AJ Simmons 1979
Obligations are limitations on our freedom, impositions on our will, which must be discharged regardless of our inclinations. The are independent of our desires to perform them. p7
Oughts do not entail obligations and vice versa. Ought-judgements are the end products of moral deliberations of which obligations and duties may play a part. p9
Political obligations are only one sort of consideration relevant to determine how we ought act. p11
Contrasts obligations and duties: p14-15
- obligations are the result of some voluntary action
- obligations are owed to specific people
- obligations generate correlative rights
- obligations are not generated by the nature of the act but nature of the relationship.
Positional duties do not establish moral constraints. A man pressed into service is not morally obliged to obey orders. p22
The fact that an institution exists, and its rules apply to me, in no way binds me to that institution. p23
Obligations have to be more than prima facie requirements. The ought/obligation distinction renders the prima facie account redundant. p25
"A political obligation is a moral requirement to support and comply with the political institutions of one's country of residence" p29
The notion of political obligation is one that concerns the moral requirements that bind us to particular states or institutions. p31
It is common place for non-particularised accounts to simply assume a particularised application. But why should a government being ours be special in any way? p32
Plato's Crito suggested 3 grounds for obligation: p35
- the state was good and thus owed obedience
- the state was a benefactor to be repaid
- tacit consent.
Why must there be a singularity requirement to obedience? Why must the state require obedience from all subjects & why must a person be bound to only one state or institution? p36
"A theory of political obligation ought tell us what class of people are bound to their governments and why" p36
Utilitarian accounts of obligation are problematic because it is difficult to see how obligations to obey could ever trump obligations to maximise the good in any instance. p47
"We can derive from the simple act-utilitarian approach no marl requirement to support or comply with the political institutions of one's country of residence." p48
Obligations don't seem to give way in cases of slight changes in net utility (from negative to positive) that utilitarianism would require. p49
"Consent theory has provided us with a more intuitively appealing account of political obligations that any other tradition in modern political philosophy". p57
The heart of the doctrine is that no one is obligated to a political institution unless he has personally consented to the authority over him.
Consent theory is a theory where the political obligations of citizens are grounded in their personal, deliberate, voluntary undertaking.
Most consent theorists argue that: p60
- consent generates political obligation.
- no authority can be legitimate without consent.
Political obligation and political authority are correlative under consent theory. p60
There are 2 approaches to consent theory: p61
- authority is grounded in the personal consent of an individual
- authority is grounded in the historical consent of the founding citizens.
But obligations from consent can only arise when the consenter authorises the consentee. Clearly, the descendants of the original contractors have not authorised the original contract.
It is often held that this historical contract is a necessary condition for a legitimate government.
The major assumptions of consent theory: pp62-67
- Man is naturally free. There are no natural pre-political obligations that bind one to some authority.
- This natural freedom can only be given up voluntarily via a clear sign. A no net loss requirement is often seen as a necessary condition of the obligation.
- Consenting protects the citizen from the state. In two senses i) one can't be unknowingly bound to some authority & ii) it is logically impossible to be injured once consent has been given volenti non fit injuria.
- The state is an instrument for serving the interests of its citizens.
Problems arise when certain rights are considered inalienable. In these cases, they cannot be granted or assigned and thus negate any obligations that conflict with them. p66
Inalienable rights also has problems. Consent theorists have a major concern with individual autonomy but this clashes with the inability to give certain things away, even if willing. p67
"The doctrine of inalienable rights fits uncomfortably into consent theory, for it smacks of a paternalism that consent theorists, above all others, have opposed." p68
Consent theorists demonstrate a preference for individual choice over unavoidable benefits. p69
One must know what one is doing in order to consent. Political obligations cannot be inherited or unwittingly acquired. p70
The dilemma of majority consent: "A government has authority only over those citizens who have granted that authority through their consent, and only a government which has authority over all of its citizens is legitimate. Thus, a legitimate government requires unanimous consent." p71.
Alternatively, majority consent means that some individuals become bound without their consent or in opposition to it. p72
One interpretation of Hobbes, Locke & Rousseau is that unanimous consent is required to form the body politic, but only majority consent is necessary for subsequent rules (but only for those original consenters) p73.
The Rawlsian account of fairness is a natural response to the problems of applying general political obligation to voluntary acts. A duty based account would solve this. p144
This stems from Rawls' position that all obligation centred accounts of political bonds fail. p145
Rawls admits that the principle of fairness doesn't bind citizens in general, even within just states. "All citizens generally do not have political obligations." p146
"The natural duty of justice binds each member of the political community to support and further the just political institutions in his country.It binds each member irrespective of his voluntary acts, permeative or otherwise." p147
The problem with this account is determining when institutions apply to us. If they apply in a weak or territorial sense, then his seems insufficient to generate political bonds because "people cannot simply force institutions on me, not matter how just" p148
If weak application is sufficient, then it seems we have political bonds to more than just 'our' state, but rather any just institution.
If they apply in the strong sense, then they apply simply because of some voluntary action, thus making the account vacuous and better explained by an obligation centric account.
Citizens have no special political bonds which require that they obey and support the governments of the country of their residents. p192
In the absence of these political bonds to the state, there may still be strong reasons for supporting certain types of governments or obeying the law. p193
"In so far as we believe ourselves to be tied in some special way to our country of residence, most of us are mistaken." p194
Any duty which we may have to support our government because of its quality will be 'non-particularized' p198
But good qualities do distinguish which governments do deserve our support (but apply equally to all governments)
Simmons' thesis removes the presumption of obedience to established authority. Obedience requires just as much justification as disobedience. p200
Bibtex @book{simmons1979moral, title={Moral principles and political obligations}, author={Simmons, A.J.}, year={1979}, publisher={Princeton University Press} }