---
bibtex: @article{gaus1996justificatory,
title={Justificatory liberalism: An essay on epistemology and political theory},
author={Gaus, Gerald F},
year={1996}
}
---
Liberalism based on public reason requires a normative theory of justification - a way to say that even though the contents of certain claims are in dispute, the claims themselves are justified.
If public justification is the core of liberalism, and there is no such thing as an undisputed theory of justification, then liberalism must clarify its conception of justified belief. p4
If so, substantive political views that cannot be justified according to this measure can be ruled out. p5
Many deny it, but Gaus argues that all political liberals rely on a normative theory of justification, and it should be rejected. p5
He introduces the idea of robustness. A theory T is robust if changes to another T' do not alter belief in T. p6
Justification is not truth or knowledge. "We can thus distinguish theory of justified belief from theories of truth" p7
"Coherentist epistemologies and realist metaphysics are detachable" p7 So we can set aside our theories of truth and focus on justification.
Jerry's account is not consistent with blind emotivism but is with affect-cognitive basic moral judgements. p9
Public justifications can start with the individual or the group. Habermas starts with the latter although Jerry's isn't inconsistent with that. p11
"The very idea of reasonable pluralism supposes that we have reasonable views that cannot be publicly justified" p11
Inferentially Justified: beliefs that are justified because they are supported by, or follow from, reasons. p17
Justifying a belief while rejecting the reason for holding it is hypocritical. p17
"To be justified in believing B one must have or accept the reasons that justify it." p17
From Williams: "rational beliefs are caused by the reasons which are their grounds" p19
Justified beliefs have sustaining causes for accepting the reasons of the belief.
"To restrict reasons in inferential justification to belief states would be to rule out a priori, that feelings can be grounding reasons for beliefs." p29
That beliefs are caused by other beliefs does not make them justified. It is reasons that are justificatory. p30
Justifications might be open or closed. An open justification is one which is stable in the face of acute and sustained criticism form others with new information. p31
"Facts become reasons when they enter into cognitive systems with inferential norms and are bale to justify acceptance of a belief." p35
"Inferential rules specify rational connections between beliefs; if inferential reasoning (which is causal) is to be rational, it must conform to these inferential rules." p47