Leviathan
For REASON in this sense is nothing but calculating sequences of general names agreed on to mark and signify our thoughts.
People who are not practised in arithmetic are bound to make mistakes and get wrong answers, and even expert arithmeticians can do so.. Even experts make mistakes
This is not to deny that •reason itself is always right reason, but no •one man’s reason—nor even the reason of any group of men, however large—makes the conclusion certain.
So when there is •a controversy about some calculation, the disputants must on their own initiative agree on some arbitrator or judge whose reason they will accept as right reason, since no standard for right reason has been set up by nature; and the same thing holds in •all debates of every kind
And when men who think themselves wiser than everyone else clamour and demand that right reason be the judge, yet actually seek that things should be settled by their reason and no-one else’s
Of appetites and aversions, a few are born with men.
In the broadest and most general sense, a man’s power is his present means to obtain some future apparent good. Power is either •original (·natural·) or •instrumental.
Natural (·original·) power is outstandingness in the faculties of body or mind, such as extraordinary strength, good looks, prudence, practical skill, eloquence, generosity, nobility.
Instrumental powers are acquired through natural powers or through luck; they are means and instruments to acquire more
The greatest of human powers is that possessed by one natural or civil person to whom most men have agreed to hand over their individual powers.
A reputation for having power is power; because it attracts the adherence of people needing protection.
Dominance and victory are honourable, because acquired through power; and servitude—if arising from need or fear— is dishonourable.
Manners - the qualities of mankind that concern their living together in peace and unity.
Happiness is a continual progress of desires from one object to another, the attaining of one being merely the path to the next. This is because the object of man’s desire is not to enjoy ·something· only once and for one instant of time, but to assure for ever the path of his future desire.
So I give primacy, for a general inclination of all mankind, to a perpetual and restless desire for power after power, a desire that ceases only in death
a man cannot •assure his present level of power and of means for living well without acquiring more power.
Competition for riches, honour, command, or any other power tends to produce quarrelling, enmity, and war; because one competitor’s path to the achievement of his desire is to kill, subdue, outwit, or repel the other competitor.
Desire for knowledge and for arts of peace inclines men to obey a common power: For that desire contains a desire for leisure, and consequently protection from some other power than their own.
Vainglorious men of the kind who aren’t conscious of any great adequacy in themselves, but delight in pretending to themselves that they are gallant men, are inclined only to •put on a show ·of strength and courage· but not actually to •attempt ·anything requiring those virtues·
There are also vainglorious men ·of a different kind. They are ones· whose estimate of their own adequacy is based on the flattery of other men, .... They are inclined to approach conflicts rashly; but when danger or difficulty come close, they withdraw if they can.
Nature has made men so equal in their physical and mental capacities that, although sometimes we may find one man who is obviously stronger in body or quicker of mind than another, yet taking all in all the difference between one and another is not so great that one man can claim to have any advantage ·of strength or skill or the like· that can’t just as well be claimed by some others.
As for •strength of body: the weakest man is strong enough to kill the strongest, either by a secret plot or by an alliance with others who are in the same danger that he is in.
Competition
This equality of ability produces equality of hope for the attaining of our goals.
So if any two men want a single thing which they can’t both enjoy, they become enemies;
And so it comes about that when someone has through farming and building come to possess a pleasant estate, if an invader would have nothing to fear but that one man’s individual power, there will probably be an invader—someone who comes with united forces to deprive him not only of the fruit of his labour but also of his life or liberty.
Distrust
Because of this distrust amongst men, the most reasonable way for any man to make himself safe is to strike first, ... This is no more than what he needs for his own survival, and is generally allowed
Some people take pleasure in contemplating their own power in the acts of conquest, pursuing them further than their security requires, ·and this increases the security needs of others ... People who would otherwise be glad to be at ease within modest bounds have to increase their power by further invasions
This increase in a man’s power over others ought to be allowed to him, as it is necessary to his survival
Glory
Every man wants his associates to value him as highly as he values himself; and any sign that he is disregarded or undervalued naturally leads a man to try, as far as he dares, to raise his value in the eyes of others....he does this by violence
So that in the nature of man, we find three principal causes of discord. First •competition, secondly •distrust, thirdly •glory....The first makes men invade for •gain; the second for •safety; and the third for •reputation.
War
This makes it obvious that for as long as men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in the condition known as ‘war’; and it is a war of every man against every man.
For WAR doesn’t consist just in •battle or the act of fighting, but in •a period of time during which it is well enough known that people are willing to join in battle.
what constitutes war is not actual fighting but a known disposition to fight during a time when there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is PEACE.
there is no place for hard work, because there is no assurance that it will yield results; and consequently no cultivation of the earth, no navigation or use of materials that can be imported by sea, no construction of large buildings ... and—worst of all—continual fear and danger of violent death, and the life of man solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.
It may be thought that there has never been such a time, such a condition of war as this; and I believe it was never generally like this all over the world.
Even if there had never been any time at which •individual men were in a state of war one against another, this is how •kings, and persons of sovereign authority relate to one another at all times.
In war the two chief virtues are force and fraud. Justice and injustice are not among the faculties
In this war of every man against every man nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice have no place there. Where there is no common power, there is no law; and where there is no law, there is no injustice. In war the two chief virtues are force and fraud. Justice and injustice are not among the faculties
The RIGHT OF NATURE, which writers commonly call jus naturale, is the liberty that each man has to make his own decisions about how to use his own power for the preserva- tion of his own nature
The proper meaning of LIBERTY is the absence of external obstacles.
A LAW OF NATURE (lex naturalis) is a command or general rule, discovered by reason, which forbids a man to •do anything that is destructive of his life
RIGHT consists in the liberty to do or not do ·as one chooses·, whereas LAW picks on one of them—either doing or not doing—and commands it.
the condition of man is a condition of war of everyone against everyone, so that everyone is governed by his own reason and can make use of anything he likes that might help him to preserve his life against his enemies.
no man, however strong or clever he may be, can be sure of living out the time that nature ordinarily allows men to live.
And consequently it is a command or general rule of reason that •every man ought to seek peace, as far as he has any hope of obtaining it; and that •when he can’t obtain it he may seek and use all helps and advantages of war.
First law of nature: Seek peace and follow it.
Second law of nature: When a man thinks that peace and self-defence require it, he should be willing (when others are too) to lay down his right to everything, and should be contented with as much liberty against other men as he would allow other men against him- self.
Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris—·Don’t do to others what you don’t want done to you·.
How a man either renounces or transfers a right is by a declaration or indication—using some voluntary and sufficient sign or signs
Whenever a man transfers or renounces a right, he does so either in consideration of some right reciprocally transferred to himself or for some other good he hopes to get from what he is doing.
a man cannot lay down the right of resisting those who bring force against him to take away his life,
Lastly, the point of the procedure of renouncing and transferring rights—the motive and purpose for which it exists—is simply to preserve a man’s security in his person, in his life
the contract on the latter person’s side is called a PACT or COVENANT. (the yet to be fufilled part)
•If this happens in the condition of mere nature (which is war of every man against every man), the contract is void if one of the parties has a reasonable suspicion ·that the other is not going to perform·.
How to get out of the state of nature
For the one who performs first has no assurance that the other will perform later, because the bonds of words are too weak to rein in men’s ambition, greed, anger, and other passions—unless there is something to be feared from some coercive power; and in the condition of mere nature, where all men are equal and are judges of the reasonableness of their own fears, there can’t possibly be such a power.
So he who performs first merely betrays himself to his enemy, which is contrary to his right (which he can never abandon) to defend his life and his means of living.
When there is a power set up to constrain those who would otherwise violate their faith, that fear—·namely, the suspicion that the other party will not perform·—is no longer reasonable; so he who has covenanted to perform first is obliged to do so.
And those who give to a man the right to govern them as sovereign are understood to give him the right to impose taxes to maintain soldiers, and to appoint magistrates for the administration of justice.
For man by nature chooses the lesser evil, which is the danger of death from resisting, rather than the greater, which is certain and present death from not resisting.
The force of words is (as I remarked earlier) too weak to hold men to the performance of their covenants,
man’s nature provides only two conceivable ways of strengthening it. Those are •fear of the consequence of breaking their word, or •glory or pride in appearing not to need to break it.
So that before the time of civil society, or in the inter- ruption of it by war, the only thing that can strengthen a covenant of agreed-on peace—to withstand the temptations of avarice, ambition, lust, or other strong desires—is the fear of that •invisible power which everyone •worships as God and •fears as a revenger of his treachery.
Fear of god or reciprocity!
Third law of nature: Men should perform the covenants they make.
only when there is some coercive power to •compel all men equally to perform their covenants, through the terror of some punishment greater than the benefit they expect from breaking their covenant, and ·thereby· to •ensure that men get the benefits they contract for, this being their compensation for giving up some of their rights.
There is no such power before the commonwealth is created.
the validity of covenants begins only with the setting up of a civil power sufficient to compel men to keep them; and that is when property is also begins.
The fool says
since every man is in charge of his own survival and welfare, there could be no reason for any man not to do anything that he thought would conduce to that end; so that making or not making covenants, keeping them or breaking them, is not against reason if it conduces to one’s benefit.
where one of the parties has performed already, or where there is a power to make him perform, is it against reason for the other party to fail to perform his part? I say he acts against reason and most imprudently.
in the natural condition where every man is an enemy to every other man, no-one can live securely without the aid of allies. But who, except by ignorance, will admit into society (which one enters by mutual covenants for the defence of individual members) a man who thinks it rational to break covenants? Who, except through ignorance, will retain him if he has been admitted?
Desire - men desire many things ??? (necessities, glory)
Power - the mens to obtain some future good. It is original and instrumental.
Equality - men are sufficiently equaly in faculty and strength.
Desire + Equility = shared objects of desire.
Competition - It is easier to take than make (my conjecture). The only thing stopping thief is individual power. The scarcity of necessary goods means that some will try to steal. This breeds distrust in others, and forces all men to seek power for their own protection.
Pursuit of power - is competition for positional goods. These are necessarily scare and tend to be obtained via conflict.
Distrust - the distrust of others means it is reasonable to stike first. This increases the desire for power. Awareness of this in others
Competition - scarcity of these shared objects of desire (goods) (both necessary and positional) leads to competition. It is easier to take than make (my conjecture). The only thing stopping thief is individual power.
If necessary goods are scarce, competition leads to conflict. Positional goods are always scarse, so competition for these always leads to conflict.
Competition leads to the pursuit of power. For its own sake in the vanglorious, for protection in the modest.
Hobbes' describes a complex loop of negative feedbacks that
N Comp -> Conflict (theft) N Comp -> Pursuit of Power (aggression) Conflict -> Pursuit of Power (protection) Conflict -> Pursuit of Power (aggression) Conflict -> Distrust Distrust -> Conflict (stike first defense) Distrust -> Pursuit of Power (protection) Pursuit of Power -> P Comp P Comp -> Conflict Glory -> P Comp
So, the Leviathan must:
- provide the conditions for sufficient necessities of life (to stop this input)
- solve the problem of distrust (covernents)
- deal with the vainglorious (to stop this input)