---
bibtex: @article{rorty1996idealizations,
title={Idealizations, foundations, and social practices},
author={Rorty, R.},
journal={Democracy and Difference},
pages={333--335},
year={1996},
publisher={Princeton University Press Princeton}
}
---
Rorty argues for anti-foundationalism in democratic theory. He points to a distinction between idealisations of practices and foundations for those practices (p333). Political debate, at its most abstract, is debate about competing idealisations.
Idealisations ask "how do we make our current practices more coherent?". They offer a utopian vision and seeks to adjust current practice towards it.
Foundationalists ask "should we do this at all?". They require that we adjust our current practices to render them coherent with some prior principle.
To be anti foundational about a practice is to claim that criticisms of it be confined to comparisons with other actual or possible practices. To be foundational is to claim a practice can be grounded on matters outside or prior to its practice (p333).
To ask for a foundation for democracy is to ask why we should be inclusive rather than exclusive in our moral and political concerns (p334).
The challenge for foundationalists is to find common ground with exclusivists so that they can argue for inclusion. Rorty claims that the requirement for shared premises enfeebles democracy (p335). Anti-foundationalists rather, should substitute the common ground requirement with an embrace of the acceptance of others.
This can be aided by taking the family rather than the market or the school as our model of democracy. The unconditional respect of the family should be the basis of our idealisations.
This sounds awfully like foundationalism to me!