diff --git a/docs/blog/.authors.yml b/docs/blog/.authors.yml
index c2f2aae2..f1c1c93e 100644
--- a/docs/blog/.authors.yml
+++ b/docs/blog/.authors.yml
@@ -3,6 +3,10 @@ authors:
     name: Taylor Silva
     description: Lead Maintainer
     avatar: https://github.com/taylorsilva.png
+  kumper:
+    name: Kalin
+    description: Contributor
+    avatar: https://github.com/Kump3r.png
   jamesma:
     name: James Ma
     description: Former Product Manager
diff --git a/docs/blog/posts/2026/06/2026-06-11-csp-in-practice.md b/docs/blog/posts/2026/06/2026-06-11-csp-in-practice.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..bfcb1862
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/blog/posts/2026/06/2026-06-11-csp-in-practice.md
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+---
+title: Locking Down Concourse - Content Security Policy in Practice
+date: 2026-##-##
+authors:
+  - kumper
+---
+
+If you run Concourse for your team, or even just for yourself, you probably
+spent more time thinking about pipeline logic than what the browser is doing in
+the background. We did too. Until we started looking at what Concourse was
+quietly loading from the internet every time someone opened the UI.
+
+<!-- more -->
+
+## What was happening
+
+Out of the box, Concourse's web UI loads a font from Google's servers -
+fonts.googleapis.com - as part of rendering the Fraktur text style used in
+build logs. That's a third-party request your users' browsers are making
+without them knowing, handing their IP address to Google on every page load.
+Small thing, but it adds up, especially in regulated environments or air-gapped
+setups where external calls simply shouldn't happen.
+
+Beyond the font, there was nothing stopping a compromised dependency or an
+injected script from loading arbitrary content from anywhere on the internet.
+The browser had no rules.
+
+## What Content Security Policy does
+
+CSP is a header the server sends with every response. It tells the browser:
+here is a list of places you are allowed to load things from. Anything not on
+the list gets blocked before it even makes a network request.
+
+The strictest useful setting is:
+
+```
+CONCOURSE_CONTENT_SECURITY_POLICY="frame-ancestors 'none'; default-src 'self'"
+```
+
+`default-src 'self'` means the browser will only load scripts, styles, fonts,
+images, and API calls from the same server that served the page. No Google. No
+CDNs. No surprises. frame-ancestors 'none' means Concourse cannot be embedded
+inside an iframe on another site — a common vector for clickjacking attacks.
+
+## Why it matters more now
+
+We are increasingly running automated agents against our tooling — CI pipelines
+triggered by AI, build results being parsed and acted on programmatically,
+browser-based agents navigating UIs to extract information. Those agents are
+subject to the same browser rules as human users. A compromised script that
+exfiltrates a CSRF token or auth token is just as dangerous whether a human or
+an agent is the victim. CSP closes that door before anything can walk through
+it.
+
+## What we had to change
+
+Getting to a clean `default-src 'self'` wasn't just a config change. Three
+separate inline blocks across the codebase needed to move out of HTML and into
+files the browser can load as `self`. This was done in (PR #9569)[https://github.com/concourse/concourse/pull/9596].
+
+The main UI had a `<style>` block in `index.html` containing keyframe
+animations for the pipeline running indicator. That moved into the existing
+`animation.less` source file, compiled into `main.css` at build time. A `<script>`
+block was injecting runtime values (CSRF token, auth token, feature flags)
+directly into the page. That was replaced with `<meta>` tags rendered
+server-side, which the external `elm-setup.js` now reads via
+`document.querySelector`. Same data, no inline execution.
+
+The login page also had its own inline script, forcing a page reload on
+back/forward navigation. That moved into a new `static/main.js` file alongside
+the existing `main.css`, served from the same embedded static directory.
+
+After those changes, `default-src 'self'` works cleanly across both the main UI
+and the login flow. No fallbacks, no hashes to maintain, and no
+'unsafe-inline' anywhere.
+
+Concourse was also bringing in one external font from Google Fonts,
+[UnifrakturCook](https://fonts.google.com/specimen/UnifrakturCook), which is
+only used when rendering terminal output that sets [SGR
+20](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ANSI_escape_code#SGR) (AKA Fraktur/Gothic
+mode). That font is now embedded in Concourse >=v8.3.0.
+
+## The config
+
+If you are running Concourse >=v8.3.0 and want to really lock down your CSP,
+set the following configuration on your web nodes:
+
+```
+CONCOURSE_CONTENT_SECURITY_POLICY: "frame-ancestors 'none'; default-src 'self'"
+```