Create README.md

**IOC 10 – Conclusion / README**
Title:
Hidden Parameter Exploitation via Admin Override – Stealth Privilege Escalation Without Credential Use

Objective:
To analyze a fileless privilege escalation attack where the adversary exploited an undocumented administrative override parameter (admin_override=true) to bypass standard authentication and gain elevated access without triggering any alert or logging trail through normal access controls.

Key Findings:

Undocumented logic flaw: Attacker used a hidden HTTP parameter to trigger backend override behavior in /admin/login.

No failed logins or audit trail: Logs showed neither credential failure nor success, highlighting broken audit coverage.

Spoofed User-Agent string: Helped attacker avoid detection by rule-based filters.

Post-access command execution: Local user created through native server-side execution—confirmed via host system logs.

Unmonitored access control file: roles.json was altered or vulnerable, allowing attacker to persist changes to privilege rules without alert.

Tactical Value:
This case reinforces the importance of:

Monitoring undocumented behaviors and internal debug logic

Correlating low-noise access with post-auth privilege changes

Using cross-system triage (application + host logs) to close audit gaps

Treating invisible entries with real-world outcomes as critical indicators

Author: Compcode1

README.md

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+**IOC 10 – Conclusion / README**
+Title:
+Hidden Parameter Exploitation via Admin Override – Stealth Privilege Escalation Without Credential Use
+
+Objective:
+To analyze a fileless privilege escalation attack where the adversary exploited an undocumented administrative override parameter (admin_override=true) to bypass standard authentication and gain elevated access without triggering any alert or logging trail through normal access controls.
+
+Key Findings:
+
+Undocumented logic flaw: Attacker used a hidden HTTP parameter to trigger backend override behavior in /admin/login.
+
+No failed logins or audit trail: Logs showed neither credential failure nor success, highlighting broken audit coverage.
+
+Spoofed User-Agent string: Helped attacker avoid detection by rule-based filters.
+
+Post-access command execution: Local user created through native server-side execution—confirmed via host system logs.
+
+Unmonitored access control file: roles.json was altered or vulnerable, allowing attacker to persist changes to privilege rules without alert.
+
+Tactical Value:
+This case reinforces the importance of:
+
+Monitoring undocumented behaviors and internal debug logic
+
+Correlating low-noise access with post-auth privilege changes
+
+Using cross-system triage (application + host logs) to close audit gaps
+
+Treating invisible entries with real-world outcomes as critical indicators