---
bibtex: @article{mclaughlin2010defence,
title={In defence of philosophical anarchism},
author={McLaughlin, Paul},
journal={Anarchism and Moral Philosophy},
pages={13--32},
year={2010},
publisher={Palgrave Macmillan Basingstoke}
}
---
Paul McLaughlin, 2010
"Anarchism cannot be defined with reference to a particular moral commitment, but only with reference to its scepticism, to its basic doubt about the legitimacy of authority." p29
Practical anarchism can be distinguished from the philosophical kind.
There are 3 understandings of the philosophical anarchist position:
- classical, a fundamental critique of the idea of authority, is associated with late 18th century European thought such as Godwin, Stirner, & Proudhon. They were concerned with the legitimacy of authority, rather than the liberal concern with the limits of authority. p(13-14)
- cultural, associated with American contributions such as Tucker.
- contemporary, work by analytic political philosophers such as Wolff & Simmons
Practical/political anarchist object to philosophical anarchism for its absolutism and quietism (p14).
The defining characteristics of philosophical anarchism are its philosophical approach and the claim that rejection of state authority doesn't entail opposition to the state.
"The question of our duty to obey is distinction form the question of our duty to act" p18
"Philosophical concepts nurtured in the stillness of a professor's study can destroy a civilisation" p21
"Thinking is not disengagement, even if it is insufficient." p21
"Anarchism can be defined as scepticism towards authority." p26 This skepticism can be motivated by a plurality of moral commitments or by none. "This very fact frustrates all attempts to find a unifying or even a definitive anarchist ethic" p26
Parental authority can be legitimated on pragmatic grounds. p28
McLaughlin defences a weak but engaged form of anarchism. Weak/strong is not what Simmon's meant but rather on an absolutist dimension denying all types of authority or just some.