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Democracy's Domain.md

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---
bibtex: @article{miller2009democracy,
  title={Democracy's domain},
  author={Miller, David},
  journal={Philosophy \& public affairs},
  volume={37},
  number={3},
  pages={201--228},
  year={2009},
  publisher={Wiley Online Library}
}
---

Democracy's domain

Miller defines the problem as "who should be included in the demos, or constituency when democratic decisions are taken" p201 or "how should the political units within which democracy will be practiced be constituted?" p202

It is a question primarily about people rather than territory and is driven by three primary concerns: p202

  • transnational or global democracy
  • political seccession
  • immigration

It is not obvious that democracy is any help on this issue. "Ateempts to propose criteria from the outside simply reveal a disagreement about what makes a person fit to participate in democratic politics" p202

This might be because "there is no simple entailment from democratic principles to the choice of political unit...or it might mean that the criteria ... are not themselves democratic." p203

Two reasons we shoudl try and solve the BP with a democratic approach: p203

  • without democracy, we become emeshed in controversy as non-democratic substantive ideals are hotly contested.
  • there is inutitive discomfort with an abitrary approach from the democratic perspective.

Democratic solutions are only circular if we limit our view of democracy as procedural. While there is no reason to believe majority voting from arbitrary boundaries will settle into an acceptable equalibrium, democratic values can also be used. See @arrhenius2005 on conflating process and ideals. p204

If we want to solve the BP with democratic ideals, we need to be clear on what they are. Miller describes two conceptions of democracy - Liberal and Radical: p205

  • L-democrats understand democracy in instrumental terms "democracy serves freedom by protecting members of the demos from domination, and that democracy promotes welfare by ensuring that political decisions track the aggregate interests of its constituency."

  • R-democrats understand democracy in intrinsic terms "the idea of collective self-determination and stands at the heart of democratic theory". It is not only the outcomes that are important but the manor in which they are achieved.

LD concerns of constituency will primarily relate to impact of decisions. RD concerns of constituency will primarily relate to to the quality of the demos itself. p206

RD concerns suggest exclusion:

  • mutual solidarity and identification is easier in small homogeneous groups. p208
  • underlying agreement on ethical issues is necessary for cohesion. p208
  • interpersonal trust between citizens is needed. p209
  • the group must be stable over time. p209

But there are a number of reasons RD's would want more inclusion:

  • small polities may be internally effective but lack external impact or system capacity. p210
  • decision quality is higher when people are free to express dissenting views. p209

LD concerns point to inclusion:

  • unless completely homogeneous, multiple group identities make oppression by a majority less likely. p211
  • segmentation means dominant views in one area can be opposed in another. p211

But the counter reasons towards exclusion are:

  • Mill's "free institution" are only possible in societies whose member shared a common national identity. p211
  • respect for law and dissent are only possible when common sympathies create sufficient solidarity between groups. p212

So far, Miller' analysis has looked internally to the demos. But democracy also has external effects. "As I suggested earlier, the effect of considering impact is likely to be to give democracy a more inclusionary push - to expand the demos so that it includes more of those who will bear the impact of its decisions" p213

Two key principles are the affected-interests and coercion principles. It's possible to be affected without being coerced but not vice versa. p214

Only LD's are concerned by affected interests but both "must respond when the coercion principle comes into play,because the normal effect of coercion is to undermine personal autonomy, while protecting autonomy is central to both conceptions of democracy". p214

Miller lists four problems with the affected-interest principle:

  • affect depend on the question which leads to circularity or universality p215
  • the interaction between domain (which people) and scope (which issues) p216
  • affect occurs in different degrees p216
  • affect doesn't normally seem to entail a right to participate p218

"Widening the demos may change its character and/or the decision procedures it uses, and these in turn will alter the quality of the decisions takes, and their impact on different groups of people .... The circularity problem runs deep."

Coercion on the other hand has the following characteristics: p219

  • intended to realise the will of a coercer
  • compliance is non-voluntary
  • pressure is used to achieve compliance.
  • undermined the autonomy of those coerced (they become an instrument of the coercer's will)
  • some other course of action must be taken

Coercion differs from prevention. Miller has a poor example on p220

"I have that what is distinctive about coercion is suggested normatively that it undermines the autonomy of the person coerced" p221

The web of laws in a democratic state is sufficiently coercive to require justification because the coercion is unavoidable. "Their unavoidable coercion can only be made legitimate by the opportunity they have to influence those decisions." p222

"being coerced by a demos does generate a claim for inclusion that is far stronger than any claim that the affected interests principle is likely to generate" p225

Miller offers some solutions:

  • have democratic states commit themselves to not coercing outsiders. p222
  • give outsiders a non-binding say on issues that effect them p223

The BP requires striking a balance between an internally functioning demos and its external effects, and this balance will be swayed by whether one is an L or R democrat. p226

"Wherewe already have a well-functioning democracy, this is a prima facie reason not to alter its domain" p227

To solve the BP, we need to ask:

  • how well do prevailing systems perform p226
  • do changes improve internal functioning p227
  • do changes reduce negative externalities p227
  • can externalities be limited internally (by removing these issues from the internal domain) p227

"there can be no algorithm for deciding whether any proposed shift of domain represents a democratic gain or a democratic loss." p227

"Instead they are questions that must be debated within existing demoi whenever proposals for altering boundaries appear on the agenda" p228

"One reason for thinking that domain questions can only be resolved internally is that each demos will have its own conception of democracy" p228