE_OVERRIDE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + MESSAGE_TIMEOUT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + FAILURE_MODE_ALLOW_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + MAX_BUFFERED_BYTES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + target: str + ca: str + client_certificate: str + processing_mode: ExtProcProcessingMode + allow_mode_override: bool + message_timeout: _duration_pb2.Duration + failure_mode_allow: bool + max_buffered_bytes: int + def __init__(self, target: _Optional[str] = ..., ca: _Optional[str] = ..., client_certificate: _Optional[str] = ..., processing_mode: _Optional[_Union[ExtProcProcessingMode, _Mapping]] = ..., allow_mode_override: bool = ..., message_timeout: _Optional[_Union[_duration_pb2.Duration, _Mapping]] = ..., failure_mode_allow: bool = ..., max_buffered_bytes: _Optional[int] = ...) -> None: ... -class NodeListResponse(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["next_page_token", "nodes"] - NEXT_PAGE_TOKEN_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - NODES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - next_page_token: str - nodes: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[EnrolledNode] - def __init__(self, nodes: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[EnrolledNode, _Mapping]]] = ..., next_page_token: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... +class ExtProcProcessingMode(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ("request_header_mode", "response_header_mode", "request_body_mode", "response_body_mode", "request_trailer_mode", "response_trailer_mode") + class HeaderMode(int, metaclass=_enum_type_wrapper.EnumTypeWrapper): + __slots__ = () + HEADER_MODE_DEFAULT: _ClassVar[ExtProcProcessingMode.HeaderMode] + SEND: _ClassVar[ExtProcProcessingMode.HeaderMode] + SKIP: _ClassVar[ExtProcProcessingMode.HeaderMode] + HEADER_MODE_DEFAULT: ExtProcProcessingMode.HeaderMode + SEND: ExtProcProcessingMode.HeaderMode + SKIP: ExtProcProcessingMode.HeaderMode + class BodyMode(int, metaclass=_enum_type_wrapper.EnumTypeWrapper): + __slots__ = () + NONE: _ClassVar[ExtProcProcessingMode.BodyMode] + STREAMED: _ClassVar[ExtProcProcessingMode.BodyMode] + BUFFERED: _ClassVar[ExtProcProcessingMode.BodyMode] + BUFFERED_PARTIAL: _ClassVar[ExtProcProcessingMode.BodyMode] + FULL_DUPLEX_STREAMED: _ClassVar[ExtProcProcessingMode.BodyMode] + NONE: ExtProcProcessingMode.BodyMode + STREAMED: ExtProcProcessingMode.BodyMode + BUFFERED: ExtProcProcessingMode.BodyMode + BUFFERED_PARTIAL: ExtProcProcessingMode.BodyMode + FULL_DUPLEX_STREAMED: ExtProcProcessingMode.BodyMode + REQUEST_HEADER_MODE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + RESPONSE_HEADER_MODE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + REQUEST_BODY_MODE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + RESPONSE_BODY_MODE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + REQUEST_TRAILER_MODE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + RESPONSE_TRAILER_MODE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + request_header_mode: ExtProcProcessingMode.HeaderMode + response_header_mode: ExtProcProcessingMode.HeaderMode + request_body_mode: ExtProcProcessingMode.BodyMode + response_body_mode: ExtProcProcessingMode.BodyMode + request_trailer_mode: ExtProcProcessingMode.HeaderMode + response_trailer_mode: ExtProcProcessingMode.HeaderMode + def __init__(self, request_header_mode: _Optional[_Union[ExtProcProcessingMode.HeaderMode, str]] = ..., response_header_mode: _Optional[_Union[ExtProcProcessingMode.HeaderMode, str]] = ..., request_body_mode: _Optional[_Union[ExtProcProcessingMode.BodyMode, str]] = ..., response_body_mode: _Optional[_Union[ExtProcProcessingMode.BodyMode, str]] = ..., request_trailer_mode: _Optional[_Union[ExtProcProcessingMode.HeaderMode, str]] = ..., response_trailer_mode: _Optional[_Union[ExtProcProcessingMode.HeaderMode, str]] = ...) -> None: ... -class NodeServices(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["report_time", "services"] - REPORT_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - SERVICES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - report_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp - services: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[ServiceInfo] - def __init__(self, services: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[ServiceInfo, _Mapping]]] = ..., report_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... +class CredentialBroker(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ("static_secret", "oidc_federation", "aws_assume_role", "platform_identity") + STATIC_SECRET_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + OIDC_FEDERATION_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + AWS_ASSUME_ROLE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + PLATFORM_IDENTITY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + static_secret: str + oidc_federation: OIDCFederation + aws_assume_role: AWSAssumeRole + platform_identity: PlatformIdentity + def __init__(self, static_secret: _Optional[str] = ..., oidc_federation: _Optional[_Union[OIDCFederation, _Mapping]] = ..., aws_assume_role: _Optional[_Union[AWSAssumeRole, _Mapping]] = ..., platform_identity: _Optional[_Union[PlatformIdentity, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... class OIDCFederation(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["audience", "impersonate", "scopes", "token_endpoint"] + __slots__ = ("token_endpoint", "audience", "impersonate", "scopes") + TOKEN_ENDPOINT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] AUDIENCE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] IMPERSONATE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] SCOPES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - TOKEN_ENDPOINT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + token_endpoint: str audience: str impersonate: str scopes: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] - token_endpoint: str def __init__(self, token_endpoint: _Optional[str] = ..., audience: _Optional[str] = ..., impersonate: _Optional[str] = ..., scopes: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ...) -> None: ... -class OIDCSession(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["audience", "client_id", "issuer", "refresh_token"] - AUDIENCE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - CLIENT_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ISSUER_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - REFRESH_TOKEN_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - audience: str - client_id: str - issuer: str - refresh_token: str - def __init__(self, issuer: _Optional[str] = ..., client_id: _Optional[str] = ..., audience: _Optional[str] = ..., refresh_token: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... - -class PeerEvidenceResponse(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["biscuit", "check_time", "expire_time", "labels", "peer_id", "revocation_ids", "roles", "verifying_key"] - class LabelsEntry(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["key", "value"] - KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - VALUE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - key: str - value: str - def __init__(self, key: _Optional[str] = ..., value: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... - BISCUIT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - CHECK_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - EXPIRE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - LABELS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - REVOCATION_IDS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ROLES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - VERIFYING_KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - biscuit: bytes - check_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp - expire_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp - labels: _containers.ScalarMap[str, str] - peer_id: str - revocation_ids: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] - roles: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] - verifying_key: bytes - def __init__(self, peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., biscuit: _Optional[bytes] = ..., verifying_key: _Optional[bytes] = ..., roles: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., labels: _Optional[_Mapping[str, str]] = ..., expire_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., revocation_ids: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., check_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... - -class PeerRecord(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["addrs", "ingress", "peer_id"] - ADDRS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - INGRESS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - addrs: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] - ingress: ServiceIngress - peer_id: str - def __init__(self, peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., addrs: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., ingress: _Optional[_Union[ServiceIngress, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... +class AWSAssumeRole(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ("role_arn", "session_policy") + ROLE_ARN_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + SESSION_POLICY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + role_arn: str + session_policy: str + def __init__(self, role_arn: _Optional[str] = ..., session_policy: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... class PlatformIdentity(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["scopes"] + __slots__ = ("scopes",) SCOPES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] scopes: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] def __init__(self, scopes: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ...) -> None: ... class PolicyBinding(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["members", "role"] - MEMBERS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + __slots__ = ("role", "members") ROLE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - members: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] + MEMBERS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] role: str + members: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] def __init__(self, role: _Optional[str] = ..., members: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ...) -> None: ... class PolicyConfig(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["bindings", "egress", "roles"] + __slots__ = ("roles", "bindings", "egress") + ROLES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] BINDINGS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] EGRESS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ROLES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + roles: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[PolicyRole] bindings: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[PolicyBinding] egress: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[EgressDestination] - roles: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[PolicyRole] def __init__(self, roles: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[PolicyRole, _Mapping]]] = ..., bindings: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[PolicyBinding, _Mapping]]] = ..., egress: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[EgressDestination, _Mapping]]] = ...) -> None: ... class PolicyConfigGetRequest(_message.Message): - __slots__ = [] + __slots__ = () def __init__(self) -> None: ... class PolicyConfigGetResponse(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["datalog_rules"] + __slots__ = ("datalog_rules",) DATALOG_RULES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] datalog_rules: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] def __init__(self, datalog_rules: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ...) -> None: ... class PolicyConfigUpdateResponse(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["error", "success"] - ERROR_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + __slots__ = ("success", "error") SUCCESS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ERROR_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + success: bool error: str + def __init__(self, success: bool = ..., error: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... + +class EgressAssignmentsRequest(_message.Message): + __slots__ = () + def __init__(self) -> None: ... + +class EgressAssignmentsResponse(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ("egress",) + EGRESS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + egress: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[EgressDestination] + def __init__(self, egress: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[EgressDestination, _Mapping]]] = ...) -> None: ... + +class KeysResponse(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ("public_keys", "sign_time", "signatures") + PUBLIC_KEYS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + SIGN_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + SIGNATURES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + public_keys: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[bytes] + sign_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp + signatures: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[bytes] + def __init__(self, public_keys: _Optional[_Iterable[bytes]] = ..., sign_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., signatures: _Optional[_Iterable[bytes]] = ...) -> None: ... + +class TokenRefreshRequest(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ("challenge_signature", "challenge_unix_ms", "peer_id", "jwt") + CHALLENGE_SIGNATURE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + CHALLENGE_UNIX_MS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + JWT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + challenge_signature: bytes + challenge_unix_ms: int + peer_id: str + jwt: str + def __init__(self, challenge_signature: _Optional[bytes] = ..., challenge_unix_ms: _Optional[int] = ..., peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., jwt: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... + +class TokenRefreshResponse(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ("biscuit_token", "expire_time", "error_message") + BISCUIT_TOKEN_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + EXPIRE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ERROR_MESSAGE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + biscuit_token: bytes + expire_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp + error_message: str + def __init__(self, biscuit_token: _Optional[bytes] = ..., expire_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., error_message: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... + +class NodeCatalogReport(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ("services",) + SERVICES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + services: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[ServiceInfo] + def __init__(self, services: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[ServiceInfo, _Mapping]]] = ...) -> None: ... + +class TokenRevokeRequest(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ("peer_id",) + PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + peer_id: str + def __init__(self, peer_id: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... + +class TokenRevokeResponse(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ("success", "error") + SUCCESS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ERROR_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] success: bool + error: str def __init__(self, success: bool = ..., error: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... -class PolicyRole(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["allowed_ingress", "allowed_labels", "allowed_publish", "allowed_services", "allowed_targets", "custom_datalog", "http", "name"] - ALLOWED_INGRESS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ALLOWED_LABELS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ALLOWED_PUBLISH_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ALLOWED_SERVICES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ALLOWED_TARGETS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - CUSTOM_DATALOG_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - HTTP_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - NAME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - allowed_ingress: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[IngressGrant] - allowed_labels: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] - allowed_publish: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] - allowed_services: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] - allowed_targets: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] - custom_datalog: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] - http: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[HTTPGrant] - name: str - def __init__(self, name: _Optional[str] = ..., allowed_targets: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., allowed_services: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., custom_datalog: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., allowed_labels: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., http: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[HTTPGrant, _Mapping]]] = ..., allowed_publish: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., allowed_ingress: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[IngressGrant, _Mapping]]] = ...) -> None: ... +class BootstrapTokenCreateRequest(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ("role", "owner_id", "ttl_hours", "max_usages", "description", "autonomous_recovery", "ephemeral") + ROLE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + OWNER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + TTL_HOURS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + MAX_USAGES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + DESCRIPTION_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + AUTONOMOUS_RECOVERY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + EPHEMERAL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + role: str + owner_id: str + ttl_hours: int + max_usages: int + description: str + autonomous_recovery: bool + ephemeral: bool + def __init__(self, role: _Optional[str] = ..., owner_id: _Optional[str] = ..., ttl_hours: _Optional[int] = ..., max_usages: _Optional[int] = ..., description: _Optional[str] = ..., autonomous_recovery: bool = ..., ephemeral: bool = ...) -> None: ... -class RegisterServiceRequest(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["command", "service", "target_url"] - COMMAND_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - SERVICE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - TARGET_URL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - command: CommandBackend - service: ServiceInfo - target_url: str - def __init__(self, service: _Optional[_Union[ServiceInfo, _Mapping]] = ..., target_url: _Optional[str] = ..., command: _Optional[_Union[CommandBackend, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... +class BootstrapTokenCreateResponse(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ("id", "token", "role", "owner_id", "expire_time") + ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + TOKEN_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ROLE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + OWNER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + EXPIRE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + id: str + token: str + role: str + owner_id: str + expire_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp + def __init__(self, id: _Optional[str] = ..., token: _Optional[str] = ..., role: _Optional[str] = ..., owner_id: _Optional[str] = ..., expire_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... -class RevocationsResponse(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["banned_peer_ids", "revocation_ids"] - BANNED_PEER_IDS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - REVOCATION_IDS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - banned_peer_ids: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] - revocation_ids: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] - def __init__(self, revocation_ids: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., banned_peer_ids: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ...) -> None: ... +class BootstrapToken(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ("id", "role", "owner_id", "max_usages", "usages_count", "description", "create_time", "expire_time", "revoke_time", "autonomous_recovery", "ephemeral") + ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ROLE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + OWNER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + MAX_USAGES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + USAGES_COUNT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + DESCRIPTION_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + CREATE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + EXPIRE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + REVOKE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + AUTONOMOUS_RECOVERY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + EPHEMERAL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + id: str + role: str + owner_id: str + max_usages: int + usages_count: int + description: str + create_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp + expire_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp + revoke_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp + autonomous_recovery: bool + ephemeral: bool + def __init__(self, id: _Optional[str] = ..., role: _Optional[str] = ..., owner_id: _Optional[str] = ..., max_usages: _Optional[int] = ..., usages_count: _Optional[int] = ..., description: _Optional[str] = ..., create_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., expire_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., revoke_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., autonomous_recovery: bool = ..., ephemeral: bool = ...) -> None: ... -class RouterGoAway(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["reason", "retry_after"] - class Reason(int, metaclass=_enum_type_wrapper.EnumTypeWrapper): - __slots__ = [] - DRAINING: RouterGoAway.Reason - OVERLOADED: RouterGoAway.Reason - REASON_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - REASON_UNSPECIFIED: RouterGoAway.Reason - RETRY_AFTER_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - reason: RouterGoAway.Reason - retry_after: _duration_pb2.Duration - def __init__(self, reason: _Optional[_Union[RouterGoAway.Reason, str]] = ..., retry_after: _Optional[_Union[_duration_pb2.Duration, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... +class BootstrapTokenListResponse(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ("tokens",) + TOKENS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + tokens: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[BootstrapToken] + def __init__(self, tokens: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[BootstrapToken, _Mapping]]] = ...) -> None: ... -class RouterInfo(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["addresses", "connection_limit", "connections", "ingress_url", "labels", "peer_id"] +class EnrollmentRequest(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ("id", "peer_id", "token_id", "status", "labels", "create_time", "resolve_time", "resolved_by") class LabelsEntry(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["key", "value"] + __slots__ = ("key", "value") KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] VALUE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] key: str value: str def __init__(self, key: _Optional[str] = ..., value: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... - ADDRESSES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - CONNECTIONS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - CONNECTION_LIMIT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - INGRESS_URL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - LABELS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - addresses: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] - connection_limit: int - connections: int - ingress_url: str + TOKEN_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + STATUS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + LABELS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + CREATE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + RESOLVE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + RESOLVED_BY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + id: str + peer_id: str + token_id: str + status: EnrollmentStatus labels: _containers.ScalarMap[str, str] + create_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp + resolve_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp + resolved_by: str + def __init__(self, id: _Optional[str] = ..., peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., token_id: _Optional[str] = ..., status: _Optional[_Union[EnrollmentStatus, str]] = ..., labels: _Optional[_Mapping[str, str]] = ..., create_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., resolve_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., resolved_by: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... + +class EnrollmentRequestListResponse(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ("requests",) + REQUESTS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + requests: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[EnrollmentRequest] + def __init__(self, requests: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[EnrollmentRequest, _Mapping]]] = ...) -> None: ... + +class User(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ("id", "issuer", "email", "role", "create_time") + ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ISSUER_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + EMAIL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ROLE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + CREATE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + id: str + issuer: str + email: str + role: str + create_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp + def __init__(self, id: _Optional[str] = ..., issuer: _Optional[str] = ..., email: _Optional[str] = ..., role: _Optional[str] = ..., create_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... + +class EnrolledNode(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ("peer_id", "role", "enrollment_type", "claims_json", "owner_id", "labels", "enroll_time", "expire_time", "banned", "autonomous_recovery", "ephemeral") + class LabelsEntry(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ("key", "value") + KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + VALUE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + key: str + value: str + def __init__(self, key: _Optional[str] = ..., value: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... + PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ROLE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ENROLLMENT_TYPE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + CLAIMS_JSON_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + OWNER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + LABELS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ENROLL_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + EXPIRE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + BANNED_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + AUTONOMOUS_RECOVERY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + EPHEMERAL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] peer_id: str - def __init__(self, peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., addresses: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., labels: _Optional[_Mapping[str, str]] = ..., connections: _Optional[int] = ..., connection_limit: _Optional[int] = ..., ingress_url: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... + role: str + enrollment_type: str + claims_json: str + owner_id: str + labels: _containers.ScalarMap[str, str] + enroll_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp + expire_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp + banned: bool + autonomous_recovery: bool + ephemeral: bool + def __init__(self, peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., role: _Optional[str] = ..., enrollment_type: _Optional[str] = ..., claims_json: _Optional[str] = ..., owner_id: _Optional[str] = ..., labels: _Optional[_Mapping[str, str]] = ..., enroll_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., expire_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., banned: bool = ..., autonomous_recovery: bool = ..., ephemeral: bool = ...) -> None: ... class RouterLease(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["addresses", "connected_peers", "dht_size", "expire_time", "ingress_url", "last_renewal_time", "peer_id"] + __slots__ = ("peer_id", "addresses", "last_renewal_time", "expire_time", "connected_peers", "dht_size", "ingress_url") + PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] ADDRESSES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + LAST_RENEWAL_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + EXPIRE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] CONNECTED_PEERS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] DHT_SIZE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - EXPIRE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] INGRESS_URL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - LAST_RENEWAL_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + peer_id: str addresses: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] + last_renewal_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp + expire_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp connected_peers: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] dht_size: int - expire_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp ingress_url: str - last_renewal_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp - peer_id: str def __init__(self, peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., addresses: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., last_renewal_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., expire_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., connected_peers: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., dht_size: _Optional[int] = ..., ingress_url: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... -class RouterLeaseRequest(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["addresses", "biscuit", "challenge_signature", "challenge_unix_ms", "connected_peers", "connection_limit", "connections", "dht_size", "ingress_url", "peer_id", "ttl"] - ADDRESSES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - BISCUIT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - CHALLENGE_SIGNATURE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - CHALLENGE_UNIX_MS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - CONNECTED_PEERS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - CONNECTIONS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - CONNECTION_LIMIT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - DHT_SIZE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - INGRESS_URL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] +class NodeServices(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ("services", "report_time") + SERVICES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + REPORT_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + services: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[ServiceInfo] + report_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp + def __init__(self, services: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[ServiceInfo, _Mapping]]] = ..., report_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... + +class AdminStatusResponse(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ("users", "active_routers", "enrolled_nodes", "enrollment_requests", "bootstrap_tokens", "policy", "node_catalog") + class NodeCatalogEntry(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ("key", "value") + KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + VALUE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + key: str + value: NodeServices + def __init__(self, key: _Optional[str] = ..., value: _Optional[_Union[NodeServices, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... + USERS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ACTIVE_ROUTERS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ENROLLED_NODES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ENROLLMENT_REQUESTS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + BOOTSTRAP_TOKENS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + POLICY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + NODE_CATALOG_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + users: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[User] + active_routers: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[RouterLease] + enrolled_nodes: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[EnrolledNode] + enrollment_requests: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[EnrollmentRequest] + bootstrap_tokens: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[BootstrapToken] + policy: PolicyConfig + node_catalog: _containers.MessageMap[str, NodeServices] + def __init__(self, users: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[User, _Mapping]]] = ..., active_routers: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[RouterLease, _Mapping]]] = ..., enrolled_nodes: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[EnrolledNode, _Mapping]]] = ..., enrollment_requests: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[EnrollmentRequest, _Mapping]]] = ..., bootstrap_tokens: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[BootstrapToken, _Mapping]]] = ..., policy: _Optional[_Union[PolicyConfig, _Mapping]] = ..., node_catalog: _Optional[_Mapping[str, NodeServices]] = ...) -> None: ... + +class UserStatusResponse(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ("user", "enrolled_nodes", "bootstrap_tokens", "active_routers", "policy") + USER_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ENROLLED_NODES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + BOOTSTRAP_TOKENS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ACTIVE_ROUTERS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + POLICY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + user: User + enrolled_nodes: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[EnrolledNode] + bootstrap_tokens: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[BootstrapToken] + active_routers: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[RouterLease] + policy: PolicyConfig + def __init__(self, user: _Optional[_Union[User, _Mapping]] = ..., enrolled_nodes: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[EnrolledNode, _Mapping]]] = ..., bootstrap_tokens: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[BootstrapToken, _Mapping]]] = ..., active_routers: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[RouterLease, _Mapping]]] = ..., policy: _Optional[_Union[PolicyConfig, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... + +class NodeListResponse(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ("nodes", "next_page_token") + NODES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + NEXT_PAGE_TOKEN_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + nodes: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[EnrolledNode] + next_page_token: str + def __init__(self, nodes: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[EnrolledNode, _Mapping]]] = ..., next_page_token: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... + +class IdentityEvidenceResponse(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ("peer_id", "biscuit", "biscuit_expire_time", "control_plane_url", "trusted_control_plane_keys", "check_time") PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - TTL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - addresses: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] - biscuit: bytes - challenge_signature: bytes - challenge_unix_ms: int - connected_peers: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] - connection_limit: int - connections: int - dht_size: int - ingress_url: str + BISCUIT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + BISCUIT_EXPIRE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + CONTROL_PLANE_URL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + TRUSTED_CONTROL_PLANE_KEYS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + CHECK_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] peer_id: str - ttl: _duration_pb2.Duration - def __init__(self, peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., addresses: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., biscuit: _Optional[bytes] = ..., connected_peers: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., dht_size: _Optional[int] = ..., challenge_unix_ms: _Optional[int] = ..., challenge_signature: _Optional[bytes] = ..., ttl: _Optional[_Union[_duration_pb2.Duration, _Mapping]] = ..., connections: _Optional[int] = ..., connection_limit: _Optional[int] = ..., ingress_url: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... + biscuit: bytes + biscuit_expire_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp + control_plane_url: str + trusted_control_plane_keys: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[bytes] + check_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp + def __init__(self, peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., biscuit: _Optional[bytes] = ..., biscuit_expire_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., control_plane_url: _Optional[str] = ..., trusted_control_plane_keys: _Optional[_Iterable[bytes]] = ..., check_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... -class RouterLeaseResponse(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["error", "expire_time", "success"] - ERROR_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] +class PeerEvidenceResponse(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ("peer_id", "biscuit", "verifying_key", "roles", "labels", "expire_time", "revocation_ids", "check_time") + class LabelsEntry(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ("key", "value") + KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + VALUE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + key: str + value: str + def __init__(self, key: _Optional[str] = ..., value: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... + PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + BISCUIT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + VERIFYING_KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ROLES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + LABELS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] EXPIRE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - SUCCESS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - error: str + REVOCATION_IDS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + CHECK_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + peer_id: str + biscuit: bytes + verifying_key: bytes + roles: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] + labels: _containers.ScalarMap[str, str] expire_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp - success: bool - def __init__(self, success: bool = ..., error: _Optional[str] = ..., expire_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... + revocation_ids: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] + check_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp + def __init__(self, peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., biscuit: _Optional[bytes] = ..., verifying_key: _Optional[bytes] = ..., roles: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., labels: _Optional[_Mapping[str, str]] = ..., expire_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., revocation_ids: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., check_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... -class STSTokenRequest(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["audience", "biscuit", "challenge_signature", "challenge_unix_ms", "destination"] - AUDIENCE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] +class MemberCredential(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ("control_plane_url", "biscuit", "expire_time", "trusted_keys", "issued_under_keys", "router_addresses", "oidc_session") + CONTROL_PLANE_URL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] BISCUIT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - CHALLENGE_SIGNATURE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - CHALLENGE_UNIX_MS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - DESTINATION_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - audience: str - biscuit: bytes - challenge_signature: bytes - challenge_unix_ms: int - destination: str - def __init__(self, biscuit: _Optional[bytes] = ..., destination: _Optional[str] = ..., audience: _Optional[str] = ..., challenge_unix_ms: _Optional[int] = ..., challenge_signature: _Optional[bytes] = ...) -> None: ... - -class STSTokenResponse(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["expire_time", "jwt", "roles", "subject", "task_name"] EXPIRE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - JWT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ROLES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - SUBJECT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - TASK_NAME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + TRUSTED_KEYS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ISSUED_UNDER_KEYS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ROUTER_ADDRESSES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + OIDC_SESSION_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + control_plane_url: str + biscuit: bytes expire_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp - jwt: str - roles: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] - subject: str - task_name: str - def __init__(self, jwt: _Optional[str] = ..., expire_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., subject: _Optional[str] = ..., roles: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., task_name: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... + trusted_keys: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[TrustedSigningKey] + issued_under_keys: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[bytes] + router_addresses: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] + oidc_session: OIDCSession + def __init__(self, control_plane_url: _Optional[str] = ..., biscuit: _Optional[bytes] = ..., expire_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., trusted_keys: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[TrustedSigningKey, _Mapping]]] = ..., issued_under_keys: _Optional[_Iterable[bytes]] = ..., router_addresses: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., oidc_session: _Optional[_Union[OIDCSession, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... -class ServiceInfo(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["description", "ingress", "name", "type"] - DESCRIPTION_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - INGRESS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - NAME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - TYPE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - description: str - ingress: ServiceIngress - name: str - type: ServiceType - def __init__(self, type: _Optional[_Union[ServiceType, str]] = ..., name: _Optional[str] = ..., description: _Optional[str] = ..., ingress: _Optional[_Union[ServiceIngress, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... +class TrustedSigningKey(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ("public_key", "receive_time") + PUBLIC_KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + RECEIVE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + public_key: bytes + receive_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp + def __init__(self, public_key: _Optional[bytes] = ..., receive_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... -class ServiceIngress(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["allow", "auth_mode"] - ALLOW_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - AUTH_MODE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - allow: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] - auth_mode: IngressAuthMode - def __init__(self, auth_mode: _Optional[_Union[IngressAuthMode, str]] = ..., allow: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ...) -> None: ... +class OIDCSession(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ("issuer", "client_id", "audience", "refresh_token") + ISSUER_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + CLIENT_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + AUDIENCE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + REFRESH_TOKEN_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + issuer: str + client_id: str + audience: str + refresh_token: str + def __init__(self, issuer: _Optional[str] = ..., client_id: _Optional[str] = ..., audience: _Optional[str] = ..., refresh_token: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... class TaskAuthorizationRule(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["display_name", "expire_time", "name", "rules"] - DISPLAY_NAME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - EXPIRE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + __slots__ = ("name", "display_name", "rules", "expire_time") NAME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + DISPLAY_NAME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] RULES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - display_name: str - expire_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp + EXPIRE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] name: str + display_name: str rules: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[TaskRule] + expire_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp def __init__(self, name: _Optional[str] = ..., display_name: _Optional[str] = ..., rules: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[TaskRule, _Mapping]]] = ..., expire_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... +class TaskRule(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ("description", "allowed_services", "operation", "allowed_resources") + DESCRIPTION_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ALLOWED_SERVICES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + OPERATION_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ALLOWED_RESOURCES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + description: str + allowed_services: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] + operation: TaskOperation + allowed_resources: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] + def __init__(self, description: _Optional[str] = ..., allowed_services: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., operation: _Optional[_Union[TaskOperation, _Mapping]] = ..., allowed_resources: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ...) -> None: ... + class TaskOperation(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["allowed_methods", "allowed_paths", "allowed_permissions", "allowed_tools"] + __slots__ = ("allowed_tools", "allowed_methods", "allowed_paths", "allowed_permissions") + ALLOWED_TOOLS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] ALLOWED_METHODS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] ALLOWED_PATHS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] ALLOWED_PERMISSIONS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ALLOWED_TOOLS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + allowed_tools: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] allowed_methods: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] allowed_paths: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] allowed_permissions: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] - allowed_tools: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] def __init__(self, allowed_tools: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., allowed_methods: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., allowed_paths: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., allowed_permissions: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ...) -> None: ... -class TaskRule(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["allowed_resources", "allowed_services", "description", "operation"] - ALLOWED_RESOURCES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ALLOWED_SERVICES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - DESCRIPTION_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - OPERATION_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - allowed_resources: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] - allowed_services: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] - description: str - operation: TaskOperation - def __init__(self, description: _Optional[str] = ..., allowed_services: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., operation: _Optional[_Union[TaskOperation, _Mapping]] = ..., allowed_resources: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ...) -> None: ... - class TokenExchangeRequest(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["challenge_signature", "challenge_unix_ms", "seal", "subject_token", "task_rule"] - CHALLENGE_SIGNATURE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - CHALLENGE_UNIX_MS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - SEAL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + __slots__ = ("subject_token", "task_rule", "seal", "challenge_unix_ms", "challenge_signature") SUBJECT_TOKEN_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] TASK_RULE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - challenge_signature: bytes - challenge_unix_ms: int - seal: bool + SEAL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + CHALLENGE_UNIX_MS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + CHALLENGE_SIGNATURE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] subject_token: str task_rule: TaskAuthorizationRule + seal: bool + challenge_unix_ms: int + challenge_signature: bytes def __init__(self, subject_token: _Optional[str] = ..., task_rule: _Optional[_Union[TaskAuthorizationRule, _Mapping]] = ..., seal: bool = ..., challenge_unix_ms: _Optional[int] = ..., challenge_signature: _Optional[bytes] = ...) -> None: ... class TokenExchangeResponse(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["biscuit_token", "expire_time", "roles", "subject"] + __slots__ = ("biscuit_token", "expire_time", "roles", "subject") BISCUIT_TOKEN_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] EXPIRE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] ROLES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] @@ -964,89 +1122,194 @@ class TokenExchangeResponse(_message.Message): subject: str def __init__(self, biscuit_token: _Optional[bytes] = ..., expire_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., roles: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., subject: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... -class TokenRefreshRequest(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["challenge_signature", "challenge_unix_ms", "jwt", "peer_id"] - CHALLENGE_SIGNATURE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] +class STSTokenRequest(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ("biscuit", "destination", "audience", "challenge_unix_ms", "challenge_signature") + BISCUIT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + DESTINATION_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + AUDIENCE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] CHALLENGE_UNIX_MS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - JWT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - challenge_signature: bytes + CHALLENGE_SIGNATURE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + biscuit: bytes + destination: str + audience: str challenge_unix_ms: int - jwt: str - peer_id: str - def __init__(self, challenge_signature: _Optional[bytes] = ..., challenge_unix_ms: _Optional[int] = ..., peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., jwt: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... + challenge_signature: bytes + def __init__(self, biscuit: _Optional[bytes] = ..., destination: _Optional[str] = ..., audience: _Optional[str] = ..., challenge_unix_ms: _Optional[int] = ..., challenge_signature: _Optional[bytes] = ...) -> None: ... -class TokenRefreshResponse(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["biscuit_token", "error_message", "expire_time"] - BISCUIT_TOKEN_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ERROR_MESSAGE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] +class STSTokenResponse(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ("jwt", "expire_time", "subject", "roles", "task_name") + JWT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] EXPIRE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - biscuit_token: bytes - error_message: str + SUBJECT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ROLES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + TASK_NAME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + jwt: str expire_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp - def __init__(self, biscuit_token: _Optional[bytes] = ..., expire_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., error_message: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... + subject: str + roles: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] + task_name: str + def __init__(self, jwt: _Optional[str] = ..., expire_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., subject: _Optional[str] = ..., roles: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., task_name: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... -class TokenRevokeRequest(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["peer_id"] +class RevocationsResponse(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ("revocation_ids", "banned_peer_ids") + REVOCATION_IDS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + BANNED_PEER_IDS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + revocation_ids: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] + banned_peer_ids: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] + def __init__(self, revocation_ids: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., banned_peer_ids: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ...) -> None: ... + +class PolicyDeniedSignal(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ("direction", "reason", "detail", "target_service", "requested_operation", "requested_resource", "caller_peer_id", "caller_subject", "caller_roles", "caller_labels", "event_time") + class CallerLabelsEntry(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ("key", "value") + KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + VALUE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + key: str + value: str + def __init__(self, key: _Optional[str] = ..., value: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... + DIRECTION_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + REASON_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + DETAIL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + TARGET_SERVICE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + REQUESTED_OPERATION_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + REQUESTED_RESOURCE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + CALLER_PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + CALLER_SUBJECT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + CALLER_ROLES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + CALLER_LABELS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + EVENT_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + direction: SignalCallerDirection + reason: PolicyDenialReason + detail: str + target_service: str + requested_operation: str + requested_resource: str + caller_peer_id: str + caller_subject: str + caller_roles: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] + caller_labels: _containers.ScalarMap[str, str] + event_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp + def __init__(self, direction: _Optional[_Union[SignalCallerDirection, str]] = ..., reason: _Optional[_Union[PolicyDenialReason, str]] = ..., detail: _Optional[str] = ..., target_service: _Optional[str] = ..., requested_operation: _Optional[str] = ..., requested_resource: _Optional[str] = ..., caller_peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., caller_subject: _Optional[str] = ..., caller_roles: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., caller_labels: _Optional[_Mapping[str, str]] = ..., event_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... + +class TransportRefusedSignal(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ("reason", "detail", "peer_id", "remote_multiaddr", "protocol_id", "coalesced_count", "first_seen_time", "event_time") + REASON_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + DETAIL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + REMOTE_MULTIADDR_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + PROTOCOL_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + COALESCED_COUNT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + FIRST_SEEN_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + EVENT_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + reason: TransportRefusalReason + detail: str peer_id: str - def __init__(self, peer_id: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... + remote_multiaddr: str + protocol_id: str + coalesced_count: int + first_seen_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp + event_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp + def __init__(self, reason: _Optional[_Union[TransportRefusalReason, str]] = ..., detail: _Optional[str] = ..., peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., remote_multiaddr: _Optional[str] = ..., protocol_id: _Optional[str] = ..., coalesced_count: _Optional[int] = ..., first_seen_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., event_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... -class TokenRevokeResponse(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["error", "success"] - ERROR_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - SUCCESS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - error: str - success: bool - def __init__(self, success: bool = ..., error: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... +class IdentityRevokedSignal(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ("peer_id", "source", "reason", "revocation_ids", "issuer_peer_id", "event_time") + PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + SOURCE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + REASON_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + REVOCATION_IDS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ISSUER_PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + EVENT_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + peer_id: str + source: RevocationSource + reason: str + revocation_ids: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] + issuer_peer_id: str + event_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp + def __init__(self, peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., source: _Optional[_Union[RevocationSource, str]] = ..., reason: _Optional[str] = ..., revocation_ids: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., issuer_peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., event_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... -class TrustedSigningKey(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["public_key", "receive_time"] - PUBLIC_KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - RECEIVE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - public_key: bytes - receive_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp - def __init__(self, public_key: _Optional[bytes] = ..., receive_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... +class EnrollmentRejectedSignal(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ("peer_id", "requested_role", "reason", "detail", "bootstrap_token_id", "remote_address", "submitted_labels", "is_autonomous_recovery", "event_time") + class SubmittedLabelsEntry(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ("key", "value") + KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + VALUE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + key: str + value: str + def __init__(self, key: _Optional[str] = ..., value: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... + PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + REQUESTED_ROLE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + REASON_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + DETAIL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + REMOTE_ADDRESS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + SUBMITTED_LABELS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + IS_AUTONOMOUS_RECOVERY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + EVENT_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + peer_id: str + requested_role: str + reason: EnrollmentRejectionReason + detail: str + bootstrap_token_id: str + remote_address: str + submitted_labels: _containers.ScalarMap[str, str] + is_autonomous_recovery: bool + event_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp + def __init__(self, peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., requested_role: _Optional[str] = ..., reason: _Optional[_Union[EnrollmentRejectionReason, str]] = ..., detail: _Optional[str] = ..., bootstrap_token_id: _Optional[str] = ..., remote_address: _Optional[str] = ..., submitted_labels: _Optional[_Mapping[str, str]] = ..., is_autonomous_recovery: bool = ..., event_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... -class User(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["create_time", "email", "id", "issuer", "role"] - CREATE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - EMAIL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] +class SecuritySignalEvent(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ("id", "source", "spec_version", "type", "event_time", "data_content_type", "subject", "policy_denied", "transport_refused", "identity_revoked", "enrollment_rejected") ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ISSUER_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ROLE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - create_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp - email: str + SOURCE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + SPEC_VERSION_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + TYPE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + EVENT_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + DATA_CONTENT_TYPE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + SUBJECT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + POLICY_DENIED_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + TRANSPORT_REFUSED_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + IDENTITY_REVOKED_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ENROLLMENT_REJECTED_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] id: str - issuer: str - role: str - def __init__(self, id: _Optional[str] = ..., issuer: _Optional[str] = ..., email: _Optional[str] = ..., role: _Optional[str] = ..., create_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... - -class UserStatusResponse(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ["active_routers", "bootstrap_tokens", "enrolled_nodes", "policy", "user"] - ACTIVE_ROUTERS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - BOOTSTRAP_TOKENS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ENROLLED_NODES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - POLICY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - USER_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - active_routers: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[RouterLease] - bootstrap_tokens: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[BootstrapToken] - enrolled_nodes: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[EnrolledNode] - policy: PolicyConfig - user: User - def __init__(self, user: _Optional[_Union[User, _Mapping]] = ..., enrolled_nodes: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[EnrolledNode, _Mapping]]] = ..., bootstrap_tokens: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[BootstrapToken, _Mapping]]] = ..., active_routers: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[RouterLease, _Mapping]]] = ..., policy: _Optional[_Union[PolicyConfig, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... - -class EnrollmentStatus(int, metaclass=_enum_type_wrapper.EnumTypeWrapper): - __slots__ = [] - -class ServiceType(int, metaclass=_enum_type_wrapper.EnumTypeWrapper): - __slots__ = [] - -class IngressAuthMode(int, metaclass=_enum_type_wrapper.EnumTypeWrapper): - __slots__ = [] - -class EgressMode(int, metaclass=_enum_type_wrapper.EnumTypeWrapper): - __slots__ = [] - -class ResponseInspection(int, metaclass=_enum_type_wrapper.EnumTypeWrapper): - __slots__ = [] + source: str + spec_version: str + type: str + event_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp + data_content_type: str + subject: str + policy_denied: PolicyDeniedSignal + transport_refused: TransportRefusedSignal + identity_revoked: IdentityRevokedSignal + enrollment_rejected: EnrollmentRejectedSignal + def __init__(self, id: _Optional[str] = ..., source: _Optional[str] = ..., spec_version: _Optional[str] = ..., type: _Optional[str] = ..., event_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., data_content_type: _Optional[str] = ..., subject: _Optional[str] = ..., policy_denied: _Optional[_Union[PolicyDeniedSignal, _Mapping]] = ..., transport_refused: _Optional[_Union[TransportRefusedSignal, _Mapping]] = ..., identity_revoked: _Optional[_Union[IdentityRevokedSignal, _Mapping]] = ..., enrollment_rejected: _Optional[_Union[EnrollmentRejectedSignal, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... + +class WebhookEndpointConfig(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ("url", "hmac_secret_path", "ca_cert_path", "client_cert_path", "client_key_path", "timeout", "max_retries", "event_types") + URL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + HMAC_SECRET_PATH_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + CA_CERT_PATH_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + CLIENT_CERT_PATH_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + CLIENT_KEY_PATH_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + TIMEOUT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + MAX_RETRIES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + EVENT_TYPES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + url: str + hmac_secret_path: str + ca_cert_path: str + client_cert_path: str + client_key_path: str + timeout: _duration_pb2.Duration + max_retries: int + event_types: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] + def __init__(self, url: _Optional[str] = ..., hmac_secret_path: _Optional[str] = ..., ca_cert_path: _Optional[str] = ..., client_cert_path: _Optional[str] = ..., client_key_path: _Optional[str] = ..., timeout: _Optional[_Union[_duration_pb2.Duration, _Mapping]] = ..., max_retries: _Optional[int] = ..., event_types: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ...) -> None: ... + +class SecuritySignalsConfig(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ("enabled", "endpoints", "queue_capacity", "coalescing_window") + ENABLED_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ENDPOINTS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + QUEUE_CAPACITY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + COALESCING_WINDOW_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + enabled: bool + endpoints: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[WebhookEndpointConfig] + queue_capacity: int + coalescing_window: _duration_pb2.Duration + def __init__(self, enabled: bool = ..., endpoints: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[WebhookEndpointConfig, _Mapping]]] = ..., queue_capacity: _Optional[int] = ..., coalescing_window: _Optional[_Union[_duration_pb2.Duration, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... diff --git a/site/content/docs/preview/sandboxed-agents.md b/site/content/docs/preview/sandboxed-agents.md index 18967307..5bb39e77 100644 --- a/site/content/docs/preview/sandboxed-agents.md +++ b/site/content/docs/preview/sandboxed-agents.md @@ -19,8 +19,8 @@ one safely, you need two things that work together: services, MCP tools, HTTP paths, and cloud resources permitted for its current task. -This page shows the four deployment blueprints for connecting sandboxed agents -and multi-hop sub-agents to an Agent Mesh. +This page shows the five deployment blueprints for connecting sandboxed agents, +multi-hop sub-agents, and out-of-band containment supervisors to an Agent Mesh. ## Blueprint 1: NVIDIA OpenShell (zero credentials inside the sandbox) @@ -270,6 +270,117 @@ intersection of `TAR_1` and `TAR_2`, mints an ES256 border JWT at the control plane (`POST /sts/token`), and exchanges it via `CloudTokenExchanger` for a downscoped cloud token. +## Blueprint 5: Out-of-Band Host Containment & Supervisor Feedback Loop (Generic Security Webhooks) + +In high-consequence agent deployments, task-scoped authorization inside the mesh +must be paired with an **out-of-band containment supervisor** (such as a +Kubernetes container controller, an NVIDIA OpenShell or gVisor sandbox supervisor, +or a host security daemon). + +When an agent suffers prompt injection, attempts lateral traversal, or violates +its Task Authorization Rules, `agentmesh-node` denies the request and dispatches an +asynchronous, machine-readable security signal across a local or remote webhook. +The external supervisor receives the signal and enacts physical OS, container, +or network containment outside the agent's reach. + +```mermaid +flowchart TD + subgraph AgentSandbox["Agent Sandbox Boundary (OpenShell / gVisor / Pod)"] + Workload["Untrusted Agent Process
(Prompt Injected / Malicious)"] + end + + subgraph LocalMesh["Local Mesh Node Boundary"] + Node["agentmesh-node Sidecar
(Policy Enforcement Point)"] + Dispatcher["Containment Dispatcher
(Ring Buffer & HMAC Signer)"] + end + + subgraph Supervisor["External Supervisor (Host / Orchestrator)"] + WebhookReceiver["Generic Webhook Receiver
(CloudEvents 1.0 Handler)"] + ContainmentEngine["Containment Engine
(cgroups / K8s API / Host Isolation)"] + end + + Workload -- "1. Unauthorized Tool Call / Resource" --> Node + Node -- "2. Policy Denied (Biscuit / TAR block)" --> Node + Node -- "3. Non-blocking Enqueue" --> Dispatcher + Dispatcher -- "4. POST CloudEvents 1.0 (ProtoJSON)
over unix:/..., https://..., or http://127.0.0.1:port" --> WebhookReceiver + WebhookReceiver -- "5. Verified Security Signal" --> ContainmentEngine + ContainmentEngine -- "6. Freeze cgroup / Evict Pod / Terminate Process" --> Workload +``` + +### 1. How security signals are dispatched + +1. **Non-blocking and zero data-path degradation:** Signal dispatch is decoupled + from request evaluation via an in-memory bounded ring buffer. If the webhook + destination is slow or unavailable, events are shed without stalling agent + traffic, and drops are counted in Prometheus metrics. +2. **CloudEvents 1.0 compliant:** Signals are formatted as standard CloudEvents + 1.0 HTTP requests with binary headers (`ce-specversion`, `ce-id`, `ce-type`, + `ce-source`, `ce-time`, `ce-subject`) and serialized via ProtoJSON. +3. **Cryptographic integrity via HMAC-SHA256:** Payloads carry an + `X-AgentMesh-Signature` header (`sha256=`) computed over + `X-AgentMesh-Timestamp` and the payload body using a shared secret file. +4. **Burst coalescing:** Rapid successive refusals (e.g. transport scan probes) + are deduplicated per `(signal_type, peer_id, service)` over a configurable + coalescing window, reporting aggregated `coalesced_count` without webhook + flooding. + +### 2. The four core security signals + +| CloudEvents Type | Source | Trigger Condition | +| :--- | :--- | :--- | +| `agentmesh.policy.denied` | `agentmesh-node` | Biscuit Datalog check failed, `tar_block` narrowing violation, or ModelArmor/ExtProc inspection blocked request. | +| `agentmesh.transport.refused` | `agentmesh-node` | libp2p connection gate refused unauthenticated peer, invalid router role, or banned peer stream. | +| `agentmesh.identity.revoked` | `agentmesh-control-plane` / `agentmesh-node` | Peer banned mesh-wide or Biscuit revocation IDs published. | +| `agentmesh.enrollment.rejected` | `agentmesh-control-plane` | Token validation failed, bootstrap token expired, or autonomous recovery refused. | + +### 3. Configuring `agentmesh-node` + +To enable security webhook dispatch, start `agentmesh-node` with the containment flags: + +```bash +# Using a local Unix domain socket (highest performance, host-local isolation) +agentmesh-node run \ + --control-plane https://mesh.example.com \ + --security-webhook-url unix:///run/agentmesh/containment.sock \ + --security-webhook-hmac-path /etc/agentmesh/containment-hmac.key \ + --security-webhook-events agentmesh.policy.denied,agentmesh.identity.revoked + +# Or using a local TCP loopback endpoint +agentmesh-node run \ + --control-plane https://mesh.example.com \ + --security-webhook-url http://127.0.0.1:8095/events \ + --security-webhook-hmac-path /etc/agentmesh/containment-hmac.key \ + --security-webhook-queue-capacity 2048 \ + --security-webhook-coalescing-window 2s +``` + +### 4. External supervisor binding patterns + +The security signals contract is completely runtime-agnostic. Any external +supervisor can bind to the webhook: + +- **Kubernetes Sandbox Controller:** A custom controller or webhook receiver + listens on `https://containment-controller.agentmesh.svc:8443/events` (secured with + TLS/mTLS; plaintext HTTP to non-loopback destinations is forbidden by anti-SSRF policy) + or a pod-local Unix socket / loopback endpoint (`unix:///run/agentmesh/containment.sock`). On receiving + `agentmesh.policy.denied` for a sandboxed pod, it applies a `quarantine: "true"` + label, triggering a NetworkPolicy egress cutoff, and deletes the pod via the + Kubernetes Core API. +- **NVIDIA OpenShell / gVisor Supervisor:** The sandbox supervisor mounts a Unix + domain socket at `/run/agentmesh/containment.sock`. When an agent attempts an + unauthorized tool call, the supervisor immediately freezes the sandbox cgroup + (`echo 1 > /sys/fs/cgroup/openshell//cgroup.freeze`) and revokes its SPIRE + SVID workload credential. +- **Host Security Daemons:** A local host daemon monitors OS-level events and + binds to the Agent Mesh containment socket. On receiving policy denials, it + terminates rogue process trees and applies host firewall drop rules. +- **Enterprise SIEM / SOC Pipelines:** An event ingestion pipeline forwards + CloudEvents into Splunk, Elastic, or Datadog, mapping `PolicyDeniedSignal` + fields into OpenTelemetry / ECS formats for compliance and alerting. + +See the complete runnable reference receiver in +[`development/examples/generic-containment-webhook/`](https://github.com/google/agentmesh/tree/main/development/examples/generic-containment-webhook). + ## Further reading - [Agent architecture](../agent-architecture/): the two-token model, safe @@ -278,3 +389,4 @@ downscoped cloud token. per-task `TaskAuthorizationRule` evaluation. - [Node API](../../reference/node-api/): `/oauth/token`, `/oauth/revoke`, `ext_authz`, `ext_proc`, and `/egress/*`. +- [Containment signals reference](../../reference/containment-signals/): CloudEvents 1.0 wire format, HMAC verification, and configuration flags. diff --git a/site/content/docs/reference/agentmesh-node.md b/site/content/docs/reference/agentmesh-node.md index c40a1438..9e331399 100644 --- a/site/content/docs/reference/agentmesh-node.md +++ b/site/content/docs/reference/agentmesh-node.md @@ -130,6 +130,24 @@ explains how to enroll. | `--log-level` | `info` | `debug`, `info`, `warn` or `error`. | | `--log-format` | `text` | `text` or `json`. | +### Security webhooks + +Out-of-band security containment signals dispatched to external supervisors when policy, +transport, identity, or enrollment violations occur. See +[Containment signals](../containment-signals/) for wire specifications and receiver blueprints. + +| Flag | Default | Meaning | +|---|---|---| +| `--security-webhook-url` | | Target endpoint URL (`unix:/path/to.sock`, `https://...`, or `http://127.0.0.1:`). | +| `--security-webhook-hmac-path` | | File containing shared secret for HMAC-SHA256 signature verification. | +| `--security-webhook-ca-cert-path` | | CA certificate bundle for verifying HTTPS webhook servers. | +| `--security-webhook-client-cert-path`, `--security-webhook-client-key-path` | | Client TLS certificate and key for mutual TLS (mTLS). | +| `--security-webhook-events` | | Comma-separated event types to forward (empty dispatches all). | +| `--security-webhook-timeout` | `500ms` | Delivery timeout per dispatch request. | +| `--security-webhook-max-retries` | `3` | Maximum retry attempts for transient delivery failures. | +| `--security-webhook-queue-capacity` | `1024` | Capacity of the non-blocking ring-buffer dispatch queue. | +| `--security-webhook-coalescing-window` | `1s` | Sliding deduplication window for repetitive signals. | + ## `forward` Opens a local TCP listener and forwards each connection through the running diff --git a/site/content/docs/reference/containment-signals.md b/site/content/docs/reference/containment-signals.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..41c4e8ae --- /dev/null +++ b/site/content/docs/reference/containment-signals.md @@ -0,0 +1,294 @@ +--- +title: "Containment signals and security webhooks" +linkTitle: "Containment signals" +weight: 10 +description: "Technical reference for Agent Mesh out-of-band security containment webhooks and signals." +aliases: + - /docs/reference/containment/ + - /docs/reference/security-signals/ +--- + +Agent Mesh components (`agentmesh-node` and `agentmesh-control-plane`) provide a generic, +runtime-agnostic security webhook interface. This mechanism emits out-of-band security +state transitions to external sandbox supervisors, container runtimes (such as NVIDIA +OpenShell, gVisor, or Kata), SIEMs, and host containment daemons. + +The contract is defined in `api/agentmesh.proto`, serializes over HTTP and Unix domain +sockets using CloudEvents 1.0 binary mode and `protojson`, and supports cryptographic +HMAC-SHA256 signing and mutual TLS. + +--- + +## 1. CloudEvents 1.0 Binary Mode Headers + +Dispatched security webhooks use HTTP `POST` requests formatted according to the +[CloudEvents 1.0 Binary Content Mode](https://github.com/cloudevents/spec/blob/v1.0.2/cloudevents/bindings/http-protocol-binding.md#31-binary-content-mode): + +| Header | Description | Example | +|---|---|---| +| `ce-specversion` | CloudEvents specification version. Always `1.0`. | `1.0` | +| `ce-id` | Unique UUID v4 identifying the event instance. | `f47ac10b-58cc-4372-a567-0e02b2c3d479` | +| `ce-type` | Fully qualified security signal event type. | `agentmesh.policy.denied` | +| `ce-source` | URI identifying the emitting context. | `agentmesh://containment/dispatcher` or `urn:agentmesh:node:12D3KooW...` | +| `ce-time` | Event generation timestamp formatted as RFC 3339 nano. | `2026-11-10T20:15:30.123456789Z` | +| `ce-subject` | Subject peer ID or caller principal (if known). | `12D3KooW...` or `spiffe://openshell.example/sandbox/42` | +| `Content-Type` | MIME type of the payload. Always `application/json`. | `application/json` | +| `User-Agent` | Client identifier. | `agentmesh-containment/1.0` | +| `X-AgentMesh-Timestamp` | Unix epoch millisecond timestamp used for HMAC signing (optional). | `1762812930123` | +| `X-AgentMesh-Signature` | Hex-encoded HMAC-SHA256 signature (optional). | `sha256=a1b2c3d4...` | + +--- + +## 2. Wire Schema & ProtoJSON Formatting + +All wire payloads are defined in `api/agentmesh.proto` under the `SecuritySignalEvent` +envelope and serialized using `protojson.MarshalOptions{UseProtoNames: true}`: +- Field names strictly preserve protobuf snake_case (e.g. `target_service`, `caller_peer_id`). +- Timestamps are encoded as standard RFC 3339 strings matching `google.protobuf.Timestamp`. +- Unknown or unmodeled JSON fields are rejected by receivers. + +```json +{ + "id": "f47ac10b-58cc-4372-a567-0e02b2c3d479", + "source": "agentmesh://containment/dispatcher", + "spec_version": "1.0", + "type": "agentmesh.policy.denied", + "event_time": "2026-11-10T20:15:30.123456789Z", + "data_content_type": "application/json", + "subject": "12D3KooWNodeDemo12345", + "policy_denied": { + "direction": "LOCAL_WORKLOAD", + "reason": "DATALOG_EVALUATION_DENIED", + "detail": "datalog block 0 denied egress to unauthorized database", + "target_service": "bigquery", + "requested_operation": "POST", + "requested_resource": "//bigquery.googleapis.com/projects/prod-ledger", + "caller_peer_id": "12D3KooWCallerDemo67890", + "caller_subject": "spiffe://example.org/ns/prod/sa/analytics-agent", + "caller_roles": ["agent", "reader"], + "caller_labels": { + "env": "production", + "tier": "restricted" + }, + "event_time": "2026-11-10T20:15:30.123456789Z" + } +} +``` + +--- + +## 3. The Four Outbound Containment Signals + +### 3.1 `agentmesh.policy.denied` + +Emitted by `agentmesh-node` whenever an authorization check, Biscuit Datalog policy, +`TaskAuthorizationRule` (`tar_block`) constraint, or content inspection filter +(Model Armor / Envoy `ext_proc`) rejects a request. + +#### Fields (`PolicyDeniedSignal`) + +| Field | Type | Description | +|---|---|---| +| `direction` | `SignalCallerDirection` | `LOCAL_WORKLOAD` (local sandboxed agent) or `REMOTE_PEER` (incoming mesh request). | +| `reason` | `PolicyDenialReason` | Denial cause: `DATALOG_EVALUATION_DENIED`, `TASK_AUTHORIZATION_RULE_VIOLATION`, `INSPECTION_FILTER_BLOCKED`, `ROLE_MISMATCH`, `EXPIRED_CREDENTIAL`, `UNAUTHORIZED_SERVICE`, `UNAUTHORIZED_PATH_OR_METHOD`. | +| `detail` | `string` | Diagnostic description of why the request was refused. | +| `target_service` | `string` | Requested service URI (e.g. `mcp://github`, `egress://bigquery.googleapis.com`). | +| `requested_operation` | `string` | HTTP method or MCP tool name (e.g. `GET`, `execute_query`). | +| `requested_resource` | `string` | Target resource path or URI pattern. | +| `caller_peer_id` | `string` | Peer ID of the caller if known. | +| `caller_subject` | `string` | Subject claim extracted from the caller's Biscuit or platform JWT. | +| `caller_roles` | `[]string` | Mesh roles held by the caller. | +| `caller_labels` | `map[string]string` | Attested labels present on the caller's credential. | +| `event_time` | `google.protobuf.Timestamp` | Instant when the policy denial occurred. | + +### 3.2 `agentmesh.transport.refused` + +Emitted by `agentmesh-node` when the libp2p connection gate or stream authorization +gate (`internal/node/auth_gate.go`) rejects an incoming stream or peer connection. +Repetitive refusals from the same peer are coalesced into a single event within a +sliding window. + +#### Fields (`TransportRefusedSignal`) + +| Field | Type | Description | +|---|---|---| +| `reason` | `TransportRefusalReason` | `PEER_UNAUTHENTICATED`, `NOT_ROUTER_ROLE`, `AUTH_DEADLINE_EXCEEDED`, `PEER_BANNED`, `PROTOCOL_UNAUTHORIZED`. | +| `detail` | `string` | Detailed refusal reason. | +| `peer_id` | `string` | Remote libp2p peer ID string. | +| `remote_multiaddr` | `string` | Remote multiaddress (e.g. `/ip4/198.51.100.42/tcp/4001`). | +| `protocol_id` | `string` | Libp2p protocol ID requested (e.g. `/agentmesh/auth`, `/libp2p-http`). | +| `coalesced_count` | `uint32` | Number of refusal occurrences coalesced in this delivery window ($ \ge 1 $). | +| `first_seen_time` | `google.protobuf.Timestamp` | Timestamp of the first observed rejection in this window. | +| `event_time` | `google.protobuf.Timestamp` | Timestamp of the most recent rejection. | + +### 3.3 `agentmesh.identity.revoked` + +Emitted when a node or Biscuit credential is explicitly revoked or banned. +`agentmesh-control-plane` emits this signal upon administrative banishment; `agentmesh-node` +emits it upon receiving a signed `MeshEvent.BANNED` gossip broadcast or when `/refresh` +rejects an active session due to an upstream ban. + +#### Fields (`IdentityRevokedSignal`) + +| Field | Type | Description | +|---|---|---| +| `peer_id` | `string` | Subject peer ID that has been banned or revoked. | +| `source` | `RevocationSource` | `CONTROL_PLANE_ADMIN`, `MESH_EVENT_BANNED_GOSSIP`, `LOCAL_CONTROL_PLANE_SYNC`, `TOKEN_REFRESH_REJECTION`. | +| `reason` | `string` | Administrative or operational explanation for the revocation. | +| `revocation_ids` | `[]string` | Hex-encoded Biscuit authority revocation IDs (`RevocationIds()[0]`). | +| `issuer_peer_id` | `string` | Peer ID of the emitting node or control plane. | +| `event_time` | `google.protobuf.Timestamp` | Instant when the revocation occurred. | + +### 3.4 `agentmesh.enrollment.rejected` + +Emitted when a node fails bootstrap enrollment (`POST /enroll`) or when autonomous +token recovery is refused during credential refresh (`POST /refresh`). + +#### Fields (`EnrollmentRejectedSignal`) + +| Field | Type | Description | +|---|---|---| +| `peer_id` | `string` | Peer ID attempting enrollment or recovery. | +| `requested_role` | `string` | Mesh role requested in the enrollment attempt. | +| `reason` | `EnrollmentRejectionReason` | `INVALID_JWT`, `EXPIRED_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN`, `BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_USAGE_EXCEEDED`, `UNATTESTED_LABELS_REJECTED`, `INVALID_CHALLENGE_SIGNATURE`, `REQUESTED_ROLE_UNAUTHORIZED`, `PEER_PREVIOUSLY_BANNED`, `AUTONOMOUS_RECOVERY_DISABLED`. | +| `detail` | `string` | Rejection details and validation error. | +| `bootstrap_token_id` | `string` | ID of the bootstrap token used (if applicable). | +| `remote_address` | `string` | Remote network address of the enrollment requester. | +| `submitted_labels` | `map[string]string` | Key/value labels submitted with the enrollment request. | +| `is_autonomous_recovery` | `bool` | `true` if rejection occurred during `/refresh` autonomous re-enrollment. | +| `event_time` | `google.protobuf.Timestamp` | Instant when the rejection occurred. | + +--- + +## 4. Caller Direction Tagging: LOCAL_WORKLOAD vs REMOTE_PEER + +The `direction` field on `PolicyDeniedSignal` allows containment runtimes to isolate +the source of an authorization failure: + +- **`LOCAL_WORKLOAD`**: Indicates that the violation was attempted by the local agent process + running on the same host or container and talking to the `agentmesh-node` sidecar listener + (`http://localhost:8080` or `agentmesh.sock`). This is the primary trigger for host sandbox + supervisors (OpenShell, gVisor, or host containment daemons) to apply cgroups freezing, revoke Landlock privileges, + or terminate the local container. +- **`REMOTE_PEER`**: Indicates that the violation arrived over the libp2p network from an + external mesh member. A `REMOTE_PEER` violation suggests lateral traversal or remote probing, + warranting peer rate-limiting or mesh-wide eviction rather than host container teardown. + +--- + +## 5. Cryptographic HMAC-SHA256 Signing + +To prevent webhook spoofing, endpoints can configure a shared HMAC secret. + +### Secret Hygiene Invariant +Per `AGENTS.md`, secrets MUST be loaded from a file path (`hmac_secret_path` or +`--security-webhook-hmac-path`) or provided via the `AGENTMESH_CONTAINMENT_HMAC_SECRET` +environment variable. Raw secret strings in YAML configuration or CLI flags are strictly +forbidden and fail validation at startup. + +### Signing Algorithm +When HMAC is enabled, the webhook client attaches two headers: +1. `X-AgentMesh-Timestamp`: String representing the current Unix epoch time in milliseconds. +2. `X-AgentMesh-Signature`: Signature computed as: + ```text + signature = "sha256=" + HexEncode(HMAC-SHA256(secret, timestamp + "." + request_body)) + ``` + +### Verification Example (Go) + +```go +func VerifyWebhookSignature(secret []byte, timestamp string, body []byte, signatureHeader string) bool { + h := hmac.New(sha256.New, secret) + h.Write([]byte(timestamp)) + h.Write([]byte(".")) + h.Write(body) + expected := "sha256=" + hex.EncodeToString(h.Sum(nil)) + return hmac.Equal([]byte(signatureHeader), []byte(expected)) +} +``` + +--- + +## 6. Supported Transports + +The webhook dispatcher supports three transport schemes: + +1. **Unix Domain Socket (`unix:/path/to.sock`)**: + Delivers events over a local Unix domain socket using standard HTTP/1.1 framing. + Zero network exposure; access is controlled via host filesystem DAC permissions. +2. **Mutual TLS (`https://host:port/path`)**: + Enforces TLS 1.2+. Supports optional `ca_cert_path` for custom PKI bundles and + `client_cert_path` / `client_key_path` for mTLS client authentication. +3. **Loopback HTTP (`http://127.0.0.1:/path`)**: + Plaintext HTTP is strictly permitted only for loopback IP addresses (`127.0.0.1`, + `localhost`, `::1`). Plaintext HTTP to non-loopback destinations is rejected at startup. + +--- + +## 7. Node Configuration + +### Command-Line Flags (`agentmesh-node run`) + +```bash +agentmesh-node run \ + --security-webhook-url="unix:/var/run/containment.sock" \ + --security-webhook-hmac-path="/etc/agentmesh/webhook-hmac.key" \ + --security-webhook-timeout="500ms" \ + --security-webhook-max-retries=3 \ + --security-webhook-queue-capacity=1024 \ + --security-webhook-coalescing-window="1s" +``` + +| Flag | Default | Description | +|---|---|---| +| `--security-webhook-url` | `""` | Destination endpoint URL (`unix:...`, `https://...`, `http://127.0.0.1:...`). | +| `--security-webhook-hmac-path` | `""` | File containing shared secret for HMAC-SHA256 signing. | +| `--security-webhook-ca-cert-path` | `""` | Path to CA certificate bundle for HTTPS server verification. | +| `--security-webhook-client-cert-path` | `""` | Path to client TLS certificate for mTLS. | +| `--security-webhook-client-key-path` | `""` | Path to client TLS private key for mTLS. | +| `--security-webhook-timeout` | `500ms` | Per-dispatch timeout for HTTP requests or socket writes. | +| `--security-webhook-max-retries` | `3` | Maximum delivery retry attempts for transient failures. | +| `--security-webhook-events` | `""` | Comma-separated list of event types to dispatch; empty dispatches all. | +| `--security-webhook-queue-capacity` | `1024` | Capacity of the non-blocking ring-buffer dispatch queue. | +| `--security-webhook-coalescing-window` | `1s` | Sliding deduplication window for repetitive signals. | + +### YAML Configuration (`agentmesh-node.yaml`) + +Under the `security_signals` section in `agentmesh-node.yaml`: + +```yaml +version: "v1alpha1" + +security_signals: + enabled: true + queue_capacity: 1024 + coalescing_window: "1s" + endpoints: + - url: "unix:/var/run/containment.sock" + hmac_secret_path: "/etc/agentmesh/containment-hmac.key" + timeout: "500ms" + max_retries: 3 + event_types: + - "agentmesh.policy.denied" + - "agentmesh.transport.refused" + - url: "https://siem.internal:8443/alerts" + ca_cert_path: "/etc/agentmesh/ca.pem" + client_cert_path: "/etc/agentmesh/client.crt" + client_key_path: "/etc/agentmesh/client.key" + timeout: "1s" +``` + +--- + +## 8. Observability & Prometheus Metrics + +The dispatcher exports Prometheus counters, gauges, and histograms under the `agentmesh_containment_*` namespace: + +| Metric | Type | Labels | Description | +|---|---|---|---| +| `agentmesh_containment_events_queued_total` | Counter | `signal_type` | Total number of security signal events enqueued to the ring buffer. | +| `agentmesh_containment_events_delivered_total` | Counter | `signal_type`, `status_code` | Total number of successfully delivered webhook requests, partitioned by HTTP status code. | +| `agentmesh_containment_events_dropped_total` | Counter | `signal_type`, `reason` | Total number of events dropped due to queue overflow, timeout, or transport failures. | +| `agentmesh_containment_events_coalesced_total` | Counter | `signal_type` | Total number of repetitive events coalesced within sliding windows. | +| `agentmesh_containment_delivery_duration_seconds` | Histogram | `signal_type` | Webhook HTTP delivery duration in seconds. | +| `agentmesh_containment_queue_depth` | Gauge | — | Current depth of the containment webhook ring buffer queue. | diff --git a/site/content/docs/reference/node-config.md b/site/content/docs/reference/node-config.md index 112655f3..c65e627a 100644 --- a/site/content/docs/reference/node-config.md +++ b/site/content/docs/reference/node-config.md @@ -50,6 +50,12 @@ attenuation: egress: require_labels: jurisdiction: eu + +security_signals: + enabled: true + endpoints: + - url: "unix:/var/run/containment.sock" + hmac_secret_path: /etc/agentmesh/containment-hmac.key ``` ## `version` @@ -156,6 +162,33 @@ names a label which no provider carries makes the node unable to reach any provider, which can serve as an egress kill switch. Omit the block for no floor. +## `security_signals` + +Configures out-of-band security webhook dispatch to external containment supervisors. +See [Containment signals](../containment-signals/) for complete specifications and blueprints. + +```yaml +security_signals: + enabled: true + queue_capacity: 1024 + coalescing_window: "1s" + endpoints: + - url: "unix:/var/run/containment.sock" + hmac_secret_path: "/etc/agentmesh/containment-hmac.key" + timeout: "500ms" + max_retries: 3 + event_types: + - "agentmesh.policy.denied" + - "agentmesh.transport.refused" +``` + +| Key | Meaning | +|---|---| +| `enabled` | Enables security signal event emission and webhook dispatch. | +| `queue_capacity` | In-memory bounded ring buffer capacity (default `1024`). Sheds events on overflow. | +| `coalescing_window` | Sliding deduplication window duration (e.g. `1s`) to suppress event bursts. | +| `endpoints` | List of destination webhook endpoints (`url`, `hmac_secret_path`, `timeout`, `max_retries`, `event_types`, `ca_cert_path`, `client_cert_path`, `client_key_path`). | + ## Kubernetes The `agentmesh-node` Helm chart renders its `config:` value as this file and From 330f51cb05559f85ef4555779913dcd1991222bb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: femi oyesanya Date: Tue, 10 Nov 2026 22:38:49 -0600 Subject: [PATCH 2/5] fix(containment): resolve event race, lint checks, Python SDK proto, and review findings - Clone SecuritySignalEvent on Dispatch, Coalescer.Record, and Client.Send, and capture metric/log fields before channel handoff to eliminate concurrent read/write data race under -race. - Bound Coalescer active entries to MaxCoalescerEntries (1024) with agentmesh_containment_coalescer_entries gauge and agentmesh_containment_coalescer_overflow_total counter to prevent DoS via spoofed peer IDs. - Canonicalize peer IDs via peer.Decode across EmitPolicyDenied, emitIdentityRevoked, reconcileBannedPeers, emitEnrollmentRejected, and Coalescer.Record, and check crypto/rand.Read errors. - Check error returns on Close/Remove, remove trailing colon in scheme validation error string, and remove unreachable exported wrappers to satisfy golangci-lint and deadcode in hack/lint.sh. - Regenerate sdk/python agentmesh_pb2.py and agentmesh_pb2.pyi matching CI protoc output. Signed-off-by: femi oyesanya --- .../generic-containment-webhook/main.go | 4 +- internal/containment/client.go | 23 +- internal/containment/coalescer.go | 28 +- .../containment_resilience_test.go | 91 +- internal/containment/dispatcher.go | 53 +- internal/containment/metrics.go | 32 +- .../controlplane/containment_edge_test.go | 52 +- internal/controlplane/server.go | 28 +- internal/node/containment_security_test.go | 52 + internal/node/controlplane_sync.go | 9 +- internal/node/node.go | 15 +- .../src/agent_mesh/_proto/agentmesh_pb2.py | 497 ++--- .../src/agent_mesh/_proto/agentmesh_pb2.pyi | 1977 ++++++++--------- 13 files changed, 1503 insertions(+), 1358 deletions(-) diff --git a/development/examples/generic-containment-webhook/main.go b/development/examples/generic-containment-webhook/main.go index 9c9345ec..f2201dce 100644 --- a/development/examples/generic-containment-webhook/main.go +++ b/development/examples/generic-containment-webhook/main.go @@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ func NewWebhookHandler(cfg HandlerConfig) http.Handler { http.Error(w, "Bad Request: unable to read request body", http.StatusBadRequest) return } - defer r.Body.Close() + defer func() { _ = r.Body.Close() }() // 3. Verify HMAC-SHA256 signature if secret is configured if len(cfg.HMACSecret) > 0 { @@ -412,7 +412,7 @@ func main() { if err != nil { log.Fatalf("Fatal: creating Unix domain socket listener at %s: %v", sockPath, err) } - defer os.Remove(sockPath) + defer func() { _ = os.Remove(sockPath) }() unixServer := &http.Server{ Handler: mux, diff --git a/internal/containment/client.go b/internal/containment/client.go index be6a5b04..094bc13b 100644 --- a/internal/containment/client.go +++ b/internal/containment/client.go @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ import ( "github.com/google/agentmesh/api" "github.com/google/agentmesh/internal/secrets" "google.golang.org/protobuf/encoding/protojson" + "google.golang.org/protobuf/proto" "google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/timestamppb" ) @@ -247,33 +248,23 @@ func NewSingleClient(cfg EndpointConfig) (Client, error) { } default: - return nil, fmt.Errorf("containment: unsupported scheme in URL %q: must start with https://, http://127.0.0.1, or unix:", rawTarget) + return nil, fmt.Errorf("containment: unsupported scheme in URL %q (must start with https://, http://127.0.0.1, or unix:)", rawTarget) } return c, nil } -// NewClientFromProto constructs a Client directly from protobuf WebhookEndpointConfig. -func NewClientFromProto(cfg *api.WebhookEndpointConfig) (Client, error) { - if cfg == nil { - return nil, errors.New("containment: nil WebhookEndpointConfig") - } - epCfg, err := EndpointFromProto(cfg) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - return NewSingleClient(epCfg) -} - func (c *singleClient) Deliver(ctx context.Context, event *api.SecuritySignalEvent) error { return c.Send(ctx, event) } -func (c *singleClient) Send(ctx context.Context, event *api.SecuritySignalEvent) error { - if event == nil { +func (c *singleClient) Send(ctx context.Context, inEvent *api.SecuritySignalEvent) error { + if inEvent == nil { return errors.New("containment: cannot send nil SecuritySignalEvent") } + event := proto.Clone(inEvent).(*api.SecuritySignalEvent) + // 1. Check event type filter signalType := event.Type if signalType == "" { @@ -364,7 +355,7 @@ func (c *singleClient) Send(ctx context.Context, event *api.SecuritySignalEvent) if err == nil { _, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, io.LimitReader(resp.Body, MaxResponseBytes)) - resp.Body.Close() + _ = resp.Body.Close() statusStr := strconv.Itoa(resp.StatusCode) containmentDeliveredTotal.WithLabelValues(event.Type, statusStr).Inc() diff --git a/internal/containment/coalescer.go b/internal/containment/coalescer.go index c402332c..5371562a 100644 --- a/internal/containment/coalescer.go +++ b/internal/containment/coalescer.go @@ -21,10 +21,15 @@ import ( "time" "github.com/google/agentmesh/api" + "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/peer" "google.golang.org/protobuf/proto" "google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/timestamppb" ) +// MaxCoalescerEntries bounds active deduplication keys and timers to prevent +// memory/timer exhaustion when unauthenticated remote peers spoof peer IDs. +const MaxCoalescerEntries = 1024 + // SummaryCallback is invoked when a coalescing window closes and duplicate events occurred. type SummaryCallback func(summary *api.SecuritySignalEvent) @@ -76,6 +81,11 @@ func (c *Coalescer) Record(event *api.SecuritySignalEvent) bool { if subject == "" { subject = extractSubject(event) } + if subject != "" { + if pID, err := peer.Decode(subject); err == nil { + subject = pID.String() + } + } key := fmt.Sprintf("%s|%s|%s", event.Type, subject, targetService) now := time.Now() @@ -85,10 +95,15 @@ func (c *Coalescer) Record(event *api.SecuritySignalEvent) bool { entry, exists := c.entries[key] if !exists { + if len(c.entries) >= MaxCoalescerEntries { + containmentCoalescerOverflowTotal.Inc() + return false + } + cloned := proto.Clone(event).(*api.SecuritySignalEvent) newEntry := &coalesceEntry{ key: key, - firstEvent: event, - lastEvent: event, + firstEvent: cloned, + lastEvent: cloned, firstSeenTime: now, lastSeenTime: now, count: 0, @@ -97,11 +112,12 @@ func (c *Coalescer) Record(event *api.SecuritySignalEvent) bool { c.flushEntry(key) }) c.entries[key] = newEntry + containmentCoalescerEntries.Set(float64(len(c.entries))) return false } entry.count++ - entry.lastEvent = event + entry.lastEvent = proto.Clone(event).(*api.SecuritySignalEvent) entry.lastSeenTime = now return true } @@ -118,6 +134,7 @@ func (c *Coalescer) flushEntry(key string) { return } delete(c.entries, key) + containmentCoalescerEntries.Set(float64(len(c.entries))) c.mu.Unlock() if entry.count > 0 && c.onSummary != nil { @@ -182,6 +199,7 @@ func (c *Coalescer) Close() { } } c.entries = make(map[string]*coalesceEntry) + containmentCoalescerEntries.Set(float64(len(c.entries))) c.mu.Unlock() for _, entry := range toFlush { @@ -248,7 +266,9 @@ func extractSubject(event *api.SecuritySignalEvent) string { func generateUUID() string { var b [16]byte - _, _ = rand.Read(b[:]) + if _, err := rand.Read(b[:]); err != nil { + panic(fmt.Sprintf("containment: crypto/rand failed: %v", err)) + } b[6] = (b[6] & 0x0f) | 0x40 // RFC 4122 version 4 b[8] = (b[8] & 0x3f) | 0x80 // RFC 4122 variant return fmt.Sprintf("%08x-%04x-%04x-%04x-%012x", diff --git a/internal/containment/containment_resilience_test.go b/internal/containment/containment_resilience_test.go index 0a30863a..dc6f765d 100644 --- a/internal/containment/containment_resilience_test.go +++ b/internal/containment/containment_resilience_test.go @@ -605,15 +605,102 @@ func TestAdversarial_NilAndEmptyEvents(t *testing.T) { // 1. Dispatch nil event disp.Dispatch(nil) - // 2. Dispatch empty event + // 2. Dispatch empty event and concurrent shared-pointer events (race detector guard) disp.Dispatch(&api.SecuritySignalEvent{}) + sharedEvent := &api.SecuritySignalEvent{ + Data: &api.SecuritySignalEvent_PolicyDenied{ + PolicyDenied: &api.PolicyDeniedSignal{ + Direction: api.SignalCallerDirection_LOCAL_WORKLOAD, + Reason: api.PolicyDenialReason_DATALOG_EVALUATION_DENIED, + TargetService: "mcp://race-test", + }, + }, + } + var wg sync.WaitGroup + for i := 0; i < 10; i++ { + wg.Add(1) + go func() { + defer wg.Done() + disp.Dispatch(sharedEvent) + disp.Dispatch(&api.SecuritySignalEvent{}) + }() + } + wg.Wait() + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 2*time.Second) defer cancel() - _ = disp.Close(ctx) + if err := disp.Close(ctx); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("disp.Close: %v", err) + } finalNilDrops := GetDroppedCountFor("unknown", "nil_event") if finalNilDrops-initialNilDrops != 1 { t.Errorf("expected 1 nil_event drop, got delta %f", finalNilDrops-initialNilDrops) } } + +func TestAdversarial_CoalescerMaxEntriesDoSBound(t *testing.T) { + c := NewCoalescer(10*time.Second, nil) + t.Cleanup(c.Close) + + const overflow = 200 + total := MaxCoalescerEntries + overflow + + for i := 0; i < total; i++ { + ev := &api.SecuritySignalEvent{ + Type: "agentmesh.transport.refused", + Subject: fmt.Sprintf("spoofed-peer-%d", i), + Data: &api.SecuritySignalEvent_TransportRefused{ + TransportRefused: &api.TransportRefusedSignal{ + Reason: api.TransportRefusalReason_PEER_UNAUTHENTICATED, + PeerId: fmt.Sprintf("spoofed-peer-%d", i), + ProtocolId: "/mesh/auth/1.0.0", + }, + }, + } + if suppressed := c.Record(ev); suppressed { + t.Fatalf("unique spoofed peer %d was unexpectedly suppressed", i) + } + } + + c.mu.Lock() + activeEntries := len(c.entries) + c.mu.Unlock() + + if activeEntries != MaxCoalescerEntries { + t.Fatalf("coalescer active entries = %d, want %d", activeEntries, MaxCoalescerEntries) + } + + // Existing entry within the bound must still coalesce duplicates. + dup := &api.SecuritySignalEvent{ + Type: "agentmesh.transport.refused", + Subject: "spoofed-peer-0", + Data: &api.SecuritySignalEvent_TransportRefused{ + TransportRefused: &api.TransportRefusedSignal{ + Reason: api.TransportRefusalReason_PEER_UNAUTHENTICATED, + PeerId: "spoofed-peer-0", + ProtocolId: "/mesh/auth/1.0.0", + }, + }, + } + if !c.Record(dup) { + t.Fatal("duplicate event for active key was not coalesced") + } + + // Overflow entry was not stored, so a second occurrence also passes through without growing the map. + overflowEv := &api.SecuritySignalEvent{ + Type: "agentmesh.transport.refused", + Subject: fmt.Sprintf("spoofed-peer-%d", MaxCoalescerEntries+5), + Data: &api.SecuritySignalEvent_TransportRefused{ + TransportRefused: &api.TransportRefusedSignal{ + Reason: api.TransportRefusalReason_PEER_UNAUTHENTICATED, + PeerId: fmt.Sprintf("spoofed-peer-%d", MaxCoalescerEntries+5), + ProtocolId: "/mesh/auth/1.0.0", + }, + }, + } + if c.Record(overflowEv) { + t.Fatal("overflow event above MaxCoalescerEntries should bypass coalescing") + } +} diff --git a/internal/containment/dispatcher.go b/internal/containment/dispatcher.go index fe7dc8e7..c80afa01 100644 --- a/internal/containment/dispatcher.go +++ b/internal/containment/dispatcher.go @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ import ( "sync" "github.com/google/agentmesh/api" + "google.golang.org/protobuf/proto" "google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/timestamppb" ) @@ -72,24 +73,18 @@ func NewDispatcher(cfg Config) (Dispatcher, error) { return d, nil } -// NewDispatcherFromPtr constructs a Dispatcher from a *Config pointer. -func NewDispatcherFromPtr(cfg *Config) (Dispatcher, error) { - if cfg == nil { - return NewDispatcher(Config{}) - } - return NewDispatcher(*cfg) -} - // Dispatch queues an event for out-of-band delivery. Strictly non-blocking. -func (d *dispatcher) Dispatch(event *api.SecuritySignalEvent) { +func (d *dispatcher) Dispatch(inEvent *api.SecuritySignalEvent) { if d == nil { return } - if event == nil { + if inEvent == nil { containmentDroppedTotal.WithLabelValues("unknown", "nil_event").Inc() return } + event := proto.Clone(inEvent).(*api.SecuritySignalEvent) + d.mu.RLock() if d.closed { d.mu.RUnlock() @@ -129,17 +124,21 @@ func (d *dispatcher) Dispatch(event *api.SecuritySignalEvent) { tr.CoalescedCount = 1 } + eventType := event.Type + eventSubject := event.Subject + eventID := event.Id + // Strictly non-blocking enqueue select { case d.queue <- event: - containmentQueuedTotal.WithLabelValues(event.Type).Inc() + containmentQueuedTotal.WithLabelValues(eventType).Inc() containmentQueueDepth.Set(float64(len(d.queue))) default: - containmentDroppedTotal.WithLabelValues(event.Type, "buffer_full").Inc() + containmentDroppedTotal.WithLabelValues(eventType, "buffer_full").Inc() logger.Warnw("Containment signal queue full; shedding event", - "type", event.Type, - "subject", event.Subject, - "id", event.Id, + "type", eventType, + "subject", eventSubject, + "id", eventID, "capacity", cap(d.queue), "reason", "buffer_full", ) @@ -152,23 +151,27 @@ func (d *dispatcher) enqueueDirect(event *api.SecuritySignalEvent) { return } + eventType := event.Type + eventSubject := event.Subject + eventID := event.Id + d.mu.RLock() if d.closed { d.mu.RUnlock() - containmentDroppedTotal.WithLabelValues(event.Type, "dispatcher_closed").Inc() + containmentDroppedTotal.WithLabelValues(eventType, "dispatcher_closed").Inc() return } select { case d.queue <- event: - containmentQueuedTotal.WithLabelValues(event.Type).Inc() + containmentQueuedTotal.WithLabelValues(eventType).Inc() containmentQueueDepth.Set(float64(len(d.queue))) default: - containmentDroppedTotal.WithLabelValues(event.Type, "buffer_full").Inc() + containmentDroppedTotal.WithLabelValues(eventType, "buffer_full").Inc() logger.Warnw("Containment signal queue full; shedding summary event", - "type", event.Type, - "subject", event.Subject, - "id", event.Id, + "type", eventType, + "subject", eventSubject, + "id", eventID, "capacity", cap(d.queue), "reason", "buffer_full", ) @@ -181,7 +184,13 @@ func (d *dispatcher) workerLoop() { for event := range d.queue { containmentQueueDepth.Set(float64(len(d.queue))) if d.client != nil { - _ = d.client.Send(context.Background(), event) + if err := d.client.Send(context.Background(), event); err != nil { + logger.Debugw("Containment webhook delivery attempt returned error", + "id", event.Id, + "type", event.Type, + "err", err, + ) + } } containmentQueueDepth.Set(float64(len(d.queue))) } diff --git a/internal/containment/metrics.go b/internal/containment/metrics.go index 986b235d..03af75ab 100644 --- a/internal/containment/metrics.go +++ b/internal/containment/metrics.go @@ -71,6 +71,20 @@ var ( Help: "Current depth of the containment webhook ring buffer queue.", }, ) + + containmentCoalescerEntries = promauto.NewGauge( + prometheus.GaugeOpts{ + Name: "agentmesh_containment_coalescer_entries", + Help: "Current number of active deduplication entries held by the containment coalescer.", + }, + ) + + containmentCoalescerOverflowTotal = promauto.NewCounter( + prometheus.CounterOpts{ + Name: "agentmesh_containment_coalescer_overflow_total", + Help: "Total containment signals that bypassed coalescing because the active entry cap was reached.", + }, + ) ) // GetDroppedCount returns the sum of dropped events across all reasons and types. @@ -101,15 +115,6 @@ func GetDroppedCountFor(signalType, reason string) float64 { return m.GetCounter().GetValue() } -// GetQueuedCountFor returns the count of queued events for a specific signal type. -func GetQueuedCountFor(signalType string) float64 { - m := &dto.Metric{} - if err := containmentQueuedTotal.WithLabelValues(signalType).Write(m); err != nil { - return 0 - } - return m.GetCounter().GetValue() -} - // GetDeliveredCountFor returns the count of delivered events for a specific signal type and status code. func GetDeliveredCountFor(signalType, statusCode string) float64 { m := &dto.Metric{} @@ -118,12 +123,3 @@ func GetDeliveredCountFor(signalType, statusCode string) float64 { } return m.GetCounter().GetValue() } - -// GetCoalescedCountFor returns the count of coalesced events for a specific signal type. -func GetCoalescedCountFor(signalType string) float64 { - m := &dto.Metric{} - if err := containmentCoalescedTotal.WithLabelValues(signalType).Write(m); err != nil { - return 0 - } - return m.GetCounter().GetValue() -} diff --git a/internal/controlplane/containment_edge_test.go b/internal/controlplane/containment_edge_test.go index 8103604a..7c7d690a 100644 --- a/internal/controlplane/containment_edge_test.go +++ b/internal/controlplane/containment_edge_test.go @@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ import ( "github.com/google/agentmesh/api" "github.com/google/agentmesh/internal/containment" "github.com/google/agentmesh/internal/storage" + "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/crypto" + "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/peer" "google.golang.org/protobuf/proto" ) @@ -384,7 +386,7 @@ func TestControlPlaneContainment_Revocation_AdminAndUserRevoke(t *testing.T) { func TestControlPlaneContainment_ServerClose_NilDispatcher(t *testing.T) { issuer, _ := startCustomMockOIDC(t) srv, store, _ := setupTestServer(t, issuer) - defer store.Close() + defer func() { _ = store.Close() }() srv.SetContainmentDispatcher(nil) if err := srv.Close(); err != nil { @@ -420,7 +422,7 @@ func TestControlPlaneContainment_ServerClose_DrainsDispatcher(t *testing.T) { srv, store, _ := setupTestServer(t, issuer, func(o *Options) { o.ContainmentDispatcher = disp }) - defer store.Close() + defer func() { _ = store.Close() }() const numEvents = 5 for i := 0; i < numEvents; i++ { @@ -476,7 +478,7 @@ func TestControlPlaneContainment_ServerClose_DrainTimeoutOnHangingWebhook(t *tes srv, store, _ := setupTestServer(t, issuer, func(o *Options) { o.ContainmentDispatcher = disp }) - defer store.Close() + defer func() { _ = store.Close() }() srv.emitEnrollmentRejected( "peer-hanging", @@ -500,3 +502,47 @@ func TestControlPlaneContainment_ServerClose_DrainTimeoutOnHangingWebhook(t *tes t.Fatalf("expected containment dispatcher close timeout error, got %v", err) } } + +func TestControlPlaneContainment_CanonicalizesCIDv1PeerID(t *testing.T) { + _, pub, err := crypto.GenerateEd25519Key(rand.Reader) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("GenerateEd25519Key: %v", err) + } + pID, err := peer.IDFromPublicKey(pub) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("IDFromPublicKey: %v", err) + } + canonical := pID.String() + cidV1Form := peer.ToCid(pID).String() + + disp := newCPChanDispatcher(10) + srv := &Server{ + containmentDispatcher: disp, + } + + srv.emitEnrollmentRejected( + cidV1Form, + "invalid token", + api.EnrollmentRejectionReason_INVALID_JWT, + api.RoleNode, + nil, + time.Now(), + false, + ) + erEvt := expectCPEvent(t, disp, "agentmesh.enrollment.rejected") + if erEvt.Subject != canonical { + t.Fatalf("emitEnrollmentRejected Subject = %q, want canonical %q", erEvt.Subject, canonical) + } + if got := erEvt.GetEnrollmentRejected().GetPeerId(); got != canonical { + t.Fatalf("emitEnrollmentRejected PeerId = %q, want canonical %q", got, canonical) + } + + srv.emitIdentityRevoked(cidV1Form, api.RevocationSource_CONTROL_PLANE_ADMIN, "admin revoke", nil) + irEvt := expectCPEvent(t, disp, "agentmesh.identity.revoked") + if irEvt.Subject != canonical { + t.Fatalf("emitIdentityRevoked Subject = %q, want canonical %q", irEvt.Subject, canonical) + } + if got := irEvt.GetIdentityRevoked().GetPeerId(); got != canonical { + t.Fatalf("emitIdentityRevoked PeerId = %q, want canonical %q", got, canonical) + } +} diff --git a/internal/controlplane/server.go b/internal/controlplane/server.go index a6f17378..38d22a01 100644 --- a/internal/controlplane/server.go +++ b/internal/controlplane/server.go @@ -2205,14 +2205,6 @@ func (s *Server) Close() error { return errors.Join(errs...) } -// ContainmentDispatcher returns the active containment Dispatcher, or nil if unconfigured. -func (s *Server) ContainmentDispatcher() containment.Dispatcher { - if s == nil { - return nil - } - return s.containmentDispatcher -} - // SetContainmentDispatcher injects a containment Dispatcher into the server. func (s *Server) SetContainmentDispatcher(d containment.Dispatcher) { if s == nil { @@ -2232,10 +2224,16 @@ func (s *Server) emitEnrollmentRejected(peerID, detail string, reason api.Enroll if s == nil || s.containmentDispatcher == nil { return } + canonical := peerID + if canonical != "" { + if pID, err := peer.Decode(canonical); err == nil { + canonical = pID.String() + } + } now := timestamppb.Now() event := &api.SecuritySignalEvent{ Type: "agentmesh.enrollment.rejected", - Subject: peerID, + Subject: canonical, Source: s.eventSource(), EventTime: now, DataContentType: "application/json", @@ -2244,7 +2242,7 @@ func (s *Server) emitEnrollmentRejected(peerID, detail string, reason api.Enroll EnrollmentRejected: &api.EnrollmentRejectedSignal{ Reason: reason, Detail: detail, - PeerId: peerID, + PeerId: canonical, RequestedRole: role, SubmittedLabels: labels, IsAutonomousRecovery: isAutoRecovery, @@ -2259,17 +2257,23 @@ func (s *Server) emitIdentityRevoked(peerID string, source api.RevocationSource, if s == nil || s.containmentDispatcher == nil { return } + canonical := peerID + if canonical != "" { + if pID, err := peer.Decode(canonical); err == nil { + canonical = pID.String() + } + } now := timestamppb.Now() event := &api.SecuritySignalEvent{ Type: "agentmesh.identity.revoked", - Subject: peerID, + Subject: canonical, Source: s.eventSource(), EventTime: now, DataContentType: "application/json", SpecVersion: "1.0", Data: &api.SecuritySignalEvent_IdentityRevoked{ IdentityRevoked: &api.IdentityRevokedSignal{ - PeerId: peerID, + PeerId: canonical, Source: source, Reason: reason, RevocationIds: revocationIDs, diff --git a/internal/node/containment_security_test.go b/internal/node/containment_security_test.go index 5ecb7033..d06c0e4a 100644 --- a/internal/node/containment_security_test.go +++ b/internal/node/containment_security_test.go @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ import ( "github.com/google/agentmesh/api" "github.com/google/agentmesh/internal/containment" + lru "github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru/v2" "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/crypto" "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/peer" "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/protocol" @@ -834,3 +835,54 @@ func TestContainmentSecurity_Concurrency_DispatcherCloseRace_ZeroPanic(t *testin wg.Wait() } } + +func TestContainmentSecurity_CanonicalizesAlternativePeerIDEncodings(t *testing.T) { + _, pub, err := crypto.GenerateEd25519Key(rand.Reader) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("GenerateEd25519Key: %v", err) + } + pID, err := peer.IDFromPublicKey(pub) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("IDFromPublicKey: %v", err) + } + canonical := pID.String() + cidV1Form := peer.ToCid(pID).String() + if cidV1Form == canonical { + t.Fatalf("expected non-canonical CIDv1 string to differ from canonical %q", canonical) + } + + disp := newChanDispatcher(10) + revokedCache, err := lru.New[string, int64](RevocationCacheSize) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("lru.New: %v", err) + } + n := &AgentMeshNode{ + containmentDispatcher: disp, + revokedPeers: revokedCache, + } + + // 1. EmitPolicyDenied given CIDv1 form must emit canonical base58 PeerId and Subject. + n.EmitPolicyDenied(PolicyDeniedParams{ + Direction: api.SignalCallerDirection_REMOTE_PEER, + Reason: api.PolicyDenialReason_DATALOG_EVALUATION_DENIED, + TargetService: "mcp://calc", + CallerPeerID: cidV1Form, + }) + pdEvt := expectEventTimeout(t, disp, "agentmesh.policy.denied", time.Second) + if pdEvt.Subject != canonical { + t.Fatalf("EmitPolicyDenied Subject = %q, want canonical %q", pdEvt.Subject, canonical) + } + if got := pdEvt.GetPolicyDenied().GetCallerPeerId(); got != canonical { + t.Fatalf("EmitPolicyDenied CallerPeerId = %q, want canonical %q", got, canonical) + } + + // 2. reconcileBannedPeers given CIDv1 form must emit canonical base58 PeerId and Subject. + n.reconcileBannedPeers([]string{cidV1Form}, time.Now()) + irEvt := expectEventTimeout(t, disp, "agentmesh.identity.revoked", time.Second) + if irEvt.Subject != canonical { + t.Fatalf("reconcileBannedPeers Subject = %q, want canonical %q", irEvt.Subject, canonical) + } + if got := irEvt.GetIdentityRevoked().GetPeerId(); got != canonical { + t.Fatalf("reconcileBannedPeers PeerId = %q, want canonical %q", got, canonical) + } +} diff --git a/internal/node/controlplane_sync.go b/internal/node/controlplane_sync.go index 92da72a2..3ef4c785 100644 --- a/internal/node/controlplane_sync.go +++ b/internal/node/controlplane_sync.go @@ -287,13 +287,14 @@ func (n *AgentMeshNode) reconcileBannedPeers(peerIDs []string, fetchedAt time.Ti logger.Infof("Peer %s is no longer banned by the control plane; lifting the local ban", key) n.revokedPeers.Remove(key) } - for key, p := range banned { - if n.revokedPeers.Contains(key) { + for _, p := range banned { + canonical := p.String() + if n.revokedPeers.Contains(canonical) { continue } - logger.Infow("peer banned by the control plane", "event", meshEventBanned, "peer", key) + logger.Infow("peer banned by the control plane", "event", meshEventBanned, "peer", canonical) n.banPeer(p, fetchedAtMs) - n.emitIdentityRevoked(key, api.RevocationSource_LOCAL_CONTROL_PLANE_SYNC, "peer ban reconciled from control plane sync", nil) + n.emitIdentityRevoked(canonical, api.RevocationSource_LOCAL_CONTROL_PLANE_SYNC, "peer ban reconciled from control plane sync", nil) } } diff --git a/internal/node/node.go b/internal/node/node.go index 27031b8c..ca160bdf 100644 --- a/internal/node/node.go +++ b/internal/node/node.go @@ -2380,6 +2380,11 @@ func (n *AgentMeshNode) EmitPolicyDenied(params PolicyDeniedParams) { } callerPeer := params.CallerPeerID + if callerPeer != "" { + if pID, err := peer.Decode(callerPeer); err == nil { + callerPeer = pID.String() + } + } if callerPeer == "" && params.Direction == api.SignalCallerDirection_LOCAL_WORKLOAD { callerPeer = localPID } @@ -2456,6 +2461,12 @@ func (n *AgentMeshNode) emitIdentityRevoked(peerID string, source api.Revocation if n == nil || n.containmentDispatcher == nil { return } + canonical := peerID + if canonical != "" { + if pID, err := peer.Decode(canonical); err == nil { + canonical = pID.String() + } + } now := timestamppb.Now() var issuer string if n.Host != nil { @@ -2463,14 +2474,14 @@ func (n *AgentMeshNode) emitIdentityRevoked(peerID string, source api.Revocation } event := &api.SecuritySignalEvent{ Type: "agentmesh.identity.revoked", - Subject: peerID, + Subject: canonical, Source: n.eventSource(), EventTime: now, DataContentType: "application/json", SpecVersion: "1.0", Data: &api.SecuritySignalEvent_IdentityRevoked{ IdentityRevoked: &api.IdentityRevokedSignal{ - PeerId: peerID, + PeerId: canonical, Source: source, Reason: reason, RevocationIds: revocationIDs, diff --git a/sdk/python/src/agent_mesh/_proto/agentmesh_pb2.py b/sdk/python/src/agent_mesh/_proto/agentmesh_pb2.py index 66f4ac58..3e9996d7 100644 --- a/sdk/python/src/agent_mesh/_proto/agentmesh_pb2.py +++ b/sdk/python/src/agent_mesh/_proto/agentmesh_pb2.py @@ -1,22 +1,11 @@ # -*- coding: utf-8 -*- # Generated by the protocol buffer compiler. DO NOT EDIT! -# NO CHECKED-IN PROTOBUF GENCODE # source: agentmesh.proto -# Protobuf Python Version: 5.28.3 """Generated protocol buffer code.""" +from google.protobuf.internal import builder as _builder from google.protobuf import descriptor as _descriptor from google.protobuf import descriptor_pool as _descriptor_pool -from google.protobuf import runtime_version as _runtime_version from google.protobuf import symbol_database as _symbol_database -from google.protobuf.internal import builder as _builder -_runtime_version.ValidateProtobufRuntimeVersion( - _runtime_version.Domain.PUBLIC, - 5, - 28, - 3, - '', - 'agentmesh.proto' -) # @@protoc_insertion_point(imports) _sym_db = _symbol_database.Default() @@ -28,246 +17,246 @@ DESCRIPTOR = _descriptor_pool.Default().AddSerializedFile(b'\n\x0f\x61gentmesh.proto\x12\x0c\x61gentmesh.v1\x1a\x1egoogle/protobuf/duration.proto\x1a\x1fgoogle/protobuf/timestamp.proto\"4\n\tAuthFrame\x12\x0f\n\x07\x62iscuit\x18\x01 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_globals['_AWSASSUMEROLE']._serialized_start=6182 - _globals['_AWSASSUMEROLE']._serialized_end=6239 - _globals['_PLATFORMIDENTITY']._serialized_start=6241 - _globals['_PLATFORMIDENTITY']._serialized_end=6275 - _globals['_POLICYBINDING']._serialized_start=6277 - _globals['_POLICYBINDING']._serialized_end=6323 - _globals['_POLICYCONFIG']._serialized_start=6326 - _globals['_POLICYCONFIG']._serialized_end=6477 - _globals['_POLICYCONFIGGETREQUEST']._serialized_start=6479 - _globals['_POLICYCONFIGGETREQUEST']._serialized_end=6503 - _globals['_POLICYCONFIGGETRESPONSE']._serialized_start=6505 - _globals['_POLICYCONFIGGETRESPONSE']._serialized_end=6553 - _globals['_POLICYCONFIGUPDATERESPONSE']._serialized_start=6555 - _globals['_POLICYCONFIGUPDATERESPONSE']._serialized_end=6615 - _globals['_EGRESSASSIGNMENTSREQUEST']._serialized_start=6617 - _globals['_EGRESSASSIGNMENTSREQUEST']._serialized_end=6643 - _globals['_EGRESSASSIGNMENTSRESPONSE']._serialized_start=6645 - _globals['_EGRESSASSIGNMENTSRESPONSE']._serialized_end=6721 - _globals['_KEYSRESPONSE']._serialized_start=6723 - _globals['_KEYSRESPONSE']._serialized_end=6825 - _globals['_TOKENREFRESHREQUEST']._serialized_start=6827 - _globals['_TOKENREFRESHREQUEST']._serialized_end=6934 - _globals['_TOKENREFRESHRESPONSE']._serialized_start=6936 - _globals['_TOKENREFRESHRESPONSE']._serialized_end=7053 - _globals['_NODECATALOGREPORT']._serialized_start=7055 - _globals['_NODECATALOGREPORT']._serialized_end=7119 - _globals['_TOKENREVOKEREQUEST']._serialized_start=7121 - _globals['_TOKENREVOKEREQUEST']._serialized_end=7158 - _globals['_TOKENREVOKERESPONSE']._serialized_start=7160 - _globals['_TOKENREVOKERESPONSE']._serialized_end=7213 - _globals['_BOOTSTRAPTOKENCREATEREQUEST']._serialized_start=7216 - _globals['_BOOTSTRAPTOKENCREATEREQUEST']._serialized_end=7385 - _globals['_BOOTSTRAPTOKENCREATERESPONSE']._serialized_start=7388 - _globals['_BOOTSTRAPTOKENCREATERESPONSE']._serialized_end=7526 - _globals['_BOOTSTRAPTOKEN']._serialized_start=7529 - _globals['_BOOTSTRAPTOKEN']._serialized_end=7847 - _globals['_BOOTSTRAPTOKENLISTRESPONSE']._serialized_start=7849 - _globals['_BOOTSTRAPTOKENLISTRESPONSE']._serialized_end=7923 - _globals['_ENROLLMENTREQUEST']._serialized_start=7926 - _globals['_ENROLLMENTREQUEST']._serialized_end=8268 - _globals['_ENROLLMENTREQUEST_LABELSENTRY']._serialized_start=825 - _globals['_ENROLLMENTREQUEST_LABELSENTRY']._serialized_end=870 - _globals['_ENROLLMENTREQUESTLISTRESPONSE']._serialized_start=8270 - _globals['_ENROLLMENTREQUESTLISTRESPONSE']._serialized_end=8352 - _globals['_USER']._serialized_start=8354 - _globals['_USER']._serialized_end=8466 - _globals['_ENROLLEDNODE']._serialized_start=8469 - _globals['_ENROLLEDNODE']._serialized_end=8843 - _globals['_ENROLLEDNODE_LABELSENTRY']._serialized_start=825 - _globals['_ENROLLEDNODE_LABELSENTRY']._serialized_end=870 - _globals['_ROUTERLEASE']._serialized_start=8846 - _globals['_ROUTERLEASE']._serialized_end=9063 - _globals['_NODESERVICES']._serialized_start=9065 - _globals['_NODESERVICES']._serialized_end=9173 - _globals['_ADMINSTATUSRESPONSE']._serialized_start=9176 - _globals['_ADMINSTATUSRESPONSE']._serialized_end=9651 - _globals['_ADMINSTATUSRESPONSE_NODECATALOGENTRY']._serialized_start=9573 - _globals['_ADMINSTATUSRESPONSE_NODECATALOGENTRY']._serialized_end=9651 - _globals['_USERSTATUSRESPONSE']._serialized_start=9654 - _globals['_USERSTATUSRESPONSE']._serialized_end=9911 - _globals['_NODELISTRESPONSE']._serialized_start=9913 - _globals['_NODELISTRESPONSE']._serialized_end=9999 - _globals['_IDENTITYEVIDENCERESPONSE']._serialized_start=10002 - _globals['_IDENTITYEVIDENCERESPONSE']._serialized_end=10230 - _globals['_PEEREVIDENCERESPONSE']._serialized_start=10233 - _globals['_PEEREVIDENCERESPONSE']._serialized_end=10559 - _globals['_PEEREVIDENCERESPONSE_LABELSENTRY']._serialized_start=825 - _globals['_PEEREVIDENCERESPONSE_LABELSENTRY']._serialized_end=870 - _globals['_MEMBERCREDENTIAL']._serialized_start=10562 - _globals['_MEMBERCREDENTIAL']._serialized_end=10830 - _globals['_TRUSTEDSIGNINGKEY']._serialized_start=10832 - _globals['_TRUSTEDSIGNINGKEY']._serialized_end=10921 - _globals['_OIDCSESSION']._serialized_start=10923 - _globals['_OIDCSESSION']._serialized_end=11012 - _globals['_TASKAUTHORIZATIONRULE']._serialized_start=11015 - _globals['_TASKAUTHORIZATIONRULE']._serialized_end=11162 - _globals['_TASKRULE']._serialized_start=11165 - _globals['_TASKRULE']._serialized_end=11297 - _globals['_TASKOPERATION']._serialized_start=11299 - _globals['_TASKOPERATION']._serialized_end=11414 - _globals['_TOKENEXCHANGEREQUEST']._serialized_start=11417 - _globals['_TOKENEXCHANGEREQUEST']._serialized_end=11588 - _globals['_TOKENEXCHANGERESPONSE']._serialized_start=11590 - _globals['_TOKENEXCHANGERESPONSE']._serialized_end=11717 - _globals['_STSTOKENREQUEST']._serialized_start=11720 - _globals['_STSTOKENREQUEST']._serialized_end=11849 - _globals['_STSTOKENRESPONSE']._serialized_start=11852 - _globals['_STSTOKENRESPONSE']._serialized_end=11983 - _globals['_REVOCATIONSRESPONSE']._serialized_start=11985 - _globals['_REVOCATIONSRESPONSE']._serialized_end=12055 - _globals['_POLICYDENIEDSIGNAL']._serialized_start=12058 - _globals['_POLICYDENIEDSIGNAL']._serialized_end=12527 - _globals['_POLICYDENIEDSIGNAL_CALLERLABELSENTRY']._serialized_start=12476 - _globals['_POLICYDENIEDSIGNAL_CALLERLABELSENTRY']._serialized_end=12527 - _globals['_TRANSPORTREFUSEDSIGNAL']._serialized_start=12530 - _globals['_TRANSPORTREFUSEDSIGNAL']._serialized_end=12814 - _globals['_IDENTITYREVOKEDSIGNAL']._serialized_start=12817 - _globals['_IDENTITYREVOKEDSIGNAL']._serialized_end=13017 - _globals['_ENROLLMENTREJECTEDSIGNAL']._serialized_start=13020 - _globals['_ENROLLMENTREJECTEDSIGNAL']._serialized_end=13435 - _globals['_ENROLLMENTREJECTEDSIGNAL_SUBMITTEDLABELSENTRY']._serialized_start=13381 - _globals['_ENROLLMENTREJECTEDSIGNAL_SUBMITTEDLABELSENTRY']._serialized_end=13435 - _globals['_SECURITYSIGNALEVENT']._serialized_start=13438 - _globals['_SECURITYSIGNALEVENT']._serialized_end=13885 - _globals['_WEBHOOKENDPOINTCONFIG']._serialized_start=13888 - _globals['_WEBHOOKENDPOINTCONFIG']._serialized_end=14109 - _globals['_SECURITYSIGNALSCONFIG']._serialized_start=14112 - _globals['_SECURITYSIGNALSCONFIG']._serialized_end=14286 +_builder.BuildMessageAndEnumDescriptors(DESCRIPTOR, globals()) +_builder.BuildTopDescriptorsAndMessages(DESCRIPTOR, 'agentmesh_pb2', globals()) +if _descriptor._USE_C_DESCRIPTORS == False: + + DESCRIPTOR._options = None + DESCRIPTOR._serialized_options = b'Z\037github.com/google/agentmesh/api' + _ENROLLREQUEST_LABELSENTRY._options = None + _ENROLLREQUEST_LABELSENTRY._serialized_options = b'8\001' + _BOOTSTRAPENROLLREQUEST_LABELSENTRY._options = None + _BOOTSTRAPENROLLREQUEST_LABELSENTRY._serialized_options = b'8\001' + _COMMANDBACKEND_ENVENTRY._options = None + _COMMANDBACKEND_ENVENTRY._serialized_options = b'8\001' + _ROUTERINFO_LABELSENTRY._options = None + _ROUTERINFO_LABELSENTRY._serialized_options = b'8\001' + _ENROLLMENTREQUEST_LABELSENTRY._options = None + _ENROLLMENTREQUEST_LABELSENTRY._serialized_options = b'8\001' + _ENROLLEDNODE_LABELSENTRY._options = None + _ENROLLEDNODE_LABELSENTRY._serialized_options = b'8\001' + _ADMINSTATUSRESPONSE_NODECATALOGENTRY._options = None + _ADMINSTATUSRESPONSE_NODECATALOGENTRY._serialized_options = b'8\001' + _PEEREVIDENCERESPONSE_LABELSENTRY._options = None + _PEEREVIDENCERESPONSE_LABELSENTRY._serialized_options = b'8\001' + _POLICYDENIEDSIGNAL_CALLERLABELSENTRY._options = None + _POLICYDENIEDSIGNAL_CALLERLABELSENTRY._serialized_options = b'8\001' + _ENROLLMENTREJECTEDSIGNAL_SUBMITTEDLABELSENTRY._options = None + _ENROLLMENTREJECTEDSIGNAL_SUBMITTEDLABELSENTRY._serialized_options = b'8\001' + _ENROLLMENTSTATUS._serialized_start=14289 + _ENROLLMENTSTATUS._serialized_end=14437 + _SERVICETYPE._serialized_start=14440 + _SERVICETYPE._serialized_end=14580 + _INGRESSAUTHMODE._serialized_start=14582 + _INGRESSAUTHMODE._serialized_end=14697 + _EGRESSMODE._serialized_start=14699 + _EGRESSMODE._serialized_end=14754 + _RESPONSEINSPECTION._serialized_start=14756 + _RESPONSEINSPECTION._serialized_end=14848 + _SIGNALCALLERDIRECTION._serialized_start=14850 + _SIGNALCALLERDIRECTION._serialized_end=14951 + _POLICYDENIALREASON._serialized_start=14954 + _POLICYDENIALREASON._serialized_end=15215 + _TRANSPORTREFUSALREASON._serialized_start=15218 + _TRANSPORTREFUSALREASON._serialized_end=15403 + _REVOCATIONSOURCE._serialized_start=15406 + _REVOCATIONSOURCE._serialized_end=15573 + _ENROLLMENTREJECTIONREASON._serialized_start=15576 + _ENROLLMENTREJECTIONREASON._serialized_end=15890 + _AUTHFRAME._serialized_start=98 + _AUTHFRAME._serialized_end=150 + _AUTHRESPONSE._serialized_start=152 + _AUTHRESPONSE._serialized_end=215 + _ROUTERGOAWAY._serialized_start=218 + _ROUTERGOAWAY._serialized_end=395 + _ROUTERGOAWAY_REASON._serialized_start=333 + _ROUTERGOAWAY_REASON._serialized_end=395 + _MESHEVENT._serialized_start=398 + _MESHEVENT._serialized_end=618 + _MESHEVENT_TYPE._serialized_start=563 + _MESHEVENT_TYPE._serialized_end=618 + _ENROLLREQUEST._serialized_start=621 + _ENROLLREQUEST._serialized_end=870 + _ENROLLREQUEST_LABELSENTRY._serialized_start=825 + _ENROLLREQUEST_LABELSENTRY._serialized_end=870 + _ENROLLRESPONSE._serialized_start=873 + _ENROLLRESPONSE._serialized_end=1044 + _BOOTSTRAPENROLLREQUEST._serialized_start=1047 + _BOOTSTRAPENROLLREQUEST._serialized_end=1326 + _BOOTSTRAPENROLLREQUEST_LABELSENTRY._serialized_start=825 + _BOOTSTRAPENROLLREQUEST_LABELSENTRY._serialized_end=870 + _BOOTSTRAPENROLLRESPONSE._serialized_start=1329 + _BOOTSTRAPENROLLRESPONSE._serialized_end=1588 + _SERVICEINGRESS._serialized_start=1590 + _SERVICEINGRESS._serialized_end=1671 + _SERVICEINFO._serialized_start=1674 + _SERVICEINFO._serialized_end=1810 + _COMMANDBACKEND._serialized_start=1813 + _COMMANDBACKEND._serialized_end=1942 + _COMMANDBACKEND_ENVENTRY._serialized_start=1900 + _COMMANDBACKEND_ENVENTRY._serialized_end=1942 + _REGISTERSERVICEREQUEST._serialized_start=1945 + _REGISTERSERVICEREQUEST._serialized_end=2095 + _DISCOVEREDPROVIDER._serialized_start=2097 + _DISCOVEREDPROVIDER._serialized_end=2202 + _CONTROLPLANEINFORESPONSE._serialized_start=2205 + _CONTROLPLANEINFORESPONSE._serialized_end=2437 + _DIRECTORYPARAMETERS._serialized_start=2440 + _DIRECTORYPARAMETERS._serialized_end=2584 + _DIRECTORYREQUEST._serialized_start=2587 + _DIRECTORYREQUEST._serialized_end=2838 + _DIRECTORYPROVIDE._serialized_start=2841 + _DIRECTORYPROVIDE._serialized_end=2969 + _DIRECTORYWITHDRAW._serialized_start=2971 + _DIRECTORYWITHDRAW._serialized_end=3021 + _DIRECTORYFINDPROVIDERS._serialized_start=3023 + _DIRECTORYFINDPROVIDERS._serialized_end=3075 + _DIRECTORYFINDPEER._serialized_start=3077 + _DIRECTORYFINDPEER._serialized_end=3113 + _DIRECTORYRESPONSE._serialized_start=3115 + _DIRECTORYRESPONSE._serialized_end=3234 + _PEERRECORD._serialized_start=3236 + _PEERRECORD._serialized_end=3327 + _ROUTERINFO._serialized_start=3330 + _ROUTERINFO._serialized_end=3547 + _ROUTERINFO_LABELSENTRY._serialized_start=825 + _ROUTERINFO_LABELSENTRY._serialized_end=870 + _ROUTERLEASEREQUEST._serialized_start=3550 + _ROUTERLEASEREQUEST._serialized_end=3830 + _ROUTERLEASERESPONSE._serialized_start=3832 + _ROUTERLEASERESPONSE._serialized_end=3934 + _POLICYROLE._serialized_start=3937 + _POLICYROLE._serialized_end=4179 + _INGRESSGRANT._serialized_start=4181 + _INGRESSGRANT._serialized_end=4272 + _HTTPGRANT._serialized_start=4274 + _HTTPGRANT._serialized_end=4334 + _EGRESSDESTINATION._serialized_start=4337 + _EGRESSDESTINATION._serialized_end=4626 + _INSPECTION._serialized_start=4628 + _INSPECTION._serialized_end=4685 + _INSPECTOR._serialized_start=4687 + _INSPECTOR._serialized_end=4798 + _MODELARMOR._serialized_start=4801 + _MODELARMOR._serialized_end=4946 + _EXTPROC._serialized_start=4949 + _EXTPROC._serialized_end=5213 + _EXTPROCPROCESSINGMODE._serialized_start=5216 + _EXTPROCPROCESSINGMODE._serialized_end=5855 + _EXTPROCPROCESSINGMODE_HEADERMODE._serialized_start=5700 + _EXTPROCPROCESSINGMODE_HEADERMODE._serialized_end=5757 + _EXTPROCPROCESSINGMODE_BODYMODE._serialized_start=5759 + _EXTPROCPROCESSINGMODE_BODYMODE._serialized_end=5855 + _CREDENTIALBROKER._serialized_start=5858 + _CREDENTIALBROKER._serialized_end=6083 + _OIDCFEDERATION._serialized_start=6085 + _OIDCFEDERATION._serialized_end=6180 + _AWSASSUMEROLE._serialized_start=6182 + _AWSASSUMEROLE._serialized_end=6239 + _PLATFORMIDENTITY._serialized_start=6241 + _PLATFORMIDENTITY._serialized_end=6275 + _POLICYBINDING._serialized_start=6277 + _POLICYBINDING._serialized_end=6323 + _POLICYCONFIG._serialized_start=6326 + _POLICYCONFIG._serialized_end=6477 + _POLICYCONFIGGETREQUEST._serialized_start=6479 + _POLICYCONFIGGETREQUEST._serialized_end=6503 + _POLICYCONFIGGETRESPONSE._serialized_start=6505 + _POLICYCONFIGGETRESPONSE._serialized_end=6553 + _POLICYCONFIGUPDATERESPONSE._serialized_start=6555 + _POLICYCONFIGUPDATERESPONSE._serialized_end=6615 + _EGRESSASSIGNMENTSREQUEST._serialized_start=6617 + _EGRESSASSIGNMENTSREQUEST._serialized_end=6643 + _EGRESSASSIGNMENTSRESPONSE._serialized_start=6645 + _EGRESSASSIGNMENTSRESPONSE._serialized_end=6721 + _KEYSRESPONSE._serialized_start=6723 + _KEYSRESPONSE._serialized_end=6825 + _TOKENREFRESHREQUEST._serialized_start=6827 + _TOKENREFRESHREQUEST._serialized_end=6934 + _TOKENREFRESHRESPONSE._serialized_start=6936 + _TOKENREFRESHRESPONSE._serialized_end=7053 + _NODECATALOGREPORT._serialized_start=7055 + _NODECATALOGREPORT._serialized_end=7119 + _TOKENREVOKEREQUEST._serialized_start=7121 + _TOKENREVOKEREQUEST._serialized_end=7158 + _TOKENREVOKERESPONSE._serialized_start=7160 + _TOKENREVOKERESPONSE._serialized_end=7213 + _BOOTSTRAPTOKENCREATEREQUEST._serialized_start=7216 + _BOOTSTRAPTOKENCREATEREQUEST._serialized_end=7385 + _BOOTSTRAPTOKENCREATERESPONSE._serialized_start=7388 + _BOOTSTRAPTOKENCREATERESPONSE._serialized_end=7526 + _BOOTSTRAPTOKEN._serialized_start=7529 + _BOOTSTRAPTOKEN._serialized_end=7847 + _BOOTSTRAPTOKENLISTRESPONSE._serialized_start=7849 + _BOOTSTRAPTOKENLISTRESPONSE._serialized_end=7923 + _ENROLLMENTREQUEST._serialized_start=7926 + _ENROLLMENTREQUEST._serialized_end=8268 + _ENROLLMENTREQUEST_LABELSENTRY._serialized_start=825 + _ENROLLMENTREQUEST_LABELSENTRY._serialized_end=870 + _ENROLLMENTREQUESTLISTRESPONSE._serialized_start=8270 + _ENROLLMENTREQUESTLISTRESPONSE._serialized_end=8352 + _USER._serialized_start=8354 + _USER._serialized_end=8466 + _ENROLLEDNODE._serialized_start=8469 + _ENROLLEDNODE._serialized_end=8843 + _ENROLLEDNODE_LABELSENTRY._serialized_start=825 + _ENROLLEDNODE_LABELSENTRY._serialized_end=870 + _ROUTERLEASE._serialized_start=8846 + _ROUTERLEASE._serialized_end=9063 + _NODESERVICES._serialized_start=9065 + _NODESERVICES._serialized_end=9173 + _ADMINSTATUSRESPONSE._serialized_start=9176 + _ADMINSTATUSRESPONSE._serialized_end=9651 + _ADMINSTATUSRESPONSE_NODECATALOGENTRY._serialized_start=9573 + _ADMINSTATUSRESPONSE_NODECATALOGENTRY._serialized_end=9651 + _USERSTATUSRESPONSE._serialized_start=9654 + _USERSTATUSRESPONSE._serialized_end=9911 + _NODELISTRESPONSE._serialized_start=9913 + _NODELISTRESPONSE._serialized_end=9999 + _IDENTITYEVIDENCERESPONSE._serialized_start=10002 + _IDENTITYEVIDENCERESPONSE._serialized_end=10230 + _PEEREVIDENCERESPONSE._serialized_start=10233 + _PEEREVIDENCERESPONSE._serialized_end=10559 + _PEEREVIDENCERESPONSE_LABELSENTRY._serialized_start=825 + _PEEREVIDENCERESPONSE_LABELSENTRY._serialized_end=870 + _MEMBERCREDENTIAL._serialized_start=10562 + _MEMBERCREDENTIAL._serialized_end=10830 + _TRUSTEDSIGNINGKEY._serialized_start=10832 + _TRUSTEDSIGNINGKEY._serialized_end=10921 + _OIDCSESSION._serialized_start=10923 + _OIDCSESSION._serialized_end=11012 + _TASKAUTHORIZATIONRULE._serialized_start=11015 + _TASKAUTHORIZATIONRULE._serialized_end=11162 + _TASKRULE._serialized_start=11165 + _TASKRULE._serialized_end=11297 + _TASKOPERATION._serialized_start=11299 + _TASKOPERATION._serialized_end=11414 + _TOKENEXCHANGEREQUEST._serialized_start=11417 + _TOKENEXCHANGEREQUEST._serialized_end=11588 + _TOKENEXCHANGERESPONSE._serialized_start=11590 + _TOKENEXCHANGERESPONSE._serialized_end=11717 + _STSTOKENREQUEST._serialized_start=11720 + _STSTOKENREQUEST._serialized_end=11849 + _STSTOKENRESPONSE._serialized_start=11852 + _STSTOKENRESPONSE._serialized_end=11983 + _REVOCATIONSRESPONSE._serialized_start=11985 + _REVOCATIONSRESPONSE._serialized_end=12055 + _POLICYDENIEDSIGNAL._serialized_start=12058 + _POLICYDENIEDSIGNAL._serialized_end=12527 + _POLICYDENIEDSIGNAL_CALLERLABELSENTRY._serialized_start=12476 + _POLICYDENIEDSIGNAL_CALLERLABELSENTRY._serialized_end=12527 + _TRANSPORTREFUSEDSIGNAL._serialized_start=12530 + _TRANSPORTREFUSEDSIGNAL._serialized_end=12814 + _IDENTITYREVOKEDSIGNAL._serialized_start=12817 + _IDENTITYREVOKEDSIGNAL._serialized_end=13017 + _ENROLLMENTREJECTEDSIGNAL._serialized_start=13020 + _ENROLLMENTREJECTEDSIGNAL._serialized_end=13435 + _ENROLLMENTREJECTEDSIGNAL_SUBMITTEDLABELSENTRY._serialized_start=13381 + _ENROLLMENTREJECTEDSIGNAL_SUBMITTEDLABELSENTRY._serialized_end=13435 + _SECURITYSIGNALEVENT._serialized_start=13438 + _SECURITYSIGNALEVENT._serialized_end=13885 + _WEBHOOKENDPOINTCONFIG._serialized_start=13888 + _WEBHOOKENDPOINTCONFIG._serialized_end=14109 + _SECURITYSIGNALSCONFIG._serialized_start=14112 + _SECURITYSIGNALSCONFIG._serialized_end=14286 # @@protoc_insertion_point(module_scope) diff --git a/sdk/python/src/agent_mesh/_proto/agentmesh_pb2.pyi b/sdk/python/src/agent_mesh/_proto/agentmesh_pb2.pyi index d96e2712..0460b291 100644 --- a/sdk/python/src/agent_mesh/_proto/agentmesh_pb2.pyi +++ b/sdk/python/src/agent_mesh/_proto/agentmesh_pb2.pyi @@ -6,134 +6,90 @@ from google.protobuf import descriptor as _descriptor from google.protobuf import message as _message from typing import ClassVar as _ClassVar, Iterable as _Iterable, Mapping as _Mapping, Optional as _Optional, Union as _Union +AUTH_DEADLINE_EXCEEDED: TransportRefusalReason +AUTONOMOUS_RECOVERY_DISABLED: EnrollmentRejectionReason +BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_USAGE_EXCEEDED: EnrollmentRejectionReason +CONTROL_PLANE_ADMIN: RevocationSource +DATALOG_EVALUATION_DENIED: PolicyDenialReason DESCRIPTOR: _descriptor.FileDescriptor - -class EnrollmentStatus(int, metaclass=_enum_type_wrapper.EnumTypeWrapper): - __slots__ = () - ENROLLMENT_STATUS_UNSPECIFIED: _ClassVar[EnrollmentStatus] - ENROLLMENT_STATUS_PENDING: _ClassVar[EnrollmentStatus] - ENROLLMENT_STATUS_APPROVED: _ClassVar[EnrollmentStatus] - ENROLLMENT_STATUS_REJECTED: _ClassVar[EnrollmentStatus] - -class ServiceType(int, metaclass=_enum_type_wrapper.EnumTypeWrapper): - __slots__ = () - SERVICE_TYPE_UNSPECIFIED: _ClassVar[ServiceType] - SERVICE_TYPE_MCP: _ClassVar[ServiceType] - SERVICE_TYPE_INFERENCE: _ClassVar[ServiceType] - SERVICE_TYPE_A2A: _ClassVar[ServiceType] - SERVICE_TYPE_EGRESS: _ClassVar[ServiceType] - -class IngressAuthMode(int, metaclass=_enum_type_wrapper.EnumTypeWrapper): - __slots__ = () - INGRESS_AUTH_MODE_UNSPECIFIED: _ClassVar[IngressAuthMode] - INGRESS_AUTH_MODE_EDGE: _ClassVar[IngressAuthMode] - INGRESS_AUTH_MODE_PASSTHROUGH: _ClassVar[IngressAuthMode] - -class EgressMode(int, metaclass=_enum_type_wrapper.EnumTypeWrapper): - __slots__ = () - EGRESS_MODE_HTTP: _ClassVar[EgressMode] - EGRESS_MODE_TCP: _ClassVar[EgressMode] - -class ResponseInspection(int, metaclass=_enum_type_wrapper.EnumTypeWrapper): - __slots__ = () - RESPONSE_INSPECTION_BUFFERED: _ClassVar[ResponseInspection] - RESPONSE_INSPECTION_REQUEST_ONLY: _ClassVar[ResponseInspection] - -class SignalCallerDirection(int, metaclass=_enum_type_wrapper.EnumTypeWrapper): - __slots__ = () - SIGNAL_CALLER_DIRECTION_UNSPECIFIED: _ClassVar[SignalCallerDirection] - LOCAL_WORKLOAD: _ClassVar[SignalCallerDirection] - REMOTE_PEER: _ClassVar[SignalCallerDirection] - -class PolicyDenialReason(int, metaclass=_enum_type_wrapper.EnumTypeWrapper): - __slots__ = () - POLICY_DENIAL_REASON_UNSPECIFIED: _ClassVar[PolicyDenialReason] - DATALOG_EVALUATION_DENIED: _ClassVar[PolicyDenialReason] - TASK_AUTHORIZATION_RULE_VIOLATION: _ClassVar[PolicyDenialReason] - INSPECTION_FILTER_BLOCKED: _ClassVar[PolicyDenialReason] - ROLE_MISMATCH: _ClassVar[PolicyDenialReason] - EXPIRED_CREDENTIAL: _ClassVar[PolicyDenialReason] - UNAUTHORIZED_SERVICE: _ClassVar[PolicyDenialReason] - UNAUTHORIZED_PATH_OR_METHOD: _ClassVar[PolicyDenialReason] - -class TransportRefusalReason(int, metaclass=_enum_type_wrapper.EnumTypeWrapper): - __slots__ = () - TRANSPORT_REFUSAL_REASON_UNSPECIFIED: _ClassVar[TransportRefusalReason] - PEER_UNAUTHENTICATED: _ClassVar[TransportRefusalReason] - NOT_ROUTER_ROLE: _ClassVar[TransportRefusalReason] - AUTH_DEADLINE_EXCEEDED: _ClassVar[TransportRefusalReason] - PEER_BANNED: _ClassVar[TransportRefusalReason] - PROTOCOL_UNAUTHORIZED: _ClassVar[TransportRefusalReason] - -class RevocationSource(int, metaclass=_enum_type_wrapper.EnumTypeWrapper): - __slots__ = () - REVOCATION_SOURCE_UNSPECIFIED: _ClassVar[RevocationSource] - CONTROL_PLANE_ADMIN: _ClassVar[RevocationSource] - MESH_EVENT_BANNED_GOSSIP: _ClassVar[RevocationSource] - LOCAL_CONTROL_PLANE_SYNC: _ClassVar[RevocationSource] - TOKEN_REFRESH_REJECTION: _ClassVar[RevocationSource] - -class EnrollmentRejectionReason(int, metaclass=_enum_type_wrapper.EnumTypeWrapper): - __slots__ = () - ENROLLMENT_REJECTION_REASON_UNSPECIFIED: _ClassVar[EnrollmentRejectionReason] - INVALID_JWT: _ClassVar[EnrollmentRejectionReason] - EXPIRED_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN: _ClassVar[EnrollmentRejectionReason] - BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_USAGE_EXCEEDED: _ClassVar[EnrollmentRejectionReason] - UNATTESTED_LABELS_REJECTED: _ClassVar[EnrollmentRejectionReason] - INVALID_CHALLENGE_SIGNATURE: _ClassVar[EnrollmentRejectionReason] - REQUESTED_ROLE_UNAUTHORIZED: _ClassVar[EnrollmentRejectionReason] - PEER_PREVIOUSLY_BANNED: _ClassVar[EnrollmentRejectionReason] - AUTONOMOUS_RECOVERY_DISABLED: _ClassVar[EnrollmentRejectionReason] -ENROLLMENT_STATUS_UNSPECIFIED: EnrollmentStatus -ENROLLMENT_STATUS_PENDING: EnrollmentStatus +EGRESS_MODE_HTTP: EgressMode +EGRESS_MODE_TCP: EgressMode +ENROLLMENT_REJECTION_REASON_UNSPECIFIED: EnrollmentRejectionReason ENROLLMENT_STATUS_APPROVED: EnrollmentStatus +ENROLLMENT_STATUS_PENDING: EnrollmentStatus ENROLLMENT_STATUS_REJECTED: EnrollmentStatus -SERVICE_TYPE_UNSPECIFIED: ServiceType -SERVICE_TYPE_MCP: ServiceType -SERVICE_TYPE_INFERENCE: ServiceType -SERVICE_TYPE_A2A: ServiceType -SERVICE_TYPE_EGRESS: ServiceType -INGRESS_AUTH_MODE_UNSPECIFIED: IngressAuthMode +ENROLLMENT_STATUS_UNSPECIFIED: EnrollmentStatus +EXPIRED_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN: EnrollmentRejectionReason +EXPIRED_CREDENTIAL: PolicyDenialReason INGRESS_AUTH_MODE_EDGE: IngressAuthMode INGRESS_AUTH_MODE_PASSTHROUGH: IngressAuthMode -EGRESS_MODE_HTTP: EgressMode -EGRESS_MODE_TCP: EgressMode -RESPONSE_INSPECTION_BUFFERED: ResponseInspection -RESPONSE_INSPECTION_REQUEST_ONLY: ResponseInspection -SIGNAL_CALLER_DIRECTION_UNSPECIFIED: SignalCallerDirection -LOCAL_WORKLOAD: SignalCallerDirection -REMOTE_PEER: SignalCallerDirection -POLICY_DENIAL_REASON_UNSPECIFIED: PolicyDenialReason -DATALOG_EVALUATION_DENIED: PolicyDenialReason -TASK_AUTHORIZATION_RULE_VIOLATION: PolicyDenialReason +INGRESS_AUTH_MODE_UNSPECIFIED: IngressAuthMode INSPECTION_FILTER_BLOCKED: PolicyDenialReason -ROLE_MISMATCH: PolicyDenialReason -EXPIRED_CREDENTIAL: PolicyDenialReason -UNAUTHORIZED_SERVICE: PolicyDenialReason -UNAUTHORIZED_PATH_OR_METHOD: PolicyDenialReason -TRANSPORT_REFUSAL_REASON_UNSPECIFIED: TransportRefusalReason -PEER_UNAUTHENTICATED: TransportRefusalReason +INVALID_CHALLENGE_SIGNATURE: EnrollmentRejectionReason +INVALID_JWT: EnrollmentRejectionReason +LOCAL_CONTROL_PLANE_SYNC: RevocationSource +LOCAL_WORKLOAD: SignalCallerDirection +MESH_EVENT_BANNED_GOSSIP: RevocationSource NOT_ROUTER_ROLE: TransportRefusalReason -AUTH_DEADLINE_EXCEEDED: TransportRefusalReason PEER_BANNED: TransportRefusalReason +PEER_PREVIOUSLY_BANNED: EnrollmentRejectionReason +PEER_UNAUTHENTICATED: TransportRefusalReason +POLICY_DENIAL_REASON_UNSPECIFIED: PolicyDenialReason PROTOCOL_UNAUTHORIZED: TransportRefusalReason +REMOTE_PEER: SignalCallerDirection +REQUESTED_ROLE_UNAUTHORIZED: EnrollmentRejectionReason +RESPONSE_INSPECTION_BUFFERED: ResponseInspection +RESPONSE_INSPECTION_REQUEST_ONLY: ResponseInspection REVOCATION_SOURCE_UNSPECIFIED: RevocationSource -CONTROL_PLANE_ADMIN: RevocationSource -MESH_EVENT_BANNED_GOSSIP: RevocationSource -LOCAL_CONTROL_PLANE_SYNC: RevocationSource +ROLE_MISMATCH: PolicyDenialReason +SERVICE_TYPE_A2A: ServiceType +SERVICE_TYPE_EGRESS: ServiceType +SERVICE_TYPE_INFERENCE: ServiceType +SERVICE_TYPE_MCP: ServiceType +SERVICE_TYPE_UNSPECIFIED: ServiceType +SIGNAL_CALLER_DIRECTION_UNSPECIFIED: SignalCallerDirection +TASK_AUTHORIZATION_RULE_VIOLATION: PolicyDenialReason TOKEN_REFRESH_REJECTION: RevocationSource -ENROLLMENT_REJECTION_REASON_UNSPECIFIED: EnrollmentRejectionReason -INVALID_JWT: EnrollmentRejectionReason -EXPIRED_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN: EnrollmentRejectionReason -BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_USAGE_EXCEEDED: EnrollmentRejectionReason +TRANSPORT_REFUSAL_REASON_UNSPECIFIED: TransportRefusalReason UNATTESTED_LABELS_REJECTED: EnrollmentRejectionReason -INVALID_CHALLENGE_SIGNATURE: EnrollmentRejectionReason -REQUESTED_ROLE_UNAUTHORIZED: EnrollmentRejectionReason -PEER_PREVIOUSLY_BANNED: EnrollmentRejectionReason -AUTONOMOUS_RECOVERY_DISABLED: EnrollmentRejectionReason +UNAUTHORIZED_PATH_OR_METHOD: PolicyDenialReason +UNAUTHORIZED_SERVICE: PolicyDenialReason + +class AWSAssumeRole(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["role_arn", "session_policy"] + ROLE_ARN_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + SESSION_POLICY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + role_arn: str + session_policy: str + def __init__(self, role_arn: _Optional[str] = ..., session_policy: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... + +class AdminStatusResponse(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["active_routers", "bootstrap_tokens", "enrolled_nodes", "enrollment_requests", "node_catalog", "policy", "users"] + class NodeCatalogEntry(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["key", "value"] + KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + VALUE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + key: str + value: NodeServices + def __init__(self, key: _Optional[str] = ..., value: _Optional[_Union[NodeServices, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... + ACTIVE_ROUTERS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + BOOTSTRAP_TOKENS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ENROLLED_NODES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ENROLLMENT_REQUESTS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + NODE_CATALOG_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + POLICY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + USERS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + active_routers: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[RouterLease] + bootstrap_tokens: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[BootstrapToken] + enrolled_nodes: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[EnrolledNode] + enrollment_requests: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[EnrollmentRequest] + node_catalog: _containers.MessageMap[str, NodeServices] + policy: PolicyConfig + users: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[User] + def __init__(self, users: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[User, _Mapping]]] = ..., active_routers: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[RouterLease, _Mapping]]] = ..., enrolled_nodes: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[EnrolledNode, _Mapping]]] = ..., enrollment_requests: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[EnrollmentRequest, _Mapping]]] = ..., bootstrap_tokens: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[BootstrapToken, _Mapping]]] = ..., policy: _Optional[_Union[PolicyConfig, _Mapping]] = ..., node_catalog: _Optional[_Mapping[str, NodeServices]] = ...) -> None: ... class AuthFrame(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("biscuit", "target_service") + __slots__ = ["biscuit", "target_service"] BISCUIT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] TARGET_SERVICE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] biscuit: bytes @@ -141,162 +97,129 @@ class AuthFrame(_message.Message): def __init__(self, biscuit: _Optional[bytes] = ..., target_service: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... class AuthResponse(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("success", "error", "biscuit") - SUCCESS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ERROR_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + __slots__ = ["biscuit", "error", "success"] BISCUIT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - success: bool - error: str + ERROR_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + SUCCESS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] biscuit: bytes + error: str + success: bool def __init__(self, success: bool = ..., error: _Optional[str] = ..., biscuit: _Optional[bytes] = ...) -> None: ... -class RouterGoAway(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("reason", "retry_after") - class Reason(int, metaclass=_enum_type_wrapper.EnumTypeWrapper): - __slots__ = () - REASON_UNSPECIFIED: _ClassVar[RouterGoAway.Reason] - DRAINING: _ClassVar[RouterGoAway.Reason] - OVERLOADED: _ClassVar[RouterGoAway.Reason] - REASON_UNSPECIFIED: RouterGoAway.Reason - DRAINING: RouterGoAway.Reason - OVERLOADED: RouterGoAway.Reason - REASON_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - RETRY_AFTER_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - reason: RouterGoAway.Reason - retry_after: _duration_pb2.Duration - def __init__(self, reason: _Optional[_Union[RouterGoAway.Reason, str]] = ..., retry_after: _Optional[_Union[_duration_pb2.Duration, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... - -class MeshEvent(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("type", "peer_id", "event_time", "new_public_key", "signature") - class Type(int, metaclass=_enum_type_wrapper.EnumTypeWrapper): - __slots__ = () - BANNED: _ClassVar[MeshEvent.Type] - KEY_ROTATION: _ClassVar[MeshEvent.Type] - POLICY_UPDATE: _ClassVar[MeshEvent.Type] - BANNED: MeshEvent.Type - KEY_ROTATION: MeshEvent.Type - POLICY_UPDATE: MeshEvent.Type - TYPE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - EVENT_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - NEW_PUBLIC_KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - SIGNATURE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - type: MeshEvent.Type - peer_id: str - event_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp - new_public_key: bytes - signature: bytes - def __init__(self, type: _Optional[_Union[MeshEvent.Type, str]] = ..., peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., event_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., new_public_key: _Optional[bytes] = ..., signature: _Optional[bytes] = ...) -> None: ... - -class EnrollRequest(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("jwt", "peer_id", "public_key", "requested_role", "labels", "challenge_unix_ms", "challenge_signature") - class LabelsEntry(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("key", "value") - KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - VALUE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - key: str - value: str - def __init__(self, key: _Optional[str] = ..., value: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... - JWT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - PUBLIC_KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - REQUESTED_ROLE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - LABELS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - CHALLENGE_UNIX_MS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - CHALLENGE_SIGNATURE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - jwt: str - peer_id: str - public_key: bytes - requested_role: str - labels: _containers.ScalarMap[str, str] - challenge_unix_ms: int - challenge_signature: bytes - def __init__(self, jwt: _Optional[str] = ..., peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., public_key: _Optional[bytes] = ..., requested_role: _Optional[str] = ..., labels: _Optional[_Mapping[str, str]] = ..., challenge_unix_ms: _Optional[int] = ..., challenge_signature: _Optional[bytes] = ...) -> None: ... - -class EnrollResponse(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("biscuit_token", "error_message", "control_plane_public_key", "router_addresses", "expire_time") - BISCUIT_TOKEN_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ERROR_MESSAGE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - CONTROL_PLANE_PUBLIC_KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ROUTER_ADDRESSES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - EXPIRE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - biscuit_token: bytes - error_message: str - control_plane_public_key: bytes - router_addresses: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] - expire_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp - def __init__(self, biscuit_token: _Optional[bytes] = ..., error_message: _Optional[str] = ..., control_plane_public_key: _Optional[bytes] = ..., router_addresses: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., expire_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... - class BootstrapEnrollRequest(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("bootstrap_token", "peer_id", "public_key", "requested_role", "labels", "challenge_unix_ms", "challenge_signature") + __slots__ = ["bootstrap_token", "challenge_signature", "challenge_unix_ms", "labels", "peer_id", "public_key", "requested_role"] class LabelsEntry(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("key", "value") + __slots__ = ["key", "value"] KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] VALUE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] key: str value: str def __init__(self, key: _Optional[str] = ..., value: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + CHALLENGE_SIGNATURE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + CHALLENGE_UNIX_MS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + LABELS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] PUBLIC_KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] REQUESTED_ROLE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - LABELS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - CHALLENGE_UNIX_MS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - CHALLENGE_SIGNATURE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] bootstrap_token: str + challenge_signature: bytes + challenge_unix_ms: int + labels: _containers.ScalarMap[str, str] peer_id: str public_key: bytes requested_role: str - labels: _containers.ScalarMap[str, str] - challenge_unix_ms: int - challenge_signature: bytes def __init__(self, bootstrap_token: _Optional[str] = ..., peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., public_key: _Optional[bytes] = ..., requested_role: _Optional[str] = ..., labels: _Optional[_Mapping[str, str]] = ..., challenge_unix_ms: _Optional[int] = ..., challenge_signature: _Optional[bytes] = ...) -> None: ... class BootstrapEnrollResponse(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("status", "biscuit_token", "poll_interval_seconds", "error_message", "control_plane_public_key", "router_addresses", "expire_time") - STATUS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + __slots__ = ["biscuit_token", "control_plane_public_key", "error_message", "expire_time", "poll_interval_seconds", "router_addresses", "status"] BISCUIT_TOKEN_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - POLL_INTERVAL_SECONDS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ERROR_MESSAGE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] CONTROL_PLANE_PUBLIC_KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ROUTER_ADDRESSES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ERROR_MESSAGE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] EXPIRE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - status: EnrollmentStatus + POLL_INTERVAL_SECONDS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ROUTER_ADDRESSES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + STATUS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] biscuit_token: bytes - poll_interval_seconds: int - error_message: str control_plane_public_key: bytes - router_addresses: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] + error_message: str expire_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp + poll_interval_seconds: int + router_addresses: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] + status: EnrollmentStatus def __init__(self, status: _Optional[_Union[EnrollmentStatus, str]] = ..., biscuit_token: _Optional[bytes] = ..., poll_interval_seconds: _Optional[int] = ..., error_message: _Optional[str] = ..., control_plane_public_key: _Optional[bytes] = ..., router_addresses: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., expire_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... -class ServiceIngress(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("auth_mode", "allow") - AUTH_MODE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ALLOW_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - auth_mode: IngressAuthMode - allow: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] - def __init__(self, auth_mode: _Optional[_Union[IngressAuthMode, str]] = ..., allow: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ...) -> None: ... - -class ServiceInfo(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("type", "name", "description", "ingress") - TYPE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - NAME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] +class BootstrapToken(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["autonomous_recovery", "create_time", "description", "ephemeral", "expire_time", "id", "max_usages", "owner_id", "revoke_time", "role", "usages_count"] + AUTONOMOUS_RECOVERY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + CREATE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] DESCRIPTION_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - INGRESS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - type: ServiceType - name: str + EPHEMERAL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + EXPIRE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + MAX_USAGES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + OWNER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + REVOKE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ROLE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + USAGES_COUNT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + autonomous_recovery: bool + create_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp description: str - ingress: ServiceIngress - def __init__(self, type: _Optional[_Union[ServiceType, str]] = ..., name: _Optional[str] = ..., description: _Optional[str] = ..., ingress: _Optional[_Union[ServiceIngress, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... - -class CommandBackend(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("command", "env") - class EnvEntry(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("key", "value") - KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - VALUE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - key: str + ephemeral: bool + expire_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp + id: str + max_usages: int + owner_id: str + revoke_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp + role: str + usages_count: int + def __init__(self, id: _Optional[str] = ..., role: _Optional[str] = ..., owner_id: _Optional[str] = ..., max_usages: _Optional[int] = ..., usages_count: _Optional[int] = ..., description: _Optional[str] = ..., create_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., expire_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., revoke_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., autonomous_recovery: bool = ..., ephemeral: bool = ...) -> None: ... + +class BootstrapTokenCreateRequest(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["autonomous_recovery", "description", "ephemeral", "max_usages", "owner_id", "role", "ttl_hours"] + AUTONOMOUS_RECOVERY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + DESCRIPTION_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + EPHEMERAL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + MAX_USAGES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + OWNER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ROLE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + TTL_HOURS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + autonomous_recovery: bool + description: str + ephemeral: bool + max_usages: int + owner_id: str + role: str + ttl_hours: int + def __init__(self, role: _Optional[str] = ..., owner_id: _Optional[str] = ..., ttl_hours: _Optional[int] = ..., max_usages: _Optional[int] = ..., description: _Optional[str] = ..., autonomous_recovery: bool = ..., ephemeral: bool = ...) -> None: ... + +class BootstrapTokenCreateResponse(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["expire_time", "id", "owner_id", "role", "token"] + EXPIRE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + OWNER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ROLE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + TOKEN_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + expire_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp + id: str + owner_id: str + role: str + token: str + def __init__(self, id: _Optional[str] = ..., token: _Optional[str] = ..., role: _Optional[str] = ..., owner_id: _Optional[str] = ..., expire_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... + +class BootstrapTokenListResponse(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["tokens"] + TOKENS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + tokens: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[BootstrapToken] + def __init__(self, tokens: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[BootstrapToken, _Mapping]]] = ...) -> None: ... + +class CommandBackend(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["command", "env"] + class EnvEntry(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["key", "value"] + KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + VALUE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + key: str value: str def __init__(self, key: _Optional[str] = ..., value: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... COMMAND_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] @@ -305,813 +228,879 @@ class CommandBackend(_message.Message): env: _containers.ScalarMap[str, str] def __init__(self, command: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., env: _Optional[_Mapping[str, str]] = ...) -> None: ... -class RegisterServiceRequest(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("service", "target_url", "command") - SERVICE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - TARGET_URL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - COMMAND_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - service: ServiceInfo - target_url: str - command: CommandBackend - def __init__(self, service: _Optional[_Union[ServiceInfo, _Mapping]] = ..., target_url: _Optional[str] = ..., command: _Optional[_Union[CommandBackend, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... - -class DiscoveredProvider(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("peer_id", "local_proxy_url", "srv_name", "srv_description") - PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - LOCAL_PROXY_URL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - SRV_NAME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - SRV_DESCRIPTION_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - peer_id: str - local_proxy_url: str - srv_name: str - srv_description: str - def __init__(self, peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., local_proxy_url: _Optional[str] = ..., srv_name: _Optional[str] = ..., srv_description: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... - class ControlPlaneInfoResponse(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("oidc_issuer", "client_id", "audience", "router_addresses", "banned_peer_ids", "routers", "directory") - OIDC_ISSUER_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - CLIENT_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + __slots__ = ["audience", "banned_peer_ids", "client_id", "directory", "oidc_issuer", "router_addresses", "routers"] AUDIENCE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ROUTER_ADDRESSES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] BANNED_PEER_IDS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ROUTERS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + CLIENT_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] DIRECTORY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - oidc_issuer: str - client_id: str + OIDC_ISSUER_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ROUTERS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ROUTER_ADDRESSES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] audience: str - router_addresses: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] banned_peer_ids: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] - routers: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[RouterInfo] + client_id: str directory: DirectoryParameters + oidc_issuer: str + router_addresses: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] + routers: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[RouterInfo] def __init__(self, oidc_issuer: _Optional[str] = ..., client_id: _Optional[str] = ..., audience: _Optional[str] = ..., router_addresses: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., banned_peer_ids: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., routers: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[RouterInfo, _Mapping]]] = ..., directory: _Optional[_Union[DirectoryParameters, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... +class CredentialBroker(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["aws_assume_role", "oidc_federation", "platform_identity", "static_secret"] + AWS_ASSUME_ROLE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + OIDC_FEDERATION_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + PLATFORM_IDENTITY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + STATIC_SECRET_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + aws_assume_role: AWSAssumeRole + oidc_federation: OIDCFederation + platform_identity: PlatformIdentity + static_secret: str + def __init__(self, static_secret: _Optional[str] = ..., oidc_federation: _Optional[_Union[OIDCFederation, _Mapping]] = ..., aws_assume_role: _Optional[_Union[AWSAssumeRole, _Mapping]] = ..., platform_identity: _Optional[_Union[PlatformIdentity, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... + +class DirectoryFindPeer(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["peer_id"] + PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + peer_id: str + def __init__(self, peer_id: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... + +class DirectoryFindProviders(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["key", "limit"] + KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + LIMIT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + key: bytes + limit: int + def __init__(self, key: _Optional[bytes] = ..., limit: _Optional[int] = ...) -> None: ... + class DirectoryParameters(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("replication", "reprovide_interval", "record_ttl") + __slots__ = ["record_ttl", "replication", "reprovide_interval"] + RECORD_TTL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] REPLICATION_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] REPROVIDE_INTERVAL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - RECORD_TTL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + record_ttl: _duration_pb2.Duration replication: int reprovide_interval: _duration_pb2.Duration - record_ttl: _duration_pb2.Duration def __init__(self, replication: _Optional[int] = ..., reprovide_interval: _Optional[_Union[_duration_pb2.Duration, _Mapping]] = ..., record_ttl: _Optional[_Union[_duration_pb2.Duration, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... -class DirectoryRequest(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("provide", "find_providers", "find_peer", "withdraw") - PROVIDE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - FIND_PROVIDERS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - FIND_PEER_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - WITHDRAW_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - provide: DirectoryProvide - find_providers: DirectoryFindProviders - find_peer: DirectoryFindPeer - withdraw: DirectoryWithdraw - def __init__(self, provide: _Optional[_Union[DirectoryProvide, _Mapping]] = ..., find_providers: _Optional[_Union[DirectoryFindProviders, _Mapping]] = ..., find_peer: _Optional[_Union[DirectoryFindPeer, _Mapping]] = ..., withdraw: _Optional[_Union[DirectoryWithdraw, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... - class DirectoryProvide(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("key", "addrs", "provider", "service", "ingress") - KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + __slots__ = ["addrs", "ingress", "key", "provider", "service"] ADDRS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + INGRESS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] PROVIDER_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] SERVICE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - INGRESS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - key: bytes addrs: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] + ingress: ServiceIngress + key: bytes provider: str service: str - ingress: ServiceIngress def __init__(self, key: _Optional[bytes] = ..., addrs: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., provider: _Optional[str] = ..., service: _Optional[str] = ..., ingress: _Optional[_Union[ServiceIngress, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... +class DirectoryRequest(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["find_peer", "find_providers", "provide", "withdraw"] + FIND_PEER_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + FIND_PROVIDERS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + PROVIDE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + WITHDRAW_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + find_peer: DirectoryFindPeer + find_providers: DirectoryFindProviders + provide: DirectoryProvide + withdraw: DirectoryWithdraw + def __init__(self, provide: _Optional[_Union[DirectoryProvide, _Mapping]] = ..., find_providers: _Optional[_Union[DirectoryFindProviders, _Mapping]] = ..., find_peer: _Optional[_Union[DirectoryFindPeer, _Mapping]] = ..., withdraw: _Optional[_Union[DirectoryWithdraw, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... + +class DirectoryResponse(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["error", "peer", "providers"] + ERROR_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + PEER_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + PROVIDERS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + error: str + peer: PeerRecord + providers: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[PeerRecord] + def __init__(self, providers: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[PeerRecord, _Mapping]]] = ..., peer: _Optional[_Union[PeerRecord, _Mapping]] = ..., error: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... + class DirectoryWithdraw(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("key", "provider") + __slots__ = ["key", "provider"] KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] PROVIDER_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] key: bytes provider: str def __init__(self, key: _Optional[bytes] = ..., provider: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... -class DirectoryFindProviders(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("key", "limit") - KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - LIMIT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - key: bytes - limit: int - def __init__(self, key: _Optional[bytes] = ..., limit: _Optional[int] = ...) -> None: ... - -class DirectoryFindPeer(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("peer_id",) +class DiscoveredProvider(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["local_proxy_url", "peer_id", "srv_description", "srv_name"] + LOCAL_PROXY_URL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + SRV_DESCRIPTION_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + SRV_NAME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + local_proxy_url: str peer_id: str - def __init__(self, peer_id: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... + srv_description: str + srv_name: str + def __init__(self, peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., local_proxy_url: _Optional[str] = ..., srv_name: _Optional[str] = ..., srv_description: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... -class DirectoryResponse(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("providers", "peer", "error") - PROVIDERS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - PEER_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ERROR_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - providers: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[PeerRecord] - peer: PeerRecord - error: str - def __init__(self, providers: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[PeerRecord, _Mapping]]] = ..., peer: _Optional[_Union[PeerRecord, _Mapping]] = ..., error: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... +class EgressAssignmentsRequest(_message.Message): + __slots__ = [] + def __init__(self) -> None: ... -class PeerRecord(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("peer_id", "addrs", "ingress") - PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ADDRS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - INGRESS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - peer_id: str - addrs: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] - ingress: ServiceIngress - def __init__(self, peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., addrs: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., ingress: _Optional[_Union[ServiceIngress, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... +class EgressAssignmentsResponse(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["egress"] + EGRESS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + egress: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[EgressDestination] + def __init__(self, egress: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[EgressDestination, _Mapping]]] = ...) -> None: ... -class RouterInfo(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("peer_id", "addresses", "labels", "connections", "connection_limit", "ingress_url") +class EgressDestination(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["broker", "credential", "forward_context", "inspection", "mode", "name", "ports", "preserve_host", "served_by", "target_url"] + BROKER_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + CREDENTIAL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + FORWARD_CONTEXT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + INSPECTION_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + MODE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + NAME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + PORTS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + PRESERVE_HOST_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + SERVED_BY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + TARGET_URL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + broker: CredentialBroker + credential: str + forward_context: bool + inspection: Inspection + mode: EgressMode + name: str + ports: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[int] + preserve_host: bool + served_by: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] + target_url: str + def __init__(self, name: _Optional[str] = ..., target_url: _Optional[str] = ..., credential: _Optional[str] = ..., served_by: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., broker: _Optional[_Union[CredentialBroker, _Mapping]] = ..., inspection: _Optional[_Union[Inspection, _Mapping]] = ..., mode: _Optional[_Union[EgressMode, str]] = ..., ports: _Optional[_Iterable[int]] = ..., preserve_host: bool = ..., forward_context: bool = ...) -> None: ... + +class EnrollRequest(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["challenge_signature", "challenge_unix_ms", "jwt", "labels", "peer_id", "public_key", "requested_role"] class LabelsEntry(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("key", "value") + __slots__ = ["key", "value"] KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] VALUE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] key: str value: str def __init__(self, key: _Optional[str] = ..., value: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... - PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ADDRESSES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + CHALLENGE_SIGNATURE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + CHALLENGE_UNIX_MS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + JWT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] LABELS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - CONNECTIONS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - CONNECTION_LIMIT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - INGRESS_URL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - peer_id: str - addresses: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] - labels: _containers.ScalarMap[str, str] - connections: int - connection_limit: int - ingress_url: str - def __init__(self, peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., addresses: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., labels: _Optional[_Mapping[str, str]] = ..., connections: _Optional[int] = ..., connection_limit: _Optional[int] = ..., ingress_url: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... - -class RouterLeaseRequest(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("peer_id", "addresses", "biscuit", "connected_peers", "dht_size", "challenge_unix_ms", "challenge_signature", "ttl", "connections", "connection_limit", "ingress_url") PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ADDRESSES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - BISCUIT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - CONNECTED_PEERS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - DHT_SIZE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - CHALLENGE_UNIX_MS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - CHALLENGE_SIGNATURE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - TTL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - CONNECTIONS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - CONNECTION_LIMIT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - INGRESS_URL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - peer_id: str - addresses: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] - biscuit: bytes - connected_peers: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] - dht_size: int - challenge_unix_ms: int + PUBLIC_KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + REQUESTED_ROLE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] challenge_signature: bytes - ttl: _duration_pb2.Duration - connections: int - connection_limit: int - ingress_url: str - def __init__(self, peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., addresses: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., biscuit: _Optional[bytes] = ..., connected_peers: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., dht_size: _Optional[int] = ..., challenge_unix_ms: _Optional[int] = ..., challenge_signature: _Optional[bytes] = ..., ttl: _Optional[_Union[_duration_pb2.Duration, _Mapping]] = ..., connections: _Optional[int] = ..., connection_limit: _Optional[int] = ..., ingress_url: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... + challenge_unix_ms: int + jwt: str + labels: _containers.ScalarMap[str, str] + peer_id: str + public_key: bytes + requested_role: str + def __init__(self, jwt: _Optional[str] = ..., peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., public_key: _Optional[bytes] = ..., requested_role: _Optional[str] = ..., labels: _Optional[_Mapping[str, str]] = ..., challenge_unix_ms: _Optional[int] = ..., challenge_signature: _Optional[bytes] = ...) -> None: ... -class RouterLeaseResponse(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("success", "error", "expire_time") - SUCCESS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ERROR_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] +class EnrollResponse(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["biscuit_token", "control_plane_public_key", "error_message", "expire_time", "router_addresses"] + BISCUIT_TOKEN_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + CONTROL_PLANE_PUBLIC_KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ERROR_MESSAGE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] EXPIRE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - success: bool - error: str + ROUTER_ADDRESSES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + biscuit_token: bytes + control_plane_public_key: bytes + error_message: str expire_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp - def __init__(self, success: bool = ..., error: _Optional[str] = ..., expire_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... + router_addresses: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] + def __init__(self, biscuit_token: _Optional[bytes] = ..., error_message: _Optional[str] = ..., control_plane_public_key: _Optional[bytes] = ..., router_addresses: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., expire_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... -class PolicyRole(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("name", "allowed_targets", "allowed_services", "custom_datalog", "allowed_labels", "http", "allowed_publish", "allowed_ingress") - NAME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ALLOWED_TARGETS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ALLOWED_SERVICES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - CUSTOM_DATALOG_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ALLOWED_LABELS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - HTTP_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ALLOWED_PUBLISH_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ALLOWED_INGRESS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - name: str - allowed_targets: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] - allowed_services: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] - custom_datalog: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] - allowed_labels: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] - http: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[HTTPGrant] - allowed_publish: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] - allowed_ingress: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[IngressGrant] - def __init__(self, name: _Optional[str] = ..., allowed_targets: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., allowed_services: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., custom_datalog: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., allowed_labels: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., http: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[HTTPGrant, _Mapping]]] = ..., allowed_publish: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., allowed_ingress: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[IngressGrant, _Mapping]]] = ...) -> None: ... +class EnrolledNode(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["autonomous_recovery", "banned", "claims_json", "enroll_time", "enrollment_type", "ephemeral", "expire_time", "labels", "owner_id", "peer_id", "role"] + class LabelsEntry(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["key", "value"] + KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + VALUE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + key: str + value: str + def __init__(self, key: _Optional[str] = ..., value: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... + AUTONOMOUS_RECOVERY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + BANNED_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + CLAIMS_JSON_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ENROLLMENT_TYPE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ENROLL_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + EPHEMERAL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + EXPIRE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + LABELS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + OWNER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ROLE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + autonomous_recovery: bool + banned: bool + claims_json: str + enroll_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp + enrollment_type: str + ephemeral: bool + expire_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp + labels: _containers.ScalarMap[str, str] + owner_id: str + peer_id: str + role: str + def __init__(self, peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., role: _Optional[str] = ..., enrollment_type: _Optional[str] = ..., claims_json: _Optional[str] = ..., owner_id: _Optional[str] = ..., labels: _Optional[_Mapping[str, str]] = ..., enroll_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., expire_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., banned: bool = ..., autonomous_recovery: bool = ..., ephemeral: bool = ...) -> None: ... -class IngressGrant(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("services", "allowed_auth_modes") - SERVICES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ALLOWED_AUTH_MODES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - services: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] - allowed_auth_modes: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[IngressAuthMode] - def __init__(self, services: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., allowed_auth_modes: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[IngressAuthMode, str]]] = ...) -> None: ... +class EnrollmentRejectedSignal(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["bootstrap_token_id", "detail", "event_time", "is_autonomous_recovery", "peer_id", "reason", "remote_address", "requested_role", "submitted_labels"] + class SubmittedLabelsEntry(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["key", "value"] + KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + VALUE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + key: str + value: str + def __init__(self, key: _Optional[str] = ..., value: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... + BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + DETAIL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + EVENT_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + IS_AUTONOMOUS_RECOVERY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + REASON_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + REMOTE_ADDRESS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + REQUESTED_ROLE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + SUBMITTED_LABELS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + bootstrap_token_id: str + detail: str + event_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp + is_autonomous_recovery: bool + peer_id: str + reason: EnrollmentRejectionReason + remote_address: str + requested_role: str + submitted_labels: _containers.ScalarMap[str, str] + def __init__(self, peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., requested_role: _Optional[str] = ..., reason: _Optional[_Union[EnrollmentRejectionReason, str]] = ..., detail: _Optional[str] = ..., bootstrap_token_id: _Optional[str] = ..., remote_address: _Optional[str] = ..., submitted_labels: _Optional[_Mapping[str, str]] = ..., is_autonomous_recovery: bool = ..., event_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... + +class EnrollmentRequest(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["create_time", "id", "labels", "peer_id", "resolve_time", "resolved_by", "status", "token_id"] + class LabelsEntry(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["key", "value"] + KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + VALUE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + key: str + value: str + def __init__(self, key: _Optional[str] = ..., value: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... + CREATE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + LABELS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + RESOLVED_BY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + RESOLVE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + STATUS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + TOKEN_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + create_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp + id: str + labels: _containers.ScalarMap[str, str] + peer_id: str + resolve_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp + resolved_by: str + status: EnrollmentStatus + token_id: str + def __init__(self, id: _Optional[str] = ..., peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., token_id: _Optional[str] = ..., status: _Optional[_Union[EnrollmentStatus, str]] = ..., labels: _Optional[_Mapping[str, str]] = ..., create_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., resolve_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., resolved_by: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... + +class EnrollmentRequestListResponse(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["requests"] + REQUESTS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + requests: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[EnrollmentRequest] + def __init__(self, requests: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[EnrollmentRequest, _Mapping]]] = ...) -> None: ... + +class ExtProc(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["allow_mode_override", "ca", "client_certificate", "failure_mode_allow", "max_buffered_bytes", "message_timeout", "processing_mode", "target"] + ALLOW_MODE_OVERRIDE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + CA_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + FAILURE_MODE_ALLOW_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + MAX_BUFFERED_BYTES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + MESSAGE_TIMEOUT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + PROCESSING_MODE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + TARGET_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + allow_mode_override: bool + ca: str + client_certificate: str + failure_mode_allow: bool + max_buffered_bytes: int + message_timeout: _duration_pb2.Duration + processing_mode: ExtProcProcessingMode + target: str + def __init__(self, target: _Optional[str] = ..., ca: _Optional[str] = ..., client_certificate: _Optional[str] = ..., processing_mode: _Optional[_Union[ExtProcProcessingMode, _Mapping]] = ..., allow_mode_override: bool = ..., message_timeout: _Optional[_Union[_duration_pb2.Duration, _Mapping]] = ..., failure_mode_allow: bool = ..., max_buffered_bytes: _Optional[int] = ...) -> None: ... + +class ExtProcProcessingMode(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["request_body_mode", "request_header_mode", "request_trailer_mode", "response_body_mode", "response_header_mode", "response_trailer_mode"] + class BodyMode(int, metaclass=_enum_type_wrapper.EnumTypeWrapper): + __slots__ = [] + class HeaderMode(int, metaclass=_enum_type_wrapper.EnumTypeWrapper): + __slots__ = [] + BUFFERED: ExtProcProcessingMode.BodyMode + BUFFERED_PARTIAL: ExtProcProcessingMode.BodyMode + FULL_DUPLEX_STREAMED: ExtProcProcessingMode.BodyMode + HEADER_MODE_DEFAULT: ExtProcProcessingMode.HeaderMode + NONE: ExtProcProcessingMode.BodyMode + REQUEST_BODY_MODE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + REQUEST_HEADER_MODE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + REQUEST_TRAILER_MODE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + RESPONSE_BODY_MODE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + RESPONSE_HEADER_MODE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + RESPONSE_TRAILER_MODE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + SEND: ExtProcProcessingMode.HeaderMode + SKIP: ExtProcProcessingMode.HeaderMode + STREAMED: ExtProcProcessingMode.BodyMode + request_body_mode: ExtProcProcessingMode.BodyMode + request_header_mode: ExtProcProcessingMode.HeaderMode + request_trailer_mode: ExtProcProcessingMode.HeaderMode + response_body_mode: ExtProcProcessingMode.BodyMode + response_header_mode: ExtProcProcessingMode.HeaderMode + response_trailer_mode: ExtProcProcessingMode.HeaderMode + def __init__(self, request_header_mode: _Optional[_Union[ExtProcProcessingMode.HeaderMode, str]] = ..., response_header_mode: _Optional[_Union[ExtProcProcessingMode.HeaderMode, str]] = ..., request_body_mode: _Optional[_Union[ExtProcProcessingMode.BodyMode, str]] = ..., response_body_mode: _Optional[_Union[ExtProcProcessingMode.BodyMode, str]] = ..., request_trailer_mode: _Optional[_Union[ExtProcProcessingMode.HeaderMode, str]] = ..., response_trailer_mode: _Optional[_Union[ExtProcProcessingMode.HeaderMode, str]] = ...) -> None: ... class HTTPGrant(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("service", "methods", "paths") - SERVICE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + __slots__ = ["methods", "paths", "service"] METHODS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] PATHS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - service: str + SERVICE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] methods: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] paths: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] + service: str def __init__(self, service: _Optional[str] = ..., methods: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., paths: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ...) -> None: ... -class EgressDestination(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("name", "target_url", "credential", "served_by", "broker", "inspection", "mode", "ports", "preserve_host", "forward_context") - NAME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - TARGET_URL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - CREDENTIAL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - SERVED_BY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - BROKER_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - INSPECTION_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - MODE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - PORTS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - PRESERVE_HOST_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - FORWARD_CONTEXT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - name: str - target_url: str - credential: str - served_by: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] - broker: CredentialBroker - inspection: Inspection - mode: EgressMode - ports: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[int] - preserve_host: bool - forward_context: bool - def __init__(self, name: _Optional[str] = ..., target_url: _Optional[str] = ..., credential: _Optional[str] = ..., served_by: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., broker: _Optional[_Union[CredentialBroker, _Mapping]] = ..., inspection: _Optional[_Union[Inspection, _Mapping]] = ..., mode: _Optional[_Union[EgressMode, str]] = ..., ports: _Optional[_Iterable[int]] = ..., preserve_host: bool = ..., forward_context: bool = ...) -> None: ... +class IdentityEvidenceResponse(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["biscuit", "biscuit_expire_time", "check_time", "control_plane_url", "peer_id", "trusted_control_plane_keys"] + BISCUIT_EXPIRE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + BISCUIT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + CHECK_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + CONTROL_PLANE_URL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + TRUSTED_CONTROL_PLANE_KEYS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + biscuit: bytes + biscuit_expire_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp + check_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp + control_plane_url: str + peer_id: str + trusted_control_plane_keys: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[bytes] + def __init__(self, peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., biscuit: _Optional[bytes] = ..., biscuit_expire_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., control_plane_url: _Optional[str] = ..., trusted_control_plane_keys: _Optional[_Iterable[bytes]] = ..., check_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... + +class IdentityRevokedSignal(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["event_time", "issuer_peer_id", "peer_id", "reason", "revocation_ids", "source"] + EVENT_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ISSUER_PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + REASON_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + REVOCATION_IDS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + SOURCE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + event_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp + issuer_peer_id: str + peer_id: str + reason: str + revocation_ids: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] + source: RevocationSource + def __init__(self, peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., source: _Optional[_Union[RevocationSource, str]] = ..., reason: _Optional[str] = ..., revocation_ids: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., issuer_peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., event_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... + +class IngressGrant(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["allowed_auth_modes", "services"] + ALLOWED_AUTH_MODES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + SERVICES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + allowed_auth_modes: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[IngressAuthMode] + services: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] + def __init__(self, services: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., allowed_auth_modes: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[IngressAuthMode, str]]] = ...) -> None: ... class Inspection(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("inspectors",) + __slots__ = ["inspectors"] INSPECTORS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] inspectors: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[Inspector] def __init__(self, inspectors: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[Inspector, _Mapping]]] = ...) -> None: ... class Inspector(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("model_armor", "ext_proc") - MODEL_ARMOR_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + __slots__ = ["ext_proc", "model_armor"] EXT_PROC_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - model_armor: ModelArmor + MODEL_ARMOR_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] ext_proc: ExtProc + model_armor: ModelArmor def __init__(self, model_armor: _Optional[_Union[ModelArmor, _Mapping]] = ..., ext_proc: _Optional[_Union[ExtProc, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... +class KeysResponse(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["public_keys", "sign_time", "signatures"] + PUBLIC_KEYS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + SIGNATURES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + SIGN_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + public_keys: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[bytes] + sign_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp + signatures: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[bytes] + def __init__(self, public_keys: _Optional[_Iterable[bytes]] = ..., sign_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., signatures: _Optional[_Iterable[bytes]] = ...) -> None: ... + +class MemberCredential(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["biscuit", "control_plane_url", "expire_time", "issued_under_keys", "oidc_session", "router_addresses", "trusted_keys"] + BISCUIT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + CONTROL_PLANE_URL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + EXPIRE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ISSUED_UNDER_KEYS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + OIDC_SESSION_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ROUTER_ADDRESSES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + TRUSTED_KEYS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + biscuit: bytes + control_plane_url: str + expire_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp + issued_under_keys: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[bytes] + oidc_session: OIDCSession + router_addresses: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] + trusted_keys: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[TrustedSigningKey] + def __init__(self, control_plane_url: _Optional[str] = ..., biscuit: _Optional[bytes] = ..., expire_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., trusted_keys: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[TrustedSigningKey, _Mapping]]] = ..., issued_under_keys: _Optional[_Iterable[bytes]] = ..., router_addresses: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., oidc_session: _Optional[_Union[OIDCSession, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... + +class MeshEvent(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["event_time", "new_public_key", "peer_id", "signature", "type"] + class Type(int, metaclass=_enum_type_wrapper.EnumTypeWrapper): + __slots__ = [] + BANNED: MeshEvent.Type + EVENT_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + KEY_ROTATION: MeshEvent.Type + NEW_PUBLIC_KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + POLICY_UPDATE: MeshEvent.Type + SIGNATURE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + TYPE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + event_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp + new_public_key: bytes + peer_id: str + signature: bytes + type: MeshEvent.Type + def __init__(self, type: _Optional[_Union[MeshEvent.Type, str]] = ..., peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., event_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., new_public_key: _Optional[bytes] = ..., signature: _Optional[bytes] = ...) -> None: ... + class ModelArmor(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("template", "response", "fail_open", "timeout") - TEMPLATE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - RESPONSE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + __slots__ = ["fail_open", "response", "template", "timeout"] FAIL_OPEN_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + RESPONSE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + TEMPLATE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] TIMEOUT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - template: str - response: ResponseInspection fail_open: bool + response: ResponseInspection + template: str timeout: _duration_pb2.Duration def __init__(self, template: _Optional[str] = ..., response: _Optional[_Union[ResponseInspection, str]] = ..., fail_open: bool = ..., timeout: _Optional[_Union[_duration_pb2.Duration, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... -class ExtProc(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("target", "ca", "client_certificate", "processing_mode", "allow_mode_override", "message_timeout", "failure_mode_allow", "max_buffered_bytes") - TARGET_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - CA_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - PROCESSING_MODE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ALLOW_MODE_OVERRIDE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - MESSAGE_TIMEOUT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - FAILURE_MODE_ALLOW_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - MAX_BUFFERED_BYTES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - target: str - ca: str - client_certificate: str - processing_mode: ExtProcProcessingMode - allow_mode_override: bool - message_timeout: _duration_pb2.Duration - failure_mode_allow: bool - max_buffered_bytes: int - def __init__(self, target: _Optional[str] = ..., ca: _Optional[str] = ..., client_certificate: _Optional[str] = ..., processing_mode: _Optional[_Union[ExtProcProcessingMode, _Mapping]] = ..., allow_mode_override: bool = ..., message_timeout: _Optional[_Union[_duration_pb2.Duration, _Mapping]] = ..., failure_mode_allow: bool = ..., max_buffered_bytes: _Optional[int] = ...) -> None: ... +class NodeCatalogReport(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["services"] + SERVICES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + services: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[ServiceInfo] + def __init__(self, services: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[ServiceInfo, _Mapping]]] = ...) -> None: ... -class ExtProcProcessingMode(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("request_header_mode", "response_header_mode", "request_body_mode", "response_body_mode", "request_trailer_mode", "response_trailer_mode") - class HeaderMode(int, metaclass=_enum_type_wrapper.EnumTypeWrapper): - __slots__ = () - HEADER_MODE_DEFAULT: _ClassVar[ExtProcProcessingMode.HeaderMode] - SEND: _ClassVar[ExtProcProcessingMode.HeaderMode] - SKIP: _ClassVar[ExtProcProcessingMode.HeaderMode] - HEADER_MODE_DEFAULT: ExtProcProcessingMode.HeaderMode - SEND: ExtProcProcessingMode.HeaderMode - SKIP: ExtProcProcessingMode.HeaderMode - class BodyMode(int, metaclass=_enum_type_wrapper.EnumTypeWrapper): - __slots__ = () - NONE: _ClassVar[ExtProcProcessingMode.BodyMode] - STREAMED: _ClassVar[ExtProcProcessingMode.BodyMode] - BUFFERED: _ClassVar[ExtProcProcessingMode.BodyMode] - BUFFERED_PARTIAL: _ClassVar[ExtProcProcessingMode.BodyMode] - FULL_DUPLEX_STREAMED: _ClassVar[ExtProcProcessingMode.BodyMode] - NONE: ExtProcProcessingMode.BodyMode - STREAMED: ExtProcProcessingMode.BodyMode - BUFFERED: ExtProcProcessingMode.BodyMode - BUFFERED_PARTIAL: ExtProcProcessingMode.BodyMode - FULL_DUPLEX_STREAMED: ExtProcProcessingMode.BodyMode - REQUEST_HEADER_MODE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - RESPONSE_HEADER_MODE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - REQUEST_BODY_MODE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - RESPONSE_BODY_MODE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - REQUEST_TRAILER_MODE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - RESPONSE_TRAILER_MODE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - request_header_mode: ExtProcProcessingMode.HeaderMode - response_header_mode: ExtProcProcessingMode.HeaderMode - request_body_mode: ExtProcProcessingMode.BodyMode - response_body_mode: ExtProcProcessingMode.BodyMode - request_trailer_mode: ExtProcProcessingMode.HeaderMode - response_trailer_mode: ExtProcProcessingMode.HeaderMode - def __init__(self, request_header_mode: _Optional[_Union[ExtProcProcessingMode.HeaderMode, str]] = ..., response_header_mode: _Optional[_Union[ExtProcProcessingMode.HeaderMode, str]] = ..., request_body_mode: _Optional[_Union[ExtProcProcessingMode.BodyMode, str]] = ..., response_body_mode: _Optional[_Union[ExtProcProcessingMode.BodyMode, str]] = ..., request_trailer_mode: _Optional[_Union[ExtProcProcessingMode.HeaderMode, str]] = ..., response_trailer_mode: _Optional[_Union[ExtProcProcessingMode.HeaderMode, str]] = ...) -> None: ... +class NodeListResponse(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["next_page_token", "nodes"] + NEXT_PAGE_TOKEN_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + NODES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + next_page_token: str + nodes: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[EnrolledNode] + def __init__(self, nodes: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[EnrolledNode, _Mapping]]] = ..., next_page_token: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... -class CredentialBroker(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("static_secret", "oidc_federation", "aws_assume_role", "platform_identity") - STATIC_SECRET_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - OIDC_FEDERATION_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - AWS_ASSUME_ROLE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - PLATFORM_IDENTITY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - static_secret: str - oidc_federation: OIDCFederation - aws_assume_role: AWSAssumeRole - platform_identity: PlatformIdentity - def __init__(self, static_secret: _Optional[str] = ..., oidc_federation: _Optional[_Union[OIDCFederation, _Mapping]] = ..., aws_assume_role: _Optional[_Union[AWSAssumeRole, _Mapping]] = ..., platform_identity: _Optional[_Union[PlatformIdentity, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... +class NodeServices(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["report_time", "services"] + REPORT_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + SERVICES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + report_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp + services: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[ServiceInfo] + def __init__(self, services: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[ServiceInfo, _Mapping]]] = ..., report_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... class OIDCFederation(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("token_endpoint", "audience", "impersonate", "scopes") - TOKEN_ENDPOINT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + __slots__ = ["audience", "impersonate", "scopes", "token_endpoint"] AUDIENCE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] IMPERSONATE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] SCOPES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - token_endpoint: str + TOKEN_ENDPOINT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] audience: str impersonate: str scopes: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] + token_endpoint: str def __init__(self, token_endpoint: _Optional[str] = ..., audience: _Optional[str] = ..., impersonate: _Optional[str] = ..., scopes: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ...) -> None: ... -class AWSAssumeRole(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("role_arn", "session_policy") - ROLE_ARN_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - SESSION_POLICY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - role_arn: str - session_policy: str - def __init__(self, role_arn: _Optional[str] = ..., session_policy: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... +class OIDCSession(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["audience", "client_id", "issuer", "refresh_token"] + AUDIENCE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + CLIENT_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ISSUER_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + REFRESH_TOKEN_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + audience: str + client_id: str + issuer: str + refresh_token: str + def __init__(self, issuer: _Optional[str] = ..., client_id: _Optional[str] = ..., audience: _Optional[str] = ..., refresh_token: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... + +class PeerEvidenceResponse(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["biscuit", "check_time", "expire_time", "labels", "peer_id", "revocation_ids", "roles", "verifying_key"] + class LabelsEntry(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["key", "value"] + KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + VALUE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + key: str + value: str + def __init__(self, key: _Optional[str] = ..., value: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... + BISCUIT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + CHECK_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + EXPIRE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + LABELS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + REVOCATION_IDS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ROLES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + VERIFYING_KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + biscuit: bytes + check_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp + expire_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp + labels: _containers.ScalarMap[str, str] + peer_id: str + revocation_ids: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] + roles: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] + verifying_key: bytes + def __init__(self, peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., biscuit: _Optional[bytes] = ..., verifying_key: _Optional[bytes] = ..., roles: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., labels: _Optional[_Mapping[str, str]] = ..., expire_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., revocation_ids: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., check_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... + +class PeerRecord(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["addrs", "ingress", "peer_id"] + ADDRS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + INGRESS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + addrs: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] + ingress: ServiceIngress + peer_id: str + def __init__(self, peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., addrs: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., ingress: _Optional[_Union[ServiceIngress, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... class PlatformIdentity(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("scopes",) + __slots__ = ["scopes"] SCOPES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] scopes: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] def __init__(self, scopes: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ...) -> None: ... class PolicyBinding(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("role", "members") - ROLE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + __slots__ = ["members", "role"] MEMBERS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - role: str + ROLE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] members: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] + role: str def __init__(self, role: _Optional[str] = ..., members: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ...) -> None: ... class PolicyConfig(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("roles", "bindings", "egress") - ROLES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + __slots__ = ["bindings", "egress", "roles"] BINDINGS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] EGRESS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - roles: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[PolicyRole] + ROLES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] bindings: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[PolicyBinding] egress: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[EgressDestination] + roles: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[PolicyRole] def __init__(self, roles: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[PolicyRole, _Mapping]]] = ..., bindings: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[PolicyBinding, _Mapping]]] = ..., egress: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[EgressDestination, _Mapping]]] = ...) -> None: ... class PolicyConfigGetRequest(_message.Message): - __slots__ = () + __slots__ = [] def __init__(self) -> None: ... class PolicyConfigGetResponse(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("datalog_rules",) + __slots__ = ["datalog_rules"] DATALOG_RULES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] datalog_rules: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] def __init__(self, datalog_rules: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ...) -> None: ... class PolicyConfigUpdateResponse(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("success", "error") - SUCCESS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + __slots__ = ["error", "success"] ERROR_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - success: bool - error: str - def __init__(self, success: bool = ..., error: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... - -class EgressAssignmentsRequest(_message.Message): - __slots__ = () - def __init__(self) -> None: ... - -class EgressAssignmentsResponse(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("egress",) - EGRESS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - egress: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[EgressDestination] - def __init__(self, egress: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[EgressDestination, _Mapping]]] = ...) -> None: ... - -class KeysResponse(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("public_keys", "sign_time", "signatures") - PUBLIC_KEYS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - SIGN_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - SIGNATURES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - public_keys: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[bytes] - sign_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp - signatures: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[bytes] - def __init__(self, public_keys: _Optional[_Iterable[bytes]] = ..., sign_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., signatures: _Optional[_Iterable[bytes]] = ...) -> None: ... - -class TokenRefreshRequest(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("challenge_signature", "challenge_unix_ms", "peer_id", "jwt") - CHALLENGE_SIGNATURE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - CHALLENGE_UNIX_MS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - JWT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - challenge_signature: bytes - challenge_unix_ms: int - peer_id: str - jwt: str - def __init__(self, challenge_signature: _Optional[bytes] = ..., challenge_unix_ms: _Optional[int] = ..., peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., jwt: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... - -class TokenRefreshResponse(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("biscuit_token", "expire_time", "error_message") - BISCUIT_TOKEN_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - EXPIRE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ERROR_MESSAGE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - biscuit_token: bytes - expire_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp - error_message: str - def __init__(self, biscuit_token: _Optional[bytes] = ..., expire_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., error_message: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... - -class NodeCatalogReport(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("services",) - SERVICES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - services: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[ServiceInfo] - def __init__(self, services: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[ServiceInfo, _Mapping]]] = ...) -> None: ... - -class TokenRevokeRequest(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("peer_id",) - PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - peer_id: str - def __init__(self, peer_id: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... - -class TokenRevokeResponse(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("success", "error") SUCCESS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ERROR_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - success: bool error: str + success: bool def __init__(self, success: bool = ..., error: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... -class BootstrapTokenCreateRequest(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("role", "owner_id", "ttl_hours", "max_usages", "description", "autonomous_recovery", "ephemeral") - ROLE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - OWNER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - TTL_HOURS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - MAX_USAGES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - DESCRIPTION_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - AUTONOMOUS_RECOVERY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - EPHEMERAL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - role: str - owner_id: str - ttl_hours: int - max_usages: int - description: str - autonomous_recovery: bool - ephemeral: bool - def __init__(self, role: _Optional[str] = ..., owner_id: _Optional[str] = ..., ttl_hours: _Optional[int] = ..., max_usages: _Optional[int] = ..., description: _Optional[str] = ..., autonomous_recovery: bool = ..., ephemeral: bool = ...) -> None: ... - -class BootstrapTokenCreateResponse(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("id", "token", "role", "owner_id", "expire_time") - ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - TOKEN_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ROLE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - OWNER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - EXPIRE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - id: str - token: str - role: str - owner_id: str - expire_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp - def __init__(self, id: _Optional[str] = ..., token: _Optional[str] = ..., role: _Optional[str] = ..., owner_id: _Optional[str] = ..., expire_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... - -class BootstrapToken(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("id", "role", "owner_id", "max_usages", "usages_count", "description", "create_time", "expire_time", "revoke_time", "autonomous_recovery", "ephemeral") - ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ROLE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - OWNER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - MAX_USAGES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - USAGES_COUNT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - DESCRIPTION_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - CREATE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - EXPIRE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - REVOKE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - AUTONOMOUS_RECOVERY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - EPHEMERAL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - id: str - role: str - owner_id: str - max_usages: int - usages_count: int - description: str - create_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp - expire_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp - revoke_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp - autonomous_recovery: bool - ephemeral: bool - def __init__(self, id: _Optional[str] = ..., role: _Optional[str] = ..., owner_id: _Optional[str] = ..., max_usages: _Optional[int] = ..., usages_count: _Optional[int] = ..., description: _Optional[str] = ..., create_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., expire_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., revoke_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., autonomous_recovery: bool = ..., ephemeral: bool = ...) -> None: ... - -class BootstrapTokenListResponse(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("tokens",) - TOKENS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - tokens: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[BootstrapToken] - def __init__(self, tokens: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[BootstrapToken, _Mapping]]] = ...) -> None: ... - -class EnrollmentRequest(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("id", "peer_id", "token_id", "status", "labels", "create_time", "resolve_time", "resolved_by") - class LabelsEntry(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("key", "value") +class PolicyDeniedSignal(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["caller_labels", "caller_peer_id", "caller_roles", "caller_subject", "detail", "direction", "event_time", "reason", "requested_operation", "requested_resource", "target_service"] + class CallerLabelsEntry(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["key", "value"] KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] VALUE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] key: str value: str def __init__(self, key: _Optional[str] = ..., value: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... - ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - TOKEN_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - STATUS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - LABELS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - CREATE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - RESOLVE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - RESOLVED_BY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - id: str - peer_id: str - token_id: str - status: EnrollmentStatus - labels: _containers.ScalarMap[str, str] - create_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp - resolve_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp - resolved_by: str - def __init__(self, id: _Optional[str] = ..., peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., token_id: _Optional[str] = ..., status: _Optional[_Union[EnrollmentStatus, str]] = ..., labels: _Optional[_Mapping[str, str]] = ..., create_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., resolve_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., resolved_by: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... + CALLER_LABELS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + CALLER_PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + CALLER_ROLES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + CALLER_SUBJECT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + DETAIL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + DIRECTION_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + EVENT_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + REASON_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + REQUESTED_OPERATION_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + REQUESTED_RESOURCE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + TARGET_SERVICE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + caller_labels: _containers.ScalarMap[str, str] + caller_peer_id: str + caller_roles: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] + caller_subject: str + detail: str + direction: SignalCallerDirection + event_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp + reason: PolicyDenialReason + requested_operation: str + requested_resource: str + target_service: str + def __init__(self, direction: _Optional[_Union[SignalCallerDirection, str]] = ..., reason: _Optional[_Union[PolicyDenialReason, str]] = ..., detail: _Optional[str] = ..., target_service: _Optional[str] = ..., requested_operation: _Optional[str] = ..., requested_resource: _Optional[str] = ..., caller_peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., caller_subject: _Optional[str] = ..., caller_roles: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., caller_labels: _Optional[_Mapping[str, str]] = ..., event_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... -class EnrollmentRequestListResponse(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("requests",) - REQUESTS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - requests: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[EnrollmentRequest] - def __init__(self, requests: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[EnrollmentRequest, _Mapping]]] = ...) -> None: ... +class PolicyRole(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["allowed_ingress", "allowed_labels", "allowed_publish", "allowed_services", "allowed_targets", "custom_datalog", "http", "name"] + ALLOWED_INGRESS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ALLOWED_LABELS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ALLOWED_PUBLISH_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ALLOWED_SERVICES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ALLOWED_TARGETS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + CUSTOM_DATALOG_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + HTTP_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + NAME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + allowed_ingress: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[IngressGrant] + allowed_labels: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] + allowed_publish: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] + allowed_services: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] + allowed_targets: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] + custom_datalog: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] + http: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[HTTPGrant] + name: str + def __init__(self, name: _Optional[str] = ..., allowed_targets: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., allowed_services: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., custom_datalog: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., allowed_labels: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., http: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[HTTPGrant, _Mapping]]] = ..., allowed_publish: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., allowed_ingress: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[IngressGrant, _Mapping]]] = ...) -> None: ... -class User(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("id", "issuer", "email", "role", "create_time") - ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ISSUER_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - EMAIL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ROLE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - CREATE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - id: str - issuer: str - email: str - role: str - create_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp - def __init__(self, id: _Optional[str] = ..., issuer: _Optional[str] = ..., email: _Optional[str] = ..., role: _Optional[str] = ..., create_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... +class RegisterServiceRequest(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["command", "service", "target_url"] + COMMAND_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + SERVICE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + TARGET_URL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + command: CommandBackend + service: ServiceInfo + target_url: str + def __init__(self, service: _Optional[_Union[ServiceInfo, _Mapping]] = ..., target_url: _Optional[str] = ..., command: _Optional[_Union[CommandBackend, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... -class EnrolledNode(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("peer_id", "role", "enrollment_type", "claims_json", "owner_id", "labels", "enroll_time", "expire_time", "banned", "autonomous_recovery", "ephemeral") +class RevocationsResponse(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["banned_peer_ids", "revocation_ids"] + BANNED_PEER_IDS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + REVOCATION_IDS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + banned_peer_ids: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] + revocation_ids: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] + def __init__(self, revocation_ids: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., banned_peer_ids: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ...) -> None: ... + +class RouterGoAway(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["reason", "retry_after"] + class Reason(int, metaclass=_enum_type_wrapper.EnumTypeWrapper): + __slots__ = [] + DRAINING: RouterGoAway.Reason + OVERLOADED: RouterGoAway.Reason + REASON_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + REASON_UNSPECIFIED: RouterGoAway.Reason + RETRY_AFTER_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + reason: RouterGoAway.Reason + retry_after: _duration_pb2.Duration + def __init__(self, reason: _Optional[_Union[RouterGoAway.Reason, str]] = ..., retry_after: _Optional[_Union[_duration_pb2.Duration, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... + +class RouterInfo(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["addresses", "connection_limit", "connections", "ingress_url", "labels", "peer_id"] class LabelsEntry(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("key", "value") + __slots__ = ["key", "value"] KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] VALUE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] key: str value: str def __init__(self, key: _Optional[str] = ..., value: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... - PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ROLE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ENROLLMENT_TYPE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - CLAIMS_JSON_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - OWNER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ADDRESSES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + CONNECTIONS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + CONNECTION_LIMIT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + INGRESS_URL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] LABELS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ENROLL_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - EXPIRE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - BANNED_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - AUTONOMOUS_RECOVERY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - EPHEMERAL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - peer_id: str - role: str - enrollment_type: str - claims_json: str - owner_id: str + PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + addresses: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] + connection_limit: int + connections: int + ingress_url: str labels: _containers.ScalarMap[str, str] - enroll_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp - expire_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp - banned: bool - autonomous_recovery: bool - ephemeral: bool - def __init__(self, peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., role: _Optional[str] = ..., enrollment_type: _Optional[str] = ..., claims_json: _Optional[str] = ..., owner_id: _Optional[str] = ..., labels: _Optional[_Mapping[str, str]] = ..., enroll_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., expire_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., banned: bool = ..., autonomous_recovery: bool = ..., ephemeral: bool = ...) -> None: ... + peer_id: str + def __init__(self, peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., addresses: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., labels: _Optional[_Mapping[str, str]] = ..., connections: _Optional[int] = ..., connection_limit: _Optional[int] = ..., ingress_url: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... class RouterLease(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("peer_id", "addresses", "last_renewal_time", "expire_time", "connected_peers", "dht_size", "ingress_url") - PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + __slots__ = ["addresses", "connected_peers", "dht_size", "expire_time", "ingress_url", "last_renewal_time", "peer_id"] ADDRESSES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - LAST_RENEWAL_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - EXPIRE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] CONNECTED_PEERS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] DHT_SIZE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + EXPIRE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] INGRESS_URL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - peer_id: str + LAST_RENEWAL_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] addresses: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] - last_renewal_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp - expire_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp connected_peers: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] dht_size: int + expire_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp ingress_url: str + last_renewal_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp + peer_id: str def __init__(self, peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., addresses: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., last_renewal_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., expire_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., connected_peers: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., dht_size: _Optional[int] = ..., ingress_url: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... -class NodeServices(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("services", "report_time") - SERVICES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - REPORT_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - services: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[ServiceInfo] - report_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp - def __init__(self, services: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[ServiceInfo, _Mapping]]] = ..., report_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... - -class AdminStatusResponse(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("users", "active_routers", "enrolled_nodes", "enrollment_requests", "bootstrap_tokens", "policy", "node_catalog") - class NodeCatalogEntry(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("key", "value") - KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - VALUE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - key: str - value: NodeServices - def __init__(self, key: _Optional[str] = ..., value: _Optional[_Union[NodeServices, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... - USERS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ACTIVE_ROUTERS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ENROLLED_NODES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ENROLLMENT_REQUESTS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - BOOTSTRAP_TOKENS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - POLICY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - NODE_CATALOG_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - users: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[User] - active_routers: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[RouterLease] - enrolled_nodes: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[EnrolledNode] - enrollment_requests: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[EnrollmentRequest] - bootstrap_tokens: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[BootstrapToken] - policy: PolicyConfig - node_catalog: _containers.MessageMap[str, NodeServices] - def __init__(self, users: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[User, _Mapping]]] = ..., active_routers: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[RouterLease, _Mapping]]] = ..., enrolled_nodes: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[EnrolledNode, _Mapping]]] = ..., enrollment_requests: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[EnrollmentRequest, _Mapping]]] = ..., bootstrap_tokens: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[BootstrapToken, _Mapping]]] = ..., policy: _Optional[_Union[PolicyConfig, _Mapping]] = ..., node_catalog: _Optional[_Mapping[str, NodeServices]] = ...) -> None: ... - -class UserStatusResponse(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("user", "enrolled_nodes", "bootstrap_tokens", "active_routers", "policy") - USER_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ENROLLED_NODES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - BOOTSTRAP_TOKENS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ACTIVE_ROUTERS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - POLICY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - user: User - enrolled_nodes: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[EnrolledNode] - bootstrap_tokens: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[BootstrapToken] - active_routers: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[RouterLease] - policy: PolicyConfig - def __init__(self, user: _Optional[_Union[User, _Mapping]] = ..., enrolled_nodes: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[EnrolledNode, _Mapping]]] = ..., bootstrap_tokens: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[BootstrapToken, _Mapping]]] = ..., active_routers: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[RouterLease, _Mapping]]] = ..., policy: _Optional[_Union[PolicyConfig, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... - -class NodeListResponse(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("nodes", "next_page_token") - NODES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - NEXT_PAGE_TOKEN_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - nodes: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[EnrolledNode] - next_page_token: str - def __init__(self, nodes: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[EnrolledNode, _Mapping]]] = ..., next_page_token: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... - -class IdentityEvidenceResponse(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("peer_id", "biscuit", "biscuit_expire_time", "control_plane_url", "trusted_control_plane_keys", "check_time") - PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] +class RouterLeaseRequest(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["addresses", "biscuit", "challenge_signature", "challenge_unix_ms", "connected_peers", "connection_limit", "connections", "dht_size", "ingress_url", "peer_id", "ttl"] + ADDRESSES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] BISCUIT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - BISCUIT_EXPIRE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - CONTROL_PLANE_URL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - TRUSTED_CONTROL_PLANE_KEYS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - CHECK_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - peer_id: str + CHALLENGE_SIGNATURE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + CHALLENGE_UNIX_MS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + CONNECTED_PEERS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + CONNECTIONS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + CONNECTION_LIMIT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + DHT_SIZE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + INGRESS_URL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + TTL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + addresses: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] biscuit: bytes - biscuit_expire_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp - control_plane_url: str - trusted_control_plane_keys: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[bytes] - check_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp - def __init__(self, peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., biscuit: _Optional[bytes] = ..., biscuit_expire_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., control_plane_url: _Optional[str] = ..., trusted_control_plane_keys: _Optional[_Iterable[bytes]] = ..., check_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... + challenge_signature: bytes + challenge_unix_ms: int + connected_peers: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] + connection_limit: int + connections: int + dht_size: int + ingress_url: str + peer_id: str + ttl: _duration_pb2.Duration + def __init__(self, peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., addresses: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., biscuit: _Optional[bytes] = ..., connected_peers: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., dht_size: _Optional[int] = ..., challenge_unix_ms: _Optional[int] = ..., challenge_signature: _Optional[bytes] = ..., ttl: _Optional[_Union[_duration_pb2.Duration, _Mapping]] = ..., connections: _Optional[int] = ..., connection_limit: _Optional[int] = ..., ingress_url: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... -class PeerEvidenceResponse(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("peer_id", "biscuit", "verifying_key", "roles", "labels", "expire_time", "revocation_ids", "check_time") - class LabelsEntry(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("key", "value") - KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - VALUE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - key: str - value: str - def __init__(self, key: _Optional[str] = ..., value: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... - PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - BISCUIT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - VERIFYING_KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ROLES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - LABELS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] +class RouterLeaseResponse(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["error", "expire_time", "success"] + ERROR_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] EXPIRE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - REVOCATION_IDS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - CHECK_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - peer_id: str - biscuit: bytes - verifying_key: bytes - roles: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] - labels: _containers.ScalarMap[str, str] + SUCCESS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + error: str expire_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp - revocation_ids: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] - check_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp - def __init__(self, peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., biscuit: _Optional[bytes] = ..., verifying_key: _Optional[bytes] = ..., roles: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., labels: _Optional[_Mapping[str, str]] = ..., expire_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., revocation_ids: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., check_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... + success: bool + def __init__(self, success: bool = ..., error: _Optional[str] = ..., expire_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... -class MemberCredential(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("control_plane_url", "biscuit", "expire_time", "trusted_keys", "issued_under_keys", "router_addresses", "oidc_session") - CONTROL_PLANE_URL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] +class STSTokenRequest(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["audience", "biscuit", "challenge_signature", "challenge_unix_ms", "destination"] + AUDIENCE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] BISCUIT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - EXPIRE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - TRUSTED_KEYS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ISSUED_UNDER_KEYS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ROUTER_ADDRESSES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - OIDC_SESSION_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - control_plane_url: str + CHALLENGE_SIGNATURE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + CHALLENGE_UNIX_MS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + DESTINATION_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + audience: str biscuit: bytes + challenge_signature: bytes + challenge_unix_ms: int + destination: str + def __init__(self, biscuit: _Optional[bytes] = ..., destination: _Optional[str] = ..., audience: _Optional[str] = ..., challenge_unix_ms: _Optional[int] = ..., challenge_signature: _Optional[bytes] = ...) -> None: ... + +class STSTokenResponse(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["expire_time", "jwt", "roles", "subject", "task_name"] + EXPIRE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + JWT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ROLES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + SUBJECT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + TASK_NAME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] expire_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp - trusted_keys: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[TrustedSigningKey] - issued_under_keys: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[bytes] - router_addresses: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] - oidc_session: OIDCSession - def __init__(self, control_plane_url: _Optional[str] = ..., biscuit: _Optional[bytes] = ..., expire_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., trusted_keys: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[TrustedSigningKey, _Mapping]]] = ..., issued_under_keys: _Optional[_Iterable[bytes]] = ..., router_addresses: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., oidc_session: _Optional[_Union[OIDCSession, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... + jwt: str + roles: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] + subject: str + task_name: str + def __init__(self, jwt: _Optional[str] = ..., expire_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., subject: _Optional[str] = ..., roles: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., task_name: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... -class TrustedSigningKey(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("public_key", "receive_time") - PUBLIC_KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - RECEIVE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - public_key: bytes - receive_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp - def __init__(self, public_key: _Optional[bytes] = ..., receive_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... +class SecuritySignalEvent(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["data_content_type", "enrollment_rejected", "event_time", "id", "identity_revoked", "policy_denied", "source", "spec_version", "subject", "transport_refused", "type"] + DATA_CONTENT_TYPE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ENROLLMENT_REJECTED_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + EVENT_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + IDENTITY_REVOKED_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + POLICY_DENIED_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + SOURCE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + SPEC_VERSION_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + SUBJECT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + TRANSPORT_REFUSED_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + TYPE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + data_content_type: str + enrollment_rejected: EnrollmentRejectedSignal + event_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp + id: str + identity_revoked: IdentityRevokedSignal + policy_denied: PolicyDeniedSignal + source: str + spec_version: str + subject: str + transport_refused: TransportRefusedSignal + type: str + def __init__(self, id: _Optional[str] = ..., source: _Optional[str] = ..., spec_version: _Optional[str] = ..., type: _Optional[str] = ..., event_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., data_content_type: _Optional[str] = ..., subject: _Optional[str] = ..., policy_denied: _Optional[_Union[PolicyDeniedSignal, _Mapping]] = ..., transport_refused: _Optional[_Union[TransportRefusedSignal, _Mapping]] = ..., identity_revoked: _Optional[_Union[IdentityRevokedSignal, _Mapping]] = ..., enrollment_rejected: _Optional[_Union[EnrollmentRejectedSignal, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... -class OIDCSession(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("issuer", "client_id", "audience", "refresh_token") - ISSUER_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - CLIENT_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - AUDIENCE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - REFRESH_TOKEN_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - issuer: str - client_id: str - audience: str - refresh_token: str - def __init__(self, issuer: _Optional[str] = ..., client_id: _Optional[str] = ..., audience: _Optional[str] = ..., refresh_token: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... +class SecuritySignalsConfig(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["coalescing_window", "enabled", "endpoints", "queue_capacity"] + COALESCING_WINDOW_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ENABLED_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ENDPOINTS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + QUEUE_CAPACITY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + coalescing_window: _duration_pb2.Duration + enabled: bool + endpoints: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[WebhookEndpointConfig] + queue_capacity: int + def __init__(self, enabled: bool = ..., endpoints: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[WebhookEndpointConfig, _Mapping]]] = ..., queue_capacity: _Optional[int] = ..., coalescing_window: _Optional[_Union[_duration_pb2.Duration, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... -class TaskAuthorizationRule(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("name", "display_name", "rules", "expire_time") +class ServiceInfo(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["description", "ingress", "name", "type"] + DESCRIPTION_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + INGRESS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] NAME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + TYPE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + description: str + ingress: ServiceIngress + name: str + type: ServiceType + def __init__(self, type: _Optional[_Union[ServiceType, str]] = ..., name: _Optional[str] = ..., description: _Optional[str] = ..., ingress: _Optional[_Union[ServiceIngress, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... + +class ServiceIngress(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["allow", "auth_mode"] + ALLOW_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + AUTH_MODE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + allow: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] + auth_mode: IngressAuthMode + def __init__(self, auth_mode: _Optional[_Union[IngressAuthMode, str]] = ..., allow: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ...) -> None: ... + +class TaskAuthorizationRule(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["display_name", "expire_time", "name", "rules"] DISPLAY_NAME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - RULES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] EXPIRE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - name: str + NAME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + RULES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] display_name: str - rules: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[TaskRule] expire_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp + name: str + rules: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[TaskRule] def __init__(self, name: _Optional[str] = ..., display_name: _Optional[str] = ..., rules: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[TaskRule, _Mapping]]] = ..., expire_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... -class TaskRule(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("description", "allowed_services", "operation", "allowed_resources") - DESCRIPTION_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ALLOWED_SERVICES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - OPERATION_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ALLOWED_RESOURCES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - description: str - allowed_services: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] - operation: TaskOperation - allowed_resources: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] - def __init__(self, description: _Optional[str] = ..., allowed_services: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., operation: _Optional[_Union[TaskOperation, _Mapping]] = ..., allowed_resources: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ...) -> None: ... - class TaskOperation(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("allowed_tools", "allowed_methods", "allowed_paths", "allowed_permissions") - ALLOWED_TOOLS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + __slots__ = ["allowed_methods", "allowed_paths", "allowed_permissions", "allowed_tools"] ALLOWED_METHODS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] ALLOWED_PATHS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] ALLOWED_PERMISSIONS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - allowed_tools: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] + ALLOWED_TOOLS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] allowed_methods: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] allowed_paths: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] allowed_permissions: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] + allowed_tools: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] def __init__(self, allowed_tools: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., allowed_methods: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., allowed_paths: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., allowed_permissions: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ...) -> None: ... +class TaskRule(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["allowed_resources", "allowed_services", "description", "operation"] + ALLOWED_RESOURCES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ALLOWED_SERVICES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + DESCRIPTION_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + OPERATION_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + allowed_resources: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] + allowed_services: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] + description: str + operation: TaskOperation + def __init__(self, description: _Optional[str] = ..., allowed_services: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., operation: _Optional[_Union[TaskOperation, _Mapping]] = ..., allowed_resources: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ...) -> None: ... + class TokenExchangeRequest(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("subject_token", "task_rule", "seal", "challenge_unix_ms", "challenge_signature") + __slots__ = ["challenge_signature", "challenge_unix_ms", "seal", "subject_token", "task_rule"] + CHALLENGE_SIGNATURE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + CHALLENGE_UNIX_MS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + SEAL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] SUBJECT_TOKEN_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] TASK_RULE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - SEAL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - CHALLENGE_UNIX_MS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - CHALLENGE_SIGNATURE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + challenge_signature: bytes + challenge_unix_ms: int + seal: bool subject_token: str task_rule: TaskAuthorizationRule - seal: bool - challenge_unix_ms: int - challenge_signature: bytes def __init__(self, subject_token: _Optional[str] = ..., task_rule: _Optional[_Union[TaskAuthorizationRule, _Mapping]] = ..., seal: bool = ..., challenge_unix_ms: _Optional[int] = ..., challenge_signature: _Optional[bytes] = ...) -> None: ... class TokenExchangeResponse(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("biscuit_token", "expire_time", "roles", "subject") + __slots__ = ["biscuit_token", "expire_time", "roles", "subject"] BISCUIT_TOKEN_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] EXPIRE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] ROLES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] @@ -1122,194 +1111,144 @@ class TokenExchangeResponse(_message.Message): subject: str def __init__(self, biscuit_token: _Optional[bytes] = ..., expire_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., roles: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., subject: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... -class STSTokenRequest(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("biscuit", "destination", "audience", "challenge_unix_ms", "challenge_signature") - BISCUIT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - DESTINATION_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - AUDIENCE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - CHALLENGE_UNIX_MS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] +class TokenRefreshRequest(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["challenge_signature", "challenge_unix_ms", "jwt", "peer_id"] CHALLENGE_SIGNATURE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - biscuit: bytes - destination: str - audience: str - challenge_unix_ms: int + CHALLENGE_UNIX_MS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + JWT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] challenge_signature: bytes - def __init__(self, biscuit: _Optional[bytes] = ..., destination: _Optional[str] = ..., audience: _Optional[str] = ..., challenge_unix_ms: _Optional[int] = ..., challenge_signature: _Optional[bytes] = ...) -> None: ... + challenge_unix_ms: int + jwt: str + peer_id: str + def __init__(self, challenge_signature: _Optional[bytes] = ..., challenge_unix_ms: _Optional[int] = ..., peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., jwt: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... -class STSTokenResponse(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("jwt", "expire_time", "subject", "roles", "task_name") - JWT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] +class TokenRefreshResponse(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["biscuit_token", "error_message", "expire_time"] + BISCUIT_TOKEN_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ERROR_MESSAGE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] EXPIRE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - SUBJECT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ROLES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - TASK_NAME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - jwt: str + biscuit_token: bytes + error_message: str expire_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp - subject: str - roles: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] - task_name: str - def __init__(self, jwt: _Optional[str] = ..., expire_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., subject: _Optional[str] = ..., roles: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., task_name: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... + def __init__(self, biscuit_token: _Optional[bytes] = ..., expire_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., error_message: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... -class RevocationsResponse(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("revocation_ids", "banned_peer_ids") - REVOCATION_IDS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - BANNED_PEER_IDS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - revocation_ids: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] - banned_peer_ids: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] - def __init__(self, revocation_ids: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., banned_peer_ids: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ...) -> None: ... +class TokenRevokeRequest(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["peer_id"] + PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + peer_id: str + def __init__(self, peer_id: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... -class PolicyDeniedSignal(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("direction", "reason", "detail", "target_service", "requested_operation", "requested_resource", "caller_peer_id", "caller_subject", "caller_roles", "caller_labels", "event_time") - class CallerLabelsEntry(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("key", "value") - KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - VALUE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - key: str - value: str - def __init__(self, key: _Optional[str] = ..., value: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... - DIRECTION_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - REASON_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - DETAIL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - TARGET_SERVICE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - REQUESTED_OPERATION_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - REQUESTED_RESOURCE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - CALLER_PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - CALLER_SUBJECT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - CALLER_ROLES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - CALLER_LABELS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - EVENT_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - direction: SignalCallerDirection - reason: PolicyDenialReason - detail: str - target_service: str - requested_operation: str - requested_resource: str - caller_peer_id: str - caller_subject: str - caller_roles: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] - caller_labels: _containers.ScalarMap[str, str] - event_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp - def __init__(self, direction: _Optional[_Union[SignalCallerDirection, str]] = ..., reason: _Optional[_Union[PolicyDenialReason, str]] = ..., detail: _Optional[str] = ..., target_service: _Optional[str] = ..., requested_operation: _Optional[str] = ..., requested_resource: _Optional[str] = ..., caller_peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., caller_subject: _Optional[str] = ..., caller_roles: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., caller_labels: _Optional[_Mapping[str, str]] = ..., event_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... +class TokenRevokeResponse(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["error", "success"] + ERROR_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + SUCCESS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + error: str + success: bool + def __init__(self, success: bool = ..., error: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... class TransportRefusedSignal(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("reason", "detail", "peer_id", "remote_multiaddr", "protocol_id", "coalesced_count", "first_seen_time", "event_time") - REASON_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + __slots__ = ["coalesced_count", "detail", "event_time", "first_seen_time", "peer_id", "protocol_id", "reason", "remote_multiaddr"] + COALESCED_COUNT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] DETAIL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + EVENT_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + FIRST_SEEN_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - REMOTE_MULTIADDR_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] PROTOCOL_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - COALESCED_COUNT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - FIRST_SEEN_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - EVENT_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - reason: TransportRefusalReason + REASON_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + REMOTE_MULTIADDR_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + coalesced_count: int detail: str + event_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp + first_seen_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp peer_id: str - remote_multiaddr: str protocol_id: str - coalesced_count: int - first_seen_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp - event_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp + reason: TransportRefusalReason + remote_multiaddr: str def __init__(self, reason: _Optional[_Union[TransportRefusalReason, str]] = ..., detail: _Optional[str] = ..., peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., remote_multiaddr: _Optional[str] = ..., protocol_id: _Optional[str] = ..., coalesced_count: _Optional[int] = ..., first_seen_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., event_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... -class IdentityRevokedSignal(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("peer_id", "source", "reason", "revocation_ids", "issuer_peer_id", "event_time") - PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - SOURCE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - REASON_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - REVOCATION_IDS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ISSUER_PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - EVENT_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - peer_id: str - source: RevocationSource - reason: str - revocation_ids: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] - issuer_peer_id: str - event_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp - def __init__(self, peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., source: _Optional[_Union[RevocationSource, str]] = ..., reason: _Optional[str] = ..., revocation_ids: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., issuer_peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., event_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... - -class EnrollmentRejectedSignal(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("peer_id", "requested_role", "reason", "detail", "bootstrap_token_id", "remote_address", "submitted_labels", "is_autonomous_recovery", "event_time") - class SubmittedLabelsEntry(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("key", "value") - KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - VALUE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - key: str - value: str - def __init__(self, key: _Optional[str] = ..., value: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ... - PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - REQUESTED_ROLE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - REASON_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - DETAIL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - REMOTE_ADDRESS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - SUBMITTED_LABELS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - IS_AUTONOMOUS_RECOVERY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - EVENT_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - peer_id: str - requested_role: str - reason: EnrollmentRejectionReason - detail: str - bootstrap_token_id: str - remote_address: str - submitted_labels: _containers.ScalarMap[str, str] - is_autonomous_recovery: bool - event_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp - def __init__(self, peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., requested_role: _Optional[str] = ..., reason: _Optional[_Union[EnrollmentRejectionReason, str]] = ..., detail: _Optional[str] = ..., bootstrap_token_id: _Optional[str] = ..., remote_address: _Optional[str] = ..., submitted_labels: _Optional[_Mapping[str, str]] = ..., is_autonomous_recovery: bool = ..., event_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... +class TrustedSigningKey(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["public_key", "receive_time"] + PUBLIC_KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + RECEIVE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + public_key: bytes + receive_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp + def __init__(self, public_key: _Optional[bytes] = ..., receive_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... -class SecuritySignalEvent(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("id", "source", "spec_version", "type", "event_time", "data_content_type", "subject", "policy_denied", "transport_refused", "identity_revoked", "enrollment_rejected") +class User(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["create_time", "email", "id", "issuer", "role"] + CREATE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + EMAIL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - SOURCE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - SPEC_VERSION_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - TYPE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - EVENT_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - DATA_CONTENT_TYPE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - SUBJECT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - POLICY_DENIED_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - TRANSPORT_REFUSED_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - IDENTITY_REVOKED_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ENROLLMENT_REJECTED_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ISSUER_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ROLE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + create_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp + email: str id: str - source: str - spec_version: str - type: str - event_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp - data_content_type: str - subject: str - policy_denied: PolicyDeniedSignal - transport_refused: TransportRefusedSignal - identity_revoked: IdentityRevokedSignal - enrollment_rejected: EnrollmentRejectedSignal - def __init__(self, id: _Optional[str] = ..., source: _Optional[str] = ..., spec_version: _Optional[str] = ..., type: _Optional[str] = ..., event_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., data_content_type: _Optional[str] = ..., subject: _Optional[str] = ..., policy_denied: _Optional[_Union[PolicyDeniedSignal, _Mapping]] = ..., transport_refused: _Optional[_Union[TransportRefusedSignal, _Mapping]] = ..., identity_revoked: _Optional[_Union[IdentityRevokedSignal, _Mapping]] = ..., enrollment_rejected: _Optional[_Union[EnrollmentRejectedSignal, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... + issuer: str + role: str + def __init__(self, id: _Optional[str] = ..., issuer: _Optional[str] = ..., email: _Optional[str] = ..., role: _Optional[str] = ..., create_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... + +class UserStatusResponse(_message.Message): + __slots__ = ["active_routers", "bootstrap_tokens", "enrolled_nodes", "policy", "user"] + ACTIVE_ROUTERS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + BOOTSTRAP_TOKENS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + ENROLLED_NODES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + POLICY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + USER_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + active_routers: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[RouterLease] + bootstrap_tokens: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[BootstrapToken] + enrolled_nodes: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[EnrolledNode] + policy: PolicyConfig + user: User + def __init__(self, user: _Optional[_Union[User, _Mapping]] = ..., enrolled_nodes: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[EnrolledNode, _Mapping]]] = ..., bootstrap_tokens: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[BootstrapToken, _Mapping]]] = ..., active_routers: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[RouterLease, _Mapping]]] = ..., policy: _Optional[_Union[PolicyConfig, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... class WebhookEndpointConfig(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("url", "hmac_secret_path", "ca_cert_path", "client_cert_path", "client_key_path", "timeout", "max_retries", "event_types") - URL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - HMAC_SECRET_PATH_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + __slots__ = ["ca_cert_path", "client_cert_path", "client_key_path", "event_types", "hmac_secret_path", "max_retries", "timeout", "url"] CA_CERT_PATH_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] CLIENT_CERT_PATH_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] CLIENT_KEY_PATH_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - TIMEOUT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - MAX_RETRIES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] EVENT_TYPES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - url: str - hmac_secret_path: str + HMAC_SECRET_PATH_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + MAX_RETRIES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + TIMEOUT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] + URL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] ca_cert_path: str client_cert_path: str client_key_path: str - timeout: _duration_pb2.Duration - max_retries: int event_types: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str] + hmac_secret_path: str + max_retries: int + timeout: _duration_pb2.Duration + url: str def __init__(self, url: _Optional[str] = ..., hmac_secret_path: _Optional[str] = ..., ca_cert_path: _Optional[str] = ..., client_cert_path: _Optional[str] = ..., client_key_path: _Optional[str] = ..., timeout: _Optional[_Union[_duration_pb2.Duration, _Mapping]] = ..., max_retries: _Optional[int] = ..., event_types: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ...) -> None: ... -class SecuritySignalsConfig(_message.Message): - __slots__ = ("enabled", "endpoints", "queue_capacity", "coalescing_window") - ENABLED_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - ENDPOINTS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - QUEUE_CAPACITY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - COALESCING_WINDOW_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int] - enabled: bool - endpoints: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[WebhookEndpointConfig] - queue_capacity: int - coalescing_window: _duration_pb2.Duration - def __init__(self, enabled: bool = ..., endpoints: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[WebhookEndpointConfig, _Mapping]]] = ..., queue_capacity: _Optional[int] = ..., coalescing_window: _Optional[_Union[_duration_pb2.Duration, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ... +class EnrollmentStatus(int, metaclass=_enum_type_wrapper.EnumTypeWrapper): + __slots__ = [] + +class ServiceType(int, metaclass=_enum_type_wrapper.EnumTypeWrapper): + __slots__ = [] + +class IngressAuthMode(int, metaclass=_enum_type_wrapper.EnumTypeWrapper): + __slots__ = [] + +class EgressMode(int, metaclass=_enum_type_wrapper.EnumTypeWrapper): + __slots__ = [] + +class ResponseInspection(int, metaclass=_enum_type_wrapper.EnumTypeWrapper): + __slots__ = [] + +class SignalCallerDirection(int, metaclass=_enum_type_wrapper.EnumTypeWrapper): + __slots__ = [] + +class PolicyDenialReason(int, metaclass=_enum_type_wrapper.EnumTypeWrapper): + __slots__ = [] + +class TransportRefusalReason(int, metaclass=_enum_type_wrapper.EnumTypeWrapper): + __slots__ = [] + +class RevocationSource(int, metaclass=_enum_type_wrapper.EnumTypeWrapper): + __slots__ = [] + +class EnrollmentRejectionReason(int, metaclass=_enum_type_wrapper.EnumTypeWrapper): + __slots__ = [] From 0dc36014fe3b71fc9e0c04fdafe0b1ceed0991aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: femi oyesanya Date: Tue, 10 Nov 2026 22:53:58 -0600 Subject: [PATCH 3/5] test(api): give TestIngressDatalogPolicyEvaluation a 5s Datalog budget biscuit-go defaults to a 2ms Datalog evaluation timeout, which under -race on loaded CI runners exceeds the budget and causes spurious denials in TestIngressDatalogPolicyEvaluation. Match api/datalog_test.go and api/http_grants_test.go (per f1399f6c) by passing an explicit 5s world duration budget. --- api/ingress_test.go | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/api/ingress_test.go b/api/ingress_test.go index f7a904bd..0b1b4099 100644 --- a/api/ingress_test.go +++ b/api/ingress_test.go @@ -19,8 +19,10 @@ import ( "crypto/rand" "slices" "testing" + "time" "github.com/eclipse-biscuit/biscuit-go/v2" + "github.com/eclipse-biscuit/biscuit-go/v2/datalog" "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/crypto" "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/peer" ) @@ -309,7 +311,7 @@ func TestIngressDatalogPolicyEvaluation(t *testing.T) { } check := func(svcType, svcName, mode string) bool { - auth, err := tok.Authorizer(pub) + auth, err := tok.Authorizer(pub, biscuit.WithWorldOptions(datalog.WithMaxDuration(5*time.Second))) if err != nil { t.Fatalf("Authorizer: %v", err) } From 13ec0fd40eada759e78c91ea489669af1a93931a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: femi oyesanya Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2026 08:17:45 -0600 Subject: [PATCH 4/5] fix(containment): support env-only HMAC secret fallback and 413 payload limit - Resolve AGENTMESH_CONTAINMENT_HMAC_SECRET via secrets.FromPathOrEnv in containment.FromProto, EndpointFromProto, NewClient, and NewSingleClient even when hmac_secret_path is omitted, trimming whitespace and preserving fallback across multiple configured endpoints. - Return 413 Payload Too Large (via io.LimitReader(r.Body, maxBodyBytes+1)) and defer body close upfront in the generic-containment-webhook example. - Add TestHMACSecretEnvFallbackWithoutPath unit tests and update oversized payload assertions. --- cmd/agentmesh-node/main.go | 5 +- .../generic-containment-webhook/main.go | 8 +- .../generic-containment-webhook/main_test.go | 6 +- internal/containment/client.go | 28 ++++-- internal/containment/config.go | 29 ++++-- .../containment_resilience_test.go | 89 +++++++++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 142 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) diff --git a/cmd/agentmesh-node/main.go b/cmd/agentmesh-node/main.go index 40b50b0f..bd4335f6 100644 --- a/cmd/agentmesh-node/main.go +++ b/cmd/agentmesh-node/main.go @@ -473,11 +473,8 @@ func main() { EventTypes: securityWebhookEventsFlag, } if ep.HMACSecretPath == "" { - if envPath := os.Getenv("AGENTMESH_CONTAINMENT_HMAC_SECRET_PATH"); envPath != "" { + if envPath := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("AGENTMESH_CONTAINMENT_HMAC_SECRET_PATH")); envPath != "" { ep.HMACSecretPath = envPath - } else if envSecret := os.Getenv("AGENTMESH_CONTAINMENT_HMAC_SECRET"); envSecret != "" { - ep.HMACSecret = []byte(envSecret) - _ = os.Unsetenv("AGENTMESH_CONTAINMENT_HMAC_SECRET") } } containmentCfg.Endpoints = append(containmentCfg.Endpoints, ep) diff --git a/development/examples/generic-containment-webhook/main.go b/development/examples/generic-containment-webhook/main.go index f2201dce..7cfb51d2 100644 --- a/development/examples/generic-containment-webhook/main.go +++ b/development/examples/generic-containment-webhook/main.go @@ -122,12 +122,16 @@ func NewWebhookHandler(cfg HandlerConfig) http.Handler { } // 2. Read request body safely - bodyBytes, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(r.Body, maxBodyBytes)) + defer func() { _ = r.Body.Close() }() + bodyBytes, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(r.Body, maxBodyBytes+1)) if err != nil { http.Error(w, "Bad Request: unable to read request body", http.StatusBadRequest) return } - defer func() { _ = r.Body.Close() }() + if len(bodyBytes) > maxBodyBytes { + http.Error(w, "Payload Too Large: request body exceeds 1MB limit", http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge) + return + } // 3. Verify HMAC-SHA256 signature if secret is configured if len(cfg.HMACSecret) > 0 { diff --git a/development/examples/generic-containment-webhook/main_test.go b/development/examples/generic-containment-webhook/main_test.go index 01255359..2328ff8c 100644 --- a/development/examples/generic-containment-webhook/main_test.go +++ b/development/examples/generic-containment-webhook/main_test.go @@ -415,10 +415,8 @@ func TestAdversarial_WebhookBoundaries(t *testing.T) { req := makeSignedReq(http.MethodPost, time.Now().UnixMilli(), oversized) rec := httptest.NewRecorder() handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req) - // Because LimitReader truncates at 1MB, the truncated body fails either - // HMAC verification (401) or ProtoJSON parsing (400). In both cases, oversized payloads are rejected. - if rec.Code != http.StatusBadRequest && rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized { - t.Errorf("oversized body: expected 400 Bad Request or 401 Unauthorized, got %d", rec.Code) + if rec.Code != http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge { + t.Errorf("oversized body: expected 413 Payload Too Large, got %d", rec.Code) } }) diff --git a/internal/containment/client.go b/internal/containment/client.go index 094bc13b..daf7c7cf 100644 --- a/internal/containment/client.go +++ b/internal/containment/client.go @@ -89,11 +89,29 @@ func NewClient(endpoints ...EndpointConfig) (Client, error) { return &multiClient{}, nil } + // Resolve AGENTMESH_CONTAINMENT_HMAC_SECRET once upfront before secrets.FromPathOrEnv + // unsets it from process environment, so multiple endpoints omitting hmac_secret_path + // all inherit the fallback secret. + var envSecret string + for _, ep := range endpoints { + if ep.URL != "" && len(ep.HMACSecret) == 0 && ep.HMACSecretPath == "" { + resolved, err := secrets.FromPathOrEnv("containment-hmac-secret", "", "AGENTMESH_CONTAINMENT_HMAC_SECRET") + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("containment: resolve AGENTMESH_CONTAINMENT_HMAC_SECRET: %w", err) + } + envSecret = strings.TrimSpace(resolved) + break + } + } + var clients []Client for _, ep := range endpoints { if ep.URL == "" { continue } + if len(ep.HMACSecret) == 0 && ep.HMACSecretPath == "" && envSecret != "" { + ep.HMACSecret = []byte(envSecret) + } c, err := NewSingleClient(ep) if err != nil { return nil, err @@ -124,17 +142,17 @@ func NewSingleClient(cfg EndpointConfig) (Client, error) { hasHMAC: false, } - // 1. Resolve HMAC secret (direct bytes or file path) + // 1. Resolve HMAC secret (direct bytes, file path, or environment fallback) if len(cfg.HMACSecret) > 0 { c.hmacSecret = append([]byte(nil), cfg.HMACSecret...) c.hasHMAC = true - } else if cfg.HMACSecretPath != "" { + } else { secretStr, err := secrets.FromPathOrEnv("containment-hmac-secret", cfg.HMACSecretPath, "AGENTMESH_CONTAINMENT_HMAC_SECRET") - if err != nil { + if err != nil && cfg.HMACSecretPath != "" { return nil, fmt.Errorf("containment: read hmac_secret_path %q: %w", cfg.HMACSecretPath, err) } - if secretStr != "" { - c.hmacSecret = []byte(secretStr) + if trimmed := strings.TrimSpace(secretStr); trimmed != "" { + c.hmacSecret = []byte(trimmed) c.hasHMAC = true } } diff --git a/internal/containment/config.go b/internal/containment/config.go index dfe6ab04..f6eee6d9 100644 --- a/internal/containment/config.go +++ b/internal/containment/config.go @@ -103,6 +103,18 @@ func FromProto(p *api.SecuritySignalsConfig) (*Config, error) { cfg.CoalescingWindow = DefaultCoalescingWindow } + var envSecret string + for _, ep := range p.Endpoints { + if ep != nil && ep.Url != "" && ep.HmacSecretPath == "" { + resolved, err := secrets.FromPathOrEnv("containment-hmac-secret", "", "AGENTMESH_CONTAINMENT_HMAC_SECRET") + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("resolve AGENTMESH_CONTAINMENT_HMAC_SECRET: %w", err) + } + envSecret = strings.TrimSpace(resolved) + break + } + } + for _, ep := range p.Endpoints { if ep == nil || ep.Url == "" { continue @@ -111,6 +123,9 @@ func FromProto(p *api.SecuritySignalsConfig) (*Config, error) { if err != nil { return nil, err } + if len(epCfg.HMACSecret) == 0 && epCfg.HMACSecretPath == "" && envSecret != "" { + epCfg.HMACSecret = []byte(envSecret) + } cfg.Endpoints = append(cfg.Endpoints, epCfg) } @@ -154,14 +169,12 @@ func EndpointFromProto(ep *api.WebhookEndpointConfig) (EndpointConfig, error) { epCfg.MaxRetries = DefaultMaxRetries } - if ep.HmacSecretPath != "" { - secretStr, err := secrets.FromPathOrEnv("containment-hmac-secret", ep.HmacSecretPath, "AGENTMESH_CONTAINMENT_HMAC_SECRET") - if err != nil { - return EndpointConfig{}, fmt.Errorf("endpoint %s hmac secret error: %w", rawURL, err) - } - if secretStr != "" { - epCfg.HMACSecret = []byte(secretStr) - } + secretStr, err := secrets.FromPathOrEnv("containment-hmac-secret", ep.HmacSecretPath, "AGENTMESH_CONTAINMENT_HMAC_SECRET") + if err != nil && ep.HmacSecretPath != "" { + return EndpointConfig{}, fmt.Errorf("endpoint %s hmac secret error: %w", rawURL, err) + } + if trimmed := strings.TrimSpace(secretStr); trimmed != "" { + epCfg.HMACSecret = []byte(trimmed) } return epCfg, nil diff --git a/internal/containment/containment_resilience_test.go b/internal/containment/containment_resilience_test.go index dc6f765d..643d8b6e 100644 --- a/internal/containment/containment_resilience_test.go +++ b/internal/containment/containment_resilience_test.go @@ -704,3 +704,92 @@ func TestAdversarial_CoalescerMaxEntriesDoSBound(t *testing.T) { t.Fatal("overflow event above MaxCoalescerEntries should bypass coalescing") } } + +func TestHMACSecretEnvFallbackWithoutPath(t *testing.T) { + t.Run("FromProto resolves env secret across multiple pathless endpoints", func(t *testing.T) { + t.Setenv("AGENTMESH_CONTAINMENT_HMAC_SECRET", " env-proto-secret\n") + cfg, err := FromProto(&api.SecuritySignalsConfig{ + Enabled: true, + Endpoints: []*api.WebhookEndpointConfig{ + {Url: "http://127.0.0.1:9001/events"}, + {Url: "http://127.0.0.1:9002/events"}, + }, + }) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("FromProto failed: %v", err) + } + if len(cfg.Endpoints) != 2 { + t.Fatalf("len(Endpoints) = %d, want 2", len(cfg.Endpoints)) + } + for i, ep := range cfg.Endpoints { + if string(ep.HMACSecret) != "env-proto-secret" { + t.Fatalf("endpoint %d HMACSecret = %q, want %q", i, string(ep.HMACSecret), "env-proto-secret") + } + } + }) + + t.Run("NewClient signs webhook requests using env fallback when HMACSecretPath is omitted", func(t *testing.T) { + var sig1, sig2 string + var ts1, ts2 string + var body1, body2 []byte + + srv1 := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + sig1 = r.Header.Get(HeaderAgentMeshSignature) + ts1 = r.Header.Get(HeaderAgentMeshTimestamp) + var readErr error + body1, readErr = io.ReadAll(r.Body) + if readErr != nil { + t.Errorf("srv1 ReadAll: %v", readErr) + } + w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent) + })) + t.Cleanup(srv1.Close) + + srv2 := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + sig2 = r.Header.Get(HeaderAgentMeshSignature) + ts2 = r.Header.Get(HeaderAgentMeshTimestamp) + var readErr error + body2, readErr = io.ReadAll(r.Body) + if readErr != nil { + t.Errorf("srv2 ReadAll: %v", readErr) + } + w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent) + })) + t.Cleanup(srv2.Close) + + t.Setenv("AGENTMESH_CONTAINMENT_HMAC_SECRET", " env-client-secret\r\n") + client, err := NewClient( + EndpointConfig{URL: srv1.URL}, + EndpointConfig{URL: srv2.URL}, + ) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("NewClient failed: %v", err) + } + t.Cleanup(func() { + if closeErr := client.Close(); closeErr != nil { + t.Errorf("client.Close: %v", closeErr) + } + }) + + ev := &api.SecuritySignalEvent{ + Id: "env-hmac-1", + Source: "urn:agentmesh:node:test", + SpecVersion: "1.0", + Type: "agentmesh.policy.denied", + Subject: "12D3KooWTest", + EventTime: timestamppb.Now(), + } + if err := client.Send(context.Background(), ev); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("client.Send failed: %v", err) + } + + want1 := ComputeSignature([]byte("env-client-secret"), ts1, body1) + if sig1 != want1 { + t.Fatalf("srv1 signature = %q, want %q", sig1, want1) + } + want2 := ComputeSignature([]byte("env-client-secret"), ts2, body2) + if sig2 != want2 { + t.Fatalf("srv2 signature = %q, want %q", sig2, want2) + } + }) +} From d722997a289d0d0eba61603cf95cfc39d42b392c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: femi oyesanya Date: Sat, 21 Nov 2026 12:39:04 -0600 Subject: [PATCH 5/5] docs(containment): document coalescer cap metrics and plain-text count bound Add the agentmesh_containment_coalescer_entries gauge and agentmesh_containment_coalescer_overflow_total counter to the containment signals reference metrics table, and replace raw LaTeX delimiters in the coalesced_count description with plain Markdown. Signed-off-by: femi oyesanya --- site/content/docs/reference/containment-signals.md | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/site/content/docs/reference/containment-signals.md b/site/content/docs/reference/containment-signals.md index 41c4e8ae..420a84a0 100644 --- a/site/content/docs/reference/containment-signals.md +++ b/site/content/docs/reference/containment-signals.md @@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ sliding window. | `peer_id` | `string` | Remote libp2p peer ID string. | | `remote_multiaddr` | `string` | Remote multiaddress (e.g. `/ip4/198.51.100.42/tcp/4001`). | | `protocol_id` | `string` | Libp2p protocol ID requested (e.g. `/agentmesh/auth`, `/libp2p-http`). | -| `coalesced_count` | `uint32` | Number of refusal occurrences coalesced in this delivery window ($ \ge 1 $). | +| `coalesced_count` | `uint32` | Number of refusal occurrences coalesced in this delivery window (>= 1). | | `first_seen_time` | `google.protobuf.Timestamp` | Timestamp of the first observed rejection in this window. | | `event_time` | `google.protobuf.Timestamp` | Timestamp of the most recent rejection. | @@ -292,3 +292,5 @@ The dispatcher exports Prometheus counters, gauges, and histograms under the `ag | `agentmesh_containment_events_coalesced_total` | Counter | `signal_type` | Total number of repetitive events coalesced within sliding windows. | | `agentmesh_containment_delivery_duration_seconds` | Histogram | `signal_type` | Webhook HTTP delivery duration in seconds. | | `agentmesh_containment_queue_depth` | Gauge | — | Current depth of the containment webhook ring buffer queue. | +| `agentmesh_containment_coalescer_entries` | Gauge | — | Current number of active deduplication entries held by the containment coalescer. | +| `agentmesh_containment_coalescer_overflow_total` | Counter | — | Total containment signals that bypassed coalescing because the active entry cap was reached. |