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<!DOCTYPE html>
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  <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0">
  <title>DevOpsDefender — attested execution for crypto systems</title>
  <meta name="description" content="Run verifiable crypto oracles, keepers, bots, and confidential agents on Intel TDX. EasyEnclave provides the measured runtime; DevOpsDefender adds fleet routing, attestation, and terminal access controls.">
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</head>
<body>

<header>
  <a href="/" class="brand"><span class="mark">dd</span> devopsdefender</a>
  <nav>
    <a href="#verify">verify</a>
    <a href="#runtime">runtime</a>
    <a href="#workloads">workloads</a>
    <a href="#shell">shell</a>
    <a href="#model">model</a>
    <a href="https://github.com/devopsdefender/dd" target="_blank">github</a>
  </nav>
</header>

<main>
  <section class="hero">
    <div class="hero-copy">
      <p class="eyebrow">Intel TDX · EasyEnclave · GitHub OIDC · Noise</p>
      <h1>Attested execution for crypto systems that cannot rely on operator trust.</h1>
      <p class="lede">
        DevOpsDefender runs protocol oracles, keepers, co-signers, settlement bots,
        and confidential coding agents inside measured TDX VMs. The public API
        exposes enough evidence for an external verifier to bind code, config,
        runtime state, and the agent Noise key before trusting a result.
      </p>
      <div class="actions">
        <a class="btn primary" href="#verify">Read the verification path</a>
        <a class="btn" href="https://github.com/devopsdefender/dd" target="_blank">Inspect the code</a>
      </div>
    </div>

    <div class="proof-card" aria-label="Attestation data example">
      <div class="proof-head">
        <span>GET /health</span>
        <span class="ok">verifiable</span>
      </div>
      <pre>{
  "confidential_mode": true,
  "taint_reasons": [
    "customer_workload_deployed"
  ],
  "noise": {
    "quote_b64": "tdx_quote...",
    "pubkey_hex": "8f0b...a91e"
  },
  "deployments": ["btc-usd-oracle"]
}</pre>
    </div>
  </section>

  <section id="verify">
    <div class="section-head">
      <p class="eyebrow">External verification</p>
      <h2>Do not trust the operator. Verify the machine.</h2>
    </div>

    <div class="flow">
      <div class="node">
        <span class="num">01</span>
        <h3>Fetch public evidence</h3>
        <p><code>/health</code> returns the TDX quote, Noise public key, workload list, mode, and taint reasons.</p>
      </div>
      <div class="edge"></div>
      <div class="node">
        <span class="num">02</span>
        <h3>Verify the TDX quote</h3>
        <p>Intel Trust Authority or an equivalent verifier checks the quote signature and measured boot.</p>
      </div>
      <div class="edge"></div>
      <div class="node">
        <span class="num">03</span>
        <h3>Bind the transport</h3>
        <p>The quote report data commits to the agent Noise key, preventing a clean quote from authenticating another endpoint.</p>
      </div>
    </div>

    <pre class="code"><span class="comment"># Evidence is public. No CF Access, no operator session.</span>
curl -fsSL https://&lt;agent&gt;.devopsdefender.com/health \
  | jq <span class="str">'{confidential_mode, taint_reasons, noise}'</span>

<span class="comment"># Sealed oracle expectation:</span>
<span class="comment"># confidential_mode == true</span>
<span class="comment"># taint_reasons == ["customer_workload_deployed"]</span></pre>
  </section>

  <section id="runtime">
    <div class="section-head">
      <p class="eyebrow">Runtime substrate</p>
      <h2>EasyEnclave is the small measured base.</h2>
    </div>

    <div class="grid two">
      <article>
        <h3>What EasyEnclave replaces</h3>
        <p>
          EasyEnclave is a Linux distribution replacement for confidential VMs:
          one Rust PID 1, a small Unix socket API, no systemd, no package
          manager, and no runtime network stack in the enclave supervisor.
        </p>
      </article>
      <article>
        <h3>What DD adds</h3>
        <p>
          DevOpsDefender layers fleet registration, Cloudflare tunnel routing,
          GitHub OIDC authorization, Intel attestation refresh, workload logs,
          and shell access controls on top of that measured base.
        </p>
      </article>
    </div>

    <div class="stack">
      <div><span>protocol client</span><strong>verifies quote + Noise key</strong></div>
      <div><span>DD agent</span><strong>routes, reports health, enforces auth</strong></div>
      <div><span>EasyEnclave</span><strong>measured PID 1 + workload supervisor</strong></div>
      <div><span>Intel TDX</span><strong>memory isolation + signed quote</strong></div>
    </div>
  </section>

  <section id="workloads">
    <div class="section-head">
      <p class="eyebrow">Workload model</p>
      <h2>Release assets in. Attested behavior out.</h2>
    </div>

    <p>
      Workloads are JSON specs, not mutable servers. A crypto oracle can be
      pinned to a GitHub release asset and a commit-level workload spec, then
      deployed into confidential mode where mutation routes are absent.
    </p>

    <pre class="code">{
  "app_name": "btc-usd-oracle",
  "github_release": {
    "repo": "example/proof-oracle",
    "asset": "oracle-linux-amd64",
    "rename": "oracle"
  },
  "cmd": ["/var/lib/easyenclave/bin/oracle"],
  "expose": { "hostname_label": "oracle", "port": 8080 }
}</pre>

    <div class="grid three">
      <article>
        <h3>Oracles</h3>
        <p>Publish signed prices, reserves, attestations, or proof status from code whose deployment state is externally checkable.</p>
      </article>
      <article>
        <h3>Keepers</h3>
        <p>Run liquidation, settlement, rebalance, or bridge-monitoring jobs with public health and operator-taint evidence.</p>
      </article>
      <article>
        <h3>Confidential agents</h3>
        <p>Run Codex, Claude, or custom bots with encrypted terminal history and reconnectable sessions when read-write access is intended.</p>
      </article>
    </div>
  </section>

  <section id="shell">
    <div class="section-head">
      <p class="eyebrow">Operational access</p>
      <h2>Terminal access is capability-scoped.</h2>
    </div>

    <div class="compare">
      <div>
        <h3>Read-only workload terminals</h3>
        <p>
          Oracle observers can view workload logs through the xterm interface
          without stdin, resize, close, or signal controls. This is for
          protocols where visibility is useful and interference is not.
        </p>
      </div>
      <div>
        <h3>Read-write PTY sessions</h3>
        <p>
          Operator shells and confidential coding agents get real PTYs,
          reconnectable sessions, encrypted transcript history, and
          WezTerm-style notification escape support.
        </p>
      </div>
    </div>

    <pre class="code"><span class="comment"># Long-running agent can notify the browser or mobile web shell.</span>
printf <span class="str">'\033]777;notify;%s;%s\033\\'</span> \
  <span class="str">'keeper'</span> <span class="str">'settlement window open'</span></pre>
  </section>

  <section id="model">
    <div class="section-head">
      <p class="eyebrow">Trust model</p>
      <h2>Taint is explicit state, not vibes.</h2>
    </div>

    <table>
      <tr>
        <th>State</th>
        <th>Verifier meaning</th>
      </tr>
      <tr>
        <td><code>[]</code></td>
        <td>Pristine boot. No customer deploy, owner reassignment, arbitrary exec, or shell access has occurred.</td>
      </tr>
      <tr>
        <td><code>customer_workload_deployed</code></td>
        <td>Expected sealed-oracle state after the workload is installed. Mutation routes should still be absent.</td>
      </tr>
      <tr>
        <td><code>arbitrary_exec_enabled</code></td>
        <td>The node booted with deploy/exec surfaces available. Useful for operators, not a sealed oracle.</td>
      </tr>
      <tr>
        <td><code>interactive_shell_enabled</code></td>
        <td>Read-write shell access is enabled. Treat as operator-interactive infrastructure.</td>
      </tr>
    </table>

    <div class="callout">
      <strong>Non-goal:</strong> DD does not make a dishonest oracle algorithm
      honest. It makes the running code, configuration, transport key, and
      operator access state inspectable enough that a protocol can decide
      whether to consume the result.
    </div>
  </section>

  <section class="final">
    <h2>Build crypto infrastructure that can explain itself to verifiers.</h2>
    <p>
      The source is open, the runtime is measured, and the public health surface
      is designed for machines, not screenshots.
    </p>
    <div class="actions">
      <a class="btn primary" href="https://github.com/devopsdefender/dd" target="_blank">Open the repository</a>
      <a class="btn" href="https://github.com/easyenclave/easyenclave" target="_blank">EasyEnclave</a>
      <a class="btn" href="https://github.com/satsforcompute/satsforcompute" target="_blank">Sats for Compute</a>
    </div>
  </section>
</main>

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  <span>devopsdefender</span>
  <span>MIT · Intel TDX · EasyEnclave</span>
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