Gauss 1996 SEP
‘By definition’, Maurice Cranston rightly points out, ‘a liberal is a man who believes in liberty’ (1967: 459)
"A central question of liberal political theory is whether political authority can be justified, and if so, how."
Fundamental Liberal Principle (Gaus, 1996: 162-166): freedom is normatively basic, and so the onus of justification is on those who would limit freedom, especially through coercive means.
Liberty can be viewed as negative:
Coercion implies the deliberate interference of other human beings within the area in which I could otherwise act....I am normally said to be free to the degree to which no man or body of men interferes with my activity. (Berlin, 1969: 122)
A contrasting account is positive liberty. A person is free only if she is self-directed or autonomous. Uncontrollable impulse or craving make one a slave "in the condition of a bondsman who is carrying out the will of another, not his own’ (Green 1986 [1895]: 228).
An alternative conception is republican liberty: The libre of liberty is the antonym of servus or slave. An agent is only said to be unfree if she is ‘subject to the potentially capricious will or the potentially idiosyncratic judgement of another’ (Pettit, 1997: 5).
"In contrast to the ordinary negative conception, on the republican conception the mere possibility of arbitrary interference appears to constitute a limitation of liberty."
Classical Liberal Theory holds that liberty and private property are intimately related. Some like Hayek assert that liberty is not possible without property.
Social Justice Liberalism responds that unchecked private ownership leads to gross inequalities of wealth and therefore freedom.
The Political Liberalism of Rawls is not a comprehensive doctrine and is restricted to reasonable principles that uphold basic civil and democratic processes.
"The aim of ‘political liberalism’ is not to add yet another sectarian doctrine, but to provide a political framework that is neutral between such controversial comprehensive doctrines (Larmore, 1996: 121ff)"
Liberal Ethics views liberalism and freedom as a normative good to be valued. It is a perfectionist ethic. "That the good life is necessarily a freely chosen one in which a person develops his unique capacities as part of a plan of life is probably the dominant liberal ethic of the past century."
"According to Kantian contractualism, ‘society, being composed of a plurality of persons, each with his own aims, interests, and conceptions of the good, is best arranged when it is governed by principles that do not themselves presuppose any particular conception of the good…’(Sandel, 1982: 1)."
"Basic to such ‘Kantian contractualism’ is the idea that suitably idealized individuals are motivated not by the pursuit of gain, but by a commitment or desire to publicly justify the claims they make on others (Reiman, 1990; Scanlon, 1982)"
"On this view, respect for the person of others demands that we refrain from imposing our view of the good life on them. Only principles that can be justified to all respect the personhood of each."
Hobbesian version of contractualism supposes only that individuals are self-interested. "Morality, then, is a common framework that advances the self-interest of each."
Mill's perfectionism sees the ultimate human value as developed personality or an autonomous life.
"Berlin insisted that values or ends are plural, and no interpersonally justifiable ranking among these many ends is to be had." Achievement of on end necessarily entails the non-achievement of another (due to opportunity costs). There is no way to intersubjectively order all possible societal ends.
Hobbes and Locke propose subjective accounts of value - what one values depends on what one desires.
"The perfectionist, the pluralist and the subjectivist concur on the crucial point: the nature of value is such that reasonable people pursue different ways of living."
Both Mill and Rawls argue that liberalism need not apply to all states. Pogge & Nussbaum reject this.
"borders are not of great moral significance in classical liberalism (Lomasky, 2007; but cf. Pogge, 2002: ch. 2)"
"to the extent that peoples or groups have rights to collective self-determination, intervention by a liberal group to induce a non-liberal community to adopt liberal principles will be morally objectionable."